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Abstract
This is a quaiitative inquiry into the possible relationships between language and 
thought for teachers and learners. This research has as its central focus some 
questions about the dynamic nature of language. These were 'what is the role of 
language in the formation of conceptual structures', 'what light might an inquiry 
into this subject throw on the processes of teaching and learning' and 'what kind 
of method could best be used to iliuminate such questions?'
The thesis uses Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) as a method for inquiring 
into people's deeply subjective experience, especially for modelling those 
experiences.
The methodology was both action research and phenomenology, inquiring into 
people's subjective experiences. There were two phases to this project; the first 
consisted of my own interviews of six ex-patriates who had attended a course I  
had taught in a Middle Eastern country in 2000. Both phases paid attention to 
what in NLP terms, are called internal representations. I  explored their responses 
to a number of language structures in interviews, which aimed to elicit some deep 
introspections from the learners. The second phase was the analysis of transcripts 
of six more interviews carried out by two collaborators, where I  track changes in 
people's constructs of learning, and themselves as learners.
The interview data is used to develop working hypotheses about the relationships 
between language and thought. These involve proposing that language transmits 
messages about how information is to be decoded, as well as content. A key 
finding appears to be a number of basic epistemological processes that are 
mediated through language, and which play a role in the construction of 
knowledge. The study offers models that describe the interactions of language 
and mental constructs, and lists some basic epistemological processes.
Practical implications of the study concern teachers' awareness of the power of 
language, and the potential need for the training of teachers to address the 
interplay between language, thought and learning.
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Chapter 1. Setting out on the Journey of Discovery.
Daughter. What are the really big differences between people and 
animals?
Father. Well- intellect, language, tools, things like that.
D. And it  is easy for people to be intellectually objective in language 
and about tools?
F. That's right.
D. But that must mean that in people there is a whole set o f ideas or 
whatnot which are all tied together. A sort o f second creature within 
the whole person, and that second creature must have a quite 
different way o f thinking about everything. An objective way.
F. Yes, the royal road to consciousness and objectivity is through 
language and tools.
D. But what happens when this creature looks at all those parts o f the 
person about which it  is difficult for people to be objective? Does it 
jus t look? Or does it meddle?
F. I t  meddles.
D. And what happens?
F. That's a very terrible question.
(Conversation between Gregory Bateson and his daughter Catherine- 
Mary Bateson, in Bateson 1972:48-49.^)
1.1 Introduction.
The core intention of this research project is to explore the role of 
language in human information processing, mainly within the context 
of teaching and learning. This is a broad inquiry, with relevance to 
teaching and learning in both formal and informal settings. Although it 
concerns itself with some philosophical and especially epistemological 
aspects of learning and making sense, the aim is to contribute to 
educational thinking. The main participants that were used for the
^Quoted from 'Metalogue: What Is an Instinct', originally published in 
Sebock, T.A., ed (1959) Approaches to Animal Communication.
gathering of information were adult learners, though there is also 
some use of observations made in a secondary school. It is thus 
rooted in an educational context.
There has long been a fascination about the internal dynamics of 
human information processing. These processes include such activities 
as thinking, learning, dreaming, remembering, reflecting, and not 
least, knowing. A central purpose here is to explore the approach of 
Neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) to understanding people's 
subjective processes.
The emergence of NLP was strongly influenced by Gregory Bateson's 
philosophical reflections (Bateson 1960, 1972, Bateson and Bateson 
1988, Donaldson 1991). One of Bateson's main concerns was the 
exploration of the possibilities a cybernetic approach opened up for 
research into human behaviour and thought. This inquiry approaches 
the phenomena of teaching and learning from a cybernetic and 
systemic perspective, as well as using NLP. As Bateson's cybernetics 
included concerns and explorations of epistemology, this also forms a 
thread running through this work. Thus, whilst it has inter-disciplinary 
aspects, it is neither linguistics nor psychology, but seeks to delineate 
a different approach to what happens when people engage in 
learning. What I aim to explore specifically are the effects of language 
and communication on the inner world of the conceiver's constructs.
According to Mercer et al (1999) there has been little significant 
research into the relationship between language and thinking in the 
learning process. This thesis seeks to enhance understanding of the 
inter-relationships between language and thinking in the learning 
process, through the perspective of NLP, and Bateson's ideas. This 
inquiry could be said to follow in the tradition that holds 
communication to be central to the (sometimes inseparable) activities 
of teaching and learning. I approach the subject from a particular 
theoretical and epistemological standpoint.
The central questions that I address are:
• How does language influence the formation of people's
conceptual structures?
• What perspective does NLP offer on inquiring into the processes
of teaching and learning?
The thesis offers a model of the interactions between language and 
thought with special reference to learning processes. The model was 
derived from an empirical approach, within a phenomenological 
context, as part of an action research programme. Its status is that of 
a working hypothesis for the generation of future explorations.
1,2. An overview of forthcoming chapters
This first chapter gives a brief introduction to the theoretical 
background relevant to the whole work. Chapter 2 reviews some 
philosophical and methodological approaches that might serve as 
useful tools to further this Inquiry, and describes the first phase of 
information gathering. The thesis explores in detail the approach of 
Neuro-linguistic Programming (Bandler and Grinder 1975, 1975A, 
1979, 1982, Bandler 1985, Bandler and McDonald 1988, Grinder and 
Bandler 1976, Grinder Delozier and Bandler 1977) towards the main 
issues. I review this topic in relation to other approaches to language 
and cognition in Chapters 3,4 and 5.
I was fortunate in having been invited to the capital of a Middle 
Eastern country in 2000 to give a course in NLP to ten people working 
in one of its large military hospitals. Most of my data comes from this 
period.
Two distinct data gathering phases emerged from this time. The first 
one happened during my two months' stay, where I carried out a 
series of preliminary interviews of people who had participated in an 
NLP course I had given. I believed these interviews to be a pilot study
at the time. However, these yielded such a wealth of information 
when transcribed, that they became one of the two major sources for 
my analysis and subsequent theory generation of this inquiry. The 
analyses of these, and my reflections on them, form the main part of 
chapters 6,7,8 and 9.
The second phase was the result of the activities of two collaborators, 
who carried out some post-course, retrospective interviews of some 
students on the course, whose tape recordings I transcribed after my 
return to the UK; I used the information from these to explore new 
ways of understanding what may be happening when people learn. I 
describe and explain these in Chapter 10.
In Chapter 11 ,1 draw on information gathered from both these 
phases, as well as a transcript of a previous observation of a 
mathematics class^ to propose a new model of learning in which 
language structures may have distinctive epistemological functions. I 
propose that these may catalyse various processes leading to the 
construction of learners' models.
In Chapter 12 ,1 review some current approaches to the training of 
teachers in communication skills. I put forward some brief 
suggestions for the inclusion of a new approach to the training of 
teachers in communication so as to enhance their teaching. Chapter 
13 is a review of the work as a whole, and takes a backward glance 
over what this inquiry may or may not have achieved.
1.3. Serendipity, and the personal emergence of the question 
for the researcher.
Heuristic inquiry Is a process that begins with a question o f a problem 
which the researcher seeks to Illuminate or answer. The question Is one 
that has been a personal challenge and puzzlement in the search to
2 This was a part of the course work (Assignment 2) for the MPhil/PhD/EdD 
Research Methods Programme at the University of Surrey, 1999.
understand one's self and the world In which one lives. The heuristic 
process Is autobiographical, yet with virtually every question that 
matters there Is also a social -  and perhaps universal -  significance. 
(Moustakas 1994:11)
Reason and Marshall (1987) urged that research be perceived as 
necessarily including a personal process. James (1999) has explored the 
influence of researchers' autobiographies on the process and outcomes 
of their research. Here I recount some of the professional and personal 
events that led to my own involvement in this inquiry. It initially arose 
as the result of my own reflections (and puzzlement) about many 
challenging experiences I have had in nearly forty years of teaching and 
learning. I first began by teaching Botany in the early 1960s, at what 
was then Chelsea College of Technology, (University of London). Then 
the approach to teaching was didactic, and effectiveness was judged on 
the amount of'useful' information that a lecturer transmitted to 
students. 'Useful' in this context meant'necessary to regurgitate to pass 
unseen exams'. Then, in the seventies I lectured in Zoology at a College 
of Technology, which was in the throes of becoming a Polytechnic. 
Originally, here too, the teaching was essentially the transmission of 
information, made all the more challenging by the fact that the 
examination questions^ were set 'internally' by the University of London, 
and completely unknown to us teachers on the 'External London. The 
only way to teach, at the time, seemed to be to cram as much 
information into the poor students just in case a question came up on 
some abstruse topic that might only be hinted at In the University's 
published syllabuses. Often it seemed like a game of chance."^
It was fortunate that this particular college was designated a 
Polytechnic in 1972, and began, (not without a struggle) the transition 
to the development of designing, teaching and awarding its own 
degrees under the aegis of the CNAA (Council for National Academic
3 The degree was the now long defunct BSc (External London).
4 If the lecturer was ill, and missed a topic, which then came up on the exam 
paper, this was merely considered to be bad luck.
Awards). The CNAA insisted (In Clause 5 of their Educational 
Principles) that scientific subjects should be taught in the context of 
their social, political and economic backgrounds, which presented 
many challenges to us teachers who were not even aware of the 
limitations of logical positivism, let alone the necessity of persuading 
science undergraduates of this. I was one of a team chosen to design 
a completely new approach to the teaching of scientific subjects. It 
became obvious however, that this section of the syllabus needed a 
different approach from that of classical science teaching, and I found 
myself becoming fascinated by the History and Philosophy of Science, 
and how to teach it.
We were forced to become innovators, and present, for validation, a 
course that was to be taken by all the science undergraduates. This 
included the History and Philosophy of Science in the first year. 
Science in the Present Social Context in the second year, and a third 
year group project, where students worked as a team on a jointly 
designed project about a scientific issue of current relevance. 5
At about the same time, the Polytechnic encouraged our (not always 
willingly given) participation in its newly formed and innovative School 
for Independent Study, (SIS) where students without the 'usual 
qualifications could sign up to do a degree in a subject of their choice, 
however outlandish, provided they could persuade the Board of 
Studies to accept their Study Plan and Learning Contract, and find a 
member of the teaching staff to supervise them,^ (O'Reilly 1989,
1991, Stephenson 1988, Stephenson and Laycock 1993). This 
resulted in the somewhat strange situation where a Biologist such as 
myself was suddenly asked to supervise the studies of students whose 
interests were not always covered by my formal academic
5 Some examples of these were; the ecology of motorway verges (with the 
advent of the neighbouring M i l ) ,  the misuse of antibiotics, the ramifications 
of Darwin's theory, the development of nuclear weapons, the ethics of the 
pharmaceutical industry, the use and mid-use of antibiotics, and many 
others.
® Many colleagues refused to have anything to do with such an unorthodox 
approach.
qualifications. They were often also difficult to place within accepted 
academic disciplines. The existence and success of the School for 
Independent Study (SIS) certainly exposed the tensions between 
academic orthodoxy and a more post - modernist, heterogeneous and 
liberating approach to learning. It was closed In the early 1990s as 
the result of changes in educational policy.
The most critical difference that I, as a tutor working with students 
from SIS, experienced, was that teaching people whose field of 
interests were somewhat outside my own immediate areas of 
expertise demanded that I pay more attention to the processes they 
used to learn and investigate their field, rather than its academic 
content. I had to develop a very different approach to tutoring. Many 
of my students got First Class Honours, fully validated by the CNAA's 
various External Examiners. What struck me as curious was that there 
seemed to be little interest in the educational literature in the idea 
that teaching involved attention to both process and content. 
Recognising this distinction was a fundamental part of training in 
Neuro-linguistic Programming. Traditionally, NLP is taught through a 
kind of apprenticeship, learning and finding out through experience 
and assisting other trainers. This gave me many opportunities to 
observe very 'good' communicators at work. I became intrigued by 
the distinctions between process and content, and by the ways in 
which learning processes could be activated by what, and how 
discussions were 'languaged'.
At this point, in the late eighties, serendipity played a vital role in my 
own personal and professional development. A friend of mine, a Swiss 
psychiatrist who works for the International Committee for the Red 
Cross, was engaged in visiting prisoners in countries where torture 
was an acceptable part of the judicial process. This faced her with the 
task of understanding the suffering of political prisoners who had been 
tortured and were consequently suffering from the effects of their 
incarceration and PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder). She told me 
that she found NLP to be very useful for'modelling out' PTSD. She
8claimed that thus she gained a different understanding of the inner 
dynamics of the victim's thought processes. This, she believed, gave 
her new understandings of the inner aspects of this distressing 
condition. She claimed she was able to plan rapid and effective 
interventions in the short time the ICRC is allowed for visiting 
individual prisoners. She also asked me to translate some of her 
writings from German into English, (whilst on a summer holiday in the 
mountains of Switzerland!) and at that point I became curious to 
know more. It was my first introduction to the idea that we use our 
senses internally to recreate events in our lives. She has continued to 
work in this field, and has trained other medical staff, and published 
extensively. (Perren-Klingler G. 1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, 1998A).
I did my first'Practitioner' course in NLP in 1988, and was 
unimpressed by its claims, its culture, and apparent lack of rigour. 
However, serendipity was not going to leave me alone, and on my 
return to the Polytechnic at the start of the 1988 Academic Year, the 
School for Independent Studies circulated all the staff, asking whether 
any of us knew anything about NLP, as they thought it might be a 
subject that might recruit more students to SIS. I responded, and to 
my horror found myself a named supervisor to students wanting to 
work on NLP. It became necessary for me to acquire many more skills 
and qualifications in it, which I did. Then, in the late eighties I took 
voluntary redundancy^ from full time teaching, and started a new 
(career as a trainer in Neuro-Linguistic Programming, whilst teaching 
part time in two separate departments at what had now become one 
of the 'new' universities. These were the Departments of Health 
Studies, and Educational Studies. I have written about some of my 
experiences of applying NLP to teaching and learning elsewhere, 
(Mathison 1994, 1999).
So the early nineties saw me as Course Tutor to a part time degree 
called the BA in Nurse Education. The NLP training had introduced me
7 This was in response to a 'trawl' of staff aged over 50 years.
to the emergent paradigm of Cybernetics, the epistemology of 
Gregory Bateson and the philosophy of Bertrand Russell and Alfred 
Korzybsky, as well a wealth of information about the influence of 
language, much of it based on the work of the psychiatrist Milton 
Erickson, as well as Richard Bandler and John Grinders approach to 
language and communication. (I review these, and other approaches 
to language in Chapters 4 and 5).
My then Head of Department asked me to 'do the Education bit for the 
nurses' so I took the opportunity of making two questions the central 
themes of my teaching. These were 'what are the processes that are 
involved in learning?' and 'how do we elicit these by how we behave 
and communicate with our students?' At the same time I examined 
my own processes, both conscious and unconscious, to learning new 
things. My teaching by this time was greatly influenced by NLP, as 
well as the ideas of Gregory Bateson. The success of this course led to 
me being invited to a capital of a country in the Middle East, initially 
to teach the distance learning students working at an Armed Forces 
Hospital, and studying for the BA (Nurse Education). I was then 
invited to make several trips as a visiting lecturer to teach NLP 
Practitioner Courses. One of these yielded the data on which this 
inquiry is based.
The BA (Nurse Education) recruited few students. By chance, they 
were an extraordinary group of people prepared to explore and push 
at the boundaries of their perceptions about the teaching and learning 
processes, and the crucial role played by communication In their own 
teaching. Two of them went on to register to do PhDs in this area. So 
I asked myself the question, 'why not me too?' thinking that I would 
be gently turned away by any Department of Education that I 
approached, either because the topic I was interested in was too 
eccentric, or because people in their seventh decade may be thought 
of as too old to do PhDs. These fears, however, were unfounded. If I 
have stretched the envelope of possible hypothetical explanations of
10
learning too far, the responsibility is nevertheless mine. I offer the 
results of this research purely in the spirit of inquiry.
Thus, serendipitously, did this inquiry come about.
1.4. Language in teaching and learning: some introductory 
reflections on theory.
Nothing is more practical in teaching than knowing how people learn. 
Learning is not a theoretical issue. We need to understand the 
learning process not only because, as teachers all, we need to know 
ourselves, but also because we need to express our curiosity in how 
other people learn. (Cullingford 1990:231).
This section is an introduction to some of the literature on the central 
topic, serving to set the scene for the rest of the work. It is not the 
definitive literature review, but rather an introduction to my own 
theoretical approach.
The nature of learning is one of the main foci for this inquiry.
MacBeath (2002) claims that about 85 percent of what we know about 
learning has been discovered in the last 10 -  15 years. Rojas- 
Drummond and Mercer (2003)® have pointed out that there are a 
variety of different approaches to inquiring into language and 
education, largely inspired by the work of Vygotsky, (1978). 
Vygotsky's approach, which recognises the critical significance of 
language in the processes of learning and development, is summed 
up in his statement that "learning awakens a variety of internal 
developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child 
is interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with 
his peers, (Vygotsky 1978, cited in Pollard 2002:14).
8 To be published in a forthcoming issue of The International Journal of 
Educational Research
11
There has, however, been little systematic exploration of the effects 
of language on the subjectively experienced processes involved in 
learning. This inquiry seeks to complement existing understandings of 
the role of learning by exploring the relationship between specific 
language structures on a learner's construction of knowledge, drawing 
on Neuro-linguistic Programming
The literature on the role of language in learning comes from a variety 
of different backgrounds. Vygotsky's Idea (1939) that it was important 
to study how the language of teachers influenced the learning process 
was being explored by some, including Barnes in the 1970s. Over 
thirty years ago Barnes (1972), stressed that it was important to 
generate useful discussions between learners as a part of their 
teaching and learning process. He suggested that "language is a 
major means of learning, and (...) pupils' uses of language for learning 
are strongly influenced by the teacher's language, (Barnes, D. 1972, 
cited in Open University 1972). He suggested that one fruitful line of 
Inquiry could be the study of teachers' linguistic styles, and use of 
linguistic forms to influence the ways in which people learn. One of 
the main differences that they identify is whether teachers create a 
passive receiving of knowledge by learners, or its active exploration.
Cazden (1988) has used an approach based on Discourse Analysis to 
describe the language patterns that are typical of classroom 
interactions, and of which teachers and learners may not immediately 
be aware.® She urges the introduction of a more catalytic learning 
environment, where learning is not simply dependent on producing 
the right answers, and being corrected for wrong ones. She also cites 
research that implies that the immediate correction of children's 
answers by teachers depressed both their abilities to self-correct, and 
to score highly on accuracy tests. One of her main interests was the
9 Cazden reviews some of the most common patterns of discourse in the  ^
classroom as teacher 'inquiring', learner 'responding , teacher evaluating 
and feeding back whether the response is acceptable or not. This pattern of 
classroom discourse is shortened to the acronym IRE (Initiate, respond, 
evaluate).
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possible role of exploratory talk among children as a way of learning. 
Influenced by Barnes (1976), she describes exploratory talk as the 
process of learning without the answers fully in tact/' (Cazden 1988).
There has been increasing interest in the effects of teaching children 
'exploratory talk'. Mercer, Wegerlch and Dawes (1999) for instance, 
found that encouraging learners to use exploratory talk about specific 
topics significantly Increased their understanding. Mercer (1995) 
suggests that sharing, and co-operatively guiding the shared 
development of knowledge should be at the heart of the learning 
process. He is critical of the approach to teaching that discourages 
children from seeking information for themselves, and sharing their 
reflective observations. He believes that there are some essential 
requirements for what he calls 'the guided construction of knowledge', 
the most important of which is that the 'essence of human knowledge 
and understanding is that it is shared,' (Mercer 1995:66). He 
conceives of language as a purposeful persuasive process, proposing 
that Vygotsky "draws our attention to the construction of knowledge 
as a joint achievement," (Mercer 1995:73). In Mercer's view, the 
teacher's role is that of a 'discourse guide'. Such collaborative 
learning involving guided discussions among learners is fast becoming 
an accepted and recommended classroom activity. Tao (2003), for 
instance, reports that using stories and peer collaboration were 
effective means of generating learning on the nature of science for 
many of the students involved in his study.
Mercer's views Imply that a closer study of the influence of language 
on thought becomes critical to the development of our understanding 
of teaching and learning. Mercer also states his belief that the process 
of communication with language contributes to children s thinking, 
(Mercer 2000). He observes that few in his field share his interest in 
exploring the nature of talk. This, he believes, is not confined to 
educationalists, but also that "people with a practical interest in the 
effectiveness of communication in business, counselling, law, and
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other important areas of every day activity have shown surprisingly 
little interest in the careful analysis of talk" (Mercer 2000:175).
The present study takes the line that we need to know more about 
the influence of language, which is a complex task. Anderberg (2002) 
suggests that "little Is known about the character of the relationship 
between word meaning and understanding, how it develops or what 
role it plays." (Anderberg 2000:89). However, here he is addressing 
the topic of students' language, rather than that of teachers.
Despite the relative paucity of research into the role of language in 
learning, there are further publications of interest. Crespo (2002) for 
instance, has found from her classroom observations that traditional 
modes of discourse between teacher and pupils are very persistent, 
and likely to remain unchanged unless examined more purposefully.
She suggests that praising tends to cut off discussion, and explored 
alternative strategies for teachers, such as probing students' thinking, 
rather than automatically correcting it. She raises an important 
question: what sort of course experiences for those training in 
teaching could better support, extend and balance teachers 
understanding of teachers' talk? More recently, Harrop and Swinsch 
(2003) have analysed teachers' uses of different types of questions, 
claiming that there has been no essential change in their format in 
half a century/ and that approval and disapproval are still very much a 
part of teachers' feedback strategies.
Entwistle and Smith (2002), taking a constructivist view, have 
proposed a model to describe classroom learning, observing that 
constructivist theories present learning in terms of the development of 
individual understanding, but that this is "too diffuse a set of ideas to 
provide an integrative framework" (Entwistle and Smith 2002:324). 
They found that explanation, enthusiasm and empathy were the 
qualities of communication which are most likely to evoke what they 
term a 'deep' approach to learning in pupils. Corden (2001) has 
investigated the effects of introducing group discussion into a learning
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situation. He found that many students were inhibited from using 
exploratory talk, as this was not what they were used to. He also 
observed that teachers needed certain skills if small group work in 
their classrooms was to operate successfully.
Corden's (2001, 2001A) approach typifies much of the research into 
the area of teacher-learner interactions. For Instance, he presents a 
classification of the different types of utterances heard in classrooms, 
drawn from forty videotaped discussions. He then analysed how often 
these occurred under different teacher led contexts, such as the 
differences between when students perceived teachers to be in a non- 
examiner role, or when teachers were seen as expert examiner. He 
also identifies certain introductory phrases (such as I  was wondering, 
and what if?) as linguistic markers that he claims encourage 
collaborative learning.
Many of these works focus mainly on the language of learners, and on 
how to facilitate the development of pedagoglcally useful talk among 
them. Phillips (1985) makes the point that, with the realisation of the 
Importance of classroom discussions, which has its historical roots in 
the 1970s, teachers need to understand more about how to generate 
such activities.
None of this research, however, attempts to address how the learning 
is subjectively experienced. The works that I have cited have not 
attempted to answer questions such as 'how specifically does 
language influence the construction o f knowledge?', and 'what are the 
subjectively experienced effects of communication?'. So, the gap this 
thesis attempts to address is the need for a more precise inquiry into 
the actual, subjectively experienced, effects of language on cognition, 
and thus on learning. We can describe and classify communication 
patterns to our hearts' content, but without an understanding of what 
language actually does to the construction of knowledge of an 
individual person, we fail to address what may turn out to be one of 
the most vital dimensions of teaching and learning.
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To approach such a problem, I have drawn on a number of sources. 
This includes many of the models used in linguistics, cognitive 
psychology, systems' and cybernetic theory,^® and other areas where 
understanding human interaction is paramount.
1.5. Introducing Neuro-linguistic Programming, (NLP).
NLP offers a model of the relationships between language and 
thought, and was one of my starting points. Although I cover many of 
the origins and ideas of NLP in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, a 
brief historical introduction may be appropriate to set the scene. 
Neuro-linguistic Programming (NLP), was developed in the USA in the 
1970's and has achieved widespread popularity as a method for 
communication and personal development, and is a recognised mode 
of psychotherapy in the UK. To date, however, the academic 
community has shown little interest in it. The exceptions are Craft 
(2001) who is critical of some aspects, and Tosey and Mathison 
(forthcoming publication) who respond to Craft, and suggest that 
when understood more fully, it could be a useful approach to 
qualitative inquiry into learning.
NLP is claimed to be an innovative form of modelling (Dilts 1994, 
1998) that alleges it offers a potential for systematic and detailed 
inquiry into people's subjective experience. NLP may turn out to be 
complementary to other approaches such as phenomenology and 
cognitive and conceptual mapping, because it seems that it enables 
the researcher to seek more precise information about people s 
subjective experiences. This inquiry is as much about using NLP as it 
is about evaluating its potential as a more refined research tool for 
such an inquiry.
101 explore these further in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
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NLP was developed at the University of California at Santa Cruz^  ^ In the 
1970's (Jacobson 1994; McLendon 1989). Its founders and principal 
authors were Richard Bandler, a mathematician and information 
scientist, and John Grinder, a linguist. Their partners, Leslie Cameron- 
Bandler and Judith DeLozier, also contributed significantly, as did other 
early developers such as Robert Dilts and David Gordon (McLendon 
1989).
The title, "Neuro-linguistic Programming" was coined by Bandler and 
Grinder (McLendon 1989), who were partly inspired by Korzybski's 
(1958) extensive theoretical explorations of the relationships between 
language and ways in which he believed that the nervous system 
patterned information. This he referred to as Neuro-linguistics. Bandler 
and Grinder added programming so that their model refers to a 
purported systematic link between a person's internal experience 
(neuro), their language (linguistic) and their patterns of behaviour 
(programming). It is difficult to place it within any one academic 
discipline; it straddles linguistics, transformational grammar, 
psychotherapy, cybernetics and cognitive psychology, and its 
epistemological approach is inspired by the ideas of the polymath 
Gregory Bateson and the logic of the mathematician and philosopher 
Bertrand Russell. Despite the name NLP, and its connotations, it has no 
direct connection to neuro-science, or to computer programming 
(though these were fields of interest to its developers)
The first NLP publication was Bandler and Grinder's (1975) 'Structure 
of Magic: a Book about Language and Therapy', which was an attempt 
to identify patterns of communication that distinguished what they 
identified as extremely effective communicators. These patterns are 
explained in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5. They were also interested 
In how they differed from the strategies of some less successful
httD://sidiacQbson.com/institute/historv.htmi accessed 29.11.2002  
12 It  Is entirely separate from Natural Language Processing (for exannple, 
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/'^o ih /se rn laS /p tl/p tl—history.hi.rnj), which also 
uses the acronym NLP
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communicators. They based their studies, among others, on Virginia 
Satir, a leading family therapist, Fritz Peris, the founder of Gestalt 
therapy, and Milton Erickson, a hypnotherapist. Each of these had skills 
which Bandler and Grinder were able to identify, and model.
Central to the NLP approach is that it proposes a typology of language 
patterns which are believed to reflect basic cognitive processes. To put 
it differently, it proposes a modei o f language in which certain linguistic 
structures activate and reflect some fundamental epistemological 
processes essential to the construction o f meaning. I describe these 
aspects in more detail in chapters 4 and 5.
The research project used this NLP model as a tool for data gathering. 
NLP refers to this type of approach as modelling, which is, eliciting the 
subjective processes that people use when approaching and carrying 
out specific tasks. There is a sense in which I am using modelling to 
understand some of the processes specific to learning, which are 
mediated through language.
NLP remains controversial in academic circles. One of the greatest 
obstacles to introducing NLP into an academic context appears to result 
from the culture and ethos of NLP, which has resulted in its own 
particular, somewhat anarchic genre. Most of the books written by the 
originators come with gaudy, psychedelically illustrated covers, and 
have curious titles, such as The Structure of Magic (1975), Frogs into 
Princes (Bandler and Grinder 1979), and Using your Brain for a Change 
(Bandler 1985). These are hardly likely to attract the attention of 
mainstream cognitive psychologists or cognitive linguists.
The almost total ignorai of NLP by the academic community may be an 
example of how particular genres of discourse act both for the 
maintenance of cohesion in a group or culture, and at the same time 
exclude others. As Mercer (2000) points out, "Different groups of
18
researchers have their own discourses and research agendas, with not 
much dialogue taking place between them." (Mercer 2000:167).
One of the aims of this inquiry is to attempt to bring together 
information from some of these disparate disciplines, using NLP as a 
central thread. Mercer suggests that "we need a fresh perspective on 
language and thought, one that is not commonly employed in 
psychology, linguistics or other apparently relevant field of research." 
(Mercer 2000:167). He urges that we need what he calls an 
'intermental' (my italics) perspective, which perceives language and 
communication as a an activity for the development of knowledge as a 
shared process. Most NLP practitioners would recognise this view. What 
this inquiry aims to contribute is an unravelling of the complex 
interactions between language and thinking at a more precise level.
This will itself also need evaluation for both its usefulness and its 
limitations.
When using any model, it is important to be aware that a model is only 
a conceptual framework, which may bring some aspects of a 
phenomenon to the attention of the observer, whilst hiding others. My 
approach to NLP is purely instrumentalist; its usefulness can only be 
gauged by the amount of information its use yields. All models have 
their limitations, and I review some of the limitations of NLP in Chapter 
13.
There remains a fundamental difficulty for a researcher using such an 
approach; much of NLP is not learned from published work, but by what 
can only be called a system of apprenticeship, which includes not only 
attending courses, but also 'doing time' as an assistant to more 
experienced trainers, as well as running one's own courses. On the face 
of it, this makes NLP a different genre to most academic activities, and
Time and again, in my reading for this venture, I have been struck at how 
many different groups there appear to be studying the powers of language to 
influence and shape the thought of others, yet who do not appear to know of 
each other, if their bibliographies is any indication of this.
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adds a further challenge to the putative researcher In this field. It 
Includes the challenge of translating between one genre and another, so 
as to create bridges between different outlooks.
1.6. Conclusion.
This chapter has introduced this inquiry from the personal history of the 
researcher. It has stated the main research question illuminating the 
Inquiry. It has also Introduced the reader to Neuro-linguistic 
Programming as a novel approach that has yet to find its place In 
mainstream academic research. This was to set the scene for the ways 
in which the data gathering phases of this inquiry developed, and how 
the resulting information was then analysed.
In the next chapter I describe some of the methodological Issues that 
arose from starting and following through such an Inquiry, and describe 
the emergence of the two data gathering phases. The central role that 
NLP played is explained In greater detail.
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Chapter 2. The Nature of this Inquiry: some methodological 
issues addressed.
The closing years of the 20^ Century could find us on the threshold of 
Important new understandings, but whether to cross It will depend on 
our success In Integrating the literary scholar's appreciation of what 
language does, the ethnologist's respect for what actually happens, 
the philosopher's perspective on the larger picture, the psychologist's 
concern for experimental manipulations, the computer scientist and 
neuroscientist's fascination with how things work, and the artist's 
capacity to produce dreams. (Chafe 1994:302 -  303.)
To most scientists, subjectivity Is the Great Satan. I t  Is the mlnd-vlrus 
which has turned the humanities Into an Intellectual free for all, where 
the Idea of '^progress Is dismissed as ''bourgeois", and belief In "facts" 
naïve. (Matthews 1998:17).
2.1 Reflections on research methods.
Although the main framework for this Inquiry was action research, 
(which I consider later in this chapter) when I reflected on the ways In 
which the questions could be approached, phenomenology seemed to 
offer the most appropriate approach for such an inquiry. Thinking, 
learning and responding to communication are phenomena, which 
belong to the realm of people's subjective experiences. The data for 
this research came from Interviews and questionnaires designed to 
elicit information about respondents' intensively experienced 
conceptualising and what they reported. This required both delicacy 
and precision from the inquirer. It meant using language and thought 
to investigate the language and thought of the other, through what 
can only be described as a kind of focused introspection. A question 
that then arises Is: what existing approaches have been used to
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Inquire into such phenomena? What kind of theory window^ would 
enable the inquirer to see a more detailed picture? Cresweli (1998) 
sums up the phenomenological approach as one that "serves as the 
rationale behind efforts to understand individuals by entering into 
their field of perception (authors' emphasis) in order to see life as 
these Individuals see it". Stanage (1987) claims that "phenomenology 
is the clearest, most foundational and fullest form of investigation", 
(Stanage 1987:281). However, there remains the question of how to 
investigate such a complex phenomenon. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
propose that an important but frequently overlooked aspect of design 
is to select the theory (and the methodology it generates) that 
provides the most power In relation to the problem. I interpret what 
they mean by power as the amount of useful information that is 
generated through such an Inquiry.
The choice of an appropriate methodology Is also one of the most 
critical factors influencing how the research questions are to be 
addressed. Silverman, taking a somewhat instrumentalist approach, 
warns that, like theories, "methodologies cannot be true or false, only 
more or less useful", (Silverman 1993:2). A quantitative approach Is 
precluded because It is not possible to apply measurement to a 
phenomenon that has yet to be described. In this case the topic under 
the metaphorical research lens is the relationship between language 
and people's subjective internal thought processes. Therefore this is 
also an Inquiry Into some of the dynamic aspects of consciousness. 
Essentially, one Is seeking to discover, describe and define a new 
phenomenon, or aspect of one, however transient, through an intense 
collaboration with others. This indicates that phenomenology may be 
a useful approach. My own approach Is based on this, but I used my 
own practice as a source of information, and action research also 
played a critical role.
 ^ I  use this term in the sense that Denzin and Lincoln (1998) use it: " not 
only are facts determined by the theory window through which one looks for 
them, but different theory windows might be equally well supported by the 
same set of facts..." (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:199)
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Stevens (2000) proposed that phenomenology should be a central 
discipline In the field of consciousness studies. When consciousness Is 
the focus of Investigation, then the traditional separation between the 
observer and the observed Is difficult to maintain. Phenomenology 
itself is not a unified approach, but is split into different approaches, 
(Stevens 2000). Stevens regrets the failure to develop an effective 
phenomenological methodology. Approaching the study of conscious 
experiences is fraught with epistemological traps; not least is the 
question of the status of the information obtained through asking 
people to be deeply introspective, and then transforming such data 
into language. In order that it can be communicated. This was one of 
the main ways In which I gathered information for this inquiry. "For 
we are creating our consciousness in the very act of creating it", 
(Stevens 2000:113).
Phenomenologists are thus dependent on verbal accounts of 
phenomena which are not themselves necessarily verbal. Words 
themselves may also have different meanings for different people.
This Is a fundamental difficulty In using information acquired through 
other people's Introspections. Stevens points out, "such accounts can 
only be reconstructions, subject to the interpretative style of the 
subject and/or researcher and always open to change and 
negotiation," (Stevens 2000:115). Stanage (1987), making a case for 
a phenomenological approach to language, describes linguistic 
phenomenology as a "way of articulating, as precisely as possible, the 
distinctions between what adults say In direct Investigation, and 
description of phenomena which we feel, experience and conscious 
(know with)," [sic]. (Stanage 1987:53). However, there Is no 
escaping the deeply subjective nature of the information so gleaned, 
which raises the issue of the status of subjectivity Itself, let alone the 
question of the doubtful conceptual distinctions between the 
subjective and objective.
It has become widely acceptable to believe that knowledge is never 
'neutral' but always emerges from the matrix of a pre-existing
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conceptual framework or set of beliefs. (Chalmers 1978). The post­
modernist approach to research stresses that the distinctions between 
objectivity and subjectivity are false ones. Thomas Kuhn, has 
described how the paradigm that was operative at a particular 
historical period influenced not only what was selected to be 
observed, but also the interpretations and explanations that were 
then generated, (Kuhn 1970). The notion of objective knowledge 
belongs within the logical positivist tradition. Mangan (1993) accuses 
the psychologists, whose main conceptual operational framework is 
logical positivism, of squeamishness. He suggests that it is time that 
the rejection of the 'subjective' is seen for what it is: an unscientific 
prejudice [...] which diminishes the scope of research" (Mangan 
1993:93). Lincoln and Denzin (1998) resolve the divide between the 
Scylla of objectivism and the Charybdls of subjectivism by suggesting 
that the qualitative researcher's commitment should be to "study the 
world always from the perspective of the Interacting individual"
(Lincoln and Denzin 1998:407).
This has become one of the main philosophical assumptions which 
guides the qualitative research carried out within a post modernist 
framework, (Cresweli 1998). Reason and Marshall (1987) describe the 
post positive approach as one in which the researcher is living in a 
participatory universe where truth can be practical, intuitive, 
experiential and presentational. Moustakas (1994) also proposes that 
such approaches generate information which incorporate creative self­
processes and self-discoveries. As in quantum physics, the observer 
brings the universe of her observations into being, (Nagel and 
Newman 1956). Participation means more than naively wondering 
how the apple fell. In my view, it also means actively participating in 
the dialectic between theory and observation, hunches and data, 
paradigms and practice, self and others.
Moustakas (1994) defends the phenomenological approach, because, 
he claims, it should lay stress on open (my italics) processes In 
conducting research, rather than on fixed methods and procedures.
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He also points out that the phenomenological approach is an inductive 
process, where, contrary to the nomothetic approach, the pre-existing 
conceptual frameworks of the researcher should be put aside, and the 
researcher be open to the possibility of fresh discoveries. Giorgi has 
summed up this position: "The return to beginnings makes the 
phenomenologist a perpetual beginner" (Giorgi 1985:86). Moustakas 
(1994) proposes that the task of the phenomenological and 
hermeneutic approach is to explore the direct conscious description of 
experience, and the underlying dynamics of structures that account 
for the experience. He, like Stevens (2000) recognises the somewhat 
paradoxical nature of language in the inquiry Into consciously 
experienced phenomena. "Our possession by language is the 
ontological condition for our understanding of the texts that address 
us", (Moustakas 1994:10). Paradoxically, I am forced to use language 
to Investigate the effects of language on consciousness!
The phenomenological approach also seemed to be appropriate for 
working with people's subjective experience, because Its aim is to 
uncover and describe new phenomena; (Moustakas 1994). As such It 
seems suitable as an approach for inquiring into the relationships 
between consciousness and communication. Maykut and Morehouse 
(1994) have suggested that "the discovery of propositions by 
observation and the careful Inspection of the patterns which emerge 
from the data are the hallmark of the phenomenological approach." 
(Maykut and Morehouse 1994:13). Such an approach could be 
criticised for being too deeply subjective, however it is the very nature 
of subjective experience that Is under the microscope. Moran (2000) 
wrote that "phenomenology attempts to recognise and describe the 
role of consciousness In the achievement of knowledge, and is not 
wallowing In the subjective domain purely for its own sake." (Moran 
2000:15).
One important aspect of this Inquiry was to examine how useful the 
NLP approach to language and precision questioning were as effective 
tools for a phenomenological inquiry. My own personal view, which
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developed from my analyses of the transcripts, Is that this approach 
has uncovered aspects of conscious and unconscious thinking that are 
new to the educational literature. In fact. It yielded a veritable 
embarras de richesses of insights Into language and learning through 
the use of introspection guided by my use of NLP approaches. This 
placed me In a conflict; should I weed out what might not be so 
interesting, and risk being accused of too much bias? Or should I be 
as transparent as possible, and write about as many of my findings to 
do justice to the approach, and risk overloading the reader? My sense 
throughout this inquiry was that of a biologist having been given a 
new kind of high-powered microscope, which uncovered many novel 
and sometimes elusive creatures moving through the depths of 
people's consciousness. I therefore opted for the latter choice, to give 
as complete an account as possible of some teaslngly curious, 
evanescent, and sometimes paradoxical effects of language and 
teaching on people's thinking. The risk in this was the danger of 
overloading the reader with detail.
2.2. The case for introspection
Most of the data for this inquiry was obtained through Interviews 
which asked participants to describe the responses which they 
experienced through the guided introspection that I used when 
interviewing. Thus the inquiry relies heavily for both the information, 
and the models derived from the Information, on data obtained from 
people's shared descriptions of their inner worlds. Lincoln and Denzin 
(1998) suggest that qualitative research might move away from 
"grand narratives and single, overarching ontological, epistemological 
and methodological paradigms" (Lincoln and Denzin 1998:407) to a 
position where Inquiry Is committed to focusing on personal 
interactions.
This raises the question of the status of such information, which has 
been obtained through introspection. Moustakas describes the 
heuristic approach as one which involves a process of internal
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searching, which enables the discovery of both the nature and 
meaning of experience. This Implies that Introspection has some 
recognition as an Information gathering technique. My own approach 
to this Inquiry was to Investigate people's subjective experiences of 
language structures and learning. I wanted to know how people 
experienced learning Itself, as well as how they responded to 
particular types of language structures. In the first data gathering 
phase, very careful and precise questions were used In order to elicit 
people's subjective experiences, which could only be accessed by 
them through the act of introspection. Thus most of my data was 
obtained as the results of engaging In guided introspection with my 
collaborators. This was done partly through careful questions In my 
interviews, and the analysis of transcribed Interviews carried out by 
two collaborators.
The phenomenological approach proposes that people's inner worlds 
of subjective experience, however complex and difficult to pin down, 
are nevertheless a valid area of inquiry. Stanage (1987) has put 
forward the bold claim that phenomenology is "founding, foundational 
and a foundation for all philosophies and for all science'", (Stanage 
1987:45). This raises the issue of the management of both the 
complexity of the processes of introspection, and the reliability of the 
information so gained. Mangan, (1993) citing William James, reminds 
us that the introspection of a transitive act of consciousness is 
difficult. "The attempt at introspective analysis [...] is in fact like 
seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or trying to turn up the gas 
to see how the darkness looks," (William James, cited in Mangan 
1993:95). Chafe 1994) points out that "private, introspective data 
provide a more direct access to the mind, but suffer from the absence 
of public verifiability" (Chafe 1994:25), yet urges its use in the 
exploration of consciousness, because, "though difficult, [it] is an 
absolutely essential part of this picture", (Chafe 1994:15). He 
proposed that it was important to immerse oneself in "linguistic and 
introspective observations, combined with the cultivation of a creative 
imagination adequate to understanding these observations in
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maximally Insightful ways", (Chafe 1994:25). Carruthers (1996) 
proposed that although there was scope for error In Introspection, it 
was nevertheless a useful vehicle for Inquiring Into people's thought 
processes.
Stevens (2000) states that since the early introspectlonlsts, there 
have been few attempts at accessing and representing people's 
immediate subjective phenomenological experience. Henry (2000) 
adds that the majority of orthodox approaches to transforming 
consciousness in the clinical area are heavily dependent on 
introspection. Harre (2000) defends the use of Introspectively 
obtained data: "the legitimacy of trying to convey to another person 
the nature of one's own private experience by describing It needs to 
be defended," (Harre 2000). Giorgi (1985) offers the critique that 
"psychology has consistently failed to explicate the phenomenon of 
thinking" (Giorgi 1985:86). It is difficult to see any way of inquiring 
into this field (other than by neurological means), which does not 
make use of information harvested from introspection. Johnson Laird, 
whose main interest was the exploration of people's mental models, 
wrote in defence of introspection: "why can't we be aware of the rules 
of language and thought by introspection?" (Johnson-Laird 1983:ix). 
Patton (1990), writing about approaches to research methods, wrote 
that: "The inner perspective assumes that understanding can only be 
achieved by actively participating in the life of the observed and 
gaining insight by means of introspection", (Patton 1990:47).
I am nevertheless aware of Miller's warning, that "introspection is a 
fickle mistress", (Miller 1960:71), so offer my findings in the 
knowledge that my field of Inquiry Is, by Its nature, complex and 
difficult to clarify. Croft (1998) asked "What can Introspective 
linguistic evidence, taken alone, tell us about mental representation of 
forms and meaning?" (Croft 1998:151) He urged that it could only 
lead to possibilities, which would then need hard 'neurological' data to 
validate it. Sandra, (1988) in his response to Croft, suggests that 
although the study of how the mind represents linguistic facts to Itself
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is a valid one. He proposes that "as far as language processing is 
concerned, linguists have nothing to say, and I know no linguist who 
has tried to do so". {Sandra 1998:364). He concludes that "it Is highly 
advisable to systematically avoid any reference to mental 
representation In linguistic discussion." (Sandra 1998:376).
My approach is the exact opposite; this inquiry is based on the Idea 
that It is possible to explore the subjective responses of other people 
exposed to certain language forms and structures. The data is very 
subjective, so it requires hesitancy In coming to conclusions that are 
too firm. I offer models and hypotheses for further inquiry from the 
introspections of my collaborators, not facts in the sense that a logical 
positivist would understand.
2.3. What about Discourse Analysis?
One of the main current approaches to the study of language and 
conversation in the classroom has been the use of Discourse Analysis. 
Thus the question arises for an inquiry such as this: 'why not use 
Discourse Analysis?' There are critical distinctions to be made 
between NLP and Discourse Analysis. I believe that the most 
important difference is that NLP is essentially about modelling, which 
is as much about understanding people's inner responses to 
communication, as it is about the structure of messages. Discourse 
Analysis, on the other hand, is a more descriptive way of analysing 
and classifying human communication (Chafe 1994, Silverstein and 
Urban 1996, Popkewitz and Brennan 1998, Yaguello 1998). It 
concerns itself with the minutiae of the structures of language, or the 
power relations Inherent in it, (Popkewitz and Brennan 1998) but not 
with the complexities of the recipient's conscious and unconscious 
responses, let alone the possible effects on these of different types of 
communication. Potter (1991) believes that Discourse Analysis 
comprises 'a whole range of things,' (Potter 1991:144). It is difficult 
to disagree with David Silverman's (1993) suggestion that because
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Discourse Analysis is so heterogeneous, it is difficult to arrive at a 
clear definition of it," (Silverman 1993:121).
There is another important distinction to be made between Discourse 
Analysis and modelling using NLP. Each arose from two different 
historical and theoretical perspectives, and thus have different foci. 
Bandler's (Bandler and Grinder 1975) approach to modelling is rooted 
in Cybernetics,^ Information Theory, the philosophical insights of 
Russell's logical levels and types (Russell 1921) as well the insights of 
modern linguistics and transformational grammar (Bandler and 
Grinder 1975A). The inquirer using this approach has to assume that 
any interaction between humans is complex and multl-dimenslonal, 
and based on an exchange of information within complex systems. 
These operate at many levels of complexity. Bandler and Grinder's 
theoretical approach to modelling was partly developed from the 
theoretical frameworks of the sciences of complexity, including the 
emergent Systems Theory, as an approach to understanding 
compiexity.
Checkland (1981) proposes that when complex systems are 
investigated, then "our basic model has to include both an external 
reality and an observer/describer who will, for his own purposes, use 
systems thinking as a means of arriving at his (s/c) description 
(Checkland 1981:101). So modelling uses both a systems or 
cybernetic approach, based on the assumption that communication is 
an integral factor whenever human beings connect with each other or 
engage in their own reflections and feelings. This in turn is perceived 
as part of a complex system of both conscious and unconscious 
processes. Discourse Analysis, on the other hand, arose from 
European post-modernism, and belongs more to the field of cultural 
studies, and does not, as I understand It, address the sciences of 
complexity as such.
2 Gregory Bateson was a member of the Macy Conferences from which the 
science of Cybernetics emerged.
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Recently however Chafe (1994), whose approach Is rooted in 
Discourse Analysis, has proposed that topics within a conversation 
display a hierarchy of sub-topics, but interestingly does not refer to 
Bertrand Russell's theory of logical levels and types in relation to this.
I am inclined to believe that it is not as powerful an approach as 
modelling as a method of inquiry Into complex, Interactive systems 
that are operating at many levels of complexity, and may involve both 
conscious and unconscious processes.
Much of Discourse Analysis claims to be about understanding human 
communication, and identifying genres of discourse, yet largely 
ignores the perspectives of Cybernetics, Information Theory and 
Systems Theory. It also seems unaware of the seminal Ideas of 
Bateson (1972) and Watzlawick and Weakland (1977) who, inspired 
by Bateson, proposed that human communication and Interaction 
were multi-level and dynamic processes. They proposed a new way of 
understanding healthy and pathological patterns of communication, 
and how they could influence others both consciously and 
unconsciously.
What NLP and Discourse Analysis have In common Is that they both 
focus on patterns of language between people. They differ in that NLP 
provides tools for inquiring into the subjective effects of language, 
that Is, how meaning might be created, rather than aiming to provide 
a typology of conversational genres. Potter (1991) states that "DA 
(Discourse Analysis) does not use talk and texts as a pathway to 
underlying cognitions; indeed DA resolutely steers clear of cognitive 
reduction" (Potter 1991:158). To understand more about learning, I 
believe that NLP was the more useful tool. It made room for 
considering the cognitive dimension to language and learning. It was 
also a challenge to use an approach, which has not yet been used at 
such a level of detail In an educational inquiry.
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2.4. An outline of the data gathering phase of the research 
process.
"Knowledge does not end with moments o f connectedness, 
understanding or meaning. Such journeys open vistas to new journeys 
for uncovering meaning, truth and essence -  journeys within journeys 
within journeys" (Moustakas 1994:65.)
McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead (1996) urge the putative researcher to 
'be prepared for the unexpected' (Mcniff et al 1996:40). This was 
certainly the case when I was invited to give a course in NLP at a 
hospital in the capital of a Middle Eastern country in 2000. My stay in 
this country lasted two months. It was not the first time I had visited 
it; I had taught the educational component of a degree in Nurse 
Education as a visiting lecturer in 1993 in 1994.1 was then asked back 
on four different occasions to teach NLP to staff at the hospital under 
the aegis of their Post-Graduate Department of Education.
This particular stay was serendipitous In that it gave me an 
unexpected opportunity to explore my teaching of NLP, and to use the 
time and the people as collaborators in this research venture. Some of 
my students had already acted as a focus group for another PhD 
venture Into NLP. Jan Robertson (2000) describes qualitative research 
as a complex activity. It involves both doing and reporting, and is not 
a tidy process, rather the opposite. This was certainly my experience 
of my 'field work' and after.
There were two separate phases to my information gathering. These 
were to develop into two different but complementary parts within the 
whole inquiry. The first was close to my original intentions which had 
been to use the time abroad to pilot my own interview schedule, and 
'try it out' on people. I then intended to develop a more sophisticated 
version when I got back home to the UK, What actually happened was 
that I interviewed six of the students on the course, inquiring into their 
responses to certain language structures, originally to see what
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happened. (I describe this interview schedule below). When I arrived 
back in the UK, I transcribed these interviews, and then realised that I 
had so much information that the 'pilot' became one of the main 
sources of information. My reflections on these are the main themes of 
chapters 6,7,8 and 9.
The second stage of the inquiry was to work with three people who 
had attended previous courses of mine, and had already reached 
practitioner status in NLP. These acted, in a sense, as what McNiff et al 
(1996) would call my validating group. They were also to engage on an 
information gathering exercise by interviewing some of the students 
who had attended the NLP course. This was to be carried out after I 
had left the country. It would include obtaining feedback from the 
participants on the course about a number of different aspects of their 
experiences of learning. I describe this phase of the inquiry, and my 
thoughts about it, in some detail in Chapter 10. Essentially, my 
collaborators and I were interested in feedback from the participants 
on the NLP course, especially in any changes that had occurred in their 
conceptual maps about themselves as learners.
The overall outcome for this inquiry was that I developed a new 
understanding of some of the processes Involved In learning, which I 
offer as a hypothesis. As a result I hoped to perhaps be able to initiate 
changes in either the theory or praxis of my teaching, (and perhaps 
that of others). These are some of the characteristics that are said to 
define action research, (McNIff et al 1996, Gill and Johnson 1997, 
Robertson 2000. My research methods also arose largely out of the 
context in which I found myself.
When I set out to teach these NLP practitioner and Master Practitioner 
Programmes in 2000,1 made it clear to all the participants at the 
outset that we were all involved in research, though to begin with I 
found it difficult to specify what exactly we were looking for. This was 
to ensure transparency. NLP is taught through exploration, group 
work and feedback sessions. Power issues, and questions such as
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'who owns the information that is uncovered?' are important to post­
modern qualitative research. I made it clear from the outset that we 
were all engaged in exploration and discovery, some of which would 
be useful to me for this study. Anderson (1990) stresses the need for 
honesty, avoiding deception, and obtaining informed consent as some 
of the pre-requisites of an acceptable ethical approach. When I was 
teaching, my focus was on enabling the students to meet the 
standards of Practitioner status in NLP/ The overall framework for 
both myself In the context of being the trainer, and the participants 
on the course, was that of an exploration of themselves and others 
using the tools of NLP. This was, after all, what I was being paid for at 
the time.
2.5. Action Research
Much of this phase of the inquiry was illuminated by the approach 
generated by action research. It has been described as an approach 
where "researchers are intent on describing, interpreting and 
explaining events (enquiry) while they seek to change them (action) 
for the better (purpose)". (McNiff e ta /1996:13). Action research also 
involves reflection on practice, and I found that when I was engaged 
in teaching, I was mainly focused on guiding a group of ten people to 
the level of Practitioner. NLP Is learned and taught through guided 
exercises and Interactions with others in the group, and then shared 
reflection on what was discovered. The approach to teaching it is, in a 
sense, to 'hand over' the responsibility for learning to the participants, 
and to become more and more invisible, as it were, as their 
enjoyment and curiosity took over the process. It is deliberately 
taught as inductively as possible. The participants became fully 
engaged in their learning, and as I observed them becoming more 
confident with the exploration of their own subjective processes, and 
those of their peers, I soon realised that what was also emerging was 
a sample of people with a deeper awareness of their own internal
3 These standards are set by the Society for NLP, which is one of the many 
world wide accrediting bodies.
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modelling processes, and how these were influenced by language.
Most of them were nurses, and often reported that they had used NLP 
to make discoveries about their patients' experiences on the wards. 
They also reported that they found It useful In information gathering, 
negotiating and reassuring.
One of the Master Practitioners, (who was also one of my assistants, 
and later one of the interviewers for the second phase of Information 
gathering,y  used his new Insights to develop a more effective 
discharge planning procedure for his ward. If one of the hallmarks of 
collaborative inquiry is that professionals and non-professionals 
become co-researchers (Patton 1990) where the purpose of "such 
shared Inquiry Is typically to elucidate and Improve the nature and 
practice In some arena of action" (Patton 1990:129), then It seems to 
me that what emerged was a kind of research team of more or less 
enthusiastic Inquirers, sharing and applying their own insights in the 
contexts of their personal lives and work. Truly, serendipity is an 
essential component of research and inquiry.
McNiff et al (1996) warn that authentic research Is "where you do not 
already have the answers [...] It means that you are willing and able 
to change your own understanding." (McNiff et al 1996:13). About 
halfway through the course, I started thinking more like a researcher 
than a trainer. I Initially found It difficult to reflect on my practice as a 
researcher, until I realised that when I was actually engaged in 
teaching, I was more focused on the students' learning processes 
than on myself and what I did. One of the alms of an NLP training is 
to develop people's understanding of their own situation, and explore 
their abilities to make changes. This is not unlike what Lather 
describes as one of the hallmarks of research In practice, which is that 
"research (can be) consciously used to help participants understand 
and change their situation" (Lather, cited in Robertson 2000:311). 
Arhar and Buch (2000) describe teaching as a form of scientific
See Chapter 10
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inquiry and a nnoral commitment to democratic relationships between 
teachers and learners. "Action researchers design their watching into 
their work, not only as an afterthought... but as a documented 
reflective process throughout". (Arhar and Buch 2000:328). I believe 
that reflection on action may be as much an unconscious as a 
conscious process, an issue which most writers on research design 
and methods ignore.
My own approach to teaching is greatly influenced by the training I 
underwent to achieve the status of NLP trainer. Among the most 
important skills to be developed are the ability to enthuse one's 
learners and to enable them to acquire insights into language. This 
Includes Bandler and Grinder's (1975, 1975A) model of language. This 
proposes ways in which language may guide people's thinking. Other 
important aspects which are developed are the ability to facilitate 
people to learn for themselves, and to create relationships which act 
as a context for safe, rapid, and sometimes surprising insights to 
occur. Entwistle and Smith (2002), inquired into the factors that 
promoted what they term 'deep' learning'. They found that students 
reported that the qualities of a lecturer, which were most likely to 
bring this about, were explanation, enthusiasm and empathy. These 
generalisations echo some of the prescriptions for'good' NLP training.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that the design of a piece of 
research "designates nothing more than a broad plan relating to 
certain contingencies that will probably arise, but the precise nature 
of those contingencies is unpredictable" (Lincoln and Guba 1985:259). 
This echoes what happened to this study at the beginning. What I 
originally thought of as a pilot study emerged from a hunch, which 
came to me about half way through the course. What if I 'tested' 
these people's responses to a number of different statements by 
asking them for their responses to certain language structures where 
they would talk to me about the results of their introspections? I now 
had a sample of over a dozen highly trained people with considerable
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considerable insights into some of their own thinking processes. I 
might never have such an opportunity again.
This fitted into the category of purposive sampling, which Silverman 
describes as a sample which "allows us to choose a case because it 
illustrates some feature or process in which we are interested," 
(Silverman 2000:104). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that one of 
the characteristics of purposive sampling is what they term emergent 
sampling design where there can be no a priori specification of the 
sample, and that naturalistic sampling is based on informational 
rather than statistical criteria. These reflections of my sampling are 
made a posteriori; at the time I was only interested in developing and 
testing a pilot interview schedule, without realising that the data so 
obtained would more than Illumine my inquiry. What I was 
consciously looking for were people who had developed the ability to 
report on their own introspections, and who were unafraid to share 
them with me.
One of the first activities in the NLP Practitioner's course was to 
encourage people to explore how we use our senses internally to 
structure subjective experience. Bandler and Grinder (1975) suggest 
that we use all our senses to re-present experience internally as 
internal representations. Thus when we think, we see, hear, feel, 
taste, smell, and perhaps use other senses as well,
I introduced this aspect through telling a story, (see Appendix 1) 
which was deliberately written to stimulate the listeners' five sensory 
modalities, so as to generate rich Internal representations, and draw 
attention to them. This was an approach much loved by Milton 
Erickson, (Erickson 1980, Rosen 1982). The structure of stories seems 
to be able to influence people's thinking at the unconscious level (GIck 
and Holyoak 1977) and engage people In abductive learning (Bateson 
1972). Erickson believed that the power of metaphors lay In their 
ability to make the topic 'come alive in' people's minds.
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After I told the story, the group was asked: "as you were listening to 
the story, what sort of images did you make? What did you see?
This was to encourage participants to look more deeply at their own 
internal responses to the story, through a process of shared 
introspection in small groups. People usually respond by talking about 
what images they made internally. I then sometimes ask questions 
like "was it  in colour or black and white? Was it  a movie or a series of 
stilis, were you in it experiencing it  or outside, looking in on it? This 
was so as to elicit information about the different characteristics that 
their internal images seem to have. Whenever I have used this 
approach, people have always reported on the quality of the imagery 
produced by such stories. I then asked "as you were listening to the 
story, did you hear any sounds internally?" Agawi, many report that 
they heard sounds (for instance the grunts of the camel). I then 
asked about bodily sensations, tastes and smells. Some felt the heat 
of the desert as they listened to the story. Others experienced states 
such as curiosity, pleasure, relaxation or interest. Often they reported 
to have been aware of the taste of the water or the smell of the old 
goatskin. NLP training presupposes that this is one way that people 
can develop a greater awareness of their own worlds of internal 
representations.^ Interestingly, many participants reported an 
increase in the amount of vivid dreams they had at this stage of the 
course.
5 xhe effects of such developing insights was described by one of the 
participants, a twenty eight year old Nurse Tutor H. who was interviewed by 
one of the Master Practitioners. These were also acting as my assistants on 
the course. The interviewer asked her for her impressions at the beginning of 
the NLP course. Her reply indicates something of the surprise she felt at 
discovering so much more about her own internal world, particularly at the 
level of internal representations.
H. The way she spoke the way she engaged discussion from the group, 
the way how she'd... think... 'imagine yourself there, see yourself there, 
see what you see, hear what you hear, feel what you feel. We ve never 
had that taught, like in that second go back into thinking of that certain 
scenario it's like certain scenarios like wow. I've got it in stills. I've got 
it in certain pictures. I've got it in movie. I've never been taught that 
before.
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The story itself also had another function; to create a metaphorical 
framework for the philosophy of the course. The theory is that the 
structure of stories has the ability to by-pass the conscious mind, and 
influence how subsequent information is then structured, (Gick and 
Holyoak 1977, Erickson and Rossi 1989). I review some of these 
aspects further in Chapter 4. One of the things that the NLP training 
was designed to do was to produce a small population of people who 
were practised in introspection, and the sensitive elicitation of their 
own and other people's internal processes. The sample, and the 
questions for what I thought of as an initial set of explorations, 
emerged from my reflections on the responses of the participants on
the course.
2.5.1. The Pilot Interviews, which then became a surprisingly 
important source of information
In the last two weeks of my stay I designed what I then believed was 
the pilot interview schedule. This consisted of a number of different 
statements, in response to which I wanted my collaborators to reflect 
on the internal processes that they produced. (These are described in 
some detail in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9.) What kinds of statements could 
I use as probes? These questions became the catalyst for the 
emergence of my interview schedule. Patton states that the purpose 
of interviewing is to find out what is on someone else's mind, (Patton 
1990), and that "the persons being interviewed respond in their own 
words to express their own personal perspectives" (Patton 1990:
278). Silverman warns that it is important to ensure that one's 
analytic position is appropriate to one's practical concerns, (Silverman
2000).
I wanted to find out whether it was possible for people to be capable 
of an introspection which was deep enough for them to report on their 
own responses which might 'normally' lie outside 'normal' awareness, 
yet keep them emotionally safe. The question that then arose was:
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would I then be able to model how thinking was Influenced by 
language? Bateson was fascinated by the possibility that we know 
what we know, yet are not aware of how we know it,* I wanted to 
know what would happen if I aimed at questioning people in such a 
way that they might reveal aspects of how they know. This was one of 
my main outcomes for this inquiry.
This led to the need to recognise that there were important theoretical 
distinctions to be made between what people knew, and the processes 
by which that information was represented to them. Denzin and 
Lincoln point out "not only are facts determined by the theory window 
through which one looks for them, but different theory windows might 
be equally well supported by the same set of facts... " (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1998:199). Thus my theoretical standpoint was mined from 
the bedrock of Bandler and Grinder's model of language and their 
proposed epistemology,^ which in turn determined how I formulated 
the pilot interview schedule. I t  was also based on the notion that 
people could access some of their internal processes where they had 
used their senses to reconstruct experience, (Bandler and MacDonald 
1988). (I explore and describe some of these aspects in greater depth 
in Chapter 3.) At this point my main question was 'what happens 
inside people's minds when I  use particular language structures?
Might there be differences In people's responses to these?
The interview schedule that emerged, as the result of my reflections 
and questioning, fell into what Patton (1990) characterises as a 
standardised open ended interview, where the exact wording and 
sequence of questions are determined in advance. All interviewees are 
asked the same questions in the same order. Questions are worded in 
completely open ended format." (Patton 1990:289). I then followed 
up people's answers with probing questions in order to elicit more
6 «It seems to be a universal feature of human perception of the 
underpinnings of human epistemology that the perceiver shall perceive only 
the products of his perceiving act. He shall not perceive the means by which 
that product was created" (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:215),
7 This is explored further in Chapters 4 and 5.
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information about the effects of my words that people reported they 
had experienced. Patton describes probes as questions that are used 
to deepen a response and increase the richness of the data being 
sought, (Patton 1990).
This part of the data gathering used an approach that Gill and 
Johnson (1997) refer to as a quasi experiment Here the prime aim is 
to analyse causal relationships between independent and dependent 
variables, where subjects cannot be randomly assigned to control 
groups. Anderson (1990) describes it as an approach "where there is 
an artificially manipulated treatment, but where randomisation is not 
possible", (p. 129). This seemed to be appropriate to a 
phenomenological inquiry, as it had the potential to uncover 
subjectively experienced processes, with the caveat that it is 
epistemologically dangerous to draw too many generalised 
conclusions from data so obtained. Thus any model that emerges 
from such an inquiry essentially has the status of a hypothesis or 
preliminary working model, which can then act as a heuristic device 
for further elucidation of the phenomena under scrutiny.
Each question thus required interviewees to engage in deep 
introspection, then describe and reflect aloud on their own responses 
and whatever processes they then became aware of. In a sense they 
were to take what has been described as the transcendental 
phenomenological attitude, as part of their responses, (Sokolowski
2000).
2.5.2. Designing the pilot interview schedule
...in describing a given system, the scientist makes many choices. He 
chooses his words, and he decides which parts of the system he will 
describe first; he even decides into what parts he will divide the 
system in order to describe it. These decisions will affect the 
description as a whole in the sense that they will affect the map upon 
which the typological relations between the elementary messages of
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the description are represented. (Bateson, in Donaidson 1991:62).
When one Is engaged in modelling, the main task Is the elicitation of 
information from others at both verbal and non-verbal levels, in order 
to find out more about how they respond and construct information 
for themselves. So, when NLP is being used as a modelling tool, it is 
assumed that what is being interrogated is not the world of external 
reality, but a deeply subjective, internally constructed complex of 
thought processes, of which emotions, images, goals, values, 
memories, sounds, speech, bodily sensations, tastes and smells form 
integral parts. This involves the researcher in very precise and 
sensitive questioning of participants who are willing to share in the 
exploration of these levels of experience. This is what I mean by 
guided Introspection. Questions designed to bring to awareness the 
structures that people may be using to 'map' experience requires 
interview skills and the ability to enter into the world of the other, yet 
stand respectfully aside. It also involves a precise and skilful use of 
language and observation. This I based on Bandler and Grinders 
meta-model of language, (Bandler and Grinder 1975). I have often 
experienced feelings which I can only describe as reverence and awe 
when a participant shares her surprise and delight at discovering 
more about her own, previously un-accessed internal processes and 
resources.
What follows is the interview schedule, which I originally thought of as 
a pilot project, to be refined at a later time. I explain below what my 
rationale was behind each of the questions; what I wanted was for my 
interviewees to tell me about the subjective effects of the various 
statements at the level of their internal representations and sub­
modalities. Although I explore Bandler and Grinder's (1975) idea that 
thinking involves the use of all the senses in the construction of 
internal representations further in Chapter 3, a quick summary of 
these ideas maybe useful at this point.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) and later Bandler and MacDonald (1988)
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proposed that we re-create experience internally, as It were, using all 
our senses. So as we think, we also see, hear, feel, perhaps taste and 
smell, whatever experiences we are reflecting on. Thus our senses 
internally represent experience, often below the levels of immediate 
awareness. Sub-modality distinctions (Bandler and MacDonald 1988) 
are the characteristics of each sense; for instance, internal images 
may be in colour or black and white, sounds may be loud or soft and 
feelings (usually termed kinaesthetic responses in NLP) may be warm 
or cold, hard or soft, and may even be experienced as having a 
location within the conceiver's body.
It was this level of awareness that I wanted my interlocutors to report 
on in response to the language structures in the Interview schedule. I 
sought information about their processes, not their responses to the 
content of my words. This part of the inquiry is as much about 
exploring these levels of consciousness and how they may be involved 
in the construction of knowledge, as it is about the effects of 
language. There is no 'logical' sequence to the schedule described 
below; I simply wanted to explore a number of different aspects in no 
particular order. Many of the technical terms, and my thoughts about 
them, are described in greater detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
The transcripts of the responses to questions 3, 4, 9, 10 and 16 are 
analysed and reflected on in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 are my reflections 
on the transcripts of the responses to questions 5, 7, 8, and 12. 
Chapter 8 reviews what I found in the transcripts of questions 8, 6, 11 
and 13. Finally, Chapter 9 reports on my analyses of the transcribed 
responses to questions 1, 2, 14 and 15. These were natural 
groupings, which emerged after I had read the transcripts several 
times.
2.5.3. The interview schedule
Below I list the questions that I finally used in the pilot study, and the 
thinking that led to them. I include at the end, for the sake of
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completeness, some questions which I realised after the first few 
interviews were repetitive or Inappropriate, and therefore left out in 
my analysis of the transcripts.
Question 1.
This question was designed to explore the difference between the 
injunctions to 'think' and 'remember'. I was also curious to know 
whether the word 'think' was more likely to produce a dissociated 
response, and the word 'remember' an associated response. So 
people were asked for their responses to the following two 
suggestions.
a) Think o f a time when you were happy.
b) Remember a time when you were happy.
Question 2.
I t  has been claimed that there are two fundamental ways of attending 
to information. (Bateson 1972). One is to attend to difference, and 
the other to attend to similarity. With this question I wanted to 
explore how the internal representations of some familiar objects 
differed when the subject was asked to attend to their differences, 
and then to their similarities.
a) How are apples and oranges different?
b) How are apples and oranges the same?
Question 3.
With this question, I wanted to explore moving from a phrase which 
asked about the process how you relate, to a phrase where the verb 
had been nominalised. (Bandler and Grinder 1975) This turns what
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was, for the conceiver, originally a process into an abstract noun. 
According to Bandler and Grinder (1975) the original activity of the 
verb is thus deleted. I also changed the wording of the initial 
command from 'be aware' to 'think' in the second question, to find out 
what would happen.
a) Can you be aware o f how you relate to someone you value?
b) Can you think o f a relationship with a person you value?
Question 4.
This was a rather ambitious question, where I wanted to explore the 
differences between 'scientific text book language' about the human 
heart, and a more emotive personalised description. The first part has 
more nominalizations, and is expressed in the third person. The 
second part takes the perceptual position of the second person and 
uses more verbs rather than nominalizations.
a) In the heart, the ventricles contract to pump blood around the 
body. The atria receive blood from the body. Closure o f the valves at 
the bases of the main arteries prevent the backflow of blood on 
ventricular relaxation.
b) Your heart is a pump and receives blood from your body and 
pumps blood around your body. Imagine your ventricles contracting 
and squeezing blood into the main arteries so they need valves at 
their base that close so that blood isn't sucked back when the 
ventricle relaxes.
Question 5.
In this set of questions I wanted to explore the effects of a group of 
words known as modal operators (Bandler and Grinder 1975) on the 
internal representations that would be elicited. Modal operators are a 
complex group of words which have been described (Hall 1996) as
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'words that express the contingent relationships we believe to exist 
between ourselves, others and outcomes'. I describe them In greater 
detail in Chapters 5 and 7. This group of words can be said to 
describe the mode in which a future activity is to be carried out. It has 
been claimed (Hall 1996) that some modal operators (such as you 
will, you must) imply that the listener Is at effect, or at a reactive 
stance. Others, such as 'you m ight or 'you could', imply that there is 
a choice. This is thought to place the listener into a more pro-active 
position. Part of the interest In modal operators is that there is always 
an implied causality to them, which can be uncovered by questions 
such as 'who says', 'what would happen if you didn't' or simply by 
using the word 'because?' as a question to elicit further information 
about the activity defined by the modal operator.
Think of something quite ordinary, (like cleaning your teeth) that you 
are going to do in the near future. What happens when I  say:
a) you will do it
b) you might do it
c) you can't do it
d) you should do It
e) you can do it
f) you could do it.
Question 6.
Here I wanted to explore what happened when my collaborator was 
asked to change temporal frames. First each was asked to think of an 
event in the near future, then to perceive it as if it were now in the 
past. The injunctions place the information into two different temporal 
frameworks, one future, and one past.
a) Think of something you have to do but are not sure you particularly 
want to do.
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b) Now imagine you were in the future having done it.
Question 7.
With this question I wanted to find out about some of the effects of 
the question 'how do you feel about it' on the subject's memory of a 
mildly unpleasant experience. The word 'feel' Is a sensory predicate 
(Bandler and Grinder 1975) and it is claimed that the use of this word 
can amplify existing kinaesthetic responses in the internal 
representation of a memory.
a) Remember a miidiy unpleasant experience.
b) How do you feel about it?
Question 8.
Here my aim was to explore the effects of the word 'but' when used to 
link two separate statements in the context of feedback on a person's 
performance. In sections a) and b) I also wanted to find out what 
happened when the first and second halves of the complex sentence, 
changed places. In the third part c), I wanted to explore what 
happened when words implying a causal linkage (...so that you can...) 
between the two halves of the sentence and deliberately linking them 
to a future outcome, were included.
a) You are good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport
skills
b) You need to work on your rapport skills but you are good
at NLP
c) Think about your rapport skills so that you can be even 
better at NLP
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Question 9.
With this question I wanted to see whether there were any differences 
in response to the adverb (wrongly) and the adjective (wrong) used in 
the same context. Hall (1996) claims that adjectives digitalise 
information, whereas adverbs are analogical, giving a sense of an 
activity, which the conceiver experiences as part of an on-going 
temporal continuum.
Think of something you might have done better.
a) you did that wrong
b) you did that wrongly
Question 10.
With this question I was exploring wording a command three different 
ways so that three different perceptual positions were implied in the 
phrasing, yet all referred to the same topic. The first a) uses the 
nominalisation 'childhood' which is an abstract noun. The second b) 
uses the word 'being' which could produce association into the event, 
and in the third c) I was curious about whether there would be 
different responses to the instruction 'remember yourself as...'.
a)  Remember your childhood.
b) Remember being a child.
c) Remember yourself as a child.
Question 11.
The intentions behind this question were to explore the effects of 
directing the other to look at information (about something they did 
really well) in different ways, first by asking them to think about how 
they could make something even better, (which presupposes that it 
was good in the first place) and then requesting them to consider it in
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a totally different way, directing them to search for information that 
they were not (yet) paying attention to. This question was dropped 
after the first two interviews because the subjects seemed to be 
confused by b, and confusion was not what I wanted to explore at this 
stage.
Think o f something you do reaily weil.
a) how couid you make it  even better?
b) what are you not paying attention to?
Question 12.
With this question I was interested in the effects of the word 'yet' 
placed at the end of a negative injunction. The word 'yet' is both a 
linkage word and a phonological ambiguity, (Bandler and Grinder 
1975A). It also presupposes an on-going process by introducing a 
further time frame through presupposition.
Imagine something you might do. How do you respond when I  say:
a) you can't do that, or
b) you can't do that yet
Question 13.
Here I was interested to find out the effects of using questions 
beginning with what and how, then why, to explore whether these 
produced different internal responses when applied to the same 
content, i.e. a goal in life. Question d) aims to move the conceiver's 
perceptual position from present looking forward, to future looking 
back.
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The last question f) aims to find out whether having considered the 
previous questions had in any way altered the internal representation 
of the subject's goal.
Think o f a goal you have in your iifei
a) what do you need to achieve it?
b) how wili you achieve it?
c) why wiil you achieve it?
d) what will it  be like to have achieved that goai?
f) Now think o f the goal again? What happens?
Question 14.
It is claimed that human consciousness cannot compute a negative, 
(Erickson 1980) but must always first make an Internal representation 
of what is to be negated, in order to then negate it. The aim of this 
question was to explore the effects of negative injunctions on internal 
representations. People were asked for their responses to each of 
these statements.
a) Don't think about failure
b) You must not imagine a blue camel
c) Don't make that mistake again.
Question 15.
What interested me with this question was whether the command to 
'think about' as in sentence a) produced a different response to the 
question using an awareness predicate (feel) in question b.
a) think about how much you have learned
b) are you aware of how much you have learned?
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Question 16.
This is another attempt to elicit different responses to nominalised 
and de-nominalised information. Thus the word 'communication' is an 
abstract noun obtained by the transformation of the verb 
'communicating'. In this process the action of the verb is again 
deleted, (Bandler and Grinder 1975).
a) It's important to understand communication.
b) It's important to understand communicating.
2.5.4. Questions that ended in the recycle bin
In retrospect, I believe that some questions were thought up too 
hastily, as I really believed that the data that I would gather would 
lead me to design a more effective schedule. I give them for the sake 
of transparency about my own research process. When I realised that 
they seemed Inappropriate, I consigned them to the recycle bln.
The question below was used with some of the Interviewees. I 
stopped using It, because the answers seemed somewhat complex. In 
fact the few people I asked did, on reading the transcripts, yield some 
Interesting Insights.
A. How are apples and oranges different?
B. How are apples and oranges the same?
In the next question, I left out C.
A. Think of something you do really well.
B. How could you make it even better?
C. What are you not paying attention to?
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2.6. Ethics and research protocols.
The interviews were carried out after the end of the course and the 
assessment. This was to distinguish this part of my activities from the 
teaching, so that students' assessment and my own research were 
clearly distinguishable. I was careful to interview people several days 
after the end of the course and the presentation of certificates. I 
chose people as much on the basis of their availability in a busy 
hospital setting, as on my judgement of their willingness to share 
their (sometimes strange) introspections. Each person was 
interviewed in private, either in a teaching room in the hospital 
complex, or in their own homes. The interviews were tape recorded, 
and transcribed on my return to the UK. I include a sample of one 
whole transcript in Appendix 3.
McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead (1996) have published a checklist for 
ensuring that the research protocol follows ethical guidelines. Among 
the first is to negotiate access with the authorities. I obtained written 
consent from the Head of the Hospital Programme to carry out this 
research. This is included in appendix 2. I also asked each participant 
to sign a consent form in which they gave me permission to use the 
material for this research study, and which also informed them that 
any material that they did not want to be included would be 
withdrawn. The form also assured them of their complete anonymity, 
and confidentiality. Patton (1990) emphasises the necessity for this. 
These consent forms are also included in Appendix 2. The names of all 
the participants have also been changed to ensure anonymity.
Before the interviews, each person was told that they could stop the 
interview at any time that they wished, and withdraw from the 
sample. This was to ensure participants' right to withdraw from the 
research, which is one of the aspects listed by McNiff et al (1996). It 
is also important to protect participants from any harm or distress, so 
I made it clear during the interviews that we were not there to 
uncover unhappy memories, but to explore their responses to
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language. So on the one occasion when one of my collaborators did 
access an uncomfortable childhood memory, I made sure that she 
was able to 'leave it behind' and stay safely in the present, by 
reassuring her, and gradually moving her into a more confident state. 
She also knew that she could stop the interview, and even withdraw 
from the research at any time.
McNiff et al (1996) also recommend that others Involved in the 
research should be kept informed. Unfortunately it was not possible to 
do this with all the participants, as a few weeks after my return I was 
hospitalised for some time, and then endured several months of 
convalescence. Many of the participants had by then left the country, 
and changed their email addresses. Communication with people in the 
Middle East became problematic because of the changing world 
political climate. However, I was able to check some of the transcripts 
by email with one of the participants, ('Edward'), who was also an 
assistant on my course. He later engaged in some further interviewing 
for the second phase of my data gathering. The account of this, and 
the analysis of the resulting transcripts form the main subject of 
Chapter 10.
2.7. Concluding reflections.
These interviews were designed to elicit information about some 
deeply subjective processes in my participants. Gregory Bateson's 
cybernetic thinking, which forms one of the theoretical backbones of 
NLP and this inquiry, proposed that units of behaviour are defined by 
the structure of the experiment. (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:74). 
What follows from this is the ontological impossibility of any 
separation between observer and observation. The observer and that 
which is observed becomes one interactive phenomenon only possible 
through the act of knowing. The researcher, as it were, brings a 
phenomenon into being through the act of inquiry. According to 
Bateson, any inquiry is "an action [...] cut out from the flow of 
behaviour, through the act of perception" (Bateson, in Donaldson
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1991). An inquirer becomes "... partly blown by the winds of reality 
and partly an artist creating a composite out of the inner and outer 
events". (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:223). Introspection and 
reflection become an essential part of this approach, for "... every 
discovery concerning human behaviour in the external universe is also 
a discovery about the self, and often an unwelcome discovery in that 
inner field", (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:247).
What this approach makes possible is the ability to make distinctions 
between what Bateson thought of as logical types. For instance, it 
becomes easier to distinguish between process and content, 
description and explanation, abstraction and sensory experience, 
different levels of abstraction, or observation and projection, because 
they are considered to be different logical types. Bateson also 
introduced the fascinating possibility that learning occurs at different 
levels, so there can be learning, and learning about learning, and 
learning about learning about learning, just as there can be reflection, 
and reflection on reflection, and so on. Because these are different 
logical types or categories, it can be predicted that one can draw 
distinctions between them. A research project may then become as 
much about researching into research, as about research itself. Such 
self-reflexivity is one of the hallmarks of cybernetic systems.
Cresswell (1998) notes that every model implicitly generates 
presuppositions about its ontology, epistemology and methodology. 
Bateson's ontological view was that information was the fundamental 
organising principle of the universe. Bateson told his students " I want 
you now to start thinking in terms of biological systems or universes 
which are organised by information, i.e. by significant differences 
rather than by forces or impacts." (Donaldson 1991:178) Thus there 
is a clear distinction to be made between the ontological 
presuppositions of the mechanistic scientific tradition, which believes 
that everything is reducible to particles and forces, and Bateson's 
views on the primacy of information. In this model, information is
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itself organised into different logical levels. It is thus itself the subject 
of being organised by information, in an almost fractal way.
And this was only the beginning.
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Chapter 3. Of Maps and Models, Phantasmagoria and 
Simulacra.
Philosophy of the mind, traditional experimental psychology, 
communication theory, systems theory, computer science, linguistics 
and neuroscience have all played important roles in the shaping of 
this research area -  changing its focus, providing new theoretical 
concepts and supplying integration metaphors as explanatory tool. 
[Out o f this has arisen] cognitive modelling. Explanations of human 
cognition are expressed as abstract models based on the conception 
of a human brain as a physical symbol system consisting o f a 
representational system and the processes which manipulate it. 
(Aitkenhead and Slack 1985:IX).
We must bear in mind Wittgenstein's reminder that the diverse 
phenomena that are found within the domain of the words 'conscious' 
and 'consciousness'may not be unified by a common essence." 
(Harre 2000:234).
3.1. Introduction
My research up to now has Increasingly led me to inquire into the 
processes that people use to explain, understand, dream, make 
sense, achieve goals, learn, reflect, and respond to external stimuli, 
including language. This is at the heart of my investigation, and I 
intend to offer another model of some learning processes, which may 
be involved in the construction of knowledge. I explore the ways in 
which these may be linked to language in Chapters 10 and 11. These 
emerged from my reflections on the data I had collected, and its 
analysis.
This chapter is a review of some of the ideas from the more recent 
literature about our cognitive processes. Making sense of how we 
make sense internally has remained a challenge to educational and 
cognitive psychology for the best part of the last century. It is
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dominated by questions such as: what are the internal processes that 
are necessary for us to operate successfully in the world? What do we 
do 'inside our heads' that enables us to construct our conceptual 
maps and act on them? How do these processes influence learning?
There are four main sections to this Chapter:
1. I address some theories about mental models and related 
domains, including a consideration of the cybernetic approach.
2. I review the possible contribution of NLP to our understanding 
of mental models, and a comparison with other approaches,
3. I consider the processes of abstraction and categorisation, and 
their roles in the formation of our cognition.
4. I include a short review of some of the principal ideas about 
unconscious information processing.
3.2.1. Mental models, internal representations, cognitive maps 
or constructs; a rose by any other name...
The notion that we possess cognitive maps is usually attributed in the 
psychological literature to Tolman (1948) who proposed that the 
nervous systems of organisms were able to produce some sort of 
internal spatial re-creation of the world around them in order for them 
to find their way around their territory. However, this idea goes back 
further, to the work of Korzybski (1958) who first published his views 
in 1941 that human beings have internal maps, which may be linked 
to language. Gregory Bateson was particularly intrigued by the 
epistemological implications of such internal ways of sense making, 
(Bateson 1972). Bandura, one of Bateson's coevals, was urging 
people to recognise the relevance of the study of conceptual models 
to learning: "It is surprising that traditional accounts of learning 
contain little or no mention of modelling processes" (Bandura 
1971:2).
One of the main problems facing any reviewer of this field is the 
question of nomenclature. Wittgenstein mused that "nothing is more
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difficult than facing concepts without prejudice, and that is the 
principal difficulty of philosophy" (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:177).
The area known as cognitive psychology, from which much of this 
chapter is drawn, attributes a distinctive meaning to the word 
cognitive, and embeds it in a distinctive paradigm, or way of thinking. 
The framework of most cognitive psychology is Cartesian, positivistic, 
and based on reliance on the results of experiments that are mostly 
carried out within the empirical, objectivistic and nomothetic tradition. 
The meaning of the word cognition that emerges from this is one 
where knowing is an almost platonically idealistic mentai process, 
undistorted by gross feelings, values or the ever present danger of 
subjectivity. It is also one where it is easy to conclude that the 
nervous system alone is the chief mediator of knowledge, ignoring the 
possibility that individuals may use many other parts of their bodies 
to know, and to process information. The latter belongs more to the 
field of cybernetics, which has, in the main, been ignored by 
mainstream psychological inquiries. Its essence is to understand 
phenomena as complex wholes, not reducible to parts, depending on 
information for their functioning, and responsive to feedback. Patton 
(1990) has pointed out that neither objectivity or subjectivity are 
useful as concepts.
When I turned to the Concise Oxford Dictionary for a definition of the 
term 'cognition', I found, to my surprise, that it allowed for a rather 
broader view. Cognition: (noun) the mental action or process of 
acquiring knowledge through thought, experience, and the senses. > 
a perception, sensation or intuition resulting from this. It then informs 
me that its origin is from the Latin cognoscere, 'get to know'. 
Furthermore, the word cognitive is an adjective relating to cognition. 
Although the dictionary defines cognition as a 'mental' process (this is 
only to be expected; Cartesian/platonic dualism is embedded in our 
language!), it does not exclude the role of sensation (which I take to 
refer to a neuro-physioiogical function mediated solely by the body).
It also includes the role of experience, which again, is not just a 
mental phenomenon. It goes on to include intuition within the bounds
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of the definition of cognition. The definition of intuition seems to have 
been a challenge to many researchers, (Clarke and Mackaness 2001, 
Perrig and Wippich 1995), and may long remain so.
The terminologies that have been used to explore such internal 
'mental' phenomena present us with a veritable Tower of Babel of 
nomenclature. There are a number of different terms used in the 
literature to describe the inner worlds of human Information 
processing. As far as I can make out, they all seem to be addressing 
the same.issue, perhaps from slightly different vantage points or from 
within differing conceptual models. Miller et al (1960) introduced the 
term 'plans' into the literature. Johnson-Laird (1983) and his co­
workers favoured the term mental models. Piaget (1953) used the 
term 'mental image'. Sutherland (1992) preferred the term 'mental 
constructs'. Zhang and Norman (1994) used the term 
'representational system', and 'internal representation', though in a 
different sense to the ways in which Bandler and Grinder understood 
and used the term. Fauconnier and his school describe internal 
processes as interacting 'mental spaces' (Fauconnier 1994, Koenig 
1998). Jackendorff (1996) and Gibbs (2001) use the term 'mental 
representations'. In the literature (for instance Fauconnier 1997,
Martin 2000, Kerzel et a! 2001) the term 'cognitive map' is frequently 
found. Cause mapping is another approach used by many. This seeks 
to understand thought and action in terms of the cognitive patterns of 
cause and effect, (Weick 2001). I use a number of terms 
interchangeably; the only caveat is that when I use the term 'mental',
I use it metaphorically rather than dualistically.
Whatever confusion this variety of nomenclature produces, the 
exploration of how people code and process information remains a 
vast and complex area for inquiry. This project centres on the 
question of how we can find out more about people's internal mapping 
processes, and the possible role of language in our mysterious sense 
making procedures. The question of what to call these processes (or 
structures) remains important. Despite Wittgenstein's provocative
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statement that "we are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we 
use, not because we don't know their real definition, but because 
there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there must be 
would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they 
play a game according to strict rules," (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 
1994:119).
My own preference is to use the term cognitive maps, or mental 
constructs to give the reader some idea of the development of my 
own thinking, despite the Cartesian baggage these terms may carry. 
My own meaning of the term cognition is that which refers to a 
process of knowing in which the whole of the system of an organism 
may be involved, and which may be explored in a multitude of 
different ways.
Our concepts, or cognitive maps could be defined as the abstractions 
that we use to make sense of our life's experiences. The term 'map' 
is sometimes very useful; Tolman (1948) suggested that the central 
nervous system produced internal spatial representations that acted 
as maps enabling animals to find their way around their terrain. Since 
then the meaning of the term has expanded to include both internal 
'geographical' maps as well as the more abstract patterns of 
information that enable people to make sense of their worlds. The 
term has since expanded its meaning. It is still used in the 
geographical sense, such as in the work of Golledge et al (2000) who 
propose that "cognitive maps are the internal representations of 
experienced external environments, including the spatial relations 
among features and objects" (Golledge et al 2000:93). Others include 
Yeap and Jefferies (2000) who propose a model for the development 
of spatial maps in people. The notion of mapping has come to be 
included in models about how we think, (Gattis, 2001, Liben 2001). 
The term 'map' was also much loved by Bateson (1972) who often 
used it to describe the processes that we employ to build up our 
knowledge of the terrain of our existence.
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3.2 .2 .Constructivism and cognition
Entwistle and Smith (2002) have proposed that the 'present fashion' 
{sic) in education is constructivism. Constructivist theories present 
learning in terms of the development of an individual's unique 
understanding through how they have 'structured' knowledge. There 
is increasing interest in how learners actually construct their cognitive 
maps when engaging in learning. Constructivism is based on the 
central tenet that humans actively "build" their internal models or 
representations of the world of their experience. My own approach 
could be seen to be within this movement, as I inquire both into the 
nature of people's internal conceptual worlds, and the roles that 
language plays in their formation. The emergence of the constructivist 
movement and its main players has been reviewed by Sutherland 
(1992) who stresses the importance of developing our understanding 
of the role of language in the development of mental constructs. He 
also relates constructivism to the emergence of new approaches to 
the teaching of Science, such as the Cognitive Acceleration Science 
Education, (CASE).
Perhaps the main originator of our present understanding of the 
importance of our needs to create constructs as part of learning was 
Piaget, (1971) who, in acknowledging his debt to Kant, wrote that:
'...intelligence is not limited to receiving impressions like a tabula 
rasa, but structures reality by means of a priori forms of 
sensibility and understanding'. (Piaget 1971:57.)
He further held that 'the mental image [... ] owed its formation to an 
internalised imitation', (Piaget 1971:132). Learning theory has been 
greatly influenced by Piaget and his followers for the last half century, 
and has dominated much research into the development of children's 
logical abilities as they grow through different stages to maturity, 
(Beilin 1992). Doolittle (2003) has reviewed some more recent 
developments and applications of constructivism to teaching and
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learning theory. He has also suggested (Doolittle 2003, 2003A), that 
constructivism, having become the main explanatory metaphor system 
in contemporary learning theory, needs integrating with cognitivism, 
and could be further illumined by complexity theory.
Jonassen (1999) urged that mental constructs still needed further 
investigation, particularly in relation to how learners built up 
advanced knowledge. Martin et al (2000) have, for instance, used 
concept mapping and interviews to compare the internal strategies of 
successful and not so successful learners. Lancaster (2000) suggests 
that the impetus to generate models is probably the most 
fundamental point of connection between spiritual mysticism and 
psychology. Clarke and Mackaness (2001) have used cognitive maps 
to isolate the intuitive elements of managers' intuitions, and how it 
might be that intuition 'cuts through' to the essence of a situation. 
Weick and Bougon (2001) suggest that maps are epistemological 
structures which are intimately tied to thought and action. Liben 
(2001) suggests that cognitive maps are essential to thinking. She 
distinguishes between a cognitive and a cartographic map; in a 
cognitive map the medium is both internal and metaphorical. 
Cognitive maps are thus the more complex of the two. Van Dijk 
(1997) brings in the dimension of language, suggesting that mental 
models are "the point of departure of all text and talk" (Van Dijk 
1997:189).
3.2.3 Modelling learning, and learning modelling.
Interest in modelling learning emerged as part of the development of 
constructivism. In the 1970s, Norman (1977) argued that all cognitive 
systems had to have an internal model of the environment, of their 
self and of others in order for there to be any intelligent interaction 
between humans and the external world. He stressed that the nature 
of these cognitive systems needed to be the focus of many different 
lines of further inquiry.
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Rumelhart and Norman (1985) focused mainly on how learners learn. 
They proposed that information within human memory consists of 
active structural networks with their own complex and dynamic 
characteristics. They stress that in such representation systems "the 
processes that evaluate and interpret the representations are as 
important as the representations themselves." (Rumelhart and 
Norman 1985:20) These, they proposed, behaved somewhat like 
templates for organising information. Their origins involved the 
aggregation of a complex of information into nodes, (possibly 
mediated by the nervous system) then the naming of these with 
words, as well as organising and structuring data on the basis of 
similarity and clusters around prototypes, distinguishing differences, 
parsing, ordaining cause effect relations, creating connections, 
ordaining intentionality, quantifying, and defining subject-object 
relations. They also believed that language played a part in these 
complex processes. They suggest that it manifests as semantic 
networks in the central nervous system and was integral to human 
information processing. They also refer to a representation as a map, 
which is something that stands for something else, and which can be 
used without reference to the phenomenal world.
Such mental models are considered to be important to learning 
theory. Nelson (1996) has explored the possible roles of language in 
the construction of what she calls Mental Event Representations 
(MER). She believes that 'by building representations of 
environments on the basis of individual experience, a general "world 
model" is constructed that guides individual actions, (Nelson 
1996:17). She recognises that language has an important role to 
play, claiming that MERs change during an individual's development 
as the result of acquiring language. She also suggests that the way in 
which people are spoken to during their early development affects 
what and how they remember.
However, nearly a decade earlier, Oatley (1977) had proposed that 
thinking about anything involved the internal manipulation of
63
something that was re-constructed by human thought, rather than 
purely interacting with the environment.
"Cues in the environment and used to address and guide an 
internal model or representation, within which symbolic 
inferences are made about the outside world and actions that we 
might take towards it" (Oatley 1977:547)
Rumelhart and Norman, (1985) having explored similar ideas further, 
suggested that:
The most important point about a representation is that it allows 
us to reach conclusions about the thing being represented by 
looking only at the representing world. (Rumelhart and Norman 
(1985:17).
Johnson-Laird, working in the field of cognitive psychology, (1983, 
1983A) also suggested that mental models were indispensable to the 
process of learning and understanding. He believed that there were at 
least two levels to this process. One was the actual construction of a 
working model in the mind, which was, in his view, always limited. At 
the second level, there was the possibility of constructing a working 
model about a working model. He further distinguished between 
prepositional representations and mental models. Using the example 
of finding one's way around Hampton Court Maze, he suggests that 
when a person in the maze used their internal map to 'see' what was 
around the next corner, they were using a mental model of the 
environment. Prepositional representations, on the other hand, 
involved using language in order to access the rules about how to exit 
the maze, such as 'keep taking the next right turn.'
Johnson-Laird's view is similar to that of Miller (1977), who 
distinguished between practical and lexical knowledge. Johnson-Laird 
further distinguishes between mental models, prepositional 
representations and images, which the mind uses, as it were, to
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represent classes of phenomena. He suggests that one can have an 
image of an individual triangle, but not of the class triangle.
Sometimes however a specific image of a triangle might actually 
stand for the class it represents. He proposes that mental models are 
built up by discourse, recognising that language plays a vital role in 
their formation.
Johnson-Laird was also interested in the logical processes that people 
use to solve problems and make sense of information. He recognised 
that mental models were complex. They had the power to enable 
people to draw inferences, verify statements, use syllogisms, make 
true-false decisions, manipulate data, perceive images from different 
view points, transform images, rotate them, and (almost as an 
afterthought) 'see' the possible results of actions. He suggests that 
mental models are analogues of the world of experience, which can be 
modified and updated. Thus, in this view, all our knowledge of the 
world depends on our ability to construct models of it. However, we 
may have no ways of knowing what the structure of the world is that 
is independent of the way in which we conceive of it. Gregory Bateson 
(1972) described this as the difference between map and territory.
Are our constructs pure phantasmagoria? This was an ontological and 
epistemological conundrum, which fascinated Gregory Bateson, 
(Bateson 1972, Bateson and Bateson 1988).
Most significantly to my own work, Johnson-Laird goes to some 
lengths to explore the relationships between language and mental 
models, proposing that language is used to create models by proxy, 
and that it does not matter as far as psychological processes are 
concerned, whether those processes are real or imaginary. Language 
itself is understood through mental models. Much of what Bandler 
and Grinder (1975, 1975A, 1976, 1979), Bandler (1985), Bandler and 
MacDonald (1988) explored and proposed, that what they found from 
working in the field of personal change and psychotherapy, often bore 
resemblances to developments in cognitive psychology such as those
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of Norman, (Rumelhart and Norman 1985) Johnson-Laird, (1983) and 
De Beaugrande (1985), who wrote that:
It would seem reasonable to envision the mental representations 
as multi-directional networks constructed and annotated to serve 
all the levels of processing, including words and phrases. (De 
Beaugrande 1985:168).
One of the main differences between NLP and other more mainstream 
schools of psychology is the role assigned to the senses in the 
formation of cognitive maps. (I explain this in the next section.) There 
is little in cognitive psychology on the role of the sense in the 
formation of mental models. There are some exceptions. Kosslyn 
(1985) for instance, proposed that much long term memory is based 
on imagery, and that people can perform a variety of actions on their 
internal images, such as rotating them, scanning, zooming in or out 
or transforming them. He further suggested that people can 
"voluntarily form images of objects at different sizes and locations" 
(Kosslyn 1985:71). He does not specify the extent to which such 
'images' are constructed by means of the senses, or whether this had 
ever been empirically investigated.
Others have lately paid lip service to the idea that the senses may be 
part of internal modelling. Golledge et al (2000) recognised that:
"Most people, when building a knowledge structure or 
representation of places and environment, do not use 
instruments or mapped representations, but rely on the basic 
sense of vision, acoustics, touch and sensory, motor or 
proprioceptive experience to identify, encode and store 
environmental knowledge." (Golledge et al 2000:94).
Prevously, Gibbs and Colston (1995), working within the tradition of 
cognitive linguistics had recognised that what they term mental image 
schemas are at once visual, auditory kinaesthetic and tactile, and
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include the sense of balance. However they do not offer any ways of 
attempting to discover more about these. It is one of the most 
fundamental tenets of NLP, both in theory and practice, that we re­
create experience internally through our senses, through creating 
internal representations. Thus when we make internal representations 
we use our vision, hearing, kinaesthetic information, taste, smell and 
movement Internally. These may all be integral to our mysterious 
mapping processes, to how we make sense. I explain this in greater 
detail below.
3.2.4 Behaviourism and information processing; two different 
approaches.
Classical Behaviourists such as B.F. Skinner (1974) believed that we 
were essentially stimulus-response machines, so that learning and 
behaviour were nothing but responses to particular stimuli. Learning 
became equated with re-inforcement. On the other hand, the 
emergence of the information processing approach, reviewed by Klahr 
(1987) was closely linked to the growth in interest in artificial 
intelligence and robotics. Before that, Wiener had meticulously 
explored the differences between classical behaviourism and the 
implications to man and machine of the new paradigm of cybernetics 
and information processing, (Wiener 1961). Answers to the question 
'how do humans process information and then act on it?' became 
central to developing computer software that carried out the same 
processes. It came to be recognised that humans (and perhaps 
animals as well) may well have to construct some kind of internal 
representation or conceptual map. Then the focus of inquiry changed 
to exploring the characteristics and roles of the internal processes 
that were necessary to receive, store, recover and process 
information. They needed to make models of how people made 
models of their experiences. This changed the focus of psychological 
inquiry. Perrig (1999) has made a similar point.
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Through the dominance of the behaviourist tradition in the first 
part of this century, the focus was mainly on the action part, on 
performance. Cognitive psychology changed this focus and 
psychological studies started to contain lengthy elaborations on 
mental architecture and processes. (Perrig 1999:103).
With the growth of interest in artificial intelligence, it came to be 
realised that without more insights into such 'mental' processes, the 
investigation of any human behaviour was missing a whole dimension. 
Turing (in Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960) wrote that "a machine 
cannot be expected to simulate something that has never been 
described -  it can be held responsible only for those aspects of 
behaviour that an observer has recorded". (Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram 1960:46). The field is still at the stage of exploration; many 
authors have observed that we continue to lack an overall theoretical 
paradigm to account for human information processing and mapping. 
Van Dijk (1997) observed that "despite the rather extensive work on 
mental models, an explicit theoretical account of their internal 
structures has so far not been provided". (Van Dijk 1997:191). I hope 
that this work contributes something to this area.
3.2.5. Cybernetics
I introduce and explain some cybernetic theories, as I believe they 
may be a useful approach to our understanding of our cognitive 
processes. They also form one of the conceptual frameworks within 
which I carried out this study. The cybernetic theories of Gregory 
Bateson (1972) are relevant because they influenced the development 
of NLP.
Both cognitive psychology, and the developers of cybernetic thinking 
sought greater insights into what they called mental processes.
Bandler and Grinder, the founders of NLP, admit their debt to many of 
the first cyberneticians, such as Miller. In 1960, Miller, Galanter and 
Pribram (1960) wrote:
'A human being -  and probably other animals as well -  builds up 
internal representations, a model of the universe, a schema, a 
simulacrum, a cognitive map, an Image' (Miller et al 1960.7).
Miller and his co-workers argued that such internal representations 
(or plans) were necessary in order for any activity to be carried out 
successfully. They claimed that without an organism's ability to re­
construct an internal representation or map, either of experience or of 
a future outcome, there could be no meaningful behaviour. Learning 
thus became dependent on building up effective mental maps; 
simulacra of the 'real' world. They proposed that there could be no 
survival if an organism did not have the ability to somehow create 
such internal models. In order to operate successfully on the 
environment, the organism, in addition, needed some kind of imaginai 
thinking ability. This is part of what they termed the 'plan' which they 
believed was essential to connect knowledge, evaluation and action.
An organism was thus continuously interacting with its environment, 
and updating its 'maps'.
'Imaginai thinking is neither more nor less than constructing an 
image or model of the environment, running the model faster 
than the environment, and predicting that the event will behave 
as the model does.' (Miller et al 1960: 173)
This raises questions about the possible functions of such plans. Some 
cyberneticians suggest that in order for any activity to be able to be 
carried out successfully in the present, information about its desired 
outcome In the future must also be available to it from somewhere 
within the system. This introduction of the dimension of time into our 
understanding of information processing is one of the key differences 
between cybernetics and most other approaches and distinguishes 
the cybernetic approach from most other constructivist traditions.
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3.2.6. The Cybernetics of control and goal achievement; the 
TOTE.
Norman (1977) urged his contemporaries in cognitive psychology to 
include cybernetic explanations, proposing that there must be a 
regulatory apparatus, which 'runs' the system. Perrig (1999) has 
stressed the importance of developing our insights into what controls 
cognitive processes. Such controls may well be beyond conscious 
awareness, and even be one of the bases of intuitive knowledge.
Gregory Bateson was already exploring the concept of control in . 
cybernetic theory and our understanding of complex systems in the 
1950s and 1960s, (Bateson 1960). The idea that all complex systems 
needed a regulatory mechanism in order to function effectively and 
survive remains one of the most important tenets of cybernetics. 
(Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960, Wiener 1961, Ashby 1965,
Bateson 1972). Miller and his co-workers, exploring the implications 
of creating artificial intelligence, (Miller et al 1960) suggested that 
behaviour is organised at many levels of complexity, and is controlled 
and guided by plans existing as information already within the 
system. Such plans may be conscious or unconscious. These plans 
were essentially information about a future goal or outcome. They 
proposed that the fundamental unit of information processing which 
operated at the heart of all systems was the TOTE, an acronym for 
test-operate-test-exit. They distinguish this from the classical concept 
of the reflex arc, believing that the TOTE was the main process 
controlling all animate activities.
The TOTE became important to the development of my thinking about 
how we might construct our mental models. For this reason, I give a 
short account of this process. In cybernetics, there must be some 
information, or plans about future activities within the system. Plans 
are internal representations of what the system wants or needs to 
achieve. As long as people are alive and behaving, their plans are 
being executed. In order for the system to 'know' whether a plan is
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being achieved or not, it needs to compare its present state (i.e. 
information about what is happening in the 'now') with the desired 
planned outcome, (information about what should happen in the 
future). If there is a difference between the two, then the system is 
primed to respond to information in the form of negative feedback.
This is what Bateson referred to as 'news of difference', (Bateson 
1972). Negative feedback informs the system that something needs 
to change in order for the system to achieve the goal, i.e. that there 
is a difference between the present state and the desired outcome. If 
further operations are then carried out, and the state of the system 
becomes the same as the planned outcome, then the system 'tests' 
the differences between present state and desired state. If the activity 
is 'on track') then the feedback is positive, which is information that 
no changes in the activity are needed in order to achieve the goal. If 
the two (present state and desired state) become the same, then the 
system exits the goal directed activity, and ceases to strive to achieve 
the goal. The acronym TOTE is derived from this model. Hence test- 
ope rate-test- exit.
The first 'test' evaluates the difference between what is to be 
achieved, and what has been. Thus the TOTE process relies almost 
entirely on our abilities to compare, and to perceive similarities and 
differences. Bateson (1972) believed these to be fundamental 
epistemological processes. The 'operate' part of the TOTE is the 
system engaging in an action that furthers its path to achieving the 
goal. The third 'test' then evaluates what has now been achieved, and 
if the result matches the desired plan or outcome, then the action is 
exited ('exit'), or abandoned, having been completed.
This TOTE process is considered to be central to information 
processing, whether conscious or unconscious. This model is held to 
be as valid to explain how the nervous system controls the 
contraction of a muscle fibre, as it is to illuminate more complex 
activities such as learning, or finding food. Miller and his co-workers
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(1960) suggest that the TOTE is an organising and co-ordinating unit, 
which processes information occurring at many levels of complexity^ 
They also explored the questions about the relationships between 
energy and information. They suggested a hierarchical model in which 
energy represented the lowest level of abstraction, information the 
second level, and control the third. Cybernetics assumes that 
intentionality is an aspect of all systems.
More recently. Freeman (1999) echoes Miller's ideas about 
intentionality. He claims that neurophysiologists suggest that there 
are integrated neural frameworks which are needed for intentional 
action, because even the simplest action, such as finding food, needs 
a mechanism to co-ordinate the individual creature's position in the 
world in relation to that of its prey. It then has to be able to evaluate 
its progress during its planning of an attack, or escaping from danger. 
Freeman also suggests that the brain is able to co-ordinate visual, 
auditory, somothetic and olfactory information into 'gestalts', which 
then influence selective attention, expectancy and prediction of future 
events. This hints at a neurological basis for the TOTE process.
Bateson was intrigued by the implications of the TOTE to human 
information processing. He supported Mittelstaedt's distinctions 
between the processes of calibration and feedback, (in Bateson and 
Bateson 1988:42). Calibration is the process of referring to an 
aggregate of information, which is constellated into a plan. The 
marksman who sets his sights on a moving target is computing a 
large amount of information, including how it will be when the shot 
hits the target. This is calibration, which is a different activity from 
feedback. Feedback is the information about the extent to which the 
calibrated outcome is being met, or not. In the TOTE process, if the 
first 'test' elicits the information that the goal has not been achieved.
1 Thus, for Instance, every muscle fibre responds to Information generated by a TOTE 
carried out In the cerebellum, or the whole of a human organism can decide what he 
or she Is going to have for lunch. These reflect two different levels of complexity, yet 
are operated by the same process.
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then it is responding to negative feedback. If the 'test' finds that the 
plan has been achieved, then this is defined as positive feedback.
For Bateson, such activities were of necessity hierarchical. He uses 
the example of a thermostat controlling the central heating of a 
house. This is essentially a feedback mechanism, the thermostat 
being receptive to information about the temperature. It acts in the 
same way as the governor of a steam engine. If the ambient 
temperature is lower than that at which the thermostat is set, then 
this is negative feedback, indicating that more heat {i.e. a change) is 
needed. In other words, there are still differences between the 
present state and the desired state. When the temperature reaches 
the set degree, then the thermostat sends information to the boiler to 
switch itself off. However, there is a 'higher' level of complexity to this 
hierarchy. The person setting the thermostat, her needs, values and 
beliefs, have a controlling role in the heating of the house. She will 
TOTE as she sets the thermostat to her own outcomes. So this 
operation is at another level of control. These levels in turn may be 
controlled by yet'higher' factors, such as the ecological implications 
of burning fossil fuels, and so on.
Thus one of the main implications of cybernetic theory is that a 
system's goals must play a central role in its continuing functioning. 
This intentionality is an idea not dissimilar to Aristotle's final cause. 
Using this approach, we could not gain a full understanding of a 
phenomenon without-considering how-itsHntentionality operates.^ The 
cybernetic model proposes that the feedback, calibration and the 
TOTE may be the most fundamental of all information processing 
mechanisms, operating at all levels of complexity in organisms, from 
the sub-cellular to the societal.
"Crombie (1951) has pointed out that Aristotle distinguished between 
animate and inanimate things. Living things, in Aristotle's view, were able to 
initiate movement and change without at external mover. Both Aristotle and 
Galen made valuable discoveries about the organs of animals by seeking to 
understand their purpose or function. The main difference between the 
Aristotelian view, and cybernetics, is that for the Greeks purpose was 
perceived as something metaphysical.
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In cybernetics, intentionality is part of the physical information 
processing apparatus of any self-maintaining system.
There is a growing awareness in the literature of the importance of 
goals to the healthy functioning of individuals. Bandura (1997) has 
explored the importance of a person's goals, and how they relate to 
people's experience of their own self-efficacy. Tory-Higgins et al 
(1997) suggest that there are two kinds of goals. One has what they 
term a 'promotion focus' which relates to a desirable outcome, and 
the other is called a 'prevention focus', which is where the individual's 
goal is to avoid something unpleasant. They claim that there is a 
relationship between individuals' goal attainment, and them feeling 
good or bad. Foerster et al (1999) propose that motivation increases 
as one moves towards a goal. Motivation is also stronger when it is 
powered by a 'promotion focus' than by its opposite. Lebiere and Lee 
(2001) apparently (and if their bibliography is anything to go by, 
without being aware of Miller's views) re-discover the idea of the 
TOTE, but use a different terminology. They propose that 
uncompleted or only partially completed intentions are available as a 
context to the current goal. Once tasks are completed, they are 
removed from the current goal. This then produces an inhibitory effect 
on further activities. This is another way of describing the TOTE.
If there is any substance to Lebiere and Lee's views, then the goal 
must be of a different logical type to the actions leading to it. In 
cybernetic terms we would use the concept of positive and negative 
feedback as necessary information guiding intentional actions. As the 
internal representation of a goal is a complex aggregate of 
information, it must then be of a higher (more complex) logical level 
than the simpler actions used to achieve it. Such higher logical levels, 
operating on the system as goals, may then also act in a similar way 
to conceptual categories. Intriguingly, they then go on to suggest that 
there is an Intention Superiority Effect (ISE). They claim to show by 
means of empirical data and computational modelling, that intentions 
are the greatest determinants when people are successful in carrying
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out tasks such as memorising. Schaub (2001) believes that all 
behaviour is driven by intentions, describing them as a data structure 
comprising, besides the respective needs, one or more goals, which 
appear to be suitable to satisfy the current goal. He uses this as a 
basis for distinguishing different personality types, based on their 
individual approach to a goal.
It is as if we had come full circle back to the cybernetic viewpoint, and 
Bateson's thinking, which was so important to the development of 
Bandler and Grinder's work. Bateson stated that with the growth in 
cybernetic theory,
"the whole problem of purpose and adaptation -  the teleological 
problem in the widest sense -  had to be reconsidered ... what 
happened at the Macy meetings was an exploration of the 
enormous scope of these ideas in the explanation of biological 
and social phenomena". (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:53 -  54).
3. 3. 1. NLP, models and modelling.
NLP is both about the exploration of the nature of our subjective 
experience, and the role that language plays in thinking, (Bandler and 
Grinder 1975). Exploring the ways in which we make sense involves 
modelling, attempting to create an understanding or model of another 
person's internal world. The word modelling seems to have emerged 
directly as the result of the need to generate computer models that 
simulated human thought processes. With the emergence of cognitive 
psychology there came the recognition that inquiring into what went 
on in people's subjective experience was perhaps more important 
than experimenting with rats in mazes.
Eysenk (1993) suggests that with the growth of interest in 
information processing there occurred a'significant shift of attention 
to 'mental' processes in a number of fields. Clement (2000) has posed 
some questions that this shift generated for contemporary research
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into teaching and learning. Some of these were: what are the roles of 
mental models in learning? What is the nature of these models as 
knowledge structures? What learning processes are involved in 
constructing them? What teaching strategies can promote these 
learning processes? (Clement 2000).
Lakoff (1987), believed that we use mental models in order to 
attempt to understand the world. In particular we depend on them for 
our theorising about the world, and they allow us to make sense of 
mental phenomena. This is of interest to educationalists, particularly 
those favouring a constructivist approach, because learning is thought 
to involve the formation of cognitive maps. I draw from a number of 
psychological approaches, especially from those that intersect with my 
own approach. I believe that the topic is of importance to anyone 
interested in the processes involved in learning, and how these may 
be mediated by teaching.
In 1976 Bandler and Grinder, the founders of NLP, explained their 
own approach to the idea that in order for us to know, and to be able 
to act on the world, we humans had to be able to re-create an 
internal representation of'reality', through using all the senses 
internally. They used the term 'internal representation' specifically to 
refer to this aspect of knowing and making sense. I review their ideas 
in more depth later on in this chapter. They cite Vaihinger's work 
published in 1924^ (Bandler and Grinder 1976) as one of the sources 
which inspired them to further explorations. Gregory Bateson (1972) 
was perhaps one of their most influential mentors, as their neighbour, 
friend and prolific speculator and writer. He spent a great part of his 
life exploring how we humans, made sense of the myriads of bits of 
information that impinge on our sense organs throughout our lives, 
believing that only a new approach to our own mental processes 
would result In a greater understanding of understanding. In this he 
was influenced by Alfred Korzybski(1958), who was one of the first to
Vaihinger, H. (1924) The Philosophy of "As If". Routledge Kegan Paul, UK.
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explore the idea that mental processes might influence how we 
thought, understood and used language.
For both Korzybski and Bateson, the existence of such maps had a 
profound epistemological significance. They proposed that it was only 
through developing an understanding of the mapping processes 
themselves that we could arrive at any insights into how we knew. As 
early as 1941 Korzybski had distinguished between the mental 
processes we need to make sense of experience, and experience 
itself, urging that it was an epistemological necessity to understand 
that such internal maps were in no way to be confused with the 
'external territory'. In this he echoed Bertrand Russell, who according 
to Ernst Nagel (1960), had re-interpreted physics by proposing that 
what is experienced is distinct from the logical constructions 
subsequently put upon it by the observer.
In the 1970s some schools of psychotherapy, such as the Mental 
Research Institute in Palo Alto, California, and the approaches taken 
by practitioners of Brief Therapy, were quick to use developments in 
our understanding of internal processes. These included therapists 
deliberately inquiring into how people constructed their problematic 
experiences. What did patients see, hear, feel, taste, smell as they 
recollected? These traditions placed considerable emphasis on trying 
to understand the structure of the pathologies in people's cognitive 
maps, (Watzlawick 1967, Bateson 1972). Bandler and Grinder (1975, 
1976, 1979), Bandler (1982), were influenced by these approaches.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) and Bandler and MacDonald (1988) then 
developed an approach to therapy and change which depended wholly 
on understanding and working with people's subjectively experienced 
internal representations, beliefs and values, stressing the 
quintessential need for language to generate changes within these 
internal processes. They also recognised the extent to which 
individuals could be damaged through the pathological communication 
patterns from significant others.
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3.3.2. Bandler, Grinder and MacDonald's ideas on internal 
representations and sub-modalities; how the senses may 
be involved in information processing.
In this section I consider the approach to internal representations that 
has become part of current NLP theory and practice. It also 
represents a departure from many other ideas about mental models, 
which currently predominate in the literature. It has become part of 
received wisdom that we possess a complex interactive processing 
mechanism, simulating, yet adapting and responding to incoming 
information, forming a kind of dynamic map, a simulacrum of 
experience which is then responsible for generating our responses. 
Bandler and Grinder (Grinder and Bandler 1976, Bandler and 
MacDonald 1988) claim to have discovered a significantly different 
aspect of people's internal cognitive models, which seems to have 
escaped the notice of mainstream cognitive psychologists.
This difference is that people create what are specifically termed 
internal representations, which could be described as a part of 
people's mental models. However, in internal representations, all the 
senses are involved in creating or re-creating experience for the 
conceiver. So people can see, hear, feel, taste, smell, be aware of 
movement, experience changes in temperature, and the other 
physiological concomitants of associated emotions as they think about 
an experience. It does not matter whether the experience that is 're­
presented' is a memory, a reflection, a future goal, or a daydream. 
Thinking always involves using the senses internally, as it were, to 
code experience.
My information gathering focused on exploring these areas. 
Information about this aspect is almost completely missing from other 
approaches to modelling how we know, and how we process 
information. It is also absent from most mainstream educational
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theories. It was of particular interest to me, as it is one of the areas 
which I explored in my data collecting, and which I describe further in 
Chapters 6 -  10.
There are some references to internal representations in the 
therapeutic literature. Knox (2000), for instance, investigated people's 
internal representations of their therapists. She found that not only 
did they use visual, auditory and kinaesthetic modalities when they 
were introspecting about the therapists, some also used these images 
to gain comfort and reassurance when away from the therapist.
When one is working at the level of internal representations and sub­
modalities, questions about 'how do we know' inevitably occur. 
Traditional psychology, cast in the Cartesian dualistic mode (Damasio 
1994, 2000), usually ignores the role of the body and the emotions in 
cognition. This is nowhere more typified than in some of the recent 
publications in cognitive linguistics. Grady (2000) reviews his ideas on 
what some of the basic cognitive processes might be, but ignores the 
role of physiological processes or feelings. Gibbs (2001) explores 
blending theory in relation to cognition. Blending theory suggests that 
meaning is produced through the "blending" of different mental 
"spaces" (Fauconnier 1994,1997, Fauconnier and Turner 2000, 2002). 
Gibbs proposes that blending theory offers some provocative ideas 
about how people represent information and map different domains of 
knowledge to create what he terms 'blended spaces'. (Gibbs 
2000:352). Fie also cites seven characteristics of cognitive models, 
originally published by Markham in 1999 as a guide to further 
research. In none of these is there any mention of body, feelings, 
emotions, goal setting, or motivation"^, let alone any role for the 
senses.
Markham's Proposals, cited by Gibbs (2001) as defining cognitive models.
1. Cognitive models must be based on representations that actually 
represent.
2. Cognitive models must adopt multiple approaches to representation
3. Cognitive models must use representations at multiple grain size.
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In Bandler and MacDonald's (1988) view, if all the senses are used to 
create an internal representation, then feelings or bodily sensations 
must also be involved. Internal representations are thus not only 
neuro-physiological phenomena, they may also be linked to 
physiological processes. Damasio (2000) expresses such a view from 
his standpoint as a neuro-physiologist, Even when we merely 
think about an object, we tend to reconstruct memories not just of a 
shape or color but also of the perceptual engagement the object 
required and of the accompanying emotional reaction, regardless of 
how slight", (Damasio 2000:148). Kerzel el al (2001), writing from a 
similar position, suggest that the most recent neurological research in 
this area points to cognitive maps both influencing perception and 
simultaneously activating patterns of motor responses. Perception and 
action, in their view, are fed by a common, cognitively penetrable, 
representation.
The importance given to the domain of the senses as essential parts 
of the structures of internal representations appears to be unique to 
NLP. In Bandler's view, a phobia is a memory or image of something 
that is linked to an overwhelming bodily feeling, which produces a 
strong fight-fright-flight response whenever it is accessed. In 
cybernetic theory, body and mind are not separate entities, (the split 
is purely a linguistic one); they are parts of the same cybernetic 
system. They are not distinguishable, except conceptually. Bateson 
described the Cartesian split as "the battleground of science, 
especially of biology (...) and the problem is how to get away from it", 
(Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:176). In his cybernetic epistemology 
there is another split of a fundamentally epistemological nature; the 
split between the map that we have conceptualised, and the terrain of
4. Cognitive models must be clear about the specification of process.
5. Cognitive models must attend to the details of processing as well as 
its gross form.
6. Cognitive models must attend to social context.
7. Cognitive models must attend to the relationship between the 
individual and the world.
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experience. This, in his view, may forever remain an ontological 
conundrum to us. Bateson recounted at a lecture given at Lindisfarne 
in 1975: "I keep coming back to the assertion that what we deal with 
are descriptions, second order representations of how it is. How it 
primarily is we don't know, we can't get there", (Bateson, in 
Donaldson 1991:182). This is reminiscent of Zeno's paradox, for it 
has a similar structure. Is the only thing that we know, perhaps, that 
we cannot know?
3.3.3 Sub-modalities
One of the main areas I inquired into in my own data gathering was 
the changes that occurred in people's internal representations as I 
asked them to respond to certain of my words or phrases. I was often 
asking people to report on their experiences of what Bandler and 
Grinder termed sub-modalities. Bandler and Grinder (1976) stressed 
that our senses are critical to the coding of information and the 
construction of our internal models. They propose that there is great 
significance in the small distinctions within each sensory modality. 
These distinctions are called sub-modalities.
Sub-modality distinctions are revealed by asking people about their 
internal representations of events. For instance, are the internal 
images in colour or black and white? Moving or still? What sort of 
sounds are associated with an internal representation? Are they 
accompanied by an internal dialogue? Are the sounds loud or soft, 
near or far? What bodily or kinaesthetic responses contribute to a 
particular internal representation? (Bandler and MacDonald 1988).
When using NLP to work with people, we explore what and how 
people have re-represented internally, before making any kind of 
intervention. In order to do this we need to know how to make people 
conscious of their own processes at this level, as well as how to 
question people about their experience of these processes.
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Bandler and Grinder were some of the first people to focus 
deliberately on this aspect of people's internally coded information in 
their therapeutic work. They also paid attention to what was 
happening at this level when they were modelling people s conceptual 
processes. This meant they had to develop an approach to 
questioning which would elicit the information stored at those levels.
An example taken from one of Richard Bandler's seminars illustrates 
this approach, (Andreas 1999). In the following extract Bandler is 
asking people to compare their own internal representations of two 
different memories, then to explore how changing some of the 
variables could result in a subjective change of meaning for them. He 
does this so that people easily become aware of their own domains of 
internal representation, and learn about sub-modality distinctions at 
the same time.^
"There is another fascinating phrase that has always stuck in my 
mind. When you're going through something unpleasant, people 
will often say, "Later, when you look back on this, you'll be able 
to laugh". How many people in here have a memory of an event 
that was unpleasant to them at the time, but now you can look 
back on it and laugh? There must be something you do in your 
mind in the meantime that makes an unpleasant experience 
funny later. I want you to compare those two memories to find 
out how they're different in terms of visual sub-modalities -  the 
smaller process elements that make up a visual mental 
experience. Do you see yourself in one and not the other? Is one 
a slide and one a movie? Is there a difference in color, size, 
brightness or location? Find out what's different and then try 
changing the process variables of that unpleasant picture to 
make it like the one that you can already laugh at. If the one you 
can laugh at is far away, make that one far away too. If you see 
yourself in the one you laugh at, see yourself in the experience
This forms an important aspect of training in NLP.
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that is still unpleasant. Go ahead." (Bandler, quoted in Andreas 
1999:23-24).
This passage illustrates how Bandler teaches people about their own 
internal representations. I am continually surprised when I train in 
NLP, how easily people can access their own internal representations 
of events, whether past, present, or future, and then go on to 
explore the sub-modality distinctions between them without apparent 
difficulty. In my own personal experience the very rare exceptions 
have been when individuals have apparently suffered some profound 
trauma. Then it may become difficult for them to access certain 
internal representations. These may, quite appropriately, be 
suppressed as part of a coping mechanism. (Perren-Klinger 1998, 
Mathison 1999). There is also some interest in using NLP to enhance 
teaching, (Hager 1989, 1990, 1992, Lee, 1993 Sandhu, 1994, 
Stanton, 1994,).
There has also been interest in the use of NLP in coaching and 
personal development work, (Thompson et al 2002). Many types of 
interventions can be made at the levels of people's internal 
representations and sub-modalities. This approach has also been used 
to coach top athletes. Steve Collins (1995) for instance, used an NLP 
trained personal coach,^ before his fight with Chris Eubank. A short 
extract from Collins' autobiography illustrates how coaches can work 
with people at the level of internal representations and sub­
modalities. The coach asks Collins to shrink the internal image he has 
generated of his opponent before the fight. This is essentially asking 
him to change a sub-modality, an aspect of the internal visual image. 
In the following extract the coach has enabled Collins to access his 
internal representations about the coming fight, then change the sub­
modalities so that his feelings about the approaching fight changed. 
Collins wrote that:
This person had been one of my students in NLP.
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"Sports psychologists have discovered that when a boxer, a 
tennis player or an athlete who competes as an individual is 
frightened or intimidated by an opponent, he'll actually see that 
person as being physically bigger than he really is. Again, he (the 
coach) asked me to picture Eubank, standing opposite me in a 
ring. 'Reduce him in size,' he said. 'He's getting smaller ... smaller 
... smaller. And I did, until I towered over him by at least a foot". 
(Collins 1995:173).
Our senses may have two vital functions; one is to receive 
information from the environment, the other is to re-create 
experience internally. The existence of such internal structures is 
taken for granted by anyone who has participated in workshops or 
seminars on NLP. When working to effect changes in people, internal 
representations and their sub-modalities are often one of the main 
'sites' at which to target interventions. Bandler claims to be able to 
cure phobias by working with people almost entirely at the sub­
modality level of their conception of the phobic event, (Andreas 
1999).
Some of the areas in which an understanding of internal 
representations and sub-modalities has been shown to be of use 
includes the investigation and treatment of post-traumatic stress 
disorders, (Perren-Klinger 1992, 1998, Walsh 1992). It has also been 
applied to personal coaching (Faulkner 1999) enhancing sportsmen 
and women's performance (Wanless 1987, Collins and Howard 1995) 
and to improving students' abilities to memorise and understand, 
(Mathison 1999).
Despite its track record in business, management, and sports 
coaching, NLP remains outside mainstream psychological and 
phenomenological inquiry. Most of the published accounts of working 
with NLP in a variety of contexts are anecdotal. Sometimes people 
become suspicious of the approach, perceiving it as manipulative . 
There have been some publications on NLP. They range from the
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enthusiastic (Thompson, et al 2002, Lyali 2002, Reynolds, 2002) to 
the critical (Platt 2001, Craft 2001).
NLP makes many claims about how to go about modelling people's 
subjective experiences. What is lacking, however, from the founders 
of NLP, and many of their students, is any rigorous experimental 
inquiry into the nature of theses internal representations. Internal 
representations and their sub-modality distinctions are simply and 
uncritically accepted as one of many aspects of everyone's ability to 
code and process information. Indeed Bandler and Grinder (1975) 
claim that the classical scientific approach would be entirely 
inappropriate to this field, as one of their most fundamental beliefs is 
that every individual is unique in the way in which he or she re­
constructs and responds to information. However, I believe one can 
demonstrate the existence of internal representations and sub­
modalities, however subjective and fleeting these phenomena may 
appear, through introspection.
If  there is any substance to the notion of the existence of the domain 
of internal representations, then this opens up new directions for 
investigation. There are new questions that can be posed. These 
include: what do our senses do in the construction of internal 
representations? What effects does language have on these internal 
processes in particular?
There also remain some thorny methodological questions, such as 
'what ways are the most appropriate to such an inquiry?'The proposal 
is that human beings re-represent information internally in the form 
of complex simulacra of sensory data, which can be influenced by 
language. What remains central to this inquiry is the belief that 
people's internal representations are accessible, and can be 
approached as a domain of consciousness, which can be interrogated. 
They may appear as phantasmagoria to the more empirically minded, 
and are as evanescent as any phantasm, yet working with them
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phenomenologically is almost like entering another domain of
consciousness. ^
3,4.1 Abstraction, categorisation, classification, logical levels; 
thinking about thinking about sense-making.
The processes of abstraction and categorisation are relevant to this 
inquiry because they involve both cognition and language. In this 
section I review some ideas about how abstraction and categorisation 
may influence our thinking. I include in the next chapter information 
about some of the ways in which language too can categorise. I have 
gone into this area in some detail, as my own findings were that these 
levels played an important role in people's approach to learning, and 
to being 'taught'.
Korzybski's work Science and Sanity (Korzybski 1958), originally 
published in 1933, was one of the first to explore the implications of 
the processes of abstraction to both mathematics and linguistics, as 
well as to how we know that we know. It was also one of the works 
that influenced the development of many of Bandler and Grinder's 
ideas. Korzybsky proposed that abstraction was fundamental to 
human thinking processes, and not without its dangers. The process 
of abstraction essentially involves the aggregation of information into 
classes or categories. Korzybsky was influenced by Bertrand Russell's 
(1921) insistence that our views of logic had to be entirely revised as 
the result of his (Russell's) theory of logical types. In a nutshell, it 
proposes that there was a significant epistemological distinction to be 
made between an individual event, and the group or category to 
which it was assigned. The individual could never be the group 
because they were two different logical types.
 ^I  describe this aspect of my explorations in Chapters 6 -9 .
In 1910 Russell (Russell 1960) had urged the necessity of 
distinguishing between what was experienced through the senses, 
and the constructions and definitions placed upon this through 
theorising. Here we have the germ of the important distinction 
between logical levels; sense data are of a different logical type, and 
at a different level, than the abstractions to which they are linked to 
in the conceiver. We could say that internal representations are a 
different logical type to the class or category to which the represented 
experience is assigned. Both are essential to making sense. It could 
also be said that language could be thought of as yet another logical 
type.
The epistemological pitfalls for human reasoning encountered through 
the processes of abstraction remained a lasting fascination for 
Gregory Bateson. He frequently wrote about the importance of being 
able to distinguish between different logical levels, in order to 
understand human (and even animal) behaviour. Among his most 
enduring contributions was his analysis of the aetiology of 
schizophrenic thinking (Bateson 1972) which could only be 
understood on the basis of a sufferer's inability to assign messages to 
their 'correct' logical category.
His best-known example is illustrated by the two statements 'fruit- 
flies like a banana' and 'time flies like an arrow'. These can only be 
understood if they are assigned to their 'correct' class of 
communication. The first statement belongs to the category 'literal 
statement' the second one is metaphorical. Bateson's view was that in 
'schizophrenogenic' families, victims were unable to assign the second 
statement to the 'correct' category of metaphor. They may even have 
been prevented from doing so through confusing communications 
from significant others. There are no such insects as time flies, nor do 
they feed on arrows. To be able to assign incoming information to its 
correct category is, in this view, critical to any act of making sense.
To be prevented from doing so, can lead to psychopathologies of 
thinking.
87
The processes of abstraction have also been of considerable interest 
to linguists, philosophers, logicians, educationalists and psychologists. 
George Lakoff (1987) in his seminal work Women, Fire and Dangerous 
Things explores the processes of categorisation and their philosophical 
implications, arguing for an essentially subjectivist view of knowledge. 
He suggested that how information was categorised, influenced how it 
was then perceived. In his view, to change the very concept of a 
category was to change not only our concept of the mind, but also 
people's understanding of the world. Categorisation was, in his view, 
so fundamental an epistemological process that people tended to 
attribute a real existence to the categories themselves. For Lakoff, 
categorisation was an equally fundamental aspect of the architecture 
of all conceptual models. "There is nothing more basic than 
categorisation to our thought, perception, action and speech", (Lakoff 
1987:5). Lakoff also rejects the legacy of Cartesian dualism, stressing 
that in his view, concepts were embodied. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
wrote: "... our categories arise from the fact that we are neural 
beings, from the nature of our bodily capacities, from our experience 
interacting with the world, and from our evolved capacity of basic 
level organisation" (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:30). Knott, Sanders and 
Oberlander (2001) agree with Lakoff and Johnson that "human beings 
categorise the world around them, usually unconsciously", (Knott et al 
2001:198).
It has now become part of received wisdom to suppose that our 
central nervous systems have a way of ordering information into 
classes and categories. Rosch, (1977), whose work influenced Lakoff, 
sums this up in a passage reminiscent of Bateson's own approach:
One of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up 
of the environment into classification by which non-identical 
stimuli can be treated as equivalent [....] the objects of the world 
are determinately structured because levels of abstraction in
class-inclusion hierarchies are themselves not structured but 
highly random. (Rosch 1977: 212 - 213).
Nelson (1977) believed that categorisation was a primary cognitive 
function. In her view, categorisation involved the grouping of events 
into aggregates based on perceived similarity. This presupposes that 
the ability to perceive similarities is a necessary perceptual process. 
The ability to categorise and classify is thought to be of great 
importance to how individuals act on the environment. The 
evolutionary biologist MacPhail (1998) argues that this is one of the 
most basic of survival mechanisms. The social psychologists Sia, Lord, 
Blessum, Ratcliffe and Lepper (1997) believe that there is a 
relationship between how something is categorised, and a person's 
consequent attitude and behaviour towards it. Witten brink. Gist and 
Hilton (1997), and Hahn and Chater (1997) propose that judgements 
and actions are based not on individual instances, but on the category 
to which the conceiver has assigned an event. Then categories are 
thought to act as a kind of blueprint, which contains within it 
templates informing subsequent behaviour and cause effect relations. 
Minsky (1977) suggests that we use such frames as a kind of data 
structure for representing new situations.
Weick (2001), approaching the subject of categorisation from the 
point of view of management psychology, emphasises the importance 
of categorisation to sense making, and the effects of changing the 
perception of a task through re-categorisation.
" If  a person justifies a decision to accept an unpleasant 
assignment with the explanation that it will be a challenge and 
an opportunity, that person often can create just such attractions 
and solidify the justification by the way he or she performs the 
assignment", (Weick 2001:23).
Cazden (1988) cites an example of the influence of a perceived 
context (which acts in the same way as a category or class to which
the perception of an action is assigned) on the responses of 
schoolchildren to a command.
"In two soviet experiments, preschool children were able to 
stand still longer when asked to "be a guard" (contextualised 
instruction) than when asked simply to stand still", (Cazden 
1988:116).
Price-Davies and Knowles (1999) have described the effects on people 
when their existing conceptual frames are disrupted, and replaced 
with others. Goldstone, (1998) who heads the Percepts and Concepts 
Laboratory at Indiana State University, has researched the perceptual 
and cognitive processes involved in, and influenced by, categorisation 
and abstraction. He proposes that assigning events or 'things' to 
particular groupings or categories influences what is then attended to, 
and what is not. There are, in his view and those of his co-workers, at 
least nine different perceptual effects that categorisation can 
potentially exert on the perceiver. I have listed them fully, as they 
indicate the potential powers of categories to influence perception.
The words that are used can also assign events to categories in subtle 
ways. (This inter-relationship between language and categorisation 
will be re-visited in other chapters.)
Categorical Perception: Differences among items that fall into 
different categories are exaggerated, and differences among 
items that fall into the same category are minimised. (Goldstone 
2001A)
Attention: One of the simplest ways in which thoughts distort 
perception is by highlighting or emphasising certain aspects that 
are momentarily important, (Goldstone 2001B)
Dimensionalization: We create perceptual dimensions (size, 
brightness, saturation, eccentricity) by witnessing variation along 
these dimensions. We tend to order objects by their value on
dimensions that we create or already possess. Objects are 
originally perceived holistically, without being decomposed into 
separate dimensions, come to be perceived analytically, in terms 
of their underlying dimensions, (Goldstone 2001C).
Unitization: If a group of shapes form a coherent, contiguous 
pattern and are often repeated together, a single chunk or unit 
will be formed by concatenating them together. Unitization 
creates a single unit from multiple parts that occur together. 
(Goldstone 2001D).
Segmentation: We naturally see objects as being composed out 
of parts. Instead of perceiving indivisible objects, we perceive 
objects in terms of their labelled or categorised parts. We break 
objects into parts that we have learned are relevant or 
important, (Goldstone 2001E).
Assimilation and contrast: We distort the dimension values of an 
object so that they become more like the values typically seen 
for the object's category, or less like the values seen for 
contrasting categories. (Goldstone 2001F).
Differentiation: With expertise or practice, differences are 
noticed between objects that were once thought to be identical. 
(Goldstone 2001G).
Idealisation: Objects are often simplified so as to capture the 
basic essence of the underlying concept. (Goldstone 2001H).
Elaboration: the filling in of perceptual details according to what 
we know of the object. It is the opposite of idealisation in that it 
involves creating richer, rather than more impoverished 
representations. (Goldstone 20011).
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What may be significant about this list is that all these different 
factors may also be communicated through language. They give a hint 
that when we use language to categorise something, then it is likely 
that this could have an influence on perception and thought, and thus 
on behaviour. Gipps and MacGllchrist (2002) have, for instance, 
reviewed this in terms of teachers' perceptions of their students' 
abilities, and how this influenced their attitudes to them.
There has been some interest in what happens when people's existing 
categories are changed. In some clinical studies of human 
interactions, applying the notion that thinking and making sense 
always involved categorisation of some kind has developed clinical 
research into pathological communication patterns. In the 1960s, 
Watzlawick and his co-workers (Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson 
1967) had proposed that communication was multi-level; that all 
messages had to include meta-messages about the category to which 
the original message was to be assigned. Such meta-messages were 
communicated non-verbally. They explored how the multi-level nature 
of all communication could result in many misunderstandings and 
pathologies. Watzlawick was one of the original people at the Palo Alto 
Mental Research Institute, whose work was partly inspired by Gregory 
Bateson's approach to human thinking and epistemology, (Weakland 
1994). Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974) explained how their 
clinical approach to psychotherapy had as one of Its essential bases 
Evariste Galois' Theory of Groups, and Russell and Whitehead's 
Theory of Logical Types. In 1977 Watzlawick and Weakland produced 
a seminal book, which showed the ways in which behavioural 
pathologies could be analysed in terms of destructive communication 
patterns. These always involved producing confusion between more 
than one level of meaning, or categorisation. What this means, if one 
applies this model, is that just as human information processing 
involves categorisation as an essential part of the construction of 
mental maps or constructs, so all acts of communication between
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humans must contain information about the category to which the 
message is to be assigned.®
Bandler and Grinder (1982) argue that changing the conceptual 
framework that people have constructed around a problematic event 
can alter the meaning that they have made of it. They also believe 
that this is the basis of all therapeutic change. O'Hanlon and Wilk 
(1987) wrote extensively about the psychotherapeutic effects of 
changing patients' perceived contexts and frames, and the effects this 
had on their subsequent well being. This is another way of saying that 
re-categorisation affects how events are experienced and responded 
to.
The Investigation of the processes of abstraction and categorisation 
have become of interest to researchers in both cognitive and 
educational psychology. It is as if these processes are now taken for 
granted. Underwood and James (1996) wrote that: "Historically the 
ground has shifted in the debate over the nature of the representation 
of knowledge from an argument over whether an abstraction occurs 
or n o t... to a position where abstraction is a phenomenon accepted by 
many." (Underwood and James 1996:25.)
Thus abstracting and categorising may be as necessary to the 
construction of mental mapping processes or mental models as are 
internal representations. According to this approach, we cannot form 
mental maps, or process information without having performed some 
sort of grouping or classification. Murphy and Lassaline (1997) 
suggest that a particularly important way of organising concepts is
® One of my findings from the Master Practitioners' interviews of students 
having attended an NLP course was that how they categorised themselves as 
learners had undergone significant changes. I describe these in Chapter 10.
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through a hierarchical arrangement.^ This introduces the idea that 
organising information into different logical levels may also be an 
aspect of our cognitive ordering of information. These processes raise 
interesting epistemologlcal conundrums, such as Epimenides' 
paradox, and the Double Bind theory (Bateson 1972). Questions such 
as: 'what are their functions in learning and how does language 
influence them?^ remain intriguing. De Beaugrande (1985) proposes 
that "it would seem reasonable to envision the mental representations 
as multi-directional frameworks, constructed and annotated to serve 
all the levels of processing, including words and phrases." (De 
Beaugrande 1985:168) There also remains the possibility that how 
learners categorise their experiences of learning may influence their 
Internal representations about learning. These are some aspects 
which were explored later in the data gathering and analysis stage of 
this inquiry.
3.4.2 Metaphors
Any consideration of the processes of abstraction and categorisation 
would be incomplete without some mention of the recognition that 
has been accorded to the idea that metaphors also play a 
fundamental role in how we know. Metaphors also bridge cognition 
and linguistics. The recognition of their importance was catalysed by 
the publication of Lakoff and Johnson's work Metaphors we Live By in 
1980. Since then there has been increasing interest in the cognitive 
influence of metaphors and their epistemologlcal significance. 
Indurkhya (1992) echoes the views of Lakoff and Johnson, believing 
that metaphor but pervades all aspects of cognition is not just a 
phenomenon of language, and Is indispensable to understanding. The 
cognitive aspects of metaphor cannot be separated from language. 
Christa Baldauf (1997) believes that metaphors fulfil a central 
function to human understanding, as they make abstract concepts
9 Thus, the sentence "My dog Daisy is a black and white Border Collie" 
contains within it at least six levels of abstraction. l,Dog, 2)Collie, 3)Border 
Collie, 4)Black and White Border Collies, 5)0ther ones called Daisy, 6) Daisy.
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accessible. She refers to them as "ein Uebersetzungsmedien", which, 
loosely translated means a medium for translation. Thomas and 
Mareschal (2001) write that the metaphorical process is in some ways 
similar to that of classification. Both are equally basic epistemologlcal 
processes. "Metaphorical meaning emerges as a result of deliberate 
misclassification" (Thomas and Mareschal 2001:12) so they function 
as a different kind of classification. (Mis-classification is still 
classification!) They go on to explain that "categorisation causes a 
transformation of the input vector to make it more consistent with the 
category. Metaphor occurs when the novel input is not a member of 
the category to which it is applied." (Thomas and Mareschal 2001). 
Bateson (1972) refers to the process whereby two mental events are 
linked to form a new meaning as abductiont suggesting that this too 
was a basic epistemologlcal process.
Metaphors themselves only "work" If they are able to make links 
between what could be two different logical types, even if they initially 
appear to be mis-matched. The process o f 'métaphorisation' may thus 
be essential to any act of making sense. We seem only to have begun 
to gain insights into how we know that we know, how we map 
experience, and the power of categories to shape information.
3.5.1 Unconscious processes.
The term unconscious is difficult to define with accuracy. I Include a 
consideration of unconscious processes here because in my data 
gathering, I seemed to be working with material from people that 
seemed often, metaphorically, to come from the border between their 
conscious and unconscious processes. In the analysis of the text of 
some interviews, I conclude that it Is likely that unconscious 
processes played a role in people's approaches to learning.
There has recently been increasing recognition that many of our 
information processing activities may act below the level of our 
conscious awareness. Some of the processes, such as forming
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Internal representations, ordering information into categories and 
logical levels, apprehending meaning through metaphor, may all be 
beyond conscious awareness. They may also involve the conceivers' 
emotions and other physiological factors such as their levels of 
physiological arousal. Thus there may be unconscious processes, 
which play an important role in learning and behaviour.
This has led to increasing interest in the activities of the psychological 
unconscious, how "mental structures, processes and states can 
Influence experience, thought and action outside of phenomenal 
awareness and voluntary control." (Dorfman, Shawer and Kihlstrom 
(1996:260). Knowlton (1997) refers to the apparently separate 
conscious and unconscious conceptual activities as declarative and 
non-declarative knowledge. Categorisation is certainly a process over 
which we seem to have little conscious control, yet it is critical to how 
we order information, and therefore to our epistemology.
The idea of the existence of unconscious mental processes has been 
mooted from classical times to the emergence of the psycho-analytic 
movement, Plato to Freud as it were, (Rey 2000). Perrig, Wippich and 
Perrig-Chiello (1993) suggest that the concept of unconscious 
processes has been slow to be taken up by mainstream cognitive 
psychologists because of the difficulty of investigating these 
empirically. Their position is that Psychology is a long way from 
having a clearly defined and workable model of consciousness Itself, 
let alone of the unconscious. Historically, the unconscious has been 
mostly explored through introspection. They suggest that 
consciousness itself can never be fully modelled, as individual 
consciousness can only be experienced by an individual. The 
constructs, models, theories and generalisations that are derived from 
experimental data cannot be applied to an individual's most private 
insights into their own unique inner worlds. "When we take our 
mental situations as personally relevant, private data, then we must 
abandon the notion that such data can be the basis of any generalised
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theory", (p l7 , author's translation)/^ They further suggest that a 
phenomenological approach to exploring human experience is as valid 
as a 'scientific' one.
This is not the place for a review of the history of the idea of the 
unconscious, or its many applications. This has been done extensively 
elsewhere, for instance in Underwood (1996) and Windmann (1997). 
This concept has formed a metaphorical backbone for most if not all 
of Psychoanalytic theory developed over the last Century. I t  has also 
been extensively explored in the literature on hypnosis, particularly 
within the Ericksonian tradition, (Bandler and Grinder 1975A, Grinder, 
DeLozier and Bandler 1977, Erickson 1980, Hall 1989). Underwood 
(1996) has reviewed the emergence of interest in unconscious 
processes, and Tolk and Reingold (1996) have explored the 
unconscious relationships between motivation, categorisation and 
retrieval. Perrig and Wippich (1995) have researched the idea of 
intuitive judgements as the product of an unconscious organisation or 
structuring of perception.
There is also the question of the role of the unconscious in memory, 
(Meier and Perrig 2000). Perrig (1999) claims to have demonstrated 
that people can discriminate between an array of shapes, picking out 
the one that does not fit, (in other words, belongs to a different 
category) without being aware of how they do It. Windmann (1997) 
has reviewed some work on unconscious recognition of sensory 
stimuli. There has also been intriguing work on the unconscious 
effects of metaphor (Bettelheim 1976, Gick and Holyoak 1977, 
Watzlawick 1978), which indicates that the structures embedded 
behind the language of story or metaphor are processed 
unconsciously, and then Influence subsequent information processing.
Wenn wir mentale Zustaende a!s persoenlich relevante, private "Daten' 
begreifen, muessen wir davon ausgehen dass solche "Daten" nicht die 
Grundlage einer ailgemein akzeptablen Theorle sein koennen.
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Gregory Bateson was intrigued by the unconscious effects of 
communication. He was one of the earliest people to suggest that one 
of the unconscious' most vital functions was that of assigning 
Incoming information to categories. The notion of semantic priming is 
of more recent origin. Dorfman (Dorfman et al 1996) cites Yaniv and 
Meyer's (1987) proposal that "subjects are sensitive to, or influenced 
by, knowledge structures that are activated below the level required 
for conscious awareness" (Dorfman et a! 1996 p 275). These 
knowledge structures may be embedded in linguistic forms. This is 
one of the core assumptions of the Ericksonian tradition of hypno­
therapy.
An Increased emphasis on the importance of unconscious processes in 
learning is emerging. Johnson-Laird (1983) in his exploration of 
mental modelling, suggested that we have no way of knowing how 
our mental constructs are produced. We cannot be aware of every 
step in deduction, or of the extent to which our mental models 
actually correspond to the physical world. Neither do we know how we 
retrieve, only what we retrieve. He ends by proposing that "all 
learning depends on unconscious processes" (Johnson-Laird 
1983:467).
There is now a tendency to use the term implicit rather than 
unconscious in the literature. It is proposed that there are Implicit 
and explicit memory and perception, (Dorfman et a! 1996). It is also 
argued that Intuition and Incubation are unconscious processes, being 
aspects of implicit thought and cognition.
Explicit memory refers to conscious recall or recognition of 
events, while implicit memory refers to any effect an experience, 
thought or action that is attributable to past events in the 
absence of conscious recollection of those events" (Dorfman et a! 
1996:260).
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3.5.2. Emotions and performance
One emerging area of interest is the study of the role of the emotions 
in many kinds of human activities. I Include them here because they 
may be consciously or unconsciously experienced. It  is likely that 
subtle changes In a person's physiology can affect cognition. Among 
the proponents of these are Damasio (1994, 2000) and Goleman, 
(1996, 2003). Perrig (1995) also challenges the historical emphasis 
on exploring 'pure' cognitive processes, proposing that "not only do 
organisms use phenomenological Information in a decision making 
process before showing consciously controlled behaviour", but that 
"feelings and emotions, even physiological variants played a 
significant role. The phenomenological discriminations, feelings or 
emotions thus mediate information that Is not yet knowledge". (Perrig 
1995:25). Can we ever be aware of all the physiological and 
emotional factors that are at work as we think on things?
Another development in this area is the Increasing interest in the 
effects of emotional states on people's cognitive performances. For
instance, Frascara (1999) has suggested that the complexities of 
human cognitive performance are dependent on context and its multi- 
dimensionality. He wrote that:
" It is clear that previous experiences, fear, beliefs, arousal level, 
moods, expectations, purposes, models of behaviour, familiarity, 
adaptability, intelligence and temperament all play roles In 
cognitive performance" (Frascara 1999:78).
Interest in the influence of individuals' physiological states on their 
abilities to process Information has produced much research in this 
area, especially from within the field of the cognitive sciences. It has 
offered sonne tantalising conclusions. Harber and Pennebaker (1992) 
have made the startling suggestion that people who have undergone 
traumatic events, and are better able to write well organised 
narratives on their ordeals, have better immune functioning. Bower
99
(1992) suggests "our emotional reactions are triggered by 
'computational demons' (s/cj in the brain that monitor how our plans 
are faring during execution," (Bower 1992:5). He also proposed that 
the arousal of a particular emotion activates a repertoire of responses 
or action plans, so that It is as if  each emotion produces a particular 
script, or perceptual category, or themes and ways of interpreting the 
world, as well as acting as perceptual filters. Strong emotional 
concomitants to learning produce strong learning, whereas depression 
and anxiety can decrease learning. Cannon (1999) believes that 
concepts such as 'failure' carry a powerful and influential emotional 
sting.
Handler (1992) takes a constructivist approach, proposing that 
people's schemas (another term for cognitive maps) have emotional 
concomitants which express some aspect of an individual's value 
system. These originate as visceral responses, which may involve a 
degree of autonomic arousal. Revelle and Loftus (1992) write that it is 
their "suspicion that both arousal and affect have substantive and 
some qualitatively different effects on information processing." (RevelI 
and Loftus 1992:141). Heuer and Reisberg (1992) found that vivid 
experiences produce vivid memories, and that arousal can narrow 
focus and lead to memory and perceptual impairment. Memory for 
detail was influenced by physiological arousal. There has also been 
considerable interest in the underlying neuro-physiological and 
anatomical systems associated with the links between emotion and 
cognition, such as McGaugh, (1992) and Ledoux (1992). Christiansen 
(1992) suggests that emotions may affect memory at two different 
stages; those of perceptual processing and a later conceptual 
processing stage.
More recently, Shevrin (2000) has reviewed the factors that operate 
unconsciously, and believes that the time is ripe for cognitive 
psychology to consider the role of the emotions in how people make
This was apparent in the Master Practitioners' interviews of the participants 
on the course.
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sense. "Affect, conflict, unconscious expectancies and anxieties are 
not given any consideration in cognitive research and thus the 
tendency is for the theories of the unconscious to be overly narrow 
and purely cognitive in nature" (Shevrin 2000:62). He suggests that 
even the way in which people categorise events is influenced by their 
emotional state. Damasio (2000) has made a strong case for 
considering emotions to be an integral part of cognition. "You simply 
cannot escape the affectation of your organism, motor and emotional 
most of all, that is part and parcel of having a mind". (Damasio 
2000:148).
I return to this theme in the chapters on the analysis of my interview 
transcripts, and especially in Chapter 10, which is an analysis of 
interviews about people's experiences of learning, and the emotional 
concomitants of people's memories of previous learning experiences.
3. 6. Conclusion.
This chapter has reviewed the idea that it is becoming a modern 
paradigm about consciousness that we cannot operate without using 
some kind of internal representations or mental models. These are 
claimed to be indispensable to remembering, learning, dreaming, 
thinking, solving problems, and most importantly, planning the future, 
motivating and achieving outcomes. They may be conscious or 
unconscious, or just beyond immediate awareness. Although much 
work in the cognitive sciences seems to be based on a predominantly 
Cartesian paradigm, more recently there have been inquiries into the 
roles of affective and unconscious factors in the construction of 
cognitive maps. The cybernetic approach may shed further light on 
the operations of cognitive models. There are indications that these 
involve many and complex dimensions, such as the senses, 
abstraction, bodily sensations, feelings, responses, values, beliefs and 
goals. They may also be organised at many levels of complexity.
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The cybernetic model proposes that the feedback, calibration and the 
TOTE may be the most fundamental information processing 
mechanisms, operating at all levels of complexity in organisms, from 
the sub-cellular to the societal. The roles of language and 
communication perhaps play one of the most significant roles in 
creating, transmitting, organising and responding to Information.
The question 'what role does language and communication play in the 
complex interplay of the many dimensions of internal models?' and 
'what can such an inquiry illumine about the learning process?' 
remains a critical aspect of this research project. I review and 
explore the results of my own explorations in chapters 6 to 10. I 
propose that many of the processes that we use to construct our 
'cognitive architecture', especially at the levels of Internal 
representations and their sub-modalities, are influenced by language. 
I also believe that the time is ripe for inquiring into these aspects of 
cognition and learning.
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Chapter 4. Reflections on Language, and the Cybernetics of 
Cognitive Systems.
Every reflection, including one on the foundation of human 
knowledge, invariably takes place in language, which is our distinctive 
way of being human and being humanly active. For this reason 
language is also our starting point, our cognitive instrument and our 
sticking point (Maturana and Varela 1987:26).
The whole of language must be thoroughly ploughed up.
(Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:277).
The fact that communication is a conditio sine aua non of human 
existence has been known for a very long time. (Watzlawick 1993:4)
4.1. Introduction
In chapter 3 I reviewed some of the literature on cognitive maps and 
some related areas. I explored the notion that Bandler and Grinder's 
ideas, and especially their work on Internal representations and sub­
modalities, had contributed to a wider understanding of the 
phenomenon of cognitive mapping and of how we make sense of 
experience. This is one of the main foci of my research. In a sense, 
what they explored was a little known aspect of human information 
processing. Although the lack of research into the role of language by 
mainstream cognitive psychologists has been judged as regrettable 
(Nelson 1996) there is an increasing amount being published on the 
possible roles of language in how we develop our understanding and 
create meaning.
The previous chapter considered aspects of cognitive mapping, and 
introduced a cybernetic viewpoint. The next two chapters are about 
language, especially in relation to how we know, and how language 
may influence our perceptions, our responses, and our cognitive 
mapping processes. They lay the ground for my approach to the
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development of my interview schedule, my ways of questioning 
people, and the approach I took to analysing the texts from the 
second stage of the data gathering phase. NLP is as much about 
modelling the subjective processes that people use in processing 
information, as it is about the complex roles that language may play 
in thinking.
An overview about what has been written about language presents a 
problem, because it has been subjected to many different approaches. 
I review some of these in order to place NLP into a theoretical 
context, and to identify some of the ways in which it is distinct from 
other approaches. Chafe (1994), has pointed out that in the present 
time, "the sciences that deal with language and the mind are 
currently in something of an epistemologlcal crisis" (Chafe 1994: 8)
He further suggests that "theories of language are swimming in an 
alphabet soup whose ultimate contribution to the understanding of 
language is murky" (Chafe 1994:21). This suggests that we need to 
study language beyond its grammatical constructions or genres, which 
have been among the main pre-occupations of many engaged in using 
Discourse Analysis.
I suggest that the main reason why an understanding of language is 
so essential to any communicator, and especially to teachers, is 
because there is increasing interest in the ways in which certain 
linguistic forms may influence both perception, and the making of 
meaning for the listener. Learning must surely, in my view (and 
personal experience) involve the development of personal meaning. 
This inquiry is also about some previously unexplored ways in which 
people use words to make sense, and conversely make sense of 
words.^
 ^ I  review what emerges from my information gathering in Chapters 6 -  10, 
and then suggest a new model of learning processes, in which language 
patterns, as described by Bandler and Grinder (1975) may operate as
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In this chapter I review some of the background theories about 
language and cognition that are current in the literature. This is also 
in order to place my research into an overall theoretical framework.
My inquiry bridges both cognitive mapping and linguistics. There is a 
sense in which language emerges almost as the mirror image of 
cognition. Their separation seems to be convenient yet does not 
reflect the complexity of their interaction.
Because I use NLP in my data gathering and as one of the main foci of 
this inquiry, I explain the model of language that Bandler and Grinder 
(1975) developed in the 1970s, in some detail, particularly with a 
view to exploring the possible links between language, cybernetics, 
the creation of internal representations, mental models and 
epistemology. This is in essence what this inquiry was about
Central to Bandler and Grinder's views was that language cannot be 
separated from epistemology; language is as much about 
communicating what to know as how to know. This approach 
underpins my own thinking and research into language and thought. 
Much modern research in this area now considers language as a 
process that is intimately linked to acts of cognition, (as explored in 
Chapter 3). With the increasing interest in cognitive linguistics, it is 
coming to be believed that "language (is) an integral part of human 
cognition, not an autonomous faculty independent of other cognitive 
functions". (Paradis 2001:48). I suggest this is highly relevant to 
Education; it is mainly through teachers' communication that 
knowledge is constructed by learners in the classroom. For this reason 
I give the topic of language more than a cursory glance.
'drivers' of certain epistemologlcal processes necessary to the construction of 
cognitive maps. This idea is explored in Chapter 11.
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4.2. Language and cognition
There have been many attempts to understand the role that language 
plays In cognition. Nelson's (1996) research focused on the role of 
language in the development of children's conceptualisations. She 
describes an experiment, which involved observing a group of 
mothers and children visiting a museum. The mothers themselves 
were of two types; those who talked to their children about was going 
on, and those who merely answered questions. The second group of 
mothers also differed in that they would answer their child's questions 
by mentioning practical matters, such as where a child left a toy. The 
mothers that talked to their children also used a narrative form.
Nelson observed that "the narrative format organises the memory as 
a coherent whole, representing the perspective of consciousness as 
well as the perspectives of action [...] children are learning how to 
remember, not what to remember", (Nelson 1996:168).
Bruner (Sutherland 1992) believed that language was one of the main 
tools for accelerating learning, and urged that it be used to help 
develop children's understanding. He (Bruner 2002) added that there 
were two main constraints to our understanding. One was that "our 
evolution as a species has specialised us into certain characteristic 
ways of knowing, thinking, feeling and perceiving" (Bruner 2002:11). 
The second constraint was the complex nature of language itself.
The constructivist movement proposes that children build up their 
concepts from their experience of the world, and that teachers 
facilitate this process. How if not through language? (This is one of 
Vygotsky's central questions; I review his contributions later in this 
chapter). Nelson (1996) also urged that language should be 
understood as a catalyst for cognitive change during early to middle 
childhood, and that it was "surprising how little attention is paid to 
language in current psychological theories of cognitive development", 
(Nelson 1996:3). Fauconnier (1997) echoes this, urging that it is time 
that grammar should be recognised as "cognitively motivated, and ...
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that understanding grammar in its context... will yield insight into 
cognitive organisation" (Fauconnier 1997:67). Later he (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002) suggested that words actually activated neuronal 
patterns.
This chapter is an attempt to explore some theoretical aspects 
relating to such ideas, and to dissect (as it were) some of the 
epistemologlcal and ontological connections between language and 
thought. I rely on Bandler and Grinder's metamodel of language 
structures as the main conceptual frame within which to start this 
inquiry, (Bandler and Grinder 1975).
Language and thought may be inescapably intertwined, but we do not 
yet know enough about the specifics of their relationship. Sandra 
(1998) wrote that "cognitive linguists, as their name implies, set out 
from the working hypothesis that language cannot be isolated from 
general cognition and must be studied with the explicit purpose of 
finding its cognitive underpinnings" (Sandra 1998:362). This project 
attempts to do just that. Teaching can be said to be essentially about 
the facilitation of sense making, and learning about constructing a 
mental model of the knowledge to be learned. Rasmussen, (2001) for 
instance, considers that language acts metaphorically as a scaffold, so 
that when teachers communicate with their pupils, they are in a sense 
building a framework within which the pupils construct their own 
unique understanding. Thus, " the student's understanding of what a 
teacher says is a product of the student's own construction" 
(Rasmussen 2001:577).
My approach to language is to view it as more than transmitting 
information; it also transmits messages about how the information is 
to be coded and de-coded. This epistemological dimension, which was 
recognised by Korzybsky (1958) and Bateson (1972) demanded 
further investigation, both from the point of view of the literature in 
the field, and my own data gathering and interpretations.
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Epistemology was to emerge as a vital aspect of how language 
appears to enable us to make sense.
4.3. On some of our current approaches to language and 
thought
The emergence of an understanding of language as an essential agent 
in the mediation of internal cognitive processes has come down to us 
through the confluence of several different approaches. One of these 
comes from the ideas of early cognitive psychology, characterised by 
the works of people such as Vygotsky (1936), Miller (1977), Johnson- 
Laird (1983, 1983A) and more recently Fauconnier (1997), and 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002). Another approach stems from the 
works of linguists such as Sapir (1921), Whorf (in Carroll 1956), 
Wittgenstein (Kenny 1994) Edwards (1997) and Koenig (1998). A 
particularly rich source comes from the work on metaphor by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980, 1987 and 1999), and Johnson (1987). Another 
approach is that of Discourse Analysis, which, although it initially 
concerned itself with the structures and genres of text and spoken 
language, is now becoming increasingly concerned about the 
importance of inquiring into the relationships between language and 
thought. (Chafe 1994, 1996).
Yet another approach that has contributed to the emergence of new 
models of the role of language in the dynamics of consciousness came 
from the therapeutic tradition of the Palo Alto Mental Research 
Centre, which originated with Gregory Bateson, (1960, 1972), and 
Milton Erickson. (Watzlawick et al 1967, 1974, 1977, Weakland and 
Wendel 1994, Bandler and Grinder 1975, 1975A, 1979, 1982, Grinder 
and Bandler 1977). Neuro-linguistic programming is an offshoot from 
this approach.
It is becoming increasingly acceptable to believe that we respond to 
information at both a conscious and unconscious level. This idea was 
central to the way in which Milton Erickson worked with his patients.
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(Bandler and Grinder 1957A, Erickson and Rossi 1989). Erickson was 
one of the people from whom Bandler and Grinder drew inspiration 
and many of their insights. I f  language is considered as a critical 
component of information processing, then many questions arise 
about the possible relationships between language, how we learn, and 
how we construct our internal worlds. Other questions also arise, such 
as, how is language processed? What are the roles of what are 
traditionally termed conscious and unconscious ways of processing 
information? More importantly, what is it in us that responds to 
language, and enables us to make sense of it? What is the 
phenomenon that mediates this alchemy of creating meaning?
Another recently emerged school is that of cognitive linguistics, which 
seeks to understand how language and cognition are related. Its 
development appears to have been catalysed by the work on 
metaphor and categorisation by Johnson (1987), Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), and the ideas 
about mental spaces inspired largely by the work of Fauconnier 
(1884,1997) and Fauconnier and Turner (2000, 2002). Cognitive 
linguists recognised the difficulties of studying the complexities of 
language and thought (Gibbs and Colston 1995). These approaches 
are different from those of Neuro-linguistic Programming, yet based 
on the same premises, that a study of language may lead to insights 
into cognitive processes.
4.4. Distinguishing between map and territory
Any exploration of the connections between language and thinking 
raises many philosophical questions. Not least of these is the central 
ontological conundrum of the relationships between what we actually 
'map', as it were, through our internal cognitive re-creations of 
experience, and the world that is being mapped. Words, by virtue of 
the fact that they are essentially symbolic representations of 
something, and not the something they represent, must play some 
intriguing roles in human information processing. Edwards (1997),
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with no reference to Korzybski, comes to much the same conclusion 
about the relationships between maps and territory. "The classic 
underground map distorts scale, direction and distance for the sake of 
functional readability, omitting an infinite number of possible details", 
(Edwards 1997:226). This echoes one of the main presuppositions 
about language and thought on which NLP is built; that words 
themselves may themselves be something like metaphorical maps, in 
the Korzybskian sense (Korzybski 1958), and not territory they refer 
to. They may further also be instrumental in mapping. Weick (2001) 
suggested that sense making is analogous to mapping; " (it) 
resembles more closely the activity of cartography..." (Weick 2001:9).
Rom Harre has suggested that there were two major paradigm shifts 
in the cognitive sciences of the 20^ * Century. (Harre 1994). The first 
was the emergence of Behaviourism, the second resulted in a focus 
on understanding more about the internal cognitive processes that 
people used to construct their own maps, which then also yield 
meaning. I have reviewed some ideas about these in the previous 
chapter. With the coming of this second revolution, the links between 
language and consciousness emerged as a central concern to anyone 
trying to explore more about cognition. Harre proposed that this 
second revolution was influenced by both post-positivist science, and 
the influence of Wittgenstein's views on the nature of language. In his 
view, it was invalid to separate language from the other cognitive 
processes that people used to make sense. His particular approach to 
such questions suggested that:
Concepts, the bases of thinking, are expressed by words, and 
words are relocated in language, which are used to accomplish a 
huge variety of tasks... in this view, our delineation of the subject 
matter of Psychology has to take account of discourses, 
significations, subjectivities and positionings, for it is in these 
that psychological phenomena actualtv exist. (Harre and Gillett 
1994:21-22).
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His position is close to that of Vygotsky, who, working mostly in the 
1920s and '30s from within a Marxist context, believed that speech 
and words played a central part not only in the development of 
children's thought but in human consciousness as a whole. (Vygotsky 
1939). Put more simply, what do the words we Inherit from our 
milieu actually do to our cognitive processes? And no less important, 
how do we go about finding out? What sorts of methods are most 
suitable to uncovering the interplays between them? And if it is true 
that language creates internal meanings and recreates 'reality', then 
language has an epistemological function as well. Wittgenstein asked 
whether it was possible to think a thought without language, or even 
whether it was possible to separate the two, (Kenny 1994).
Fauconnier has pointed out (Fauconnier 1997) that much of traditional 
linguistics has concentrated rather exclusively on syntax and 
phonology. This focus on patterns and form neglected questions about 
other possible functions of language. In fact, he urges that language 
studies could suffer from ignoring the complex dynamics of meaning 
construction. There is a sense in which there has been a third 
revolution in our approach to cognitive processes, which was when 
the role of language as a constructive and epistemological device 
came to researchers' awareness. The focus changed; "it was urgent 
to concentrate on the difficult problem of meaning construction". 
(Fauconnier 1997:7).
Although Fauconnier claims that his own approach is predominantly 
positivistic, he proposes that we not only have access to 'scientifically 
obtained' knowledge about language production, we can also validly 
use "speaker intuitions about possible understandings of expressions 
in various settings". (Fauconnier 1997:7). This appears to encourage 
the reliance on data obtained through different kinds of introspection. 
For mainstream psychology within the positivistic tradition, there is a 
perception that such data may be polluted by the lack of clarity about 
anything dredged from the murky depths of subjectivity, let alone the 
dangers of the attendant methodological traps.
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It follows that such a revolution in our understanding of cognitive 
processes makes the dynamics of language of central concern. What I 
mean by dynamics is the actual conceptual and epistemological 
processes that are behind both the production, and the processing of 
language. Sometimes much linguistic analysis was concerned with the 
descriptions of patterns and forms. Now the focus is on its 
epistemology and how it may be an active agent in the construction of 
meaning itself. Recently Fauconnier, writing from his standpoint as a 
cognitive psychologist stated that: " It Is a constant assumption 
throughout [my] work that grammar Is cognitively motivated and, 
correspondingly, that understanding grammar in its context of use, 
(rather than in purely autonomous structural terms) will yield Insight 
into cognitive organisation" (Fauconnier 1997:67). This indicates the 
importance of considering language, and language production, as 
containing some (perhaps) basic epistemologlcal directives, from 
which it may be difficult for our ways of knowing to escape.
4.5. Vygotsky, Sapir, Whorf and others.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) were influenced by many of the linguistic 
philosophers of the 20^ century. The idea that language seems to be 
intimately bound up with our cognitive processes has a not 
unimpressive pedigree. Edward Sapir, working mainly between the 
two World Wars, actively proposed that language and thought were 
inseparable. In his introduction to his book Language, an Introduction 
to the Study of Speech, (Sapir 1921) he explains his ideas about this 
relationship.
We m ust... Imagine that thought processes set in, as a kind of 
psychic overflow, almost at the beginning of linguistic 
expression; further, that the concept, once defined, necessarily 
reacted on the life of its linguistic symbol, encouraging further 
linguistic growth. We see this complex process of the
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interaction of language and thought actually taking place under 
our eyes. (Sapir 1921:17).
Sapir believed that we build up our ideas about what we hold to be 
'the real world' unconsciously through the language and the culture 
we inherit. This creates culturally determined Weltanschauungen. This 
in turn influences what we pay attention to and how we interpret the 
wealth of our life's experience. Benjamin Lee Whorf, one of Sapir's 
students (Whorf, in Carroll 1956) believed that all 'higher levels of 
thinking' were dependent on language, and that the structure of a 
people's language Influenced how they understood their environment. 
Carroll summed up Whorf's insights in the phrase '"the picture o f the 
Universe shifts from tongue to fongue." (Carroll 1956:vi). This 
approach is generally known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Bandler 
and Grinder, and NLP in general, presuppose much the same thing. 
The central tenet of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis proposes that 
different languages generate different kinds world views about 
experience, not only about'life the universe and everything', but also 
about how it is to be known. Words may be the messengers of 
meaning as well as the agents of its construction.
The stand taken by Sapir and Whorf has its critics. Pinker (1994) 
vigorously dismisses it with 'it is wrong, all wrong'. (Pinker 1994:57). 
In his view, linguistic determinism was a radical position which cannot 
be supported by semantic analysis. Pinker further criticises Whorf for 
basing some of his claims on the Apache language, yet claimed that 
Whorf had not studied this group of Amerindians. He also claims that 
many of Whorf's ideas were supported by some over simplistic mis­
translations of Hopi sentences. In addition, he explodes the myth 
about the much quoted example of the number of words that Eskimos 
have for snow as a 'factoid' which has misled generations of students 
of linguistics, describing it as the Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax 
(Pinker 1994:64).
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Edwards (1997) also offers criticisms of Whorf; among them the 
problem of comparison between two different languages, and the 
elicitation of the exact concepts behind certain words. Whorf claimed 
that the Hopi Indians, whom he studied, had no concept roughly 
equating to the linearity of time. Silverstein (Silverstein 1996) has 
criticised Sapir's work, suggesting that he was not always entirely 
accurate in his analysis of the texts that he obtained from talking to 
native Americans. De Beaugrande (1997) has also criticised Sapir's 
approach for being too 'mentalist', and not making the distinction 
between what de Beaugrande calls langue, and parole. He suggests 
that language is "a leading modality for moving between the 
conscious and unconscious" (De Beaugrande 1997:10).
Edwards, (1997) when reviewing Whorf's work, also disagrees with 
his views on the lack of a Hop! conception of time. Edwards believes 
that the Hopis did have an idea of time, though it differs from that 
described by the vocabulary of standard American English. He also 
makes an interesting distinction between a 'strong' Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis, which proposes that language creates and determines the 
categories of thought and perception, whereas the 'weaker' version 
would be that language rather Influences thought. One of the reasons 
for ridiculing the strong version was that it was impossible to 
demonstrate, 'let alone test' such a hypothesis (Edwards 1997:209). 
The weaker version may be a more acceptable theoretical starting 
point; it certainly describes some of the things I set out to do in this 
inquiry.
Sapir and Whorf were not alone in their fascination with the complex 
relations between languages and consciousness. On the other side of 
the world, in what was then the USSR, Vygotsky was pursuing his 
understanding of the relations between language and the 
development of thought. Vygotsky, working within the Marxist 
tradition of the early part of the 20^  ^Century, concerned himself with 
the importance of language to the intellectual development of the 
child. For him, language was a part of the child's environment, and
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therefore part of his or her historical and cultural context. For him it 
was essential for a child's learning that he or she be spoken to by the 
teacher. In this he differs radically from Piaget's views of children's 
conceptual development. Among other things, Vygotsky was 
interested to observe children actually talking to themselves as they 
were learning. From this he concluded that speech was one of the 
most important catalysers of children's conceptual development. 
(Vygotsky, in Kozulin 1986). For Vygotsky, the teacher's 
communication was integral to a child's conceptual development. 
Furthermore, he proposed that language and thought were interactive 
and interdependent. "The relation of thought to word is first of all not 
a thing but a process; it is a proceeding from thought to word and 
conversely, from word to thought." (Vygotsky 1939:33).
Vygotsky has been criticised for his insistence on the importance of 
the distinction between psychic and social processes by Rasmussen 
(2001) who proposes that this is a false dichotomy. He suggests that 
if systems thinking is applied to these concepts, then they become in 
effect two aspects of the same system, (Rasmussen 2001). However, 
from thinkers such as Vygotsky, there arose the fundamental question 
of how mere strings of words could be interpreted and processed to 
make meaning in human thought. Vygotsky was also one of the first 
psychologists to assign significance to the activities of inner speech, 
which he considered as essential to people's thinking processes. He 
urged that psychologists should inquire into the functions of this 
aspect of speech. "Without a correct understanding of the 
psychological nature of inner speech, there is no way of explaining the 
relation of thought to words in all its complexity" (Vygotsky 1939:37). 
He also held that inner speech had a specific function governed by its 
own laws, and that it was distinct from 'outer speech'. It was also 
Vygotsky's view that words play a central role in both the 
development, and continuing functioning of human thinking. His 
theories were drawn largely from his own observations and 
experiments. Sapir and Whorf, on the other hand, pursued their goals 
through the study of different languages and their structures.
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Vygotsky also played a role in opening up this area to further 
exploration. More recently, Frawley (1997) has written extensively on 
Vygotsky's approach. He suggests that "higher thought is 
Instrumental and Involves the deferral and recasting of the external 
world, never its direct apprehension on its own terms", (Frawley 
1997:96). He believed that "speakers of different languages have 
divergent, and even perhaps incommensurable learning tasks in 
constructing meta-conscious thought", (Frawley 1997:97). He also 
proposes that an approach to understanding language in both its 
inner and outer forms, requires the researcher to distinguish between 
a language o f thought and a language for thought.
This is similar to Bandler and Grinder's approach, (1975) who, in 
proposing what they called the meta-model of language (to classify 
the different processes in which the cognitive and linguistic aspects 
are inseparable) sought to do just that. Grinder's roots In linguistics 
(Grinder and Elgin 1973) aided this development. One could say that 
their aim was to produce a language for thought. In Frawley's view, 
the Vygotskian approach leads to the conclusion that thought and 
speech are not Identical, but come together just where mental content 
comes into focus in what he calls meta-consciousness, (Frawley 
1997). He furthermore asks "how does language make it easier to 
think thoughts if, indeed, you were going to have them anyway?" 
(Frawley 1997:175). Working with people's responses at the sub­
modality level of consciousness during this research project also led 
me to wonder about the same thing. ^
Vygotsky's approach was distinct from that of Piaget, because he 
believed that language played an important role in the formation of 
concepts. Nelson (1996) judges that Piaget's work is based upon
 ^ I address this in chapters 6 - 9  where it became obvious that my 
collaborators were using a lot of internal dialogue.
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abstract logical operations independent of language, with a minor role 
assigned to symbolic representation, (Nelson 1996). Baldauf (1997) 
goes further, and, as it were, throws down the gauntlet by suggesting 
a more extreme view, namely that It is possible that the language 
faculty is really the whole cognitive system. I hesitate to agree with 
this point of view; it seems to me that language and cognition are 
intimately linked, but separable, as distinct logical types. Language Is 
not thought, it is phenomenologically only an aspect of thought, yet 
there is a sense in which the two seem to be so interdependent that 
they could be considered as two aspects of the same complex process 
of knowing. Using the terminology of systems thinking, they could be 
viewed as two aspects which subsume a more complex whole.
4.6. Some Reflections on NLP in the context of 20**' and 21®* 
Century thinking.
One of the discoveries that was revealed from my own background 
reading was the existence of many different schools of thought about 
language and cognition. Many of these seemed isolated from one 
another. Not only did they stem from different groups (factions may 
be too strong an expression) but they seemed to not know of, or 
ignore, many of the ideas and writings of others outside their own 
narrow fields. For instance, in the writings of many of the 
mainstream cognitive psychologists I have read, the work of 
psychotherapists such as Watzlawick and his co-workers are rarely 
cited, neitherjs much included from the literature of the therapeutic 
tradition, let alone Milton Erickson's work on language and change.
Conversely, the therapeutic tradition shows an almost lordly disdain 
for the findings of mainstream cognitive psychology and its laboratory 
based ideas. I have often found similar ideas expressed independently 
among these different groups, and when I referred to specific 
bibliographies, it was not unusual for me to be surprised that other 
people with similar concerns had not been cited. In particular, one of 
the traditions that stands alone, seemingly Ignored by mainstream
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the traditions that stands alone, seemingly ignored by mainstream 
cognitive psychology, (let alone learning theory) emerged from the 
spread of the practices of one particular school of Psychotherapy, one 
of whose insplrers was Gregory Bateson and his colleagues. This is 
the Palo Alto school (Watzlawick et al 1967), which uses, among 
others, a systemic and cybernetic approach.
The researcher may sometimes happen upon some surprising 
simultaneous discoveries In the literature. For instance. Fauconnier, 
(1994) a contemporary of Watzlawick, proposed the idea that 
language creates 'mental spaces' which may be organised at different 
levels. He produced ideas in many ways close to those of Watzlawick's 
and his co-workers. I  perceive little to distinguish Fauconnier's notion 
that these mental spaces are organised in a hierarchy of some sort, 
from Bateson's thoughts about logical levels. However, Fauconnier 
does not seem to have referred to either Bateson or Russell's ideas 
about logical thinking. Bateson's and Russell's ideas are, however, 
central to Watzlawick's approach to therapy and change.
Furthermore, it is rare to see Gregory Bateson cited. His views on the 
origins of schizophrenia as a pathology of communication within 
families, appearing as early as 1960, presupposed that the patterns of 
communication between people actually influences the 'victim's' 
cognitive skills by distorting them. (Bateson 1960). This implies that 
language may actually create adaptive or maladaptive thinking styles 
and patterns of response in others, and must therefore play some role 
in the formation of people's ways of thinking.
Fauconnier, and Turner (2002) have published extensively on their 
ideas about mental spaces and conceptual blending. Their models of 
how we make sense are complex, and have lately included more 
about the role of language. However, their views do not seem to be 
based on empirical research, as there is no apparent mention of what 
data they base their conclusions on. Neither do they seem to explain 
any methods that they employed. Their explanatory models rely
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greatly on what is essentially a metaphor system of spaces and the 
coming together and separation of spaces in the mind. Yet they have 
some interesting insights into language. "Language is the surface 
manifestation of a capacity. It is a singularity of function, and so 
nothing prevents it from having arisen from a basically continuous 
and adaptive process of evolution." (Fauconnier and Turner 
2002:177). For them, words activate neuronal patterns, and are also 
active in blending, compressing and enabling other processes that 
they believe enable people to make sense of information.
In many ways, Fauconnier's notion of conceptual blending is not 
unlike Bandler and Grinder's suggestion that many internal processes 
such as making linkages, and categorisation are essential to the 
making of meaning; the critical difference is that Bandler and Grinder 
actually suggest a typology of language that both reflects, and is 
believed to activate, such processes. Their general outlook finds 
echoes in the works of Maturana and Varela (1998). They proposed 
that we 'exist' in language, so that "the domain of discourse that we 
generate become part of our domain of existence, and constitute part 
of the environment" (Maturana and Varela 1998:234). "...it is by 
languaging that the act of knowing [...] brings forth a world... we are 
constituted in language, in a continuous becoming that we bring forth 
in others." (Maturana and Varela 1998: 234-235). However, Bandler 
and Grinder attempted to explain some of the more specific aspects of 
the question ^how does language shape our knowing?'
As I have used NLP as one of my approaches to this project, it may be 
appropriate to consider Bandler and Grinder's typology of the 
processes inherent in language in more detail. In their view, language 
shapes how we know. This model is not usually accepted as having an 
'academic' pedigree, and is often largely ignored as 'weird' or'new 
age'. It also has its critics, (Robbie 2000, McWhirter 2002, 2003, Craft 
2001). Nevertheless, here I offer some of the history of its 
emergence, and the basic presuppositions on which it operates, as it 
was one of my main approaches. I also consider some of the
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implications of Bandler and Grinder's model, and show how it links to 
other emergent ideas about language and thinking. Not least, I have 
explored some philosophical issues in the form of my own 
speculations and introspections.
Richard Bandler was originally one of John Grinder's students at the 
University of California, Santa Cruz. Grinder was himself influenced by 
Chomsky's work on linguistics, and his model of transformational 
grammar, (McLendon 1989). Chomsky proposed that we have innate 
abilities to structure a string of words in order to make meaning. 
Grammar is thus an innate ability. Information is transformed from 
what Chomsky calls 'deep structure' (Chomsky 1965) to the surface 
structure of language through a transforming process which results in 
the deletion of information. It is never very clear what Chomsky 
means by deep structure, and interestingly the term is not used in his 
later writings, being relegated to an end note (Chomsky 2000). For 
Chomsky (1965), the process of understanding sentences was also 
predicated on an individual's ability to assign words to categories and 
sub-categories. Sentences thus have two different categorical 
components, lexical and categorical. A grammar contains a syntactic 
component, a semantic component and a phonological component, all 
of which may be processed differently. Language, in Chomsky's view, 
was thus also indisputably a tool for thought, (Smith 1999).
Chomsky's thinking has been criticised for its Cartesian slant, and that 
he ignored the Mind-Body problem. De Beaugrande (1997) accuses 
him of denying the scientific status of many of his predecessors such 
as Saussure, Sapir and Hjeimslev, as well as indulging in 
confrontational rhetoric. Most importantly, he criticises Chomsky for 
not being empirical enough; for choosing to ignore making 
observations, and relying on his own 'model of competence' ,(De 
Beugrande 1997: 32) for his extensive theorising. He also accuses 
him of using 'technical fictions hedged round with rhetorical moves' 
(De Beaugrande 1997:45). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) are also 
trenchant in their views on Chomsky's limitations; they believe that
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from Chomsky's perspective, science studies 'essences'. Linguistics 
likewise is concerned with the essence of'language', namely pure 
'syntax'. Phenomena outside the essence of'language' are not worthy 
of being called linguistics, and thus not'interesting', (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999:479). They are dismissive of Chomsky's views, arguing 
that much of the research in linguistics over the last few decades has 
indicated that his models have little validity. Farkas and Li (2001) also 
criticised Chomsky for his structuralistic approach, urging that a more 
connectionist approach was more a valid tool for understanding 
language.
Whether such accusations of mentalism and the accusations of an 
absence of any empirical basis to these theories render them valid or 
not, Cartesian dualism remains part of the western scientific paradigm 
that perceives and perpetuates the dichotomy between mind and 
body, mental and physical, subjective and objective, internal and 
external. Smith (1999) has dismissed such apparent (and 
linguistically mediated) splits as putatively incoherent, and not 
necessarily invalidating the Chomskyan points of view. Bandler and 
Grinder went further; they rejected the Mind-Body problem as an 
insignificant and outdated construct. In linguistic and historical terms, 
mind and body are both abstractions with little useful meaning, 
except as curiosities belonging to the categorisation of redundant 
philosophical traditions. Systems theory, according to Rasmussen, 
does not share these dichotomies, and does not regard thought as 
distinct from language and communication, (Rasmussen 2001).
Viewed from the standpoint of cybernetics, human information 
processing is thought of as involving ali of the systems of the living 
body. There cannot be separation between mind and body. The 
distinction is purely linguistic.
De Beaugrande (1997) reflects that the old dualisms have not been of 
service to linguistics. Chomsky himself (2000) holds a similar position, 
stating that:
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"Distinctions between mental and other aspects of the world, in 
these respects, seem unwarranted, except in one respect: our 
theoretical understanding of language, mind and people 
generally is so shallow, apart from limited domains, that we can 
only use our intuitive resources in thinking and talking about 
these matters". (Chomsky 2000:138).
Whatever the controversies about Chomsky's notions of deep 
structure and his tendency towards theorising within a mentalist 
perspective rather than engaging with the domain of data gathering, 
his ideas have nevertheless been a fertile ground for Bandler and 
Grinder. They were instrumental in the development of some insights 
into the one of the most interesting aspects of language, namely, that 
it is both communicative and epistemological in its functions. In a 
sense, they used Chomsky's original ideas as one of their starting 
points. This sets them apart from cognitive linguists such as Sandra 
(1998) who proposed that "linguistic analysis alone cannot definitely 
answer questions of a (mental) representational nature..." (Sandra 
1998:367).
For Bandler and Grinder, the essence of NLP was to use language to 
investigate language and thought. An inquiry into how we make sense 
is as much a linguistic investigation as it is an exploration of some of 
the ways into sense making. Their own views of deep structure, 
however, seemed to change over the years; in Patterns of the 
Hypnotic techniques ofMiiton H. Erickson M.D. (Bandler and Grinder 
1975A) they use the concept of deep structure as a 'given'. Later, 
(Grinder, Delozier, Bandler 1977), deep structure is treated more as a 
word meaning the profoundly embedded, complex constructs or views 
of which the individual person may not be consciously aware. The 
concept remains vague, and difficult to define.
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4.7. Setting the stage for the iinguistic part of NLP
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use o f language; it 
can in the end only describe it. (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:269).
NLP developed from a number of sources, and the serendipitous 
coming together of a number of somewhat anarchic thinkers very 
much in tune with the Zeitgeist of California in the 1970s. It can be 
said to be derived from Milton Erickson's insights into the unconscious 
effects of language, Fritz Peris' approach to therapy, Gregory 
Bateson's epistemology and cybernetic theory, and Grinder and 
Bandler's original model of language structures, some of it derived 
from Chomsky. The young Richard Bandler was Gregory Bateson's 
neighbour (personal communication) at the time when Bandler was a 
student of psychology and cybernetics at the University of California 
at Santa Cruz in the 1970s. Through Bateson he also got to know 
Milton Erickson, a psychiatrist who specialised in Hypnotherapy, and 
was well known for his powerful uses of therapeutic language.
Grinder was a Professor of Linguistics at the University of California at 
Santa Cruz, where Richard Bandler studied. At the same time Grinder 
was also a covert operator for the American Army, (McLendon 1989).
During his studies, Bandler became increasingly disillusioned with the 
traditional academic psychology that was taught at the time, railing 
against it for not being applicable to the 'real world', (Bandler, 
personal communication, McLendon 1989). At the time, Bandler was 
intrigued by Gestalt Psychology. He was introduced to Fritz Peris 
himself by Grinder, and ended up editing some of Peris' later works, 
in particular his book The Gestalt Approach and Eye Witness to 
Therapy, (Peris 1973).
Bandler and Grinder created an informal group of like-minded people 
to explore and experiment with a number of different ideas and 
linguistic techniques that appeared to produce changes in people. 
Their aim was simply to find out'what worked and what did not'. This
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included exploring and investigating Erickson's hypnotic language 
patterns, Peris' exercises in therapeutic dialogue. Grinder's insights 
into language, and Bateson's cybernetics. Sometimes there was a 
dabbling in the esoteric, in particular from the works of writers such 
as Carlos Castaneda. One of their interests was in how to produce 
changes in people that would benefit them. Their explorations were 
not only informal, they seem to have been somewhat anarchic and 
chaotic, as well as extremely experimental, (McLendon 1989).
Milton Erickson's therapeutic work had as one of its basic tenets, the 
belief that words influence an individual's psychological life both in the 
present and the future. He also believed that people responded 
consciously and unconsciously to words. Bandler and Grinder were 
one of the few non-medically qualified people to be allowed access to 
Erickson personally, and to observe how he practised and thought. 
They became adept at identifying Erickson's patterns of 
communication. Erickson himself wrote, (perhaps with his tongue 
slightly in his cheek) in his preface to Bandler and Grinder's first book 
(1975A) about his hypnotic language forms:
Although this book by Richard Bandler and John Grinder ... is far 
from being a complete description of my methodologies, as they 
so clearly state it is a much better explanation of how I work that 
I myself, can give. I know what I do, but to explain how I do it is 
much too difficult for me. (Milton Erickson, in Bandler and 
Grinder 1975A:viii).
When Erickson was working with his clients he assumed that language 
and thought interacted, and that most of people's responses to 
language took place below conscious awareness, (Erickson and Rossi 
1989, Hall 1989). His approach has since been further developed in 
the fields of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at the Mental Research 
Institute, Palo Alto. (Watzlawick et al 1967, Watzlawick and Weakland 
1977, Watzlawick 1978, 1983, 1990, Weakland and Wendel 1994). It 
also laid the foundation for many of the interventions made in Brief
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Therapy, (De Shazer 1998). The researcher wishing to follow in this 
tradition faces some awesome methodological challenges. This model 
of language proposes that much of our responses to communication 
take place at an unconscious levei.
4.8.1. The NLP approach to language and thought
Bandler and Grinder proposed that the deletions, distortions and 
generalisations within language can act as epistemological directives 
that influence how meaning is to be made from words that are 
spoken. There remains the spectre of deep structure. Robbie (2000) 
has argued that linguistics had moved on, and the concept of deep 
structure is now becoming redundant. It may be more useful, 
however, to think of linguistic directives as imparting information 
about how a message is to be understood. This is believed to be the 
epistemic part of language, which elicits unconscious responses, often 
for both the sender and the receiver.
Chafe (1994) came to a similar conclusion twenty years after the 
publication of Bandler and Grinder's first book. (Bandler and Grinder 
1975). In Chafe's view, grammar is a set of "mental processing 
instructions [... ] designed to trigger specific mental operations in the 
mind of the receiver", (Chafe 1994:180). He also proposed that 
"language suggests that we store and activate ideas of particular 
referents and that we also store categories and schemas that allow us 
to "make sense of" those ideas by treating them as instances of 
things already familiar", (Chafe 1994:35).
Bandler and Grinder went further in their ideas about this emergent 
area. Not content with simply stating that there was an epistemology 
within language structures, they produced a model about language, 
which they called the meta-model. This is a model about a model, or 
a map of a map. It is also about ways of categorising both the content 
of the information that is transmitted, and how it is to be decoded at 
the process level. Most importantly, it is the first real attempt to
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produce a typology of various language structures according to what 
they do to information processing, as well as what instructions they 
give to guide the construction of knowledge.
An understanding of the processes behind languaging may thus 
provide a way of listening to, and analysing what people say, and thus 
attending to the thinking structures and processes behind the surface 
structure of the words. In my view, it adds another dimension to the 
analysis of discourse and text. It also produces a way of interrogating 
conscious experience (both one's own and that of others), which is 
innovatory. My own approach relies heavily on this; it became one of 
the most important tools with which to design and carry out my 
interviews. I then used it to analyse the transcripts of both my own 
interviews, and those of my assistants. I was thus using language to 
test people's responses to differently syntaxed expressions. I also 
used Bandler and Grinder's model to elucidate some of the processes 
that I believed were revealed by a using NLP as a method for textual 
analysis which was significantly different from that used in 
mainstream Discourse Analysis.
4.8.2. Deletions, Distortions and Generalisations.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) originally proposed that there were three 
main epistemological processes that occurred between the contents 
lodged in the 'deep structure' (in a 'Chomskyan' sense) and the 
Surface Structure of Language. These were deletion, distortion and 
generalisation. If we abandon the notion of deep structure, then the 
question 'how does language originate in the human information 
processing system?' arises. It seems that at one level we code 
information primarily through our senses in the form of internal 
representations, which I explained in the previous chapter. These 
could be considered to be antecedent to language production. There is 
a discontinuity between the analogue coding of the inner world of the 
senses, and the production of words which are digital. (Bateson 
1972).
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Deletions, distortions and generalisations are thought to occur 
whenever the conceiver's experience becomes 'languaged'. One of the 
unavoidable consequences of the translation of information from the 
domain of internal representations to that of speech is the deletion of 
the many details in the internal representations. Therefore, what was 
being spoken about could never convey the whole content that 
originally generated the speech act. In the act of verbalising the 
content of consciousness, a different logical type has to be used. 
Language and consciousness are different aspects; languaging 
experience involves the transformation of the information from one 
logical type into another. It aiso involves categorisation. Thus, 
changing an experience into words inevitably must delete information, 
just as making a map of an area can never include every detail of the 
'rear terrain.
According to this model, in any written text or spoken words, there 
must always be missing information, deleted, as it were, from its 
original source from the domain of internal representations and other 
cognitive structures. Language may thus be mainly communicating 
information about the map rather than the terrain. An iilusion of 
reality is created through the individual's response, who processes the 
information received by filling in the missing bits for him or herself. 
(This was certainly the case in my own data gathering, where 
individuals could report on what they 'did' at the level of internal 
representations and sub-modalities in response to the words I 
presented to them in the form of my interview questions. My 
collaborators always made sense of my words in their own way.)
Perhaps, every time speech is used, it also generates a mini-Zeigarnik 
effect on the listener. The Zeigarnik effect describes the influence of 
incomplete information on human thinking. It is based on the premise 
that the human processing system tolerates incomplete information 
with difficulty, (Zeigarnik 1965, Mazur 1996). I suggest that we add, 
or construct internal representations to fill the gaps. The Zeigarnik 
effect can be thought of as a kind of drive towards the perpetual
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resolution of unfinished business, or the filling in of missing gaps. 
Mowrer (cited in Miron 1967) wrote that "One person, by the use of 
appropriate words or other signs, can arouse or "call up" particular 
meanings in the minds of another person", (Miron 1967:11). More 
poetically, and echoing some of Wittgenstein's ideas, he further stated 
that "language, in short, is a sort of web that we spin between 
ourselves and the true essence of things, and we must constantly 
struggle to keep from becoming hopelessly enshrouded therein." 
(Mowrer, in Miron 1967:38). This ontological fragility between 
language and what it is supposed to represent, is one of the most 
exasperating and intriguing aspects of this whole Inquiry.
One of the questions I asked as I was gathering my data was: what 
do people do internally that enables them to fill in the gaps? What are 
the elements that are used to weave such webs? I believe that the 
data pointed to the existence of the phenomenon (or process) of 
people's active participation in the making of sense. Bandler and 
Grinder suggested that the effects of hypnotic language patterns 
depended on this process. These are syntaxed in such a way that they 
may contain confusing and paradoxical messages. Listeners are 
'forced' to make sense of them for themselves, thus producing a new 
thought or meaning. (Bandler and Grinder 1975A). Watzlawick states 
it more directly; that one can't not communicate, neither can one not 
respond.3 (Watzlawick et af 1967).
Bandler and Grinder revealed that Erickson structured his sentences 
so that listeners had to make sense of the information in their own 
ways. (Grinder et al 1977). A typically Ericksonian injunction such as 
'ypa may be wondering about the things you are learning yet as you 
are sitting, relaxing and reflecting on ail your experiences in many 
different ways now haven't you' makes little grammatical sense. 
However it is thought that it sends the listener on a deep internal 
search to make some sort of meaning. The followers of Erickson
Author's italics.
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would claim that the actual content evoked by the words spoken by 
the therapist is uniquely re-constructed by the individual who hears 
them. This active search for meaning is termed a trans-derivational 
search, in which a person actively scans stored information, accesses 
it, then uses it as their own semantic building blocks to construct a 
meaning unique to themselves, (Grinder, DeLozier and Bandler 1977). 
This is the essence of hypnotic language patterns; they create a 
response in which listeners are driven to make their own internal 
sense of the words, by structuring the information for themselves. In 
this way, it is believed, they achieve both meaning and closure.
4.9.1 Some hidden aspects of deletions
Deletion is an inevitable consequence of the languaging of experience. 
Bandler and Grinder distinguish between a number of different kinds 
of deletions, which I have listed in Appendix 5. There are two kinds of 
deletions which are interesting for the light they may shed on some of 
the basic processes we use to make sense. I have chosen to explore 
these as they are also examples of language structures which are 
both epistemologically and semantically significant. I have also used 
these as some of the bases for my questions in the interview phase of 
this inquiry. The ones I have chosen to illustrate this are comparative 
deletions, and nominaiizations. I explore these in some depth, 
because they give a sense of how Bandler and Grinder's model may 
be considered to be more than just a superficial typology, but also a 
way to uncover some of the basic processes that we use to make 
sense. These explorations are my own thoughts after using 
introspection to uncover more about some of these processes in 
myself.
Comparative deletions are a distinct category of words in the meta- 
model. Examples include words such as better, worse, colder, hotter, 
lovelier etc. They occur when words or expressions are used which 
presuppose that a comparison has had to be made in order to produce 
that word. However, the actual scale or criteria on which the
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comparison is based are deleted. This means the criteria on which 
the judgements are based are never explicitly stated. For instance, 
the sentence 'the weather is better today' contains the word better 
which is technically a comparative deletion. In order to initiate such a 
statement, a number of internal processes have had to precede it for 
the conceiver. The person uttering it has had to make a comparison 
with the weather yesterday, the day before, perhaps even the week 
before. The word better presupposes the existence of a graduated 
scale (from good weather through bad weather to perhaps English 
weather) and that a comparison has been made according to the 
scaie, which is missing when translated into words, and then 
'understood'. Often uncovering the scale behind people's patterns of 
comparative deletions through well aimed questioning may reveal a 
great deal about their internal maps, and the criteria used to make 
judgements. (Bandler and Grinder 1975). The question that arises 
from this is to what extent is the process of comparing a fundamental 
epistemological prototype, a kind of archetype of sense making? 
Bateson, in his search for understanding some of the basic 
epistemological processes that systems used, had suggested in 1972 
that:
" ...we can assert that any ongoing ensemble of events and 
objects which has the appropriate complexity of causal circuits 
and the appropriate energy relations will surely show mental 
characteristics. It  will compare, that is, be responsive to 
difference. (Bateson 1972:315).
The importance of such conceptual scales which are actively (if 
unconsciously) brought into play in people's cognitive maps was 
proposed by Johnson (1987), who observed that "scalarity does seem 
to permeate the whole of human experience ... this experientially 
basic, value laden structure of our grasp of both concrete and abstract 
entitles is one of the most pervasive image-schematic structures in 
our understanding." (Johnson 1987:123). Lakoff (1987) also believed 
that our metaphorical up-down schemata were like basic templates
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structuring cognition. However, I suggest that in order for such basic 
scalar schema to be of any use, they must be accompanied by the 
process of comparison. Scales are useless without the ability to make 
comparisons.
4.9.2. Hidden comparisons.
In Baldaufs view (Baldauf 1997) comparison (Vergleichung) is a 
prototypical function. I like to think of such operations as basic 
epistemological processes. So words like better, worse, prettier, 
lesser, and sentence constructions involving expressions such as more 
than, less than, greater than, and so on, are transmitting information 
which is the product of a kind of hidden internal 'holding a datum 
against an internal scale, comparing it to the divisions on the scaie, 
and then judging'.
The receivers of messages containing comparative deletions are then 
truly caught in the web of words, because they need to draw on their 
own hidden scales of comparison, (which may be different from that 
of others) and then generate a response from within their own 
subjective constructs. This can produce the illusion of agreement. 
Bateson wrote that "the living man is ... bound within a net of 
epistemological and ontological premises which -  regardless of 
ultimate truth or falsity -  become partially self-validating for him." 
(Bateson 1972:314). For better or worse, such processes seem to be 
mediated through linguistic forms. Furthermore, it is almost 
impossible to utter a meaningful 'better' or 'worse' without having to 
use what is considered an almost archetypal epistemological process 
in cybernetics, namely the ubiquitous TOTE process.
If we look more deeply at the process of producing a comparative 
deletion, we uncover another complex layer of processing. What I 
propose happens, (for the sake of argument) is that the information 
to be evaluated is tested internally against a scale, found wanting or 
not, adjusted, tested again, and then transformed into words. To
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simplify the process, it goes something like this. Was the weather 
better? First test it against my internal scale. Then get a yes or a no, 
(in cybernetic terms, obtain positive or negative feedback, and act on 
it), then make a judgement, and exit the TOTE. Only then can the 
word be uttered, or yield an illusory understanding in the hearer or 
reader. Even to 'TOTE' successfully involves comparing the present 
state with the desired outcome; self-correction to achieve the goal is 
only possible after a comparison has been made. Perhaps the 
transition from thought to language may also involve such a 
cybernetic loop. Perhaps scalarity, the use of conceptual scales in the 
formation of our internal mappings and sense making, is another 
epistemological prototype. Baldauf, (1997) also stressed the 
importance of scalarity, of vertical ordering, as a way of making sense 
of information, and which would be useless without the system's 
ability to make comparisons.
The role of comparison as essential to how cybernetic systems 
processed information in order to maintain themselves was mooted by 
Norbert Wiener in the late 1940s when Cybernetics was still in its 
infancy. (Wiener 1965). He went on to explore the ways in which 
perception could be understood cybernetically. This led him to 
suggest that perceptual systems relied on an ability to compare 
incoming data in order to organise it. The TOTE process was an 
integral part of carrying out and completing such acts. "We centre our 
images around the focus of attention and reduce them more or less to 
outlines. We have now to compare them to one another, or at any 
rate, with a standard impression stored in memory." (Wiener 
1965:136).
Similarly, we could ask the question 'how is it possible to assign 
information to meaningful categories without being able to perceive 
similarities and differences? How can it be possible to assign a hue 
such as violet to the category 'red' or the category 'blue' without 
scanning for similarities and differences, and then making 
comparisons before deciding to which category to assign the
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information? It supports the view that comparing is a prototypical 
epistemological process, as are perhaps the abilities to perceive 
similarity and difference.
So 'behind' apparently simple language structures such as 
comparative deletions, there are complex processes, perhaps 
operating unconsciously, which have to be brought into action in order 
for the words to make sense. This is an example of some of the 
epistemological dimension of language making and language 
processing.
4.10.1. Nominalisations.
I want to explain the complexities of the class of words called 
nominalisations in some detail because they emerged as one of the 
foci for my inquiry. My interviewees reported some interesting effects 
of these types of words, which I describe in Chapter 6. Some of my 
interview questions were designed to inquire into the effects of 
nominalisations on my collaborator's internal constructions. The 
responses that people gave were intriguing. The purpose of this 
section is to explore more about this class of words, so that the 
responses that were elicited in the first information gathering phase 
are placed into context.
If at a very simple level of explanation, the constructivists' stance is 
that we actively participate in creating our'realities', (Von Glaserfeld 
1984), then bringing forth a world becomes "the burning issue of 
knowledge", (Maturana and Varela 1987: 27). Such an activity may 
be associated with "the deepest part of our cognitive being, however 
strong our experience may be" (Maturana and Varela 1987:27). 
Wittgenstein (in Kenny, 1994) believed "that people who ascribe 
reality only to things and not to our representations take the world of 
our representations so much as a matter of course and aim no 
further" (Kenny 1994: 276). Wittgenstein was intrigued by the ways
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in which our intelligence could be bewitched by means of language. 
Nominalisations are among the most bewitching of words.
Exploring Nominalisations may also shed light on what may be other 
basic epistemological processes. These kinds of words seem to have 
the power to illuminate, persuade and delude. Bandler and Grinder 
were not the only ones to describe these; they have been the subject 
of investigation by many others. Langacker, (1977) for instance 
reminds us that there are two basic lexical categories, nouns and 
verbs, which he proposes profile things and processes.
Nominaiizations are essentially'thing words', and are at the same 
time, abstract nouns.
4.10.2. The tyranny of hypostatisatfon
Nominalisations are aiso deletions, because they are the product of 
turning a verb Into a noun. They are abstract nouns from which the 
original process (a verb) has been deleted. (For this reason they are 
considered as deletions by Bandler and Grinder). The original verb 
form presupposed an activity, a process which has an implied duration 
in time. Nominaiizations litter a great deal of every day speech. Words 
such as education, health, life, communication, relationship are all 
abstract nouns which in actuality do not have any objective existence 
yet behave as simulacra of something that does, perhaps because 
they have been made into nouns. Education can thus be seen as the 
reification of educating, health of healing, and relationship of relating!
4.10.3. Are nominalisations metaphorical?
In becoming nominalized, these words also become hypostatised; 
they are interpreted as something concrete. In reality, they refer to 
the existence of something that has no objective existence, because it 
is an abstraction. Yet they are treated as if they were concrete 
objects. They are no longer perceived by the conceiver as processes 
that take place within a time frame, but rather as entities that exist
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independent of the variable of time. Time has thus also been deleted 
from the word at the level of presuppositions. This is a distortion 
lodged deep within the structure of our language and perhaps our 
cognition as well. The processes that the nominaiizations have 
originated from have become deleted, and are thus not attended to.
This means that every time a nominalization is produced, it has been 
born as the result of a metaphorical shift. Metaphor always involves 
understanding one thing in terms of another.
I have already described some aspects of the metaphorical nature of 
thought in the previous chapter. It  is becoming increasingly 
recognised that metaphors are a fundamental conceptual process 
which we use to make sense of communication and experience. 
Johnson (1987) has proposed that metaphor is "a pervasive principle 
of human understanding that underlies our vast network of 
interrelated literal meanings" (Johnson 1987:65). Baldauf (1997) 
develops the work on metaphor of linguists such as Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980, 1999) by suggesting that our main metaphorical 
system comes from the world of concrete objects (what she terms the 
Gegenstandsbereich'^ in German). For her, both thinking and meaning 
were thus conceptualised as clearly defined and bounded objects. This 
involves a basic metaphorical and epistemological transformation. 
Whenever we nominalise, we therefore also 'metaphorise', because a 
process is now thought of as a 'thing'. I t  has become concretised.
More recently, Thomas and Mareschal (2001) have proposed that 
metaphors also act as categorisers of information. To explore the 
epistemological paradox posed by the structure of nominalisations 
further, that "metaphor occurs when the novel input is not a member 
of the category to which it is applied" (Thomas and Mareschal 
2001:16). Fitzgerald (1999) has proposed that providing new and 
useful analogies may be a powerful way of communicating novel
Roughly translated as the realm of solid objects.
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ideas. This raises the possibility that our epistemology has the ability 
to transform abstractions into simulacra of concreteness through such 
reification; furthermore this process is in itself profoundly 
metaphorical in that it imposes on our understanding the tyranny of 
thinking about abstractions as concrete entities. So nominaiizations 
also have ontological implications. The metaphor of concreteness 
imposes this notion on our understanding. It may be an unavoidable 
mapping process, a cognitive modelling task that is fundamental to 
how we process information, and then language it. We think and 
speak as if these abstractions had a concrete existence external to us.
It can be revealing to reflect on the notion that every time we use a 
nominalization, we may in fact be deeply deceived (and perhaps 
deceiving) both ontologicaliy and epistemologically. We talk earnestly 
about the necessity to have more education, to have a better life, to 
fight poverty, to make democracy more attractive, to encourage good 
relationships. In each of these cases, the nominalization seems to 
refer to a solid object external to the speaker. This also raises the 
question of whether we can ever know the world as it is, or whether, 
in the weaving the conceptual web of our own making, we rely on the 
simulating power of nominaiizations in our attempts to understand 
experience. Yet, paradoxically, in English and many other European 
languages,^ we cannot convince ourselves that we know without 
abstracting and concretising. Tutescu (1970) has, for instance, 
written extensively on nominal structures in the French language. 
Baldauf (1997) writing as a German speaker, refers to nominaiizations 
as ontological metaphors, which transmute the original process into 
clear things or substances, and which then appear to occupy a 
location and even give the illusion of quantifiability.
Wiener (1965) suggests that our dependence on noun forms is a 
survival of the scholastic emphasis on substance, 'in a world where
5 It  has certainly been my experience as a French and German speaker, that 
these also rely heavily on nominaiizations, German, in particular, seems to 
be very rich in them.
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the noun was hypostatised and the verb carried very little weight' 
(Wiener 1965:127). Weick (2001) has proposed that there are a 
number of basic properties of sense making. Among these he 
suggests that experience Is a continual flow, and that it only becomes 
understandable in terms of events, which can only happen when 
subjective or conceptual boundaries are placed around them. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) stressed the idea that the metaphorical use of 
entities was a fundamental cognitive device, assigning the 
metaphorical connections between ideas and objects to what they 
classed as the conduit metaphor.
4.10.4. Nominalisations as categorisers.
One of Gregory Bateson's pre-occupations was with the 
epistemological conundrums that anthropological terminology had 
generated for him during his years in the field. In an essay written in 
1974 (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991) he expressed his suspicions about 
the pervasive ways in which human epistemology needs to impose 
delimitations on experience.
As I see it, the fundamental idea that there are separate "things" 
in the universe is a creation of and projection from our own 
psychology. From this creation we go on to ascribe this same 
separateness to ideas, sequences of events, systems and even 
persons. I therefore ask whether this particular psychological 
habit can be trusted... (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:77).
Thus nominaiizations may not reflect an experience, but refer rather 
to a class of experience. Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974), 
exploring the paradoxes and contradictions that beset human 
thinking, stress that their work is inspired by Bateson, and some of 
his predecessors such as Russell and Whitehead's explorations in their 
Prlncipia Mathematlca. This reveals the logical inconsistency of 
confusing a class with one of its members. Bateson had stressed that 
"we have a whole host of words which name classes of action without
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identifying the members of the class ... What is 'play'? What is 
'aggression'? ... It  is not too much to say that a science of psychology 
might begin here". (Bateson, in Donaidson 1991:74). Watzlawick goes 
further and points out the deception inherent in confusing the class 
with its member. "Any attempt to deal with the one in terms of the 
other is doomed to lead to nonsense and confusion," (Watzlawick et af 
1974:6).
Nominaiizations are therefore one of the richest linguistic classes for 
exploring how language may influence the construction of our internal 
maps. They are one of the many ways in which language weaves a 
web of deceit, is profoundly metaphorical, creates illusions of the 
existence of non-existent entities, and generates a mistaken notion 
that there is clarity when there is only belief. Paradoxically, the 
English language without nominaiizations is an impossibiiity;® they are 
necessary to processing and storing information. They are also of 
primary epistemological interest in that that which is apparently 
perceived through their use, need not exist to make sense,
( Butch va rov 1997).
Nominaiizations were also among the main iinguistic devices used by 
Milton Erickson. Bandler and Grinder were able to interpret and 
describe how Erickson used ianguage to produce therapeutic changes 
in his patients, (Bandler and Grinder 1975A). They were among 
Erickson's many linguistic tools. As soon as information is languaged, 
it deletes. Yet when it is heard, and made sense of, listeners fill in the 
gaps for themselves. Grinder, Delozier and Bandier (1977) claim that 
this is how internal changes may be produced in the context of 
therapy, rather than the use of "repetitious verbigérations {sic) direct 
suggestions and authoritarian commands" (Erickson, in Grinder, 
Delozier and Bandler 1977:ix) so beloved of more traditional 
hypnotherapists.
 ^ I challenge the adventurous reader to try talking about any topic that 
involves levels of abstractions without using nominaiizations with their 
attendant ontological and epistemological seductiveness.
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Perhaps the only thing that can be said about nominaiizations is that 
for ali their complexity, possible treachery, (my own analysis of old 
German newsreels indicated that Adolf Hitler used them to great 
effect,) and the epistemological and ontological puzzles with which 
they seem to tease the enthusiastic seeker after truth, (itself a 
nominalization!) they are essential to how we organise and verbalise 
information from deep within our own unique internal mapping 
processes.
4.11 Conclusion
In this chapter I have reviewed some of the background theories of 
language in order to put Bandler and Grinder's model in context. I 
explored the idea that there is an epistemological function to 
language, and that exploring how certain classes of words are 
produced also reveals underlying epistemological processes. When 
experience is languaged, one of the inevitable processes is deletion. I 
paid attention to comparative deletions and nominalisations, as they 
illustrate some of the complexities of language production. I then 
explored some aspects of their formation in detail, indicating that they 
are multifaceted in their origins as well as their effects. I described 
them in some detail, as they are a backdrop to my own inquiry into 
how people process language, and how it may be linked to cognition. 
The effects of nominalisations was one of my interests when carrying 
out this inquiry. I report on this further in chapters 5, 6 and 7 and 8. 
To sum up, it seems that the effects of language are fourfold; it can 
enable people to perceive, to conceive, and to receive information. It 
also has extraordinary powers to deceive. Lakoff (1987) urged that 
our understanding of both language and cognition in general must be 
changed considerably.
This chapter was a venture into this new area. It is also the 
theoretical foundation for much of my reflections on the data 
gathering phase. This forms the substance of chapters 6 -  12.
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Chapter 5. The Imperative of Connections in Cognitive 
Mapping, and the Relevance of Presuppositions.
Clearly there are In the mind no objects or events, no pigs, no 
coconut palms, and no mothers. The mind contains only transforms, 
percepts. Images etc, and rules for making these transforms. In what 
form these rules exist we do not know ... the rules are certainly not 
commonly explicit as conscious ''thoughts". (Bateson 1972:271).
There are some safes which can be opened by using a certain word or 
a certain number; before you hit on the right word, no amount of 
force can open the door, but once you do so, any child can open It. 
Philosophical problems are like that. Wittgenstein, in Kenny (1994), 
page 269.
5.1. Introduction.
In the previous chapter I reviewed some ideas about language as 
epistemology, in particular some views on deletions and re-visited 
metaphors. In this chapter I explore other aspects of language 
construction which may illuminate other cognitive processes. These 
include the phenomenon of linking different domains of thought in 
order to create new meanings. I also include the concept of causality 
as part of our mapping processes. One of the aspects of language that 
I explore is the way in which it can create connections between two or 
more 'mental' events which, taken individually, may not immediately 
appear to connect to other concepts. This idea is not new; it has been 
extensively explored by Fauconnier, (1994,1997), Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002) and others. These suggest that meaning occurs 
through what they term conceptual blending. Fauconnier, in his 
original work on the concept of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985) had 
proposed that connections were a part of idealised cognitive models, 
essential to making mental representations of reality. As such, they 
are also a basis for selecting certain actions. Weick and Bougon 
(2001) go further, and suggest that making connections between
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events are basic epistemological processes which are imperative to 
cognitive mapping. I consider these ideas in some detail, because 
looking for connections between 'conceptual entities' in texts is one of 
the approaches I used in my analysis of the Master Practitioner's 
interviews. Chapter 10 is mainly about these. Connections emerged 
as significant to the analysis of the texts. They also yielded some 
insights into the nature of people's conceptual maps. They may also 
be involved when people undergo transformative changes in their 
beliefs. For this reason I describe this aspect of Bandler and Grinder's 
meta-model in some detail.
I prefer to remain with Bandler's terminology, that meaning is 
dependent on 'how you connect the dots',  ^and to use the term 
connections to explain linkages between two or more (hitherto 
perhaps unrelated) mental events or constructs. Connections are a 
also a way of describing linkages between two concepts. I describe 
some of the kinds of linkages that Bandler and Grinder have proposed 
are embedded in syntactical structures. Originally they proposed a 
category of language structures which they termed distortions, 
(Bandler and Grinder 1975). Two of the four sub-sets in the category 
distortions are cause-effect structures and complex equivalences. 
Here the connections are easy to spot. There are two more sub-sets, 
lost performatives and mind reads, where the connections are more 
complex to tease out. I want to explore the notion that all four of 
these sub-sets rely on connections for the emergence of meaning. 
One of the structures that I was interested in when scanning the 
transcripts of the Master Practitioners' interviews, were the types of 
connections that people had linked to learning, and used to construct 
their identity as learners.
Personal communication.
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5.2. Causality as significant to the mapping process
The search for causes to events and entities, and the use of causality 
as an explanatory principle, has something of the nature of an 
epistemological imperative. Talmy (1985) believed that what he called 
"force dynamics" (under which causality is subsumed) was a semantic 
category which had previously been neglected in linguistic study. He 
proposed that language uses certain categories to structure and 
organise meaning, and that force dynamics was a basic category 
which achieved this. Force dynamics refers to the notion that we use 
the idea of force, (which is a physical experience which becomes 
internalised as a metaphorical device) in order to understand, make 
sense, and map experience. Lakoff has described the concept of 
causation as one of the most fundamental of human concepts. "Such 
concepts are usually coded right into the grammar of language -  
either via the grammatical construction or grammatical morphemes 
[... ] the prototypical concept of causation is built into the grammar of 
the language, (Lakoff 1987:55).
Weick (2001) has proposed that causality is an epistemological 
primitive, even describing it as a cognitive archetype. The critical 
factor defining causal thinking is that two events, separated by time, 
are linked causally, and the antecedent event is believed to exert a 
(metaphorical) force on the later one, causing it, or something about 
it, to change. This is different from the views of Lakoff and Johnson, 
(1980), who reject the idea of the existence of what they term 
undecomposabie primitives, proposing that causation is best 
understood as an experiential gestalt, an example of an ontological 
metaphor "grounded by virtue of systematic correlates within our 
experience" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:58). Nevertheless they believe 
that "causation is a basic human concept. It is one of the concepts 
most often used by people to organise their physical and cultural 
realities", (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:69). They suggest that our 
understanding comes from domains of experience, rather than 
individual concepts. By their term domains of experience I understand
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that these are more than concepts; they are groups, categories (or 
whatever term seems most appropriate) whose main characteristic is 
that they have an internal structure. Freeman (1999) echoes Lakoff 
and Johnsons's views, citing David Hume's proposition that there are 
no universal essences in reaiity, so the mind can frame a concept or 
image that constitutes a general term such as causality. The concept 
itseif, however, does not exist in the world external to the conceiver.
5.3. Modal operators: carriers of information about future 
events?
One of the classes of words from the meta-model that I investigated 
in my interviews were modal operators. Stamenov (1977) has 
described these as "the prime examples of language as activity 
directed towards the accompiishment of certain goals" (Stamenov 
1977:69). Bandler and Grinder identified two meta-model language 
structures which presupposed and communicated causal thinking. 
These were modal operators and cause-effect patterns. Chomsky 
(1965) had identified what he called modals as an auxiliary to 
meaningful sentence construction. Johnson, (1987) stated that his 
inquiry into modal verbs is actually "an investigation into a further 
cluster of extremely significant patterns of experience and 
understanding", (Johnson 1987:49).
Johnson draws heavily from the work of Eve Sweetser, (Fauconnier 
and Sweetser 1996) who argued that the different sources of modal 
verbs were related by metaphorical structures in which physical forces 
become a metaphor for the non-physical. He suggested that what he 
called 'epistemic modals' originate from the metaphor of the operation 
of a force or restraint which can be experienced as either internai or 
external. Langacker (1998) has argued that a modal "is analogous to 
a future tense marker" and that the conceptualiser using the modai 
engages in a "mental extrapolation of ongoing reality" (Langacker 
1998:85).
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Sweetser explained that "root modal meanings are extended to the 
epistemic domain precisely because we generally use the language of 
the external world to apply to the internal mental world, which is 
metaphorically structured as parallel to that external world", 
(Sweetser, cited in Johnson 1987:50). She distinguishes between 
three main categories of root modals, which is similar to Bandler and 
Grinder's classification. These were modals about ability (can), 
permission (may) and obligation (must). Thus their epistemic sense 
denotes the existence of perceived distinctions between probability, 
possibility and necessity, which again reflects Bandler and Grinder's 
typology of modal operators. (1975)
What is interesting (and perhaps not insignificant) about modal 
operators is that they denote the mode, and therefore define the 
category in which a future activity is to be carried out. However 
metaphorical they may be, they introduce the dimension of time into 
the cognitive and linguistic domains. In cybernetics, the model makes 
no sense without the inclusion of time as an integral part of the 
operation of the system. Time may thus be both conceptual or actual.
Because modal operators define the mode in which a future event is 
to be carried out, they presuppose the existence of a present and a 
future as linked together. The sentence I  will do the ironing tonight 
could not be uttered, (let alone conceived of) without both an 
awareness of the time frames of present and future, and the ability to 
produce or construct information that links the two. This is one of the 
most critical distinctions between a mechanistic world view, and that 
of cybernetics. For a system to be able to operate and maintain itself 
in time, it must have access to information about future events that 
may not yet have happened. As noted in Chapter 3, without such 
information, the TOTE process cannot be carried out.
Talmy (1985) proposes that force dynamics are "a major conceptual 
organising system", (Talmy 1985:293). His view of this class of 
metaphorical structures is that they relate to how entities are
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perceived as interacting with respect to force. Modal operators imply 
the action of a force; they can presuppose that someone is pushed 
from outside {you must) or that the agent experiences him or herself 
as the locus of control, or 'at cause', (you might) or that there is an 
insurmountable barrier to the agent's future outcome {you can't).
This model sheds some light on the possible metaphoric derivation of 
modal operators, yet is firmly embedded in a mechanistic paradigm 
with its reliance on force and energy as explanatory principles. If we 
take a more cybernetic approach, then modal operators could be 
thought of as the verbal analogues of some basic homeostatic 
processes. In cybernetics, the present state of a system is always 
being calibrated to possible future states. Are not modal operators, in 
their way, information about how to calibrate to that future outcome? 
They seem to be the carriers, as it were, of implied causality, 
introducing a temporal dimension which also categorises a future act.
This again raises the idea that intentionality, that is, an innate drive 
to work towards as yet unachieved goals, is one of the characteristics 
of all cybernetic systems. With the advent of cybernetics. It became 
impossible to explain behaviour without recourse to the explanatory 
principle of intentionality. Schaub (2001) suggests that all behaviours 
are driven by intentions which are stored as specific data structures. 
"An intention is a data structure comprising, besides the respective 
needs, one or more goals..." (Schaub 2001:199).
In 1946 the Macy organisation sponsored a conference on 
"Teleological Mechanisms". This was influential in bringing the notion 
of intentionality back into the spotlight as a working concept for the 
pioneers of cybernetic theory, (Heims 1977). As Wiener pointed out: 
"when we go duck shooting, the error which we try to minimise is not 
between the position of the gun and the actual position of the target, 
but that between the position of the gun and the anticipated (author's 
italics) position of the target." (Wiener 1962:113). Systems run on 
information, of which feedback is a central dynamic. In Wiener's
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example we have an example of Information being exchanged, as it 
were, between a situation in the present and a construct of an event 
in the future. This is another way of approaching the TOTE process.
Bandler and Grinder (1975) stressed the need to listen carefully for 
the modal operators that clients use when describing problem states 
because they include (by implication) the dimension of causality, and 
thus where the client perceives themselves to be on a metaphorical 
continuum between experiencing themselves to be 'at cause' or 'at 
effect'. It is as if behind every modal operator there is a cause-effect 
pattern. A trivial example may serve as an illustration. If I were to say 
I  must do the ironing tonight and you were to ask what would happen 
i f  you didn't? then your question might uncover the causality behind 
the must, that I wish to look nice wearing a freshly Ironed shirt. The 
cause-effect pattern then becomes clearer: the (perceived and 
anticipated) effect is to have this because it will feel nice, or I may 
wish to make a certain impression on others. When NLP is used for 
information gathering, then questioning the modal operators that 
people use so as to reveal the causal assumptions 'behind' them can 
uncover further significant information about the goals that are 
driving particular activities or thoughts.
5.4. Cause-effect thinking as basic conceptual processes.
Modal operators are not the only syntactic forms that reveal cause- 
effect thinking patterns. Bandler and Grinder identified cause-effect 
patterns as another category belonging to a class of language 
structures they originally referred to as distortions, (Bandler and 
Grinder 1975). These have been described in the previous chapter. 
Distortions or connections also include the categories of complex 
equivalences, mind reads and lost performatives. All of these have 
interesting ontological and epistemological implications.
It is considered useful to be able to recognise these patterns when 
interviewing or gathering information from others. They can reveal a
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great deal about the patterns of thinking and beliefs that operate 
within other people's inner worlds. My own preference is to think 
about distortions as containing connections. These inevitably make 
use of internal representations of locations or vectors in metaphorical 
space. The idea of space as a conceptually essential organising 
principle has been widely written about. Fauconnier (1994, 1997), 
Fauconnier and Turner (1998), Turner and Fauconnier (1998), 
Fauconnier and Turner 2002, and others have put forward similar 
views. Much of this work originated with the explorations of the roles 
of metaphor in human thinking by Lakoff and Johnson, (1980, 1999) 
and Johnson (1987).
Gregory Bateson has described causality as being both literal and 
metaphorical (Bateson 1972). Lakoff and Johnson however (1999), in 
their thorough exploration of the nature of causal thinking, propose 
that cause has two syntactic valence structures that correspond to the 
metaphors of causation as a forced movement, or as transfer of an 
effect to an affected entity. For Fauconnier, the reason for studying 
space configuration was that they "provide general answers to puzzles 
of language and meaning that are usually associated with sentence 
logic". (Fauconnier 1997:66). My understanding of Bandler and 
Grinder's model is that it places a greater emphasis on teasing out the 
different types of connections in people's maps. According to this 
model, connections occur both in syntactical structures and 
conceptual maps.
In this sense Bandler and Grinder's work is more in the tradition of 
Vygotsky, (1939) who not only proposed a relationship between 
language and thought, but also that "every thought tends to connect 
something with something else, to establish a relationship between 
two things" (Vygotskyl939:33). He also believed that the sense of 
words "merge into each other" (Vygotsky 1939:48), so that preceding 
words modify the meaning of those that follow. Using this model, it 
can be suggested that the syntactic linkages between words, and the 
abstractions that they generate, are indeed basic semantic
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epistemological processes used to create meaning out of otherwise 
inchoate information. Bandler and Grinder's views (1975A) were that 
causatives were basic modelling principles which did not need to be 
rational. ’T/?e important issue is not logic, but the modelling principies 
by which the client organises his experience", (Bandler and Grinder 
1995A:19).
Fauconnier's theories, however useful as explanatory devices, have 
the weakness that they are essentially metaphorical, and may not 
represent actual spaces to the subject. In my own data gathering, 
there were indications that space was in a real sense part of people's 
internal representations. (I describe these processes further in my 
reflection on the texts of my interviews in Chapter 6,7,8 and 9). I 
found that both the spatial location of constructed 'entities', and the 
'perceived' connections between different abstractions, were reported 
by my collaborators in the interviews. Fauconniers (1994) uses of the 
image of mental spaces seem to differ somewhat from my own 
findings, where people actually reported that their conceived images 
or internal representations appeared to them to occupy a location in 
actual space. Thus sometimes images were reported as experienced 
as near or far, or to the left or right of my respondents. These 
phenomena seem to show the qualities of primary experience, rather 
than those of metaphorical devices. There may be both literally 
perceived space as well as metaphoricaiiy conceived space in people s 
conceptual maps. This is a distinction which is not apparent in 
Fauconnier's model.
Cause-effect connections are believed to be deeply embedded in 
language. It is difficult not to conclude that they must have an 
epistemological function. To take my light hearted example, the cause 
effect pattern behind the original statement is: /TI iron my shirt, then 
I will look nice, or to put it more simply, it can be represented by the 
algorithm: if x (at point t l  in time) then y (at point t2 in time). If the 
factor of time is taken out of the equation, then we have another kind 
of syntactical structure. Wearing a freshly ironed shirt means, being
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pleasing. This is what Bandler and Grinder refer to as a complex 
equivalence, which is represented by the simpler algorithm A=B. Here 
the factor of time has been eliminated from the construction. Such 
connections can be very typical of beliefs.
The idea that it is possible to map people's ideas about causality has 
been explored by Weick (2001). There is a trend to map causal 
sequences in both individuals or organisations from documents or 
interviews. Cause maps may be simple linear representations of 
cause-effect thinking, or more complex, containing recursive loops. 
Weick suggests that cause maps are attractive because they lend 
substance to phenomenology, and are a useful way of analysing the 
social construction of reality. It  has even been established that cause 
maps may change over time. I suggest that complex equivalence 
patterns may be just as useful to map, either in conjunction with 
cause maps, or on their own.
Identifying complex equivalences can thus add significant information 
to elucidating cause maps; both cause-effect and the linking of 
abstract entities in patterns of complex equivalences may be two 
sides of the same epistemological coin. It may be that both causal 
linkages and complex equivalence linkages are interdependent 
mapping processes. Beliefs that have the structures of complex 
equivalences may develop from an experience of cause and effect. 
Conversely, particular patterns of complex equivalences may 
themselves generate changes in the conceiver's cause effect patterns.
This seemingly innate tendency to create connections as a way of 
making meaning is deeply embedded in language. Fauconnier and 
Turner (2002) call this conceptual 'blending'; the bringing together of 
two hitherto unrelated 'spaces'. I prefer to use the language of 
Bateson, Russell and Korzybsky, suggesting that we create 
connections between different conceptual entities, which may then 
also operate as different categories or logical types. Sometimes these 
connections can appear to be relatively simple, such as smoking
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causes cancer. They can also be of considerable complexity, so that 
teasing out what and how people have connected in a kind of super­
complex constructs can become a challenge. This was one of the ways 
in which I approached the transcripts of the Master Practitioners' 
interviews, and forms the substance of Chapters 10 and 11.
The part of this inquiry, (which was carried out by my assistants, the 
two Master Practitioners), uncovers some interesting aspects where 
people appeared to have made dis-connections and re-connections in 
their own conceptual maps. This was evident when their experiences, 
and therefore their abstractions about themselves as learners, 
changed. One of the aspects we were interested in was the 
Practitioners' conceptions of themselves as learners. I will present and 
review theses in chapter 10, because it illustrates how one may be 
able to track changes in people's conceptual connections. This may 
yield insights into the nature of transformative changes.
5.5. Hidden connections and double binds
The complexities of connections also raises the issue about how we 
make judgements. Could connections also be involved there? Bandler 
and Grinder suggest the existence of a class of words which can only 
be produced after a judgement has been made. These are lost 
performatives; words which can only be conceptualised after a 
process of judgement has been carried out. So words such as 'good', 
'bad''evil', 'excellent', belong in this category. How does the 
conceptualiser 'know' that something is good or bad? What has to 
happen before the word is even brought to mind?
Perhaps we store such judgements as categories of'good things' and 
'bad things'. So there are hidden connections between the word and 
the category to which the individual has assigned events that have 
been judged. It may be impossible to categorise without making 
connections. Again, as with comparative deletions, in order to make 
any judgement, there has to have been a process of comparison, in
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order to assign an event to a category. Does it fit into the category or 
not? Is it the same as the other members of the category or is it 
different? Such functions are impossible without the use of the 
epistemological primitive of comparison.
This idea has emerged through my reflections on Bateson's ideas 
about language, categorisation and Russell and Whitehead's theory of 
logical types, (Bateson 1972)^ My own perception of the way I 
analyse what may be the conceptual processes producing them is 
rather like dissecting a newly discovered creature. However, this is 
more of an epistemological dissection, to introduce a new metaphor.
It is an exploration of some of the processes which may have been 
used in the creation of a lost performative, words that are the result 
of a judgement having been made.
Here the notion of scalarity, (which I  described in Chapter 3) as a 
possibly essential conceptual device emerges again. It is as if there 
existed an invisible scale behind categories such as 'good' or 'bad'.
This is similar to what I believe happens before the production of a 
comparative deletion. However, lost performatives do not seem to be 
based on a sliding scale; rather they presuppose a comparison with 
what is perceived as a polar opposite. For instance, if something is 
conceived of as 'good', then this is a polar opposite to the concept 
'bad', yet the two are linked. What are the differences between 
'ordinary' categories which group members of a class together such as 
mammals, whales, food, and so on, and categories which include 
judgements about ideas and events? This is a question which has only 
arisen for me as the result of my data collecting and perusal of 
transcripts. These are mere reflections on what could be some of the 
processes that occur before the words themselves to come to the 
surface.
 ^ In particular, the chapter entitled A Theory of Play and Fantasy, Bateson 
1972 pp 177 -  193.
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I suggest that connections may also be involved in lost performatives. 
If deletion, generalisation and making connections are some of the 
fundamental processes that occur in the production of language, 
(Bandler and Grinder 1995) then I suggest that what have been 
deleted from lost performatives are the 'mental' connections to the 
category and the scale which are part of the process of judging. 
Categorisation could be described as drawing an imaginary line 
around the information that is to be attended to, which also conveys 
information about what is not to be attended to, (Bateson 1972).
There is an overlap with Fauconnier's (1997) model that what he 
metaphorically terms 'blending' occurs between different 'mental 
spaces', when people subjectively create their maps of their 
experiences. This seems to me to be another way of saying that 
people construct all sorts of complex connections. However, he and 
his co-workers do not seem to address the process of the making of 
judgements. Connecting may also be an integral part of the process of 
judging, and then of languaging the result. However, in the case of 
lost performatives, the connections appear to be deleted, and the lost 
performative generalised into a class. (Deletion is the inevitable 
consequence of any abstraction.) Thus, when someone says 'this is 
bad' he or she is assigning an event to a class, and possibly confusing 
logical types. A member of a class cannot be the class. Bateson's 
view is that conceptually and metaphorically, a class operates as if it 
has a frame around a group of events within it. In his words:
"the messages enclosed within the imaginary line are defined as 
members of a class by virtue of their sharing common premises 
or mutual relevance. The frame itself thus becomes part of the 
premise system. Either... the frame is involved in the evaluation 
of the messages which it contains, or the frame merely assists 
the mind in understanding the contained messages by reminding 
the thinker that these messages are mutually relevant and the 
messages outside the frame may be ignored" (Bateson 
1972:188).
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In order to assign events to the class 'good' it has again been 
necessary to use the process of comparison. With what? Perhaps with 
its polar opposite, 'bad'. Bateson, in suggesting that what a frame or 
category does conceptually is to draw attention to what is within, not 
to what is outside the frame. He suggests that this gives a figure- 
ground situation, where the frame which is operative determines the 
figure against the ground of what is excluded from perception, and 
beyond the frame. So in the category of lost performatives, there has 
not only been the assigning of an event to a category; paradoxically, 
the category itself bears a (deleted) relationship to its opposite, which 
is not consciously attended to, but which is nevertheless 'there', as 
the ground behind the figure at the fore.
Perhaps, the ability to conceive of opposites may be another essential 
epistemological process we use to make sense of value judgements.
So good may be the figure against the ground of evil. Evil could be 
the figure delineated against the ground of'good'. Thus we have the 
algorithm A is not B at the heart of the process of producing a lost 
performative. Yet paradoxically, A cannot be conceived of without B. A 
and B co-exist together at a deeper level (not in the Chomskyan 
sense); when lost performatives are languaged, it is as the result of 
some fundamental epistemological processes such as comparison, 
deletion, exclusion and the apprehension of polar opposites which act 
as precursors to the emergence of words.
Thus there may be connections within the conceptual processes 
leading to lost performatives, though they are complex and perhaps 
obscure. However, they may highlight some perhaps very 
fundamental epistemological processes such as the use of scales, the 
conception of opposites, categorisation, figure-ground relationships, 
deletion, and the formation of connections. These may be obvious, as 
with complex equivalents and causal relations, or obscured, as with 
lost performatives. I do not think that it is tilting at windmills to 
suggest that these are some of the basic processes which form 
bridges between map and territory. Perhaps I should let Bateson have
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the last word in this context; "language bears to the objects which it 
denotes a relationship comparable to that which a map bears to a 
territory," {Bateson 1972:180). At the heart of this inquiry lies the 
little explored interface between our internal representations, and 
language, which is of a different logical type. In this inquiry, the two 
appear to emerge as dynamically inter-related.
5.6. Mind reading, and other epistemologicai traps
Let us remember: we never deal with realities per se, but rather with 
imaaes of reality -  that is, with interpretations. Watzlawick 
(1993:119).
...The mind, in apprehending, also experiences sensations which 
properly speaking are qualities o f the mind alone. These sensations 
are projected by the mind so as to ciothe appropriate bodies in 
external nature. Thus the bodies are perceived as with the qualities 
which in reality do not belong to them, qualities which in fact are 
purely offsprings of the mind. A.N. Whitehead, quoted in Velmans 
(2000:112).
I offer the following example of a typical mind reading process. There 
is an illuminating group exercise in a management training book 
(Mullins 2002) which I have often used as a trainer. I include it here 
because it illustrates the idea of mind reading. In this activity the 
group is given the following story, then asked to judge a number of 
statements about it as true, false or don't know, without being 
allowed to refer back to the text.
A businessman had just turned off the lights in the store when a 
man appeared and demanded money. The owner opened the 
cash register. The contents of the cash register were scooped up, 
and the man sped away. A member of the police force was 
notified promptly. (Mullins 2002:414).
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One of the statements that participants are asked to evaluate as true 
or false is: After the man who demanded the money scooped up the 
contents of the cash register, he ran away. (Mullins 2002:415). 
Surprisingly, many participants rate this statement as true. What 
seems to happen is that the people make the judgement from 
'reading' the information that they have coded into their internal 
constructs, not from what was stated in the text. When the results of 
the exercise are discussed, people soon realise that what they are 
doing is to make judgements about an event by 'reading' as it were, 
their own internal representations of the story. They are thus 
evaluating what they believe are objective facts from the source of 
their own subjective responses, rather from the statement whose 
origins were external to them. This is the essence of mind reading. 
(Bandler and Grinder 1975, 1976). So here we evaluate what we 
know by making an internal representation, and filling in the missing 
gaps in our own constructs. We then believe this to be real, and a 
valid source of knowledge.
It is also possible to project this process on to others. One of the 
dangers that Bandler and Grinder (1975) draw attention to is when a 
person believes he or she 'knows' what another person is thinking. 
This process produces the typical meta-model pattern of mind 
reading. The statement being iate for our date means you don't love 
me' is typical of a mind read. Connections again come into play. In 
this case, the conceiver makes a link between an external event 
(someone being late) and a subjective internal response. Such 
linkages are purely subjective, and yet another example of the power 
of connections to create meaning. A common linguistic marker that 
alerts one to a mind read is I  know that you..., followed by some 
judgement or conclusion. Inevitably, there may also be cause-effect 
patterns buried deep within these structures.
Bandler and Grinder observed Milton Erickson use this process with 
patients. In the Ericksonian tradition, therapists use their own 
complex patterns of language in such a way that patients' internal
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constructs of painful events are altered. Grinder, Delozier and 
Bandler(1977) have written extensively on their analyses of 
transcripts of Erickson's sessions with people, identifying the meta­
model patterns that Erickson used. This example taken from Grinder, 
Delozier and Bandler (1977) of Erickson talking to a patient gives 
some indication of Erickson using mind reading.
I know from past experience that your blood pressure is 
changed, your pulse is changed and your eyelid reflex is 
changed. (Grinder, Delozier and Bandler 1977:175).
Thus there are essentially two kinds of mind reads; one in which the 
'reading' is from the individual's own cognitive constructs, and the 
other in which people come to believe that they 'know' what is 
happening in the mind of another.
It is tempting for the putative philosopher to propose that mind 
reading may be the most fundamental epistemological process of all. 
We know that we know because we refer continuously to our own 
internal maps, and mapping processes. Our maps become the vade 
mecums of knowledge about our knowledge. They are reflected in 
linguistic structures, and also influenced by them. We end up with an 
infuriatingly recursive piece of logic; that we know that we know 
because we make it up. Yet without this ability to construct our own 
maps, we would be lost in meaningless chaos. Bateson proposed that 
"the function of consciousness is the coupling between man and the 
homeostatic systems around him" (Bateson 1972:445); that we 
continually interact cybernetically with our environment. Whatever 
models of language are used, it seems that this paradox is an 
essential part of human information processing.
5.7. Presuppositions
Bandler and Grinder emphasised the presuppositional nature of 
language. A dictionary definition of presupposition indicates that it is
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something that is assumed, or taken for granted. It is also thought to 
be a necessary antecedent to making sense. Presuppositions are 
considered to be a pre-requisite for sense making. Dilts (2000)^ has 
explained the term as something that is overtly expressed in the body 
of a statement, which must be supposed or accepted in order for the 
sentence or utterance to make sense. Thus for a statement to make 
any sense, the hearer or reader must first assume certain things. In 
the statement the cat sat on the mat, the existence of the entities cat 
and mat have to be assumed in order to process the information 
contained in the sentence. Similarly, the existence of a past, and the 
phenomenon of sitting also have to be presupposed. In other words, 
these assumptions are antecedent to the understanding of the 
sentence.
When Bandler and Grinder were identifying how Milton Erickson 
achieved the therapeutic effects that he did through his language 
patterns, one of the most influential devices he used were 
presuppositions. In The Structure of Magic Volume I  they identify 29 
different types of these.
Thus in order for a statement to be taken as 'true', something 
antecendent to it must also have been believed to be 'true'. Making 
sense of something in the present is based on sense-making that has 
gone on before. In terms of logical levels, presuppositions operate at 
a higher level of abstraction. This may then influence how an 
utterance or a text is decoded. Thus they also act in a similar way to 
categories or frameworks, which are thought to influence people's 
perception (Goldstone 2001). Presuppositions can also be powerful 
persuasive devices. For instance, asking a child at bedtime "do you 
want to put your pyjamas on now or after supper" presupposes that 
pyjamas will be put on. It Is claimed that such patterns are more 
likely to elicit assent. This is a brief example of another dimension to 
the profoundly subjective nature of sense making through language.
" This can be downloaded from
http://nlpuniversitypress.com/hmtll2/PrPu20.html.
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and of the ways in which language can be thought of as operating at 
many levels, both conscious and unconscious.
5.8. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the idea that there are different types of 
complex connections within people's conceptual architecture which 
are reflected in language structures. These both represent 
epistemological processes (which are agents in the creation of 
conceptual constructs) and, when languaged, influence the thinking of 
others. Such connections can be sought for when analysing texts, 
which is what I have done with the transcripts in Chapter 10, showing 
the changes that people underwent after attending the NLP course in 
Riyadh. Connections of various kinds seem to contribute to the 
emergence of meaning. They are also part of the process of 
abstraction; the higher abstract concepts will include connections of 
various kinds as part of the internal framework of the conceiver's 
maps. These in turn generate the presuppositions through which 
people make sense of statements and texts. Thus Bandler and 
Grinder's model of language is not merely a typology, it also includes 
some important underlying epistemological processes, which are as 
much about thought as they are about communication. These are 
some of the many aspects of information processing that I explore 
further, using the transcript of my interviews, in Chapters 6 -  10.
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Chapter 6. Exploring Nominalisations and De-nominalising, and 
finding Other Things on the Way.
You talk to yourself too much. You're not unique In that. Everyone of 
us does. We maintain our world with our inner dialogue. (Carlos 
Castaneda's character Don Juan, quoted by Kornfield 2000:36).
Be prepared for the unexpected. You might find that you unearth 
other Issues which were existing at a deeper level than the issue you 
originaliy decided to investigate. [...] Always be careful, however, not 
to let an Inquiry get out of hand. Stay disciplined and concentrate on 
one area at a time. (McNiff et al 1996:40 -  41).
6.1. Introduction
This is the first of four chapters on my analyses and interpretations of 
the transcripts of my own interviews. I explained their background 
and design in chapter 2. Although the detail I now go into in reporting 
my findings may seem daunting, I have purposely approached this 
with care, because this approach, and the findings, may be new, and 
may therefore need careful exploration and description. In my own 
data collection, I focus on the internal representations and sub­
modality changes that my interviewees reported on. I link changes in 
people's internal representations to the language structures that I 
used in my interview schedule.
My new 'microscope lens' had revealed hitherto little known things. 
One of the difficulties of using this new method is that it has shown 
the topic of my inquiry to be far more complex than I had originally 
thought. Working from within a system's perspective, it has been 
difficult to decide what to leave out. This was because many aspects 
emerged that I consider are part of the greater whole of the learning 
and sense making of people's cognitive mapping processes. However, 
I believe that the role of the senses in conceptual mapping emerges 
from the data that I describe in the following four chapters.
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As I explained in chapter 2 ,1 interviewed six participants on my NLP 
course/ I have changed their names so that they remain anonymous.
I was most interested in eliciting people's experience of their own 
internal representations and sub-modality changes generated in 
response to my words. I have described Bandler and MacDonald's 
(1988) ideas on internal representations and sub-modalities in 
Chapter 3, where I suggest that they may be a vital but hitherto little 
explored aspect of people's internal constructs. The next four chapters 
are mainly about people's reports on their internal representations, 
and the changes in sub-modalities that appear to have been elicited 
by changes in the language structures that were used. Chapter 10 
takes a different approach, as it describes my interpretation of 
interviews carried out by my assistants.
This chapter is mainly about my explorations of the effects of 
nominalisations (as distinct from the verb form) on people's 
construction of meaning at the levels of internal representations and 
sub-modalities. However, other features also came to light in these 
interviews, namely the role of words used at the beginning of my 
questions also played a role in how subsequent information was 
attended to by the conceiver.
Chapter 7 explores the role of modal operators and the effects of 
other small but seemingly powerful words on people's internal 
processes. Again, the focus is on changes in people's internal 
representations.
In Chapter 8 ,1 offer my analysis of the transcripts with a focus on a 
number of factors that seemed to emerge from the interviews. These 
include the roles of the dimension of time and goal setting. They also 
indicate that people have the ability to use different time frames 
(past, present and future) as perceptual positions.
Lucy', 'Edward', 'Ina', 'Kathleen', 'Steve' and 'Beatrice'.
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In Chapter 9, I focus on responses to certain words, which seem to 
generate more specific internal responses in people. I also describe 
my attempts to explore the different perceptual filters of'sameness' 
and 'difference'. Throughout the four chapters, I also refer to the role 
of people's internal dialogue, which appeared to emerge as an 
essential aid to the development of the concelvers' internal 
processing, and meaning making.
In Chapter 10 I use the transcripts of the Master Practitioners' 
interviews to explore some of the more abstract levels of people's 
constructs of learning, and propose that the style of teaching and 
communication may have profound effects on how people construct 
knowledge. This chapter uses Bandler and Grinder's meta-model as 
the main tool for my analysis of the transcripts.
The information from chapters 6 to 10, and my reflection on these 
findings, became the basis for the development of my hypothetical 
model of the specific processes involved in the construction of 
knowledge (and also learning). It suggests that there are a number of 
identifiable epistemological processes, used in the construction of 
people's models, which are mediated through language and 
communication.
Where I cite extracts from the transcripts, I use J. for my own words, 
and the pseudonyms for those of my interlocutors. Where there were 
pauses, I have indicated these thus:... , and where I have left out 
parts of the transcripts, I have used (...).
6.2.1. Nominalising and de-nominaiising.
In this section I begin to analyse the information from the transcripts 
of my interviews. The main focus in this chapter is on my attempts to 
explore the effects of nominalisations. I review my collaborators' 
answers to 5 different questions from my interview schedule. All of
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these were initially intended to inquire into the effects of 
nominalisations. One of my original goals was to explore the internal 
processes associated with the nominalised and de-nominalised forms 
of words. A characteristic of our language and thinking is that as part 
of our conceptual strategies we appear to concretise what were 
originally processes. I have explored what I believe to be some of the 
theoretical background to these linguistic processes in Chapter 4.
In my own interview schedule, (whose design I described in chapter 
2) there were five sets of linguistic constructions which deliberately 
contained both nominalisations and de-nominalisations. These were 
questions 3, 4, 9, 10 and 16.^ Each contained information that I 
wanted to present in both forms using different linguistic
^Question 3
a) Can you be aware of how you relate to someone you value?
b) Can you think of a relationship with a person you value?
Question 4.
a) In the heart, the ventricles contract to pump blood around the body. The 
atria receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at the bases of the 
main arteries prevent the backflow of blood on ventricular relaxation.
b)Your heart is a pump and (pause) receives blood from your body and 
(pause) pumps blood around your body. Imagine your ventricles contracting 
and (pause) squeezing blood Into the main arteries so (pause) they need 
valves at their base that close so that (pause) blood isn't sucked back when 
the ventricle relaxes.
Question 9.
Think of something you might have done better. What are the differences 
between saying to you 'you did that wrong, and you did that wrongly?'
Question 10
a) Remember your childhood.
b) Remember being a child.
c) Remember yourself as a child.
Question 16.
a) It's important to understand communication.
b) It's important to understand communicating.
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constructions. In the case of question 9, I explored using the 
adjective 'wrong' and then changed it to the adverb 'wrongly'. For the 
sake of simplicity I will look at a set of responses, and then reflect on 
my findings at the end of this section.
6.2.2. Responses to Question 4 /  textbook language 
explored
With question 4 I had deliberately set out to explore the differences 
between the standard 'medical text book' language which is 
dissociated, and uses the third person, and the same kind of content 
phrased in the second person, with some of the contents 
denominalised. I had offered two statements. The first was more 
'text-book', and contained a number of nominalisations.'^ The second 
deliberately contained more verbs, (de-nominalisations) and used the 
second person. Some of the interviewees reported that their first 
response to my initial (more impersonal, third person) statement was 
that they were reminded of lessons, or textbooks in cardiology. 
Beatrice, for instance replied almost immediately that what came to 
her mind were still, flat, two dimensional colour pictures from a book:
Beatrice: It's a text book, it's the picture from our textbooks from our 
training as a nurse. It's actually a colour picture. ... It's colour 
pictures in the book.
J. So it's fiat, two dimensional?
 ^ In the heart the ventricles contract to pump blood around the body. The atria 
receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at the bases of the main arteries 
prevent the back flow of blood on ventricular relaxation.
Your heart is a pump and receives blood from your body and pumps blood around 
your body. Imagine your ventricles contracting and squeezing blood into the main 
arteries so they need valves at their base that close, so that the blood isn't sucked 
back when the ventricle relaxes.
By dissociated, I refer to a particular perceptual stance, in which the conceivers 
experience themselves as separate from the content of their conceptions.
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Beatrice: Yeah, flat, still picture. I  can actually see the book, I  can see 
the whole thing, I  can see the art that was involved in drawing it.
The second statement changed her internal representation from a still 
picture to a moving representation at the sub-modality level. This 
appeared to be a significant change. Her whole internal construction 
seemed to alter with my words. The language of the second 
statement contained more verbs, and I had deliberately tried to 
create a flow of information using my voice. On hearing this part, she 
commented that she experienced more movement:
Beatrice: It's the same picture from the book, but has movement in it, 
and the ventricies are contracting, and it's probably because I  know 
the flow of the blood that I  can see the movement.
Another person, Kathleen, reported a similar response, conceiving a 
static 'picture' in response to the first statement, and a moving one 
after the second. Her response to the first statement was:
Kathleen: Do I  have the right picture? Thick black lines, that's it.
J. One picture?
Kathleen: Yeah.
J. And anything about what's on the picture?
Kathleen: Just little lines pointing to it. Like a diagram 
J. It's like a diagram?
Kathleen: Thick black lines for the walls o f the heart and little black 
lines pointing to the atria and ventricle.
J. Sort of textbook?
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Kathleen: Yeah, sort of basic textbook.
She responded to the second statement more enthusiastically than to 
the first.
Kathleen: Yeah, It's a moving picture, colour, quite close to me 
actually, and in the picture there are different colours, the valves, the 
reds, the .... I  can't see the blood going through the arteries but I  can 
see the ventricles contracting, pumping.
Lucy, on the other hand, reported that her response to the first 
statement was to become aware of... Slides. I'm trying to... they're 
slides. I t  wasn't moving A bit o f colour. I  suppose I  can put a little bit 
more into it  being a nurse.... Definitely slides.
For Lucy, the second part evoked moving pictures. She told me that 
she had been aware of the 'ands' linking the various pieces of 
information together, which she thought had helped to produce the 
movement. She also commented on the effects that the word 
'squeeze' had had on her. This word is one that Bandler and Grinder 
(1975) classify as a sensory predicate, that is, one likely to evoke a 
kin a esthetic^ response. In her case it seemed to transform the 
internal imagery from a series of stills to images in which there was 
movement.
Lucy: So yeah, much more of a picture. The word 'squeeze', it's easier 
to envision, it definitely was a moving picture.
J. So it was a movie?
5 The term 'kinaesthetic' is one used in NLP to denote any bodily sensation. 
This may range from interviewees being more aware of shifts in their bodily 
responses, to other sensations such as feeling heavy or light, warmer or 
colder, or with a sensation located at a particular point, or felt throughout. 
Kinaesthetic responses are considered to be an essential aspect of internal 
representations, which I have written about in chapter 3. My respondents 
often used the term kinaesthetic; it had become part of the language that we 
used in the NLP course to denote bodily sensations.
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Lucy: I t  was a movie.
Edward was a thirty two year old Respiratory Technician in the 
hospital, and was also one of the Master Practitioners assisting me on 
the NLP course. He was one of the people with whom I discussed the 
design of my interviews. He gave me some useful feedback.
It is, I believe, indicated from Edward's response that for him, the 
text-book language evoked text-book images. He volunteered what 
for me was one of the most significant pieces of information, which I 
have underlined below. Here he describes how he is aware that he is 
actively engaged in creating an internal representation, as it were in 
conjunction with my words, and his additional verbal reflections on 
them. Then, his internal representations seemed to take on a life of 
their own, so that it is as if, as he is describing his responses, his own 
internal words continue to access more information, so that as it 
builds up, it acquires more detail, colour and movement. It  was as if 
that when he spoke of his own internal representations, they 
increased in detail and richness, stimulating more memories in the 
form of further internal representations.
Edward: Mb Mb (laugh) takes me back to my days of cardiology. Em, 
I  have a picture of the heart with ... an aorta coming out o f the 
ventricle...
J. Is it  a still or a movie?
Edward: It's moving.
J. Mb Mb
Edward: I'm jus t fiiling in the bits as I  go along. I'm  constructina 
vour dialoaue aoainst mv mao of mv cardioloav that I  know. (My
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emphasis, as this made me curious about what might be involved in 
people's inner searches.)
J. OK. Yeah.
Edward: So I'm putting on the vena cava,
J. Yeah.
Edward: And iust buildina it up. and now that it's built now it starts 
aettina its colour. (My underlining, as he is talking through how he is 
constructing the internal representation.) Interesting, the colour Is as 
If you're using colour Doppler. I  don't know If you know colour 
Doppler; towards the colour Doppler is always red, and away from 
the, eh...probe Is always blue. From my days of doing cardiac echoes, 
so it's actually being coded appropriately to cardiac echoes...
J. In your internal representation?
Edward: Yeah, uh huu.
He responded differently to the second half of the question. Instead of 
responding visually, his first response appeared to engage the 
kinaesthetic domain.
Edward: That's very different. First o f all I  Internally go to where my 
heart is, I  can feel the sensation o f blood moving through my vessels, 
then If I  check my ventricle I  can feel the blood moving out of my 
vessel... out of my ventricle, sorry. Into the aorta, and when you 
mention the valves I  can feel the sensation of re-gurge, the blood 
coming back and pushing against the valves.... Now that's all the 
kinaesthetic, I  can also see the picture {...), which is three D, no 
borders, movement.
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In this case it was as if using more verbs, and the second person verb 
form, rather than the third person, may initially have led him to a 
kinaesthetic response, as he used the word 'feel' three times, as if he 
were attending more to his bodily sensations. He reported that he was 
not aware that there were any significant differences in his visual 
responses to each statement, though I did not probe further, except 
to note that his 'pictures' also had movement in them, as a response 
to my second set of statements.
Lucy, a 28 year old nurse responsible for Quality Control and teaching 
in the hospital, initially gave responses that were baffling, because 
they were different from those of the others, and thus a counter 
example. For her, it was the first statement that brought about vivid, 
colour coded moving pictures of a diagram of the heart. The second 
statement surprisingly produced a more 'textbook' representation.
Lucy: (laughter) I  think to make sense I  had... first Instructions you 
had were nice, the second instructions you gave me were more 
textbook. The language was unfamiliar yet It needed textbook picture, 
whereas the first language was un textbook like. It was 
understandable to a nurse or a layman, it  was easy, the second one I  
needed a diagram for myself. It reminded me of school.
One of the aspects that I have not focused much attention on is the 
role of meta-communication in human discourse. Factors such as 
tonality, modulation, rhythm, tempo and volume all have message 
value, (Watzlawick et al 1967). One possible explanation for Lucy's 
different responses is that my own 'meta-messages' were influencing 
her. As non-verbal communication is considered to operate at a 
higher logical level than words, that too may influence how the 
message is to be decoded. It is considered to act as a catégoriser of 
the verbal content. (Watzlawick et al 1967, Watzlawick 1978). The 
main aim of the research was exploring the power of words to 
teaching and learning. Although I did not explicitly inquire into the 
influence of meta-communication, its effects were unavoidable.
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One of the most interesting responses to the second part of Question 
4 was offered by Steve, a 26 year old male nurse, where he describes 
how his internal representation of his heart included information he 
had coded visually, auditorily and kinaesthetically. My first statement 
elicited a predominantly visual description, accompanied by some 
'squelching sound', {sic) whereas the second statement produced this ’ 
response.
Steve: No, there Is blood coming back in but I  can't see it  coming 
back In. there's a noise again, but the noise is more like the lub dub 
of the heart, than the squelching sound, standing on orangesi 
(Laughter) I  can feel my heart in my chest now, the rate is quicker 
than normal, I  can actually feel the sensation in my arms o f blood 
going through them.
I became curious to explore how people might experience the effects 
of their own internal words on these cognitive processes, and he 
seemed to be someone who was very aware of his own internal world, 
so I asked him: " So you talking about it  has actually kind o f changed 
the internal representation, so what you were saying was not jus t 
from what I  was reading?" His reply then illustrated how his own 
dialogue developed the images in his introspections.
Steve: I  think from what I  was savina. the kinaesthetic became 
stronger, (my underlining^ but the kinaesthetic did not change. The 
picture came first. As I  was describing it the kinaesthetic became 
stronger. That's exactly what happened. The auditory sounds... other 
than my internal dialogue was... became... the volume became 
greater.
Here he seemed to distinguish between the sounds of his own speech, 
and the other noises in his internal representation. So as he became 
aware of sounds, then of his own internal dialogue, as well as what he 
was saying to me, his internal model seemed to become amplified.
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more intense. It was as if the internal diaiogue was leading him to 
access more information. He also stated that he experienced a link 
between his act of describing internal events, and an increase in the 
intensity of the auditory and kinaesthetic components of his own 
responses. Lynch (1983) has reported that there is an increase in 
blood pressure in people when they talk, or even read aloud, as if 
speaking directly influenced their physiology. In the case of Steve, his 
own speech seems to have had a direct effect on the intensity of the 
activities of his internal sensory world. He also seemed to be able to 
track the effects of his own inner dialogue on the development of his 
internal representations. This could almost be described as 
introspecting introspection!
6.3. First words emerge as important.
With the first question® that I had designed to investigate people's 
responses to the nominalisation 'relationship' and the denominalised 
form 'relate', there were to be some surprising responses. Instead of 
reporting on the effects of the nominalisations, the transcripts seem 
to indicate that some people responded more to the words 'aware' 
and 'think' than they did to the nominalisation and de-nominalised 
form. This is indicated by Lucy's response.
Lucy: I  find that easier to think of, than being aware. Aware seemed 
to be more dissociated. Aware? (pause) so I  think I  wouid stiii get ail 
the same feelings...
In my first interviews, it appeared that words such as 'think' and 
'aware' may create particular mind sets rather as categories or 
metaphors do. These then influence how the information is 
constellated at the sub-modality levels. This is in keeping with
 ^ Question 3
a) Can you be aware of how you relate to someone you value?
b) Can you think of a relationship with a person you value?
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Goldstone's views about the influence of categories on perception, 
which I reviewed in Chapter 3. (Goldstone, R. 2001A). In this case, I 
found that, if we consider 'think' and 'aware' to represent two 
different frameworks, perhaps at a higher logical level than the rest of 
the sentence, then they seem to have altered the way in which my 
interlocutors paid attention to the rest of the sentence. This is in 
keeping with Robbie (2000) who has explored the idea that Sandier 
and Grinder's metamodel of language structure needs fine tuning. He 
suggests that Pinker's idea that phrases contain a word which acts as 
a 'head' (Pinker 1994) which gives a phrase its name and determines 
what it is about, needs to be considered. Perhaps how I used 'think' 
and 'aware' also caused people to respond to them as if they were 
'heads'. It is perhaps too soon to draw many generalisations about 
the effects of such words from such a small sample. Lucy's response 
to 'think' and 'be aware' were interesting. These words were somehow 
considered by the interviewees as more significant than I had 
originally thought. They seemed to override the effects of the 
nominalisatons, which were the class of words that I wanted to 
investigate.
The information about sub-modalities in the responses to this 
question was initially somewhat confused; if anything it was a lesson 
in the importance of the interviewer's awareness of her own words. 
Erickson and Rossi (1989) stressed that the initially spoken words 
may create a 'set' (or framework, perhaps even a kind of category), 
which then determines the context to which subsequent information is 
assigned by the listener. It is as if how one asks someone to process 
information (requesting them to be aware or asking them to think 
about) appears to direct the internal search in different directions. In 
writing about the responses to these language structures, it is also 
interesting to note that'be aware' and 'think' produce different 
effects. I illustrate this with extracts from the transcripts below.
It seemed that words such as 'think'and 'aware', when used as 
directives, may produce a different kind of internal search, and define
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different ways in which the acquired information is to be configured.
In retrospect I should have made clearer distinctions between 
whether I was exploring nominalisations, or the effects of asking 
people how to process and search.
Steve's responses were interesting for a number of reasons. He was a 
practiced meditator, who claimed this made him more aware of his 
own processes. There appeared to be more detail in his responses to 
my questions. The next extract shows his internal search; he is 
commenting on his process of searching as well as his responses to 
my words. Of particular interest are his comments on his own internal 
dialogue, which I have underlined. In the second set of responses he 
repeats the word 'relationship', which I take somewhat hesitantly to 
indicate that he is configuring the information in noun form, though 
he then spontaneously uses the verb to continue his own internal 
search, which may have influenced the way the information was then 
experienced. Early on in the interviewing process I began to wonder 
about the role of internal dialogue in the internal search during the 
introspective process.
One of the most marked differences in my interview with Steve was 
the distinct sensory modalities which were evoked; the first directive 
that I gave him directed his attention to his kinaesthetic response 
(which may be his response to the word 'awareness') whereas in the 
second part he seemed to oscillate between awareness of the visual 
and the kinaesthetic aspects of his internal representations.
Sometimes people's responses seemed initially to be difficult to 
describe; I suggest this may be because we lack an appropriate 
language to describe many of our introspections.
Here are some of Steve's responses to the same set of requests. They 
also seem to indicate that he uses his internal dialogue to further and 
deepen his own introspection. I have underlined the parts of the 
extracts, which seem to me to illustrate this.
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J. OK Fine. So number three is 'can you be aware of how you reiate to 
someone you value?'
Steve: Yeah, that's mainly a kinaesthetic, and the feeling is mainly in 
my chest and affects my breathing actuaily, I  get a feeiing first and 
then I  get a picture of the person, and I  hear their name, myself 
naming them. (...) It's a still picture, it's brightly coloured, the colours 
in the picture are bright anyway, that I  have, the person's wearing 
bright colours, but it's a stiii picture, it's clear, it's framed, I  can hear 
mvself talking inside saving whv I  value the person^ what this person 
means to me.... (pause; but it's mainly kinaesthetic, is the strongest 
response...
J. OK So what happens i f  we kind o f re-phrase that into 'can you think 
of a relationship with a person you value'.
Steve. Em, yes but I  don't see. I  have a sense of the relationship but 
I  can't see it relating, I  can see a picture... but I  can't see It relating in 
it, I  can't see the interaction but I  know there's a relationship, and it's 
good, it's comfortable, the feelings again, it's mainiy kinaesthetic, the 
feelings are comfortable, ... I  feel relaxed.... ("pause; but I  can't be... 
it's difficult to explain, but I'm going to the back of my head here 
there's a kinaesthetic feeling like a ball again, a sphere, in this 
relationship. It's sitting there. Give me a second to see what's in 
there... again. I've got a different picture. It's of me and the same 
person in this relationship... and it's moving, it's bright, it's vivid, it's 
actualiy the same scene... and there's actually different scenes 
coming in and out, ... the feeling at the back of my head has gone 
actually.
What emerges from this part of the transcripts and the extracts from 
the transcripts of question 3 in particular, is that here we have more 
glimpses into the complex interactions between people's internal 
dialogue, and the directions taken by their introspections, and 
therefore, it seems, their internal representations. Internal dialogue.
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even in the responses to the most deceptively simple statements, was 
now emerging as a factor apparently able to direct searches, and 
influence how the information was then sorted and attended to. At the 
same time it seemed to echo and further develop my interlocutor's 
internal dialogue. It also appeared to stimulate the creation of some 
rich and varied internal representations.
6.4. Reflections on the responses to question 10;^ memories of 
childhood.
The questions where I asked my collaborators to search internally for 
certain memories about their younger years yielded some unexpected 
responses. I chose to use the term 'childhood' because it is one of 
those nominalisations for which it has become impossible to return to 
the original verb, which could be something like 'childing', though that 
is ambiguous. I asked them to think about the differences in their 
responses between 'being a child'and 'your childhood'. These 
produced marked alterations In the internal configurations of their 
sub-modalities. There were further differences when I asked people 
to remember themselves as 'a child'.
Were I to carry out this type of questioning again, I would be more 
aware of the influence of first words on people's initial internal 
responses. People reported significant shifts in how they processed 
and responded to my words in this question. Many differences in sub­
modalities were reported. Some of the wordings elicited pleasant 
memories for some, for others, less pleasant. There were also marked 
shifts in people's perceptual positions; sometimes my respondents 
could see themselves in the internal representations, at other times 
they were actually experiencing remembered events as if they were
1. Remember your childhood.
2. Remember being a chiid.
3. Remember yourself as a child.
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happening to them in the present. The first stance is typical of 
dissociation, where people experience themselves as being 'on the 
outside' of the events that are happening, or that they are 
remembering. Abascal e ta l (2001) describe this as taking the 
'witnessing stand'. When people are associated, on the other hand 
they appear to experience events as if they were actually happening 
to them in the present.
Beatrice's responses illustrated just such a dramatic shift. To the first 
question she replied that she 'sees' lots of little pictures, which were 
associated with a good feeling. The second question produced a long 
silence and signs of distress. I wanted to avoid making any of my 
collaborators uncomfortable, so I quickly gave a few words of 
reassurance, and then moved on. Only when I was sure that she was 
no longer distressed did I continue with the interview. Here is the 
extract which I believe illustrates these shifts. What seemed 
interesting is that the first question elicited 'loads of pictures' whereas 
the second only produced one picture. This is a sub-modality 
distinction.
J. What happens i f  I  say' remember your childhood?'
Beatrice: ("Pause.; Loads of pictures, pictures all over the place o f my 
childhood.
J. OK. Lots o f different pictures?
Beatrice: All different pictures.
J. All in front of you. Are you in the pictures, or looking at them, or...
Beatrice: I'm in some of them, yeah, looking at others, there a ... 
they're not very clear, they're like sort of fuzzy sort of pictures, 
they're nice, and there's a nice comfortable feeling as well.
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J. And how is that different to 'remember being a child?'
Beatrice: Remember being a chiid is one picture with a border on it, it 
actually automatically goes into not a very nice situation...
J. Oh dear...
Beatrice: I'm a small person... ("Here she showed signs of discomfort, 
so I reassured her, and we gently moved on to another topic).
A similar pattern was shown by Edward, who also responded to the 
first statement by seeing and feeling many different things, and who 
then, when asked to remember being a child, experienced a change in 
the number of pictures and a change in the feelings (kinaesthetics) 
associated with them.
Part of Edward's response to the first statement illustrates the 
richness and complexities of people's internal representations and 
sub-modalities. Again he gave me many insights into the dynamics of 
his own internal searches.
Edward: ...picture is a muititude o f moving pictures... smelis, sounds, 
colours, fabulous, em, I  have one picture at the front, again no 
borders, they're all open... open pictures, so as I  look around the 
pictures I  just re build the map as I  go round and interestingly I  have 
all these pictures, and the one I  have at the front is the one I  always, 
em, sink back to when I  think of childhood, it's eh, very powerful, I  
can see 3D, movement, fabulous colour, in fact the colour is more 
fabulous than it wouid have been then, sounds, smells, even the 
sensation of breeze, so there's the external kinaesthetic as well.
Yeah, that's a fabulous one.
His response to the second statement was different. Whereas the 
response to the first statement was attention to visual information, 
the second statement seemed to focus him on a kinaesthetic
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response. There were also changes In his conceived spatial location of 
visual elements. The 'pictures' of his childhood have become more 
distant.
J. So how is it different when I  say ’ remember being a child?'
Edward: (Pause.) That's... primarily a kinaesthetic, with small pictures 
in the distance. Pictures are quite hard to focus on, emmm, very 
strong kinaesthetic.. em.
J. Located anywhere?
Edward: In my throat. Mmm. The pictures are wanting to be there 
but they're just so far away... so far away... stiii with the kinaesthetic
in my throat, ... quite a sad one... for some reason... mmmm....
(pauses; .
I was surprised when Kathleen also responded to the directive 
'remember yourself as a child' with an internal representation 
associated with an unpleasant feeling.
Kathleen: (pause) ... (indistinct) I  don't hear, ... it's smaller picture, 
black and white, and ... I'm in it but the K is not... it's not a verv 
pleasant K.^
Each of my interlocutors reported different responses to these three 
statements. The main differences were in their internal 
representations and sub-modalities. What was also of interest was 
that the words that were used to ask someone about their childhood 
actually produced a noticeable shift in their perceptual position in 
relation to the re-constructed memory. It was as if the events were 
categorised by the words that I used even before their searches were 
begun. Lucy's responses indicated something of the complexities of
® The term 'K' is an abbreviation for kinaesthetic, and was used on the course 
spontaneously by participants.
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her internal searches, the changes in her sub-modalities as well as 
shifts in her perceptual position. At one point she is searching so 
intently that she forgets my words.
J. What happens i f  I  say 'Remember your childhood. 7
Lucy: (laughter) My whole life flashed before me! Remember my 
childhood! Like I'm  looking over here again, there's a lot in it, like I  
can't focus on any one thing.... Although everything is going around 
here at the moment, but there seems to be a little child at the top of 
the pictures, it's in a circle, little things are happening, and there's a 
picture at the top, and it's me, as a child.
J. OK. So let's move on to the next one, and leave that one for the 
time being. 'Remember being a child. '
Lucy: Yeah right I'm  looking down now, also I'm going inside, 
remember being a chiid, I  suppose it's ... I'm trying to get a feeling of, 
it's a kina es.... Say that question again?
J. Remember being a child.
Lucy: yeah it's a feeiing that comes out, it elicits more than seeing a 
picture. Remember being a child. Yeah, yeah definitely. A big K.
J. OK. And the picture is not...
Lucy: the pic...? remember? It's more of a K. I  was trying to search 
for that. ( I underline this sentence because she describes this process 
as a 'search'.)
J. OK. That's fine.
Lucy: A bit more o f a K.
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J. 'Remember yourself as a child'.
Lucy: Remember yourself as a child. Well I 'l l be looking at mvself. A 
picture, it's moved down here, it's from the past obviously, my left
hand side  the picture's sort o f started off..{tape ends, new side
to tape begins;.... looking at mvself as a kid there...
In Steve's case there were similar processes; he moved from being 
associated to being dissociated, and he reported experiencing a shift 
in his internal representation from a pleasant to an unpleasant 
feeling.
J. OK. So what happens i f  I  say' remember being a chiid'?
Steve: (laughs) I'm associated into a picture where I'm playing with 
my friends... but I  wouldn't know who the people are now... {"laughs; 
erm... mind you the games were being very violent, but they're still 
pleasant i f  you like. I  see the picture in front o f me, not life sized, it's 
child life sized if  you like. ... it's bright, I  can hear noises, but it's 
unspecific noises, sort of shouting and roaring, laughing, erm. I've got 
a strong kinaesthetic sense on my left side here, it  must be the 
trouble I  found myself... I  ("laughs; I  have a feeling of very much 
warmth or something here... (Here he pointed to the left side of his 
chest).
J. On the left side of your chest?
Steve: Actually it's here, still on my chest. Erm, ... it's funny. It's 
clear, it's vivid, as if  I'm a child.
J. And what if  I  say ' remember yourself as a child'.
Steve: I  see a different picture, and I'm  dissociated from it, and ... it's 
... pretty dull... it's pretty dull, the movement is pretty sluggish... it's 
black and white.
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J. Are you in it? (This question was intended to establish whether he 
was associated or dissociated).
Steve: yeah, I  am in it  but I'm not... I'm  dissociated ... [the feeling 
is] ... kind of in my chest, a heaviness again, my breathing is slower, 
and... the air going in and out are the same temperature, and that's 
coid, and it's erm... it's a strong yuck factor actually.
6.5. Reflections on the transcripts of question 17.
In this section I give an description and some initial reflections on the 
transcripts of question 17, which was again an attempt to present 
similar information in the nominalised and then denominalised form. 
This question came towards the end of the interview sessions. We had 
ranged over all sorts of topics, and perhaps my long suffering 
collaborators were getting tired of it all. However, some interesting 
responses emerged. It now seemed that particular words in a 
sentence set frames for people. There were, for instance, no 
differences between the responses to the two forms from Beatrice. I 
suspected at the time that she was attending so intensely to the 
richness of her internal processes that she did not 'hear' the 
denominalisation. Therefore I checked on this in my questioning, and 
found that this was the case. The word 'important' also seemed to set 
a frame for her internal search, as she repeated it. Perhaps the word 
'important' overrode the effect of'communicating'. It may have 
categorised the information for her. Much of her reply is in the form of 
content, yet there are some aspects of her processes that emerge. 
Here is a part of the transcript.
3. 'It's  important to understand communication.'
Beatrice: I  agree.
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J. What do you have to do before you agree?
Beatrice: Em, let me see, ju s t seeing a breakdown in communication. 
I've seen a situation where there is a breakdown in communication. 
That happens every singie day with me. And that is how, iooking at 
that, that's how I  know that it's important.
J. So there's a picture out in front o f you?
Beatrice: There's a picture o f me at work, surrounded by peopie who 
don't have fluent English properly, and how our communication is 
never fluent, they never understand a word that comes out o f my 
mouth, I  can jus t see how we just don't communicate very weli. How 
they can't understand me because I  speak too fast, and I  can't 
understand them because they use all the wrong tenses. I  can see us 
all at the desk, normally me in the middle of an argument
J. Movie? Stiii?
Beatrice: Movie.
J. Noise? Sounds?
Beatrice: Yes, ioud ioud sounds. I  can just see my normai average 
working day.
J. And how is that different, or how might that be different If I  were to 
say 'it's important to understand communicating. '?
Beatrice: There's no difference, they're still all there yacking away.
It's the same. I'm still in it, they're still in it. We're all still having our 
little communication breakdowns, which is leading me to the 
assumption that it is important to establish good communication. At 
this point I wonder whether she is still under the 'influence' of the first 
statement, so I ask her:
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J. Ah, so you've just said something new, which is that you realise 
that it  is important to establish good communication. Did that come 
off the first statement or the second statement?
Beatrice: The first statement.
Kathleen offered the following information on the effects of my voice 
tonality on her internal responses. It was never my intention to elicit 
the unfortunate image of a little liked teacher from her past. This is 
however what happened.
J. We're nearly at the end. So i f  I  were to say to you Tt's important to 
understand communication. '?
Kathleen: (pausej like a schooiteacher.
J. Oh, sorry about that!
Kathleen: Like a schoolteacher, yeah, she's sitting up. (End of side 
of tape. Continues to talk about her memories of this teacher sitting 
in front of her.)
J. OK. Was it the way I  said it that eiicited Sister Frances over there? 
(I ask this because she has pointed to her internal image's spatial 
location.)
Kathleen: Yeah, you must have sounded....
J. The tonality?
Kathleen: Yeah. (At this point I decide to experiment with changing 
my tone of voice.)
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J. So i f  I  were to say something like (softer voice)' it's important to 
understand communication. '
Kathieen: That makes me want to know more.
J. OK. ...want to know more. And any pictures, any other responses?
Kathleen: I  pictured you in the ciassroom.
J. Now you see me in the classroom?
Kathleen: Not Sister Frances. Poor Sister Frances! (laughter)
J. How Is it  different to ' it's important to understand communicating'? 
("Here I deliberately asked her to focus on what was different, so as to 
elicit the contrasts between the two, by using 'different' as a 
suggestion that guided the internal search.)
Kathieen: (pause) It's more fiowing, movement, and there's a picture 
there also...
J. Is it  a moving picture?
Kathleen: Yeah.
Apart from the effects of my tone of voice, there were changes in her 
sub-modalities when communication was denominalised to 
communicating. I realised I could have asked for more detail from 
her, but the interview had now been almost an hour long, and we 
probably both felt tired. However, there seemed to be more 
movement in her denominalised version.
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6.6. Doing it wrong, and doing it wrongly; adjectives and 
adverbs.
There were many words which had the effect of changing my 
interviewees' static internal representations to more flowing ones. 
Question 9  ^attempted to explore the effects of changing the adjective 
'wrong' to the adverb 'wrongly'. I include my reflections on them in 
this section, as some of the responses appeared to have similar 
effects to those of denominalisations. Bandler and Grinder (1975) and 
Christina Hall (Hall 1989)^° propose that adjectives actually produce a 
form of nominalisation which they call a lesser nominalisation. For 
example, to say that someone was 'a lazy housewife' is said to link 
the adjective 'lazy' to the noun 'housewife' forming a structure that is 
essentially a nominalisation because it seems to be frozen in time, 
and also implies an identity, which is itself a nominalisation.
(McWhirter 1992).
This was perhaps the most deceptively simple pair of linguistic 
constructions, as the two key words only differed by the addition of 
two letters. Yet the two versions, the first using an adjective, the 
second using its adverbial form, did not fail to produce different 
responses. It was summed up by Kathieen, who told me that "wrong 
is so negative, it couldn't have been any worse, whereas wrongly 
means It was... (pause) slightly wrong." She went on to reflect on 
her responses to the two types of wording.
Kathleen: I  did it wrong... it's a black and white still picture, and I've 
no choice in the matter, and that's it, but I  did it wrongly, slightly 
over here, (Indicating the imagined iocation of the first picture) it's 
still to the right of the first picture, and .... I've a very unpieasant 
feeling about the first picture. I've an unpleasant K, but this one is not
 ^ Think of something you might have done better. What are the differences between 
saying to you 'you did that wrong, and you did that wronaiv?'
Christina Hall, personal communication.
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quite as strong, I  still feel I  have... there's a choice there... (pointing to 
the location o f the second picture).
J. OK, yeah.
Kathieen: that I  have a choice to improve, i f  I  did it  wrong then that's 
it. You know. (...) you did it wrongly gives me room to make it better. 
Wrongly notices some things that I've done wrongiy so I  can make 
that better, but with wrong I'm going to have to start aii over again, I  
must have done a big boo boo.
Lucy's responses, however, were the opposite to those of the others'.
Wrongly? Wrongly? You did that wrongly? The pictures moved up a 
iittle bit now. The picture's moved ever so slightly, it's given me a bit 
of a yuckier^^ K. wrongiy, wrongiy? There's not as much movement 
with the 'wrongly'for me. With the 'wrong', OK it's past, let's get on 
with it. It's (wrongly) bringing it stuck more. I  feel more stuck than I  
did with the wrong...
Steve gave detailed descriptions of his responses to the two forms. 
What was of interest were the bodily responses that he reported 
about the two different wordings.
The kinaesthetics of wrong and wrongly are different as well. They're 
not particularly strong but there's a sense of relaxation, I  felt more 
relaxed, in the second part where I'm  doing something wrongly, I  
don't feel as tense as when I  was told I  did it wrong. And you don't 
even know what it is! (Laughter)
He went on to describe the different responses to 'wrong' and 
'wrongly' in these words.
The term 'yucky' became part of the slang on the course to denote an 
unpleasant experience.
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Steve: OK. (long pause) well, i f  I  did it wrong, then it seems that 
that's it. Stuck, whereas if  I  did something wrongly it  gives me a 
sense that there is some kind of possibility that I  might be abie to do 
it better the next time. I f  you tell me I  did something wrong, it  was 
wrong.
J. You're looking up and your eyes are moving.
Steve: I'm  iooking at a picture and I  can see... it's one frame, even 
though it's not framed, and I  see a process doing an exercise that I'm  
doing where.... I  can see two different outcomes. ... it doesn't stop... 
like underneath there's a marker that savs 'wrong'and then there's 
nothing in the future, there's a sort of biankness. and I  can see mvself 
doing something better, it's wrong, and I've stopped, and I'm  going 
oven and I've done it wronglv, and I'm looking at what it  is that I'm  
doing wrong, and trving to change it. That's what's going on. (my 
emphasis).
J. That's interesting.
Steve: Strange actualiy, because I  see myself three times, in the one 
room as it were, it's iike it's a hall. Strange!
J. There's a lot of strange things in all of this.
Bateson (1972) distinguished between two kinds of information, 
digital and analogue. Essentially, digital information consists of 
discontinuous 'bits' whereas analogue information is in the form of a 
continuum. Bateson further believed that analogic processing 
preceded the digital mode. (This raises the possibility that analogic 
communication may operate at a higher logical level, so that voice 
tonality, for instance, is yet another transmitter of messages about 
the category to which a speech act is to be assigned. (Watzlawick et 
al 1957).
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It appears that Steve's responses to 'wrong' and 'wrongly' follow this 
pattern. The word 'wrong' in the context of giving feedback, produces 
what could be a 'digital' response, one where there is clear 
discontinuity, because the internal representation appears to come to 
a sudden stop. It is almost as if future possibilities had been 
expunged from his program. On the other hand, the response to 
'wrongly' could be compared to an analogue process, as it appears to 
elicit the experience of continuing into future possibilities. The first 
one does not seem to imply the possibility of change, whereas the 
second one does. However, this was not the case for all these 
interviewees, so any generalisations of this kind must remain purely 
speculative. Nevertheless, the Idea that some forms of words can 
increase or decrease the amount of choice available within an 
internally constructed (and perhaps problematic) situation is 
intriguing. Five of the six collaborators spontaneously volunteered the 
information that they sensed the critical difference between the two 
constructs to be the amount of choice available to them.
6.6.Conclusion.
Many aspects emerged from these reported guided introspections .
Not least were the complexities of people's individual internal worlds. 
There was much that was left out from the transcripts, and many 
other questions I could have asked. I was not expecting that small 
changes in syntax, for instance, would produce distinctive changes in 
the listeners' perceptual positions, as if their responses to my 
language structures were moving them to different internal points of 
view. Although I had set out to explore nominalisations, people 
responded strongly to other words that I had used. It was usual for 
people to experience changes in their internal representations in 
response to changes in my wording.
The question this raises is 'is it possible that language can, as it were, 
not only profoundly influence people's cognitive maps, but also, in the
187
form of internal dialogue, move people around within a kind of 
internal space?' (I explore this further in the next three chapters).
In this section, which began as an exploration into the effects of 
nominalisations at the level of internal representations, other insights 
emerged into the power of language to shape the listeners' thinking. 
One of the most noticeable aspects for me, re-reading the transcripts, 
was the discovery that people's own internal use of language 
furthered their own internal searches. It was as if these searches took 
on a life of their own. I believe that most of the processes that we 
explored, and which I have written about in this chapter, may possibly 
be beyond the conscious awareness of the individual.
Another factor that emerged was the extent to which many senses 
are used internally in the construction and re-construction of events 
and experiences that people have had. What is particularly interesting 
are the links between internal vision and feeling; changing a visual 
perspective seemed to produce changes in their kinaesthetic 
responses. This suggests a dynamic link between language, internal 
vision and people's physiological responses, which for this kind of 
exploration one can only describe using the broad brush strokes of 
generalisations.
In the next chapters I continue to explore the role of the apparently 
ceaseless chatter of people's internal dialogues. Bateson (1972) and 
Watzlawick et al (1967) argued that words were the digital aspect of 
language, whereas most non-verbal communication was analogue in 
form. Words are thus of a different logical type than the internal 
representations with which they interact.
Many of my co-researchers seemed to demonstrate the use of their 
own internal dialogue as an active continuation of the words they 
heard from me, and as a means for them to access further internal 
representations, further information from within themselves. This was 
a pattern, which was to reveal itself time and again in the rest of the
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transcribed interviews. I describe these, and other aspects of people's 
responses to words, which emerged from this part of my inquiry in 
the next three chapters.
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Chapter 7. Modal Operators in Action, and Little Words that 
Mean a Lot.
" I ... interpret an epistemic modal as indicating the force dynamic 
experience of the conceptuaiizer (primariiy the speaker) in working 
towards an augmented conception of reality, one that will incorporate 
a situation not yet assimilated to conceived reaiity either because it 
has not yet occurred or because the conceptuaiizer has not yet 
definitely learned about It."  (Stamenov 1997:68).
"One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use 
and learn from that". (Wittgenstein, in Kenny, A (Ed) 1994:116).
7.1. Introduction
In the last chapter, one of the factors to emerge from my analysis of 
the transcripts was the complexity of people's responses. These 
occurred at both the levels of internal representations and sub­
modalities. In this chapter I report on some of the ways in which my 
interlocutors responded to other kinds of words. These included the 
class of modal operators. I described some of the theoretical aspects 
of these in Chapter 5. I also report on my explorations of the effects 
of other language structures, such as the differences between adverbs 
and adjectives. I also include some of my interviewees' responses to 
other small words, such as but, feel, and yet.
I describe some of my own insights into people's responses, and the 
complexities that continued to appear. Internal representations were 
emerging as a part of people's conceptual processes, yet they also 
appeared to be complex, and sometimes frustratingly evanescent. I 
continue to describe what I believe is more about the complexities of 
their dynamics in this chapter, as well as chapters 8 and 9.
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7.2. Responses to modal operators
My approach to Inquiring into the effects of modal operators^ was to 
ask each participant to think of a relatively ordinary activity that they 
would carry out in the near future, and then ask them to obtain an 
internal representation of it which they could report on to me. I then 
requested them to respond sequentially to six different statements, 
such as 'you will do it, you can do it, you might do it,' and so on. I 
guided them to focus specifically on what sub-modality changes (if 
any) occurred in response to each of the statements, and to report on 
them. I was curious to find out the effects of changing the modal 
operator, (and by implication, the mode in which the constructed 
future activity would be approached) whilst keeping the same goal in 
mind. Again, my main focus was on how these affected the sub­
modalities of people's original internal representation.
The first finding was that it was rare for a change in modal operators 
not to produce some alterations in the conceivers' sub-modalities of 
the internal representations of the constructed goal. Aspects such as 
movement, clarity, colour, location and choice seemed to be among 
the most critical factors among the responses produced in people by 
various modal operators.
More information emerged on the frequency and use of internal 
dialogue. My collaborators seemed to use their own internal dialogue 
as part of their responses to my words. What they were saying to 
themselves 'on the inside' as a response to my statements seemed to 
play a role in catalysing sometimes quite dramatic changes in their 
own internal representations, thus generating what is known as trans- 
derivational searches, (Grinder, Delozier and Bandler 1977). These
T h in k  of something quite ordinary like cleaning your teeth, or anything of that kind, something 
that you do every day, that you're going to do in the near future, and get the I.R. (Internal 
representation). And what happens to your response when I  say 
you will do it 
you might do it 
you can't do it 
you should do it 
you can do it 
you could do it.
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refer to the process of a kind of internal sorting and searching for 
meaning. It is as if the conceiver were seeking an answer to a 
question, almost as an uncontrollable process, (Grinder et al 1977).
What follows is a report of some of the ways in which people's 
responses changed as the result of hearing similar phrases containing 
different modal operators. Often they appeared to produce movement 
in the conceiver's perceived images. Changes in modal operators 
either altered the rate at which the internal 'film' ran, or altered the 
location of the internal representation. These are amongst the many 
sub-modality changes described by Bandler and MacDonald (1988). 
For one of my collaborators, changing the modal operators actually 
changed the speed of movement of the internal representation. This is 
shown in the following segment of transcript.
J. What happens to your response i f  I  say 'you wifi do it'?
Beatrice: I  think the is changing. Because ... it's more of a 
command, I  see it  as a command, and the picture is slower, it's iike 
there's not much enthusiasm... there's no other changes in the colour 
or any things like that, it's Just the movement is slowed down.
J. OK. And if  I  said you might do it?
Beatrice. No big change.
J. Not a big change. OK. What i f  I  said you can't do it?
Beatrice. It's a total change. The picture has stopped, the whole thing 
has...
J. ...sort of frozen?
 ^This is an abbreviation, which the whole class developed for the word 
kinaesthetic.
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Beatrice: Stopped, and disassociation.
J. And if  I  say 'you can do it'?
Beatrice: It's speeded up.
Other collaborators also reported sub-modality changes in other 
sensory modalities. Edward, for instance, experienced the main 
differences between the modal operators I used with him as 
predominantly occurring in his kinaesthetic domain. His responses 
were more also complex. At one level he appeared to be clarifying and 
analysing what I was saying, and at another level paying attention to 
the sub-modality changes that occurred in his own internal world. This 
part of the transcript gave me some more interesting glimpses into 
the roles of internal dialogue in his processes of generating internal 
representations.
J. OK. 'You might do it'.
Edward: Mmmhh, gives me an option. Perhaps I  don't want to be 
bothered, so I 'ii ieave it. Again it's a kinaesthetic, the picture is... ah 
yeah... the picture is fuzzy.... Blurry, It's still a no frame. It's still an 
open picture. I'm still associated ehh, but it's a blurry picture.
Later he responded to the modal operator'can't' in the following way.
J. Mb Mh... And if  I  say, as you think about the thing that you're 
going to do, if  I  say 'you can't do it'.
Edward: It's just a kinaesthetic.
Later on in the transcripts he again reaffirms that his primary 
response to my statement was kinaesthetic.
J. (...). And if  I  were to say 'you can do it'?
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Edward: Again It's Just another... It's jus t a laugh. It's a kinaesthetic 
with a laugh, of course I  can do It!
At one point there were changes in his visual sub-modalities. 
Interestingly, my modal operators had the effect of sometimes driving 
his attention to externals, for instance to what I was actually saying, 
and how I was saying it. Others produced a more internal search. It 
appears that we have two modes of attention, one where our 
awareness is on information coming from the external world, and the 
other when we turn inwards, as it were, to pay attention to our own 
thoughts. To the suggestion 'you could do it', his response was:
J. (...) and If I  say 'You could do It'?
Edward: That's much gentler. The kinaesthetic Is more relaxed. It's 
e/77.... The external auditory effect Is one of support, so It's my 
choice... the Internal, the picture Is soft, still clear, but soft.
J. When you say soft, does that mean the colours are slightly faded.
Edward: The colours, yeah. It's gone more pastel. I  mean I  wasn't 
aware of the colours before, but I  would say now there must have 
been colours before because It's become a very soft gentle picture 
which to me means more pastelly colours.... Softer lighting on the 
picture. It was a bright Intense picture, but It's very soft now, ehm, 
much more relaxing em, more pleasant, and more acceptable, the 
external auditory Is a more acceptable p a rt... becomes part o f the 
picture.
J. So with 'you should do It'you were aware of the external?
Edward: I'm aware of the externals.
J. With 'you could do It... ?'
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Edward: Becomes more internal.
Some modal operators presuppose choice, whilst others, such as 'will', 
'can't' and 'must' are modal operators of necessity, and imply a lack 
of choice. This was borne out by some of my respondents. For 
Edward, the choice that was presupposed by the modal operator 
'might' appeared to be the critical factor that altered his visual sub­
modalities in the previous extract from the transcripts. At one point 
he said; 'yeah, It's actually a nicer picture because of the choice you 
give me'.
Lucy showed a similar response. In her case it appeared as if the 
modal operator 'will' acted as a trigger for recalling vivid memories. 
Perhaps it was a response to my own tone of voice. Here an image of 
an unfortunate teacher was linked to her feelings of a lack of choice in 
the context she accessed. She was also very aware of the presence or 
absence of perceived choice.
Lucy: 'You w llll' SchoolmarmI You wllll It's like you've got no 
choices. It's definitely repulsed. School, out there, looking at her, sort 
of thing, definitely Internal, there's a visual...
J. And are you back at school?
Lucy: I  saw a schoolmarmi (Laughter) Unless It's a movie that I've 
seen. You know, you will do this, and you won't do that I Being told 
what to do. Like I'm not a child anymore. I 'll decide what to do and 
when I  do It.
J. Yeah OK. And what's happened to the picture of the thing that you 
were going to do?
Lucy: I t  definitely didn't seem like It turned me off It.
J. What happened to the picture?
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Lucy: Well the 'will' sort o f became very big, and the picture went 
quite.... Like I  was pushing away. Well I  won't now. (laughs) I, a little 
bitch! Like ... yeah, I  would have pushed It aside.
The reaction to the modal operator 'might' was distinctly different.
J. OK. OK. What happens If I  say'you might do It'?
Lucy: Well It's definitely more appealing. I t  gives me the option now. 
And, em, the picture, I  can see myself much more clearly now 
actually, I  can see myself much more clearly doing It. I  don't have 
the repulsion that I  did like when you said 'you will'. And I  don't see 
any other pictures, jus t me doing It, yeah. It's much more pleasant.
What emerged from reading these transcripts, and then writing about 
them, was that the use of such words also seemed to transmit 
information about causality, especially in relation to how the 
individuals placed themselves in terms of what Bar-Tal (1984) 
described as the locus of control. This may be perceived as either 
internal to them, or as coming from an external source. These appear 
to be subjective standpoints which may also influence the conceiver's 
perception of the performance of a future task.
7.3. Internal dialogue and causal assumptions
By this time in the interviewing process I had become intrigued by the 
activities of people's internal dialogue. It was obvious that many of 
the responses involved this. What could its role be in the construction 
of meaning? So I sometimes questioned my interlocutors further 
about what they were saying to themselves 'on the inside'. In the 
next extract, it is possible to track the effects of Lucy's internal 
dialogue in response to my statement, and how her own Internal 
words (as it were, carrying on from my own 'externally' originating 
words) furthers the development of her internal responses. In effect,
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she continues the process of verbalising through her own internal 
dialogue, in which the modal operators that she uses may also have 
played a critical role.
J. And if  I  were to say 'you can't do it'?
Lucy: I  would probably say, well I  am, so Internal dialogue. Internal 
dialogue... like I  probably doubt myself and then say well I  can, so.j 
will now!
J. OK What did you do before you doubted yourself?
Lucy: I  probably (Indistinct) I  can't? I  mean It's a simple thing like you 
said. It's like I  cant? What do vou mean I  can't? Course I  can! (My 
emphasis).
What is also interesting about Lucy's responses is that it is as if her 
internal dialogue had the result of shifting her perceptual positions. 
She appeared to move from being 'at effect', that is, having a sense 
that she has little choice, and experiencing the locus of control as 
external, to being 'at cause', a position where she experiences choice, 
and therefore some control over what she is intending to do. Here the 
locus of control would be described as internal. Bar-Tal (1984) has 
explored pupils' perceptions of causality, and its importance to the 
success or otherwise of their learning processes. In Lucy's case, she 
apparently places herself back in the causal position through her own 
internal dialogue. A similar shift occurred with Edward. For him, 
having an option seemed to be critical to how he then perceived his 
goals. Lucy's responses to the phrase containing the word 'might' 
were interesting. 'Might' is a modal operator of possibility, often 
implying that causality could be experienced as coming from within, 
and presupposes the existence of choice.
Lucy: Well It's definitely more appealing. I t  gives me the option now. 
And em, the picture, I  can see myself much more clearly now
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actually, I  can see myself nnuch more clearly doing It. I  don't have 
the repulsion that I  did like when you said 'you will'. And I  don't see 
any other pictures. Just me doing It, yeah. It's much more pleasant.
J. Internal dialogue?
Lucy: Yeah, there was Internal dialogue as well. It's like OKI Cool, you 
know sort of thing. Internal picture as well. Yeah.
She also reported that there were different locations for the internal 
pictures associated with 'can' and 'can't'. Although the tape was 
indistinct, I made a note of this at the time.
Lucy: The picture's moved. It's on my right now, em, ....(different 
locations for picture of'can' and 'can't'.... Tape indistinct).
Beatrice also reported a strong response to the modal operator 'will'. 
This is classified as a modal operator of necessity, (Hall C. 1989) and 
by implication removes the conceiver from experiencing being 'at 
cause' to perceiving control as operating from the external 
environment.
Steve's responses also show how modal operators influenced his 
experience of causality. To the phrase including the word 'will' he 
responds with information about his internal dialogue, which 
reinforces his sense of being in charge.
Steve: (Pause) em, .... Nothing changes Internally, nothing changes 
because I  know I  will do It anyway.
J. Were you saying anything to yourself on the Inside?
Steve: Yeah, I  was asking myself 'why wouldn't you do It anyway, you 
are going to do It anyway'?
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J. It's interesting because you were actually looking from side to side 
horizontally, which Is supposed to be the auditory accessing cues, 
which made me ask that question.
His next response illustrates what might be a kind of scanning of 
information between his present state and the desired outcome.
Steve: I  was going... I  was future pacing, and going back, to the 
future again, going auditory, because that which I'm  going to do 
Involves something ... Involves the hearing. Involves hearing, and I  
could hear the sounds that It makes as well as talking to myself. I  
need to get this thing! (laughter).^
However, the use of the word 'might' had a different effect on him. 
Instead of giving him options, it seems to weaken his resolve.
J. So what happens If I  say you might do It.
Steve: Emm, (pause) Now It seems vague, ...
J. What seems vague, the picture or the sound?
Steve: The picture. The sound doesn't exist. ... It's Just... I  don't have... 
I  don't have the same sense of, of doing It, or wanting to do It.
It seemed that for Steve, the modal operators that implied certainty 
exerted a more powerful influence on his conceptual world than those 
which only suggested a possibility. With Steve, his internal dialogue 
appeared to modify the original effects of the modal operators he 
heard from me. It is tempting to suggest that what actually changed 
was his experience of the locus of the cause. When he re-phrased 
what I had said internally, he seemed to be moving himself into a 
more causal position, where there was a greater degree of certainty
He later told me that his goal was to improve his guitar playing!
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that the outcome would be achieved under his own volition. (J need to 
get this thing!)
Kathleen also had a strong response to my phrase 'you will do it'. She 
replied 'J don't want to do It now'. There is a sense in which this could 
also be interpreted as her regaining her own control over a 
constructed situation. Modal operators therefore reveal another 
dimension to their complex effects; they seem to have the ability to 
locate the individual conceiver somewhere on a spectrum between 
having 'internal' choice about a future activity, or being strongly 
influenced by forces perceived as external to them.
7.4. The phenomenon of location in internal representations.
One of the sub-modality changes reported by Bandler and MacDonald 
(1988) was that people experienced a shift in the location of their 
'pictures', almost as if internal visualisation was projected somewhere 
into outside space. Sometimes this was linked to a change in the size 
of the picture. This phenomenon was reported by Kathleen, who told 
me that changing modal operators resulted in a shift in the 'external' 
location of the internal picture. I cannot attempt to provide any 
explanation for it, except to say that it seems to me to be yet another 
internal dimension that is part of how we code and process 
information. We seem to use space to 'locate' our images. During my 
interviews I observed my interlocutors and made notes. I paid 
particular attention to where people looked when they were accessing 
their internal representations, and describing them to me. There was 
frequently a marked change in the direction in which people gazed, as 
if their internal pictures could be scrutinised as if they were external 
to themselves. In the following extract, Kathleen described how the 
use of different modal operators produced changes in the location, 
colour and size of the visual aspects of her internal representations. 
These changes also affected her kinaesthetically. In the following 
extract, it is possible to track these changes.
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J. And how is that different when I  say'you might do It'?
Kathleen: Movement and colour back again now.
J. Nearer, farther?
Kathleen: A little bit closer. And It's bigger...
J. Closer and bigger. What happens If I  say'you can't do It'?
(laughter)
Kathleen: (Pause) It actually hasn't changed from the 'might'.
J. Because you're jus t not processing 'can't'?
Kathleen: No. (laughter).
J. Good good. What happens If I  say 'you should do It'?
Kathleen: A little bit further away, and a little bit smaller, though 
there's still movement there.
J. What kind of kinaesthetic response do you get to 'you should do It'?
Kathleen: (Pause). It's a warm feeling. It's here, there's a warm 
feeling here, a warm soft feeling.
J. OK. And now,'you can do It'.
Kathleen: yeah. ... It's a much bigger picture.
7.5. Modal operators and motivation.
For one of my collaborators (Ina), the sequence of modal operators, 
(which I had not really thought about, having originally written them
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down just as they came to me) became linked in a meaningful 
developing sequence for her. They generated a series of internal 
representations in which her conceived actions were developed, and 
then nearly completed. I give the extract here in its entirety, as it 
shows how each successive modal operator produced a shift in Ina's 
responses that were in turn linked to significant changes in her 
internal representations. It was as if the modal operators were 
directly developing her construction of a future activity. In addition, 
the sequence of modal operators also seemed to develop further her 
own perceptions of a course of action she had been thinking about.
I have underlined the modal operators in the following extract for 
greater clarity. The next extract almost speaks for itself. I have 
however, added my own comments in parentheses.
J. So can you think of something quite ordinary, you know, like 
cleaning your teeth, something that you're golncj to do In the near 
future, sort of something fairly pedestrian? Now, what happens If I  
say 'you will do It'?.
Ina: I  agree. Can do,, m il do. (Her first response is that she becomes 
aware of her internal dialogue.)
J. Is that an Internal dialogue?
Ina: Yeah.
J. And do you have a picture of what you're going to do?
Ina: I'm actually doing It. (Here she apparently associates into the 
internal representation.)
J. You're actually doing It. OK. Yeah. So you're doing It, and you're 
saying to yourself...
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Ina: You can do i t  (Here it appears that the internal dialogue 
accompanied the images, and perhaps influenced their development.)
J. So back to the picture of what It Is you're going to do, or the 
Internal representation of It. What happens If I  say 'you nrilght. do It'?.
Ina: You've frozen my picture, (her bleep goes off) I'm  still. (Here it 
seemed that the movement that she experienced in the visual 
dimension stopped).
J. Do you want to answer your bleep?
Ina: Yes please. (Pause, and the microphone is disconnected for a 
short time). I t  stopped the movement, whereas when I  said I  will I  
was actually performing, mlaht do has actually frozen me.
J. So what happens If I  say 'you can't do It'?.
Ina: Exit picture.
J. You mean the picture's gone?
Ina: No, jus t me, out. I  was there, and now I'm looking at what I'm  
supposed to have done. (This implies that she has changed her 
perceptual position).
J. OK. And what happens If I  say you should do It.
Ina: I've stepped back In the picture. I'm aware of my surroundings. 
(Here she refers to her internally constructed surroundings, rather 
than those of the interview room.)
J. Is the picture all round you?
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Ina: yeah. I've stepped back into the picture and I'm  looking around, 
and I'm basically saying to myself 'well have a go, see what happens, 
have a go, see what happens'. (Here the internal dialogue comes to 
the fore, and seems to catalyse the further build up of her 
motivation.)
J. Oh! 'You ŒR do It'?
Ina: I'm there. I'm actually. I'm swinging. I'm  doing It, I'm  looking 
around, looking at what I'm  supposed to be doing, and I'm ready. 
Yeah. (Now she appears to be engaging internally in the activity, and 
aware of the motor movements necessary for the task.)
J. Has the picture changed In any ways?
Ina: Yeah, there's movement, there's sound. I'm  looking at 
everything around me, and I'm saying to myself 'come on then girl, 
keep going'. (She now seems even more aware of her constructed 
movement, sounds, internal dialogue as well as vision as she begins 
to conceive of the goal.)
J. And Is It more so than In 'you should do It'?
Ina: Yeah, In 'should. It was silent. In 'I  can' there's sound I  can hear 
what's going on around me. I  think 'I  should' Is more private. I'm like 
'I'm going to give It a go!' (Now it appears that she 'switches o ff her 
awareness of sound coming from the external world, and has a 
greater awareness of her own internal dialogue, as her sense of 
movement towards the goal continues to develop.)
J. Yeah. So with the 'should' vou've got an Internal dialogue, and the 
outside Is silent?
Ina: Is silent.
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J. And what happens if  I  say 'you could do It?'
Ina: Yeah, It re-enforces my 'I can'. It's jus t given me,... go ahead... 
more. I  have support by somebody saying I  could. 'Go on, you could 
do It, you could do It. I'm actually yeah, my coaches.... (Now there 
seem to be sounds coming from other people involved in the activity, 
encouraging her. She pays attention to these newly appeared internal 
images.)
J. So you're touching your left shoulder. Is that as If somebody's kind 
of encouraging you?
Ina: Yeah, yeah.
J. So, picture?
Ina: Yeah. Yeah, 'I  could' Is me actually going out to the dug out, 
(Indistinct) and I'm  getting a 'could'and 'I can'I 'm  actually at the 
batting, right there, on my own, but still aware, but 'I could' Is like I  
have somebody on my back. (Here she describes how the different 
modal operators develop her internal representations of the goal.)
J. Encouraging you! OK. This Is content free but I'm quite Interested 
to know what It was. Is It a sport or something?
Ina: Yes It was. It was m y,... soft ball.
J. Oh OK.
Ina: You sort of like freeze when you get to the batting mount, so It 
depends who sends you out. I f  they say 'you will do It, you could do It 
or you can do It... '. Brings back memories.
J. So modal operators might actually be quite...
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Ina: Helps me play better... (Both of us suddenly seem to realise that 
modal operators might be important to motivating.)
J. ...powerful In terms o f your performance?
Ina: That's what I  say when I'm  getting ready to hit. T will, I  will I  
will'. With the T could' Is ju s t an extra support for me. Somebody 
actually has faith In me to say, go on you can do It.
J. Just as a matter of Interest, as I  went through these modal 
operators, was there anything like stacking an anchor going o n /  (I 
am curious to know if the sequence of modal operators have 
somehow built on each other.)
Ina: yeah, I  can, and I  w ill snd you could... It's jus t that I'm out 
here...
J. Did they all sort o f Influence each other?
Ina: With the T wM' then you've told me, and I  wjlL do It, so I've 
already future done It, T m il do It', and T can' has put me there, T 
can do It', I'm there. And 'could', somebody's jus t reinforcing me, 
bringing me forward.
J. So with the... It seems to me, and again I'm not sure. I'm really jus t 
suggesting something, trying not to mind read, ... It seems to me that 
you've developed like an... attraction.
Ina: yeah, a pull, the further down we've gone the more the pull has 
developed [...] I  feel safe, I  feel great, I  feel like somebody actually 
believes that I  can do It. (Here the sequence of modal operators 
seems to have amplified her belief in herself. She implies she has a
stacking anchors Is an NLP term describing a process where a number of stimulus-response 
bonds are linked together and built up to produce a stronger effect than would just one stimulus 
alone. (McWhirter 1992).
206
motivation strategy where she depends on external support and 
encouragement.)
J. OK
This was one of the most surprising interviews; I had not expected 
that my simple phrases would be so sequentially influential in the 
development of her internal constructs about completing a future 
task. It is also apparent that her own internal dialogue played a role 
in helping her to make sense of my input.
Modal operators are small words, rarely more than one syllable long. 
Yet they seem to exert a considerable power over my interlocutors' 
perceptions of their subjective and complex internal events. It is 
tempting to conclude that they play a vital role in the representation 
of future events, and also exert a modifying influence which may be 
unique to each individual. Certainly, no two individuals reported the 
same response to different phrases containing modal operators. So at 
one level, we can suggest that modal operators play a part in the 
creative process of coding future events, yet in another, more specific 
domain, each individual has unique, idiosyncratic responses to their 
own menu of these interesting little words.
Modal operators are coherent with the cybernetic view, because they 
imply the existence of an activity in the future, thus bringing in the 
factor of time. They also carry information about the dimensions of 
causality, which is implied in the system's approach to a future event. 
This is evident from their influence on people's experience of choice 
within the framework of a specific modal operator. They certainly 
appeared to be the most powerful class of words in the sentence, 
perhaps fulfilling the role of what Pinker (1994) calls the 'head' word. 
Pinker proposed that in order to be able to make sense of a sentence,
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people needed to have a 'parser'  ^whose role was to decode the 
sentence. One of the first things that the parser needed to be able to 
do was to identify the head word, which then communicates the 
context for the classification of the rest of the words in a phrase or 
sentence. Pinker described this as a branching algorithm, with the 
'head word' occupying the 'top' position, and other syntactical 
structures branching downwards from it. This is distinct from 
grammar, which is "a mere code or protocol, a static database 
specifying what kinds of sounds correspond to what kinds of meanings 
in a particular language," (Pinker 1994:197).
There is some correspondence between people's responses to the 
modal operators, (which seemed to play a leading role in the 
construction of the internal representation,) and the idea that there is 
some sort of'head' word which, when a sentence is heard or read, 
acts as a focal point around which the rest of the meaning is 
constructed. If we use the Batesonian idea of logical levels, then it is 
as if the modal operator, because it sets context, may operate at a 
higher logical level than the rest of the information in the statement, 
and influence how meaning is made at the level of internal 
representations.
This was indicated by Beatrice's initial response to question 5. This 
was intended to explore the effects of the word 'but'. However, her 
strongest response was to the word 'need', which is a modal operator 
of necessity. In this case it clearly acted as what Pinker would have 
described as a 'head' word, creating the context for the decoding of 
the rest of the sentence, and overriding the effects of the word 'but' 
which with all my other interlocutors was the word which had the 
most influence on the meaning that they constructed at the level of 
internal representations.
 ^"The mental program that analyses sentence construction during language 
comprehension", (Pinker 1994:197).
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J. OK. Next question. What's your response, again In terms of Internal 
representations and so on. If I  were to say to you ' you are good at 
NLP, but you need to work on your rapport skills'.
Beatrice: Automatically think o f rapport skills, that's the part of the 
sentence that I  would focus on.
J. OK. And If I  said you need to work on your rapport skills but you 
are good at NLP.
Beatrice: Rapport skills.
J. Still rapport skills?
Beatrice: That little word 'need'...?
J. OK. So that word need Is kind of...
Beatrice: Yeah, I  find I  don't react well to that modal operator!
No one, as far as my searches have been able to establish, has ever 
taken this approach to the investigation of the phenomenology of the 
causal relationships between language and thought. What emerged 
was a phenomenon of complex and dynamic relationships between 
words and the thoughts that they engender. I am only scratching the 
surface of this level of subjective experience. I can only offer the very 
generalised conclusion that some words seem to have more power 
than others at setting the directions for the ways in which conceivers 
may search for, and construct meaning.
7.6. Other small, powerful words
So far this chapter has been mainly about the topic of modal 
operators. They are usually small words with surprisingly large 
effects. In the analysis of my transcripts, it emerged that there were
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other small words, which also produced noticeable effects on people's 
responses. I include my thoughts about these in this section. The 
transcripts of these questions also indicate the apparent ubiquity of 
internal dialogue in the development of people's responses.
My interest in the effects of small words had influenced the design of 
my interview schedule, which I described in chapter 2. To this end I 
formulated three different questions, in order to 'test' their effects on 
people's responses. These words were but, yet and feel. Questions 7®, 
8  ^and 12® were designed to explore these. They are three words 
which often trip off the tongue without much thought; this was 
another reason for investigating their effects.
7.6.1. Responses to the word 'feel'.
The word feel seems now to have become interchangeable with terms 
such as 'think' and 'believe'. It tends to be used indiscriminately in 
every day discourse. In my sample its effect was primarily to amplify 
the kinaesthetic dimension of people's internal representation of the 
mildly unpleasant event I asked them to recall. I chose to invite 
people to think of a 'mildly unpleasant event' as I thought it would be 
easier for people to respond to. In retrospect, it seems that asking 
people to think of a pleasant experience may have been just as 
useful. I was careful that the 'unpleasant event' did not produce 
distress in my interlocutors.
I illustrate this by extracts from Beatrice and Lucy's transcribed 
interviews.
® Question 7.
Remember a mildly unpleasant experience. How do you feel about it?
 ^ Question 8.
A) You are good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport skills.
B) You need to work at your rapport skills but you are good at NLP.
C) Think about your rapport skills so that you can be even better at NLP.
® Question 12,
A) you can't do that
B) you can't do that yet.
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J. OK. [...] 'Remember a mildly unpleasant experience'.
Beatrice: OK.
J. What happens If I  say to you 'how do you feel about It'?
Beatrice: The kinaesthetic that I  can feel seems to be getting bigger.
J. So It's kind o f amplified It?
Beatrice: Yes, It must have amplified It, because It's grown.
J. All right. So It's around about your midriff. (She was pointing to her 
midriff at the time, which is what generated this question).
Beatrice: I  don't have a midriff. Yeah, It's down there.
Perhaps Lucy reported the strongest response.
J. Remember a mildly unpleasant experience and of course we're 
working content free so...
Lucy: A mildly unpleasant... (laughs).
J. What happens If I  ask you' How do you feel about It'?
Lucy: You just, what you say, you jus t want to shrivel up. I'm doing It 
now.... How I  feel about It? Well It goes straight to your gut.
I then went on to probe more into her kinaesthetic responses, and the 
effects, if any, it might have on her internal visual construction.
J. ... and you're not attending to the picture?
Lucy: No. I  can... It's very still. It's jus t a head... I  don't see myself... 
the feeling Is the strongest thing.
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J. And to the picture?
Lucy: There's a little bit If... It's very still. It's Just a head. I  don't see 
myself. The feeling Is the strongest thing.
J. So jus t asking that, do you think that's ju s t amplified the feelings? 
Lucy: Yeah, I  suppose...
In each of these cases, using the word 'feel' as a question about their 
responses to a particular situation appeared to make them more 
aware of their internal kinaesthetic responses. It was as if the word 
caused their attention to go to the information about the situation 
that was coded in the kinaesthetic domain, rather than in other 
modalities. There is the possibility that it even blocked their attention 
of the information coded in other sensory domains. This raises 
questions about the usefulness of our tendency to use the word 'feel' 
as a general question about anything ranging from people's opinions 
to their emotional responses. Suffice it to say that perhaps there are 
words that block off internal representations, just as there are words 
which can produce astounding internal changes.
7.6.2. Responses to the word 'but'.
Such a blocking effect was not only produced by the word 'feel'. One 
of the most interesting effects was produced by the word 'but', whose 
use produced surprisingly strong responses in my interlocutors. Its 
general effect was to diminish the force of the first half of the 
statement coming before the word 'but'. I offer three extracts from 
the transcripts of the responses to my first statement to illustrate 
this. The third example is more complex, bringing internal dialogue 
into play.
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J. What happens i f  I  say 'you are good at NLP but you need to work 
on your rapport skills'? ( I  mean obviously this Isn't true... It's jus t the 
process...)
Kathleen: I've only got the negative now. I  need to work on my 
rapport skills.
Steve's response was equally clear, and more detailed.
J. How do you respond If I  say 'you are good at NLP but you need to 
work on your rapport skills'?
Steve: (Laughter^. J get a strong kinaesthetic response. It's  called 
clenching my hands (laughter) a tightness In my stomach, and a 
heaviness, a tightness In my chest.
J. Because of which part o f the sentence?
Steve: Because of the BUT. (Loudly).
J. OK. Interesting.
Steve: Em, em, yeah, because of the but. I  can't even remember 
what you said first, I  know It was something about NLP. ... but you 
threw me then.(laughs) It's like being thrown by a judo expert 
actually, (laughs).
Lucy, who responded to my first statement as follows, further 
demonstrated these effects of internal dialogue modifying internal 
responses: (I have underlined what I consider to be the most 
significant part).
Lucy: Well actually the first part, you are good at NLP that puts a big 
doubt straight away. It like, are you jus t saying that, and I'm saying, 
'am r  and you start looking In yourself, well I  am, am I? Are you jus t
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trying to be nice to the person? Then Internal dialogue happens saving 
don't be so stuold. thev're being.... I'm talking to mvself. The BUT... I  
have to tell myself to be practical again, don't be so stupid, that Is 
how It Is. I  suppose that would bring a K response, thinking well OK, 
thanks!
When I reversed the two halves of the statement, still separated by 
the word 'but', people responded differently.
J. ... 'You need to work on your rapport skills, but you're good at NLP'.
Lucy: Ah, beautiful... compared to the other one... but you're good at 
NLP, that jus t negated, that ju s t got rid of that first one. (laugh) and I  
felt good about It. Big K big...
Steve's response was similar to Lucy's. However he 'hears' more of 
the content of the second part of the statement, which could imply 
that he has blocked the segment before the but.
J. So I f  I  say you need to work on your rapport skills but you are good, 
at NLP.
Steve: That Is not as unpleasant, the kinaesthetic wasn't as strong as 
the last...
J. So which b it , ... does any bit stay with you more than another? 
Steve: NLP Is what I  heard.
The word 'but' appears to diminish the power of the information 
contained in the first half of a statement, unless it is over-ridden by 
another word with a stronger effect. This would seem to agree with 
Pinker's (1994) views about the activity of making sense (the parser) 
needing to be able to identify the 'head' word, that is, the word which 
is then used as the context which structures the rest of the sentence.
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I tentatively suggest that the approach that I am using enables one to 
explore the effects of syntax in this phenomenological way, by 
interrogating people's subjective experience of language.
7.6.3. Changing time frames with 'yet'.
It is tempting to generalise that in some cases the strongest effects 
are exerted by the smallest words. Certainly, exploring the effects of 
tagging 'yet' on to the end of a directive such as 'you can't do that' 
produced some surprising responses. My directives to my 
interlocutors followed the general pattern of 'So, you know, imagine 
something again that you might do, and I'm  really going for the 
difference between when I  say 'vou can't do that'and 'vou can't do 
that YET. ' I give examples of their responses below.
The most critical distinction between these two directives was that the 
second one brought up the consciousness of future time in some of 
my respondents. For others, the provocative 'can't' seemed to 
generate a lot of internal dialogue, which produced additional effects. 
However, the introduction of the dimension of time in for some of my 
collaborators could imply that time may be a critical aspect of our 
internal constructs, though it may be dangerous to generalise from 
such a small sample. Consider Beatrice's responses where the second 
statement clearly brings the future into what she constructs internally 
in response to my statement:
Beatrice: [....] 'you can't do that' Is dissolving my picture, and 'you 
can't do that yet' Is freezing my picture.
J. So one Is dissolving and one Is freezing?
Beatrice: Yes, yes. It's freezing It. It's giving me an opportunity that I  
might get to do It In the future.
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Edward's response was equally unambiguous about the introduction of 
a future dimension to his thoughts. It is also interesting to note that, 
with the first directive, the use of the modal operator 'can't' seemed 
to place the locus of control external to him, and he perceives it as 
being an inhibitory force. The second part of my statement produces a 
response in which a future possibility is reported as part of the 
constructed response. The word 'yet' seems to introduce the 
dimension of time into people's constructs, as well as altering sub­
modalities. I give one example of this from the transcripts.
Edward: In as much as... not that I  don't have an ability but because 
you won't let me do It. (This was his response to the first statement.) 
So when you say I  can't do that yet, I  know have a picture In the 
distance, clear. It's a bright picture. It's a white picture which Is Just 
out there waiting for me to go towards. The kinaesthetic Is In my legs, 
ju s t waiting for me to go there, and, eh, there's no sound.
7. 7. Concluding reflections.
In this chapter I have explored and analysed the results of the 
transcripts of the interviews from four separate parts of my 
questionnaire. What unites them is that in each case I was interested 
in exploring the effects of certain short words included in statements. 
In each case the results point to the powerful effects of smaller 
words. The examples I used also showed the continuing appearance 
of internal dialogue. I began with a consideration of the effects of 
modal operators, which are words defining the mode in which a future 
activity is to be carried out. They are usually words of one syllable. 
What was interesting was that people had no difficulty in forming 
internal representations of events that had not yet happened. If we 
apply the cybernetic model, then the system has to have information 
about future events, because of the significance of the variable of 
time. The modal operators, in the main, seemed to influence how 
people conceived of a future task, and to play some part in influencing 
their approach to it. Modal operators also have a causal dimension;
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they appear to have the ability for some people to alter their 
perception of causality, especially in relation to whether they 
perceived the cause as coming from within themselves, or as an 
external in origin.
What may be of significance in all this is that having explored such 
deceptively simple words, some fundamental epistemological 
processes have become more clearly delineated. Among these is the 
possibly archetypal process of linking cause and effect. Even more 
interesting is the notion that internal representations can code, even 
create, images of future events; thus they are not merely memory 
devices, or ways of thinking about information in the present. This 
ability to generate internal images of the future, apparently using all 
the senses, which then become a goal to be achieved, bears out the 
cyberneticians' insistence that time should be considered as a critical 
variable in our mental constructs, and therefore our epistemology 
(Bateson 1972). It may be necessary for us to have clear 
representations of future events in order that they can be achieved. 
We thus need to 'know' about such outcomes, so that the dimension 
of time becomes a part of how we know. So the complex internal 
world of internal representations may be critical to our survival, in 
that they play a vital part in memory, learning and creating the 
future. ®
The importance of time as a critical variable seems also to be 
illustrated by people's responses to the question designed to explore 
the effects of the word 'yet'. Its main operation seems to have been 
to introduce the variable of time into people's constructs. This 
appeared to produce some alterations in the configurations of the 
conceiver's sub-modalities. In Edward's case it generated a sense of 
movement towards a goal. The statement that did not include the
 ^ I  discuss this further in Chapter 11, where I synthesise some of the 
findings into a hypothetical model of learning.
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mediating knowing and being.
I *
you r spelling is not very good, but you did a good
m
when learning, and making sense of informaton.
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Chapter 8. Language, Thought and the Dimension of Time.
I  just want to remark on the amazing property that conscious beings 
have to represent objects and states of affairs In the world, and to act 
nn the basis of those representations. I t  Is a general feature of most, 
though not all, conscious phenomena that they represent objects, 
events and states of affairs In the world ... I t  Is a peculiar feature that 
the object need not actually exist In order to be represented by our 
Intentional state. (Searle 1999:64-65).
An Intention Is embedded In Its situation. In human customs and 
Institutions. (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 1994:115).
Brain surgeon David Ingvar has studied the relationships between the 
biological functioning of the brain and the nervous system on the one 
hand and our behaviour In an organizational setting on the other. He 
calls It neuroblologlcal management. One of the findings Is that the 
Individual registers -  In physically Identifiable sectors of the brain that 
can be even photographed -  the past, the present and the future. 
(Gummeson 2000)^
8.1. Introduction
This chapter explores the idea that the dimension of time is a variable 
in the construction of cognitive maps. This was another aspect to 
emerge from my study of the transcripts, from both phases of the 
data gathering. If one of the main ideas in cybernetics is that systems 
'run' on information about both present and future events, then it 
would be expected that people would need to be able to construct 
representations of something that has not yet happened. Without this, 
the TOTE process, which I described in chapter 3, would be 
impossible. This seems to be borne out so far from what my
1 Gummerson cites Ingvar, D (1985) "Memory of the Future An Essay on the 
Temporal Organisation of Conscious Awareness", Human Neurobiology 4 .127  
-  36.
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collaborators have told me. The idea of feedback is only valid if the 
system can create a construct of the future. (I have reviewed the 
concepts of feedback and calibration in Chapter 3.) Feedback is 
information about the extent to which a system s actions in the 
present are fulfilling its requirements for achieving an outcome in the 
future. The first kind of feedback is positive feedback, whose essential 
message to the system is that no change is necessary in order to stay 
on track. Negative feedback, on the other hand, informs the system 
that a change is necessary in order for it to be able to achieve what it 
set out to do. (Wiener 1961, Bateson 1972, Bateson and Bateson 
1988).
This raises the possibility that such a continuous internal scanning and 
comparing between what is being experienced in the present, and 
what has been constructed about the future, is an important process 
in how we construct and utilise our cognitive maps. It may also play a 
role in the generation of actions. I was curious to find out more about 
people's abilities to 'move around in time'. This chapter is about my 
reflections on my participants' abilities to utilise the dimension of 
past, present and future time as frameworks (or categories) for their 
thinking. The conceiver's ability to change time frames may be 
another component to how we know.
I have already described how modal operators appear to influence 
people's internal representations about their future activities in 
Chapter 7. This chapter is about the analyses of the parts of the 
interview schedule, where I used questions to explore some possible 
ways in which people created an internal representation of a future 
event as they were making sense of my words.
8.2. The interview questions addressed in this chapter.
This chapter focuses on the analysis and reflections on the transcripts 
of three of the questions from my interview schedule. I believe they 
illustrate aspects of the role of the dimension of time in people s
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cognitive processes. One of these is the last statement of question 8, 
some of which I have already used in the previous chapter to inquire 
into the effects of the word 'but'. The segment from question 8 'so 
that you can be'presupposes a future state. It also presupposes a 
causal link to an event that has yet to happen. Question 11  ^ includes 
a deliberate request to change focus from the present {think of 
something you do really well,) to a possible future constructed state 
by being asked "How could you make It even better'. This question 
uses the modal operator 'could', as I believed that this might direct 
listeners' attention to the future; I then used the comparative 'deleter' 
’better'(Bandler and Grinder 1975) to explore its effects.
Question 13"^  was designed to explore people's constructions of a 
future goal. I wanted to know whether words such as how, what and 
why, (which are frequently used to introduce questions) would 
produce different responses. I was also interested in finding out 
whether asking people to think about what It would be like to have 
achieved a goal would result in a change in their perceptual position, 
and what effects this might then have on the configuration of the 
internal representations and their sub-modalities.
 ^ Question 8:
1. You are good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport skills
2. You need to work on your rapport skills but you are good at NLP.
3. Think about your rapport skills so that you can be even better at NLP.
 ^ Questions 11. Think of something you do really well.
How could you make It even better?
What are you not paying attention to?
Question 13. Think of a goal you have In life, something that you really 
want to do.
What do you need to achieve It?
Why will you achieve It?
How will you achieve It?
What will it be like to have achieved that goal?
Now think of the goal again, has anything changed?
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8.3. The apparent comparing of Information between present 
and future constructs in internal representations
Although question 8 set out to explore people's responses to the word 
'but' in the context of the kind of verbal feedback that one has often 
heard teachers use, the final statement was deliberately crafted to 
direct attention to the notion of improvement. {Think about your 
rapport skills so that vou can be even better at NLP.)
Edward was aware of both movement and choice in his response.
J. "Think about your rapport skill so that you can be even better at 
NLP'.
Edward: Nice colour picture! (Here there is a very distinct change in 
the internal representation from the one that had occurred in 
response to the previous statement).
J. OK.
Edward: Em, sound, feelings that I'm trying to Improve those skills ,... 
Something to work on so I  know I  can get better.
J. Movement?
Edward: No, It's very bright, very bright picture, like the light at the 
end of the tunnel, although the tunnel.. It's not dark but there s 
definitely bright ....down.... there's something to move toward^ 
snmethlna to work towards, so there's a cholc_^
I have underlined this section as it implies that he is experiencing 
choice, as well as a sense of being able to move towards a goal. 
Again, this brings in the Leitmotif of causality, with the added 
dimension that it appears that people can experience different 
degrees of feelings of being in control and being able to cause things
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to happen. The words that I used to link 'rapport skills' with 'better at 
NLP' were so that you. This phrase, used in this context, presupposes 
a causal connection between the two. It appears to have set a 
direction for the developments of Edward's internal representations. 
When I then asked him about his kinaesthetic responses to the 
statement, he replied:
Edward: Em, a kinaesthetic, a good kinaesthetic, a very generative 
kinaesthetic.
J. In terms of attraction and repulsion. Is there anything going on 
there?
Edward: It's very attractive.
What I was trying to elicit with this question about attraction and 
repulsion was his sense of motivation in relation to his constructed 
goal. He replied unambiguously that it was attractive. For another 
interlocutor, Ina, her own internal response was experienced as 
pleasant. She said:
Ina: That's great. I'm happy, you're not questioning my ability. I 'll 
just take It Into account.
What emerges from these few excerpts is the idea that we seem able 
to link present to future in our mental constructs, so we are not, as it 
were, bound only by the time frame of the present. We can form 
informative links between past, present and future in order to obtain 
different perspectives. People seemed to have no difficulty in creating 
internal representations of future events, and then using them as 
sources of information. This emerged in the responses to question
11. Beatrice's response, for instance, was to develop a clearer picture, 
which enabled her to examine her actions in more detail.
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Beatrice: The picture becomes clearer as If you're examining the 
action that what you're doing, examining what you're doing, to see 
where you could do better. It's like putting It under a microscope and 
I'm  looking at every little bit of It very carefully to see what I'm doing, 
and It's a light feeling...
Edward's response also included some detail about his own subjective 
processes. I cite two extracts to illustrate this. This co-researcher 
often reported his kinaesthetic reactions in greater detail than 
information coded in other sensory modalities. What is also 
interesting is how he describes his internal activity as a search. I 
explore the possible significance of this process further in Chapter 11.
Edward: Ehm, that makes me go on an Internal search, em, so I  have 
a picture of what I  do, and I'm looking for another picture where I  can 
be doing It better, er, the kinaesthetic Is everywhere. It's one of
energy. [.....]  It's a search for a picture where I  could be doing It
better, the picture doesn't come up (laughter) but It makes me look 
for comparisons. Interestingly actually, yeah, the picture... looking for 
a picture of something where I'm doing It better Is actually behind the 
picture I'm doing It well, [...] So all I  have to do Is actually see that 
new Image so that I  can then move towards It.
Again there is a reference to a sense of attraction towards an 
internally represented future event. Movement presupposes the 
existence of the passage of time. Edward also reported that he was 
aware of actively comparing his two internal representations. (I have 
explored the view that comparison is a fundamental epistemological 
process in Chapter 11.)
In Edward's case, there was also evidence of a trans-derivational 
search; he uses the metaphor of'looking' to describe this internal 
activity. Later in the interview, after he had time to reflect on his 
original responses, he enlarged on the sensation of searching for 
information in his constructed future:
224
Edward: ... maybe I'm  jus t missing something that I'm not aware of 
that will allow me to step up to the next level. So what I'm looking for 
Is what It Is that I  need to get me that next step?
Kathleen had no problems generating images of her doing something 
'even better'.
Kathleen. OK. ... (long pause) I  modify the picture actually. I've a 
picture here, and ... I  find I've made the picture a little bit clearer, the 
colours brighter. I've turned up the volume...
J. And let me just check. That was as the result of "how could you 
make It even better?'
Kathleen: Yeah, yeah. So In this situation I'm doing what I  do well, 
better.
Lucy's response again seemed to be dominated by her internal 
dialogue, which appeared to help her to develop her internal searches. 
She was often very informative about what she found through her 
introspections. One can identify the internal dialogue, the internal 
search, and the visual component of her internal responses in the 
following extract.
Lucy: fPausej Searching, she's searching, ahh, there was a bit of 
doubt there. Internal dialogue, I  can't? can I? And how can I  do. It? It's 
like (indistinct; If I  can do that then you can... slight movement to my 
right, em.... It's going over now... where's It gone? Slight movement 
to my right on to the future... right, so If I  did that then I  could see 
myself being able to do better.
People appear to respond to words and phrases in their own unique 
way. What remains constant is that they use their senses internally as 
an inevitable response to words, and language in general. These
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activities seem to involve searching, internal dialogue, comparison, 
and the ability to use different time frames as contexts to generate 
other kinds of internal representations. Similar patterns were found in 
transcripts of parts of interviews that I have not cited for the sake of 
brevity.
8. 4. Goals and outcomes; back to the future.
Question 13 was used to explore people's internal representations of 
future events, and the possible influence of different words and 
syntaxed phrases on this process. This was a complex question, as I 
was curious to find out more about a number of things, such as the 
effects of asking different questions about something that affected 
people's internal representations. So I set about asking people about 
a goal in a way that would present them with that goal in different 
contexts, using what, how and why questions, and then asking them 
to change their perceptual position into the future 'as if' they had 
achieved the goal. I then asked them to think about the original goal, 
and inquired whether anything had changed in their own 
representations of the outcome they had been invited to think about. 
Partly as the result of these responses, I became more aware that 
goals were emerging as important. I have therefore cited extracts 
from each of the transcribed interviews.
8.4.1. What' and 'how' questions.
The responses to this particular set of questions and directives were 
complex. People had no apparent difficulty in creating internal 
representations of a goal they had in life. Every one of my six 
collaborators was able to generate an internal representation about 
this future event without difficulty. Then, being asked the what, how 
and why questions generated clear alterations in these 
representations. This is well illustrated by Beatrice's response.
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J. And as you pay attention to that Internal representation, what 
happens If I  ask you "what do you need to achieve It'?
Beatrice: (pauses) Well there's something happened, but I  don't 
know what's happening.^.
J. Take your time, just run over It again and see...
Beatrice: There's a series of pictures below It, of different, I  don't 
know whether they're resources or skills, different things that I  will 
need to achieve this final goal.
Edward's responses were also Informative, demonstrating the 
ubiquitous occurrence of internal dialogue and its effects. My 
questions seemed to send him on an internal search, which itself then 
altered his own representations. He forms links between his own 
internal dialogue and his awareness of his kinaesthetic states, almost 
as if his bodily responses were acting as a context for the kind of 
inner talk that he produced. To the 'what' question, he responded.
Edward: Right, I  have a picture which Is jus t a bright circle, em, no 
sounds, the bright circle Is what I'm going to achieve when I  get 
there, the kinaesthetic Is one of. It's quite calming. Its  a calming 
kinaesthetic. It's quite relaxing so that It slows me down getting to 
where I  want to be, so that It allows me to be aware of how I'm  
getting there, so I  can get there properly. Em, I  also have.... I  can 
hear music, now I  hear the music because It's becoming anchored to 
getting to where I'm going, so I  can hear that quite clearly, though 
It's just very gentle, em, again It's really the kinaesthetic ...Its one of 
peace. It's a feeling of em, take It slowly, sensible, there's no rush....
J. Is that a kinaesthetic or an Internal dialogue?
Edward: It's, yeah. It's an Internal dialogue but It's coming off the 
kinaesthetic.
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J. OK.
Edward: Yeah, because the kinaesthetic Is there. It's all built up, but 
It's holding Itself back and that In Itself Is saying to me "take your 
time, do It properly, you know you can get there so jus t take the time
to get there'.
Again, internal dialogue emerges as one of the key factors catalysing 
the further development of his internal representations. Lucy's 
response to my question 'what will you need to achieve it generated 
the response: What do I  need to achieve It? Internal dialogue 
happening big time. My picture's obviously moved now to where I  am 
now. It's a long picture. When I was interviewing Lucy, I became 
aware that she used a lot of internal dialogue, so I sometimes asked 
her about it. I wondered whether it affected some of the sub­
modalities. In this extract, we may be witnessing a link between her 
internai words, and changes in the size of her picture.
Lucy: [...] I  don't know whether I'm trying to make It bright but I'm  
jus t sort of at the moment have to be patient, so I  know what's got to 
be done to get there ... a lot of Internal dialogue.
J. Yeah. Can I  jus t check something with you? Has the picture got 
bigger?
Lucy: I t  did actually for a bit there.
Sometimes my interlocutors had difficulties in describing their internal 
processes, so I hesitate to draw any conclusions from some parts of 
these transcripts. However, one can recognise changes in people's 
perceptual positions, and the re-organisation of information in the 
next extract. In response to my 'how' question, she responded:
Lucy: I t  seems to have moved back to my left and my right and I  
have moved myself forward again, ... OK. Yep. I'm Internal
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dialoguing, visualising, em, the picture's... actually when you first said 
that... sort of here, like a what do you call It, jus t sort of opening out...
I Interpret her description of something "sort o f opening out' as 
indicating that she experienced some sort of movement in response to 
the 'how'. Certainly, the 'how' question produced changes in how 
Edward's internal representations were organised. They seemed to 
bring images of the sub-goals that he needed to achieve on the way 
to his consciousness.
Edward: (pause) It's an Internal dialogue, with a set o f pictures with 
the overall goal Is again this very bright circle, but leading up to the 
circle Is this set of pictures which are the Individual goals In getting to 
the overall goal.
Kathleen's response also showed that the word 'how' produced a re­
organisation of the internal representations she was 'mentally' 
scanning. In this case her 'series of pictures' were organised from her 
left side to the right, as if they were sequenced and located in the 
space in front of her.
Kathleen: (pause) ... I  have a series of pictures now coming back 
from this one.
J. And are they going from right to left? (I asked her this because she 
was pointing with her hand from her right to her left).
Kathleen: (pause) well that's the future event, (pointing to the right) 
and these are events leading up to It, (pointing to the left) so I  guess 
that It's going from left to right.
Beatrice's response also showed a re-organisation of her thinking. For 
her, the key word 'how' produced movement.
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Beatrice: All the little pictures are moving, I  can see myself doing this 
and this and this and this, ... (Gesticulating).
How and what apparently produced a different kind of information 
processing at the level of sub-modalities. In a sense, they also seem 
to behave as Pinker's (1994) 'head' words, acting as a kind of 
metaphorical hook on which the rest of the meaning hangs. They can 
also be thought of as words that create a category, which then acts as 
a framework which influences the de-coding of the rest of the 
statement. They may act as metaphorical signposts, setting a 
direction for the internal search for coherence and meaning.
8.4.2. 'Why' questions.
The responses to the 'why' question, produced different responses 
from the 'what?' and 'how?' questions. They indicated that another 
basic epistemological process had been brought into play^, namely 
that of causality.
The word "why' seems to elicit causal thinking. Edward's answer to my 
question 'why will you achieve it' produced an answer, which implied 
that far broader issues were now involved than, had been the case 
with the 'how' and 'what' questions. These broader issues covered not 
only information about his perception of the causality behind the 
desired activity, but also invoked his own sense of self, which is a 
more complex construct. For Edward, this sense of self had a strong 
kinaesthetic component. Again, internal dialogue seemed to activate 
further responses, which appeared to lead to him to experience a 
sense of choice.
51 have described this in Chapter 5, and suggest it is an essential aspect of 
the model of learning that emerges from this inquiry. I explain this in
Chapter 11.
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Edward: It's a single picture, and It's a single picture built on the 
kinaesthetic o f who I  am. Because I  choose to do It, so there's an 
Internal dialogue which says "because I  choose to do It'.
A similar pattern or response was shown by Kathleen. This short 
extract from the transcript indicates something of the emergence of 
her sense of self; that this is something where she has a sense of her 
own autonomous position, and where the desired outcome is 
something that she wants.
J. [...] What do you think Is the major change produced by the 
question "why'?
Kathleen: (pause) ... J have to decide If I  want... I  suppose really to 
re-check myself again, to see If this Is what I  want, ... my goal, and 
I've decided that It Is, more achievable.
J. So did It? ... jus t let me check this out.
Kathleen: OK.
J. Did It send you Inside to check something?
Kathleen: Yeah.
J. How did you check It?
Kathleen: Erm, I  asked myself. Is this definitely a goal I  want. Is this 
definitely a goal I  want to achieve?
J. And what said "yes' to you?
Kathleen: I t  was an emotion, a kinaesthetic that okeyed It with me.
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Ina's responses were shorter, but still reveal the role of internal 
dialogue. They also convey a sense of her being in charge. She 
vouchsafed to me that her goal was to obtain a degree. She uses the 
modal operator 'want to' followed by information about the necessity 
of it for her. This was one of the rare occasions when content came 
into the answers.
Ina: Because I  want to achieve It. There's a need. I  have to.
J. You touched your chest right then. Is that like a K?
Ina: I  have to.
Lucy's responses also showed a similar pattern, where a sense of self 
seems to be important, and her internal dialogue extends the 
response.
Lucy: Why? .... Why.... Why will I  achieve It? There's a K and I'm  
looking up and I'm trying to.... Why will I  achieve It? Because I  want 
to.
J. Is that Internal dialogue?
Lucy: Yes, the Internal dialogue going on because I  want to.
Later she elaborates on the importance of the goal to her life. As she 
was thinking about the answer to my question, she had looked 
upwards, as if the location of the picture was high up.
Lucy: Well I  actually looked up didn't I, like It Is, It's up high for me 
to achieve that that goal, one of my alms for my life, so...
Steve's responses were somewhat sparser; however, they do show 
sub-modality changes in response to 'why'. This is also an example of 
where using a strictly NLP approach to questioning about sub-
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modality changes may lead to the researcher missing out on 
information, because of focussing too much on content rather than 
people's processes.
J. Does anything change about the goal when I  ask "why'?
Steve: (Long pause). Actually, It's the picture has become still and 
framed, but the... actually kinaesthetic Isn't as noticeable.
Perhaps the simplest and most telling answer was offered by Beatrice, 
who told me that:
Beatrice: There's no change In any of the pictures but there's Internal 
dialogue.
J. OK.
Beatrice: I  lust tell mvself I  want to. (My emphasis).
8.5. Changing perceptual positions in time
With this part of the question,® I wanted to expiore what happened 
when I asked people to shift their perceptual position, from one where 
they were in the present looking towards a future outcome, to 
another one of actually imagining themselves in the future looking 
back, to having achieved their goal. By perceptual position, I mean 
the conceptual standpoint from which something is viewed.
We can use the example of a glass being seen as half empty or half 
full to illustrate what is meant by taking two different perceptual 
positions. In the first one, one can assume that emptyness forms the 
framework (or category) within which the viewer observes the glass.
6 What will it be like to have achieved that goal?
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In the other one, fullness, actual or potential, forms a different 
framework. Both are different perceptual positions.
With these questions, I was interested to find out whether time itself 
(in the forms of past, present and future) could act as a perceptual 
framework or standpoint from which an event was viewed by the 
conceiver.
When I asked Beatrice what will It be like to have achieved that goal? 
her description of how she conceived the achievement changed. It 
became more intense, both visually and kinaesthetically.
Beatrice: The big picture has started moving faster, you know It's a 
very strong kinaesthetic and I  think It's got brighter, It's just an. 
overall feellna that It would be right for me.
Edward's response also described changes in both the kinaesthetic 
and visual elements of his internal representations. He also reported 
on an awareness of his internal dialogue.
Edward: Oh that's a big kinaesthetic In my chest of... Oh the picture 
gets very bright, the circle gets very bright [...] and there's an 
Internal dialogue that goes with It.
Kathleen's response was to engage more with the outcome by 
associating with it, which means thinking about it as if it were 
happening to her in the present, and being fully emotionally engaged
Kathleen: (pause) Yeah, I'm In the picture now. I'm associated, 
(coughs). (She uses her arms to describe a circle around her).
J. So If you're associated, the picture's all round? OK?
For Lucy the thought of having achieved the outcome was 
pleasurable, and she reported a strong kinaesthetic response.
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Lucy: OK. I'm looking around now, to my right again. I'm  having a K, 
a big K response. I'm seeing what It would be like...
J. Picture moved?
Lucy: The picture's moved, definitely moved. I  suppose I'm  looking 
Into the future. Like, looking Into the future.... Big K, big K, can chill 
out now.
J. Good. Right (laughter) Picture's still clear or not?
Lucy: Picture's very clear, picture's very clear yeah!
Steve's response was to generate a number of pictures. When I asked 
him how many, he described how he took (at least) three different 
perceptual positions
Steve: Yeah, I  have the three of them, (laughter) That's what I  have 
done. What I  have Is a picture of more or less present time, I  have 
me having achieved the goal, the day after, or very shortly after, and 
I  have a picture of me In a couple o f years time actually looking back, 
physically looking back... but I'm not doing anything, ju s t standing 
looking at the scene, disinterested.
These responses indicate that internal representations can be 
influenced by the time frame the information is assigned to. People 
seem to be able to construct an internal representation of the present 
looking into the future, and then also a future in which they have 
achieved something. Then they appear also to be able to look back to 
the present. From what my collaborators reported, these different 
perceptual positions seemed clearly distinguished by sub-modality 
changes, as well as internal dialogue.
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The next part of the question was designed to bring my interlocutors 
back into the present, after journeying, as it were, through a number 
of different perceptual positions, which were elicited by the words that 
I used. I was curious to find out whether the original internal 
representation of their outcomes had changed. The answers were 
ambiguous; for some of my interlocutors there had been changes, for 
others, they were not aware of any alterations. Beatrice's response 
described some of these changes.
J. So now think of the original goal again, and notice If anything's 
changed?
Beatrice: (pause) I  think they've combined the original goal and the 
outcome, kind of. It's all the one picture now. It's bigger. It's more a 
rectangular... square. No difference In brightness, there's movement 
and It's got a border round It, It's a movie.
She also told me that she felt herself to be 'in' the movie', which is 
another change in perceptual position. For both Lucy and Edward the 
main changes were differences in their kinaesthetic responses, with 
no apparent change in their visual content. For Steve the question 
eliminated the visual part of his internal representation. In Kathleen's 
case, there were very clear changes. Here the process of questioning 
her in such a way that she altered her internal representation of the 
goal also altered the perception of her original construct.
J. [...] So I'm  Interested now to see what happens If I  ask you to think 
of the original goal again.
Kathleen: It's actually different! ('surprised;. It's changed. The goal Is 
actually changed.
J. Has It changed In content, or has It changed how It's represented?
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Kathleen: It's a slight variation In the content And I  think because I  
have associated myself In that future goal. It's now more achievable, 
and ... I  can say there Is a variation In the content. I  jus t remember 
what the Initial picture was up there.
Ina described the process in some detail, as well as offering more 
information about the difference between her responses to the 'why', 
and the 'how' questions.
J. So when you think of the goal again, has that changed?
Ina: Yeah, It's like I'm on my way to achieve It.
J. Movement? Attraction?
Ina: Yeah, whereas the "how'stopped me, because I  was like.... I've 
got this list, how am I  going to do It, That's what I  said, I  hadn't 
activated my list yet. But saying that I've achieved It, and how do I  
feel. It feels the "how'has already been done, because I've done It, 
and I've succeeded, very happy.
I suggest that such questions, which asked people to think of the 
same event in different ways, indicate that words apparently have the 
power to direct, influence, and categorise how information is coded at 
the sensory level. They seem to be able to effect a change in 
perceptual position in the conceiver. This implies that we may have 
considerable flexibility at this level of processing. This is shown not 
only at the apparently basic level of sub-modality changes, but also in 
people's ability to use the dimension of time as a category within 
which information is re-organised.^ It is as if we have the ability to 
change, to modify, to manipulate and to draw on information coded at 
many levels. If this is indeed the case, then it makes the phenomenon 
of internal representations an essential aspect of the processes of
7 J have reviewed some recent ideas about the effects of categorisation on 
perception in chapter 3.
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thinking, memorising, reflecting, planning and learning. What 
emerges is that sometimes, in order to make sense, we compare 
information between the time that was, and that is yet to be. Internal 
dialogue may possibly be involved in these comparisons. This could be 
another part of the phenomenon of making sense.
8.6. Changing time frames
One of my questions (number 6®) set out to explore what happened 
when people were deliberately asked to shift their perceptual 
positions about a constructed future event. So the first question 
asked them to think of something "that you have to do, but you're not 
particularly sure you want to do It'. I wanted to see what effect it 
would have if I then asked them to imagine that they were in a future 
having completed the task. I was interested in what would change as 
the result of asking them make such shifts in their perceptual 
positions.
Beatrice reported distinct differences in her representation of the 
event considered from these two different perspectives.
Beatrice: The picture has changed.... To what's In the picture has 
come with me Into the future. Does that make sense? No?, (laughter)
J. Everything Is OK. Every response Is absolutely fine.
Beatrice: The picture has changed, I  was disassociated, now I'm  
associated, and It's In the future. I  Imagine the outcome of what this
would be.
® Question 5. ,
a) Think of something you have to do but you're not sure you particularly
want to do It.
b) Now Imagine you were In the future having done It.
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J. So you're actually associated Into the outcome. So Is that a 
different picture from the first one?
Beatrice: Yes, totally different picture.
For Edward, on the other hand, the picture of the task in the future 
was fuzzy and grey, and associated with unpleasant sensations.
Having achieved it then produced a clear picture, and a different 
kinaesthetic.
J. Yeah OK. Now Imagine you were In the future having done It.
Edward: Kinaesthetic, eh, kinaesthetic of re lie f....
J. Mh mh.
Edward: The object has gone out of the picture, the picture's still 
there. It's a 3 dimensional picture ... clear.
J. Picture's still In the same place?
Edward: Yeah, and still no sound. (Coughs)
For Kathleen, the picture changed from black and white, to having 
some colour in it, and was then accompanied by a different 
kinaesthetic.
Kathleen: And here It's like a black and white snap shot. It's not... now 
that I've done It and looking back on It, because It Is small and 
framed, but there Is colour In It.
Some people's answers were more complex; both Kathleen and Lucy, 
for instance, reported that they used a lot of internal dialogue, and 
that they experienced their pictures as having two different locations.
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as it were, in the physical space in front of them. On being asked the 
second part of the question, Lucy's response was:
Lucy: Yeah, well I  feel good, like the K Is definitely there, so the K 
would be the big thing.
J. What's happened to the picture?
Lucy: Eh, ah well yeah. It's moved over again to my left. It's past, 
much bigger, done It, yeah, move on again.
Steve also produced a similar response, and eloquently summed up 
the differences between his conceptions of assigning information to 
the two time frames. It seems that his internal representation of the 
future event (the first response) also altered when he became aware 
of the second internal representation. He reported that he also 
experienced a marked kinaesthetic change.
Steve: The future? Em, yeah. Pause... I  have another strong... at first 
I  get a kinaesthetic response, that Is the tightness exploded actually 
and became fairly loose. The picture Is further to the right, and I  still 
see the other picture. I t  Is framed, but It's 3D, It's like a doll's house 
room If you like. The other one Is actually duller, even duller now, and 
further away.
8.7. Conclusion
In this chapter I explored the idea that internal representations are 
not only constructs about past and present events or actions.
Although it is dangerous to generalise from such a small sample, we 
also seem to have an extraordinary ability to move about in time. It 
also appears that when we change time frames, the information may 
be re-configured. Time seems to emerge as an essential agent for the 
categorisation of much information in this context. It becomes an 
integral part of the phenomenology of internal representations. As
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such. It also appears that these dynamics operate in a truly cybernetic 
way. Systems can process information about past, present and future 
events, and use this as a basis for both feedback and calibration. We 
seem to be able to use our powers to re-create experience internally 
using our senses in order to make sense and develop meaning.
Internal representations also appear to act as a basis for generating 
actions.
The words that we use seem to be both catalyst for the emerging and 
changing internal representations, and metaphorical frameworks that 
hold them in place. Our internal worlds are dynamic, changing, and 
can move us through time and present us with what was, what is, and 
what could be. Words can act as catalyst and stabiliser of our interior 
microcosm in an almost alchemical way. Sometimes they evoke 
changes, other times they frame information so that the meaning is 
transformed. This makes them essential not only for enabling us to 
know, but also for how to know. They thus have a truly (and 
awesome) epistemological function, drawing on, and bringing into 
play a variety of different processes for the constructing of cognitive 
maps.
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Chapter 9. Words, and the Generation of Internal Responses.
Now, the interior of language (the language of thought) Is essentially 
a sub-sentence language; of course It can Include complete 
sentences, but the code of the genre does not require this for the 
success and advantage of the communication. (Roland Barthes 
1989:95).
9.1. Introduction
This is the last chapter on the analysis of my own interviews. I include 
it because in preceding chapters it emerged that certain words 
apparently produced far reaching effects on directing the conceptual 
processes that my interlocutors reported on. Here I review my 
findings from the transcripts of four questions that have not yet been 
covered, (Questions 1, 2, 14 and 15). I have written this chapter in 
the interest of transparency, that is, to present as complete an 
account of my findings from the transcribed interviews as space 
allows. Other aspects of our conscious and unconscious processes 
came to light. It was often difficult to select the novel aspects of the 
phenomena that emerged under my scrutiny. Thus in this chapter I 
add nothing new in the sense that it has already been demonstrated 
that words and syntax can produce responses in the listener at many 
levels. However, a number of themes also re-emerge, adding more 
examples of what I believe to be fundamental epistemological 
processes mediated through particular language structures. My 
reflections on these form the substance of chapter 11.
9.2. Setting directions for internal searches, and the 
consequences.
With questions 1^  and 15  ^I had set out to explore the effects of using 
words that could direct people to process information in a particular
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way. Can certain words set directions for people's internal searches? I 
wondered what sort of effects using directive words such as "think', 
'remember' and "be aware'at the beginning of utterances could have 
on how people then went on to construct their internal 
representations. I had already found that initial words seemed to 
'override' the effects of subsequently used ones.^ What I found was 
these words seemed to set a direction for the internal search, 
influencing what was attended to. I deliberately separated these two 
questions during the actual interview; one came right at the 
beginning, and the other one was asked towards the end. In each 
case my interlocutors reported different responses. I give some of the 
most illustrative examples without going through each of the 
respondents' comments.
J [...] I f  I  say to you "Think of a time when you were happy', what's 
your response?
Edward: It's a very vague Internal search. Because I'm looking for a 
memory, and It doesn't really do anything for me.
J. I f  I  say "remember a time when you were happy?'
Edward: It's more effective.
J. Do you get a picture?
 ^ Question 1.
a) Think of a time when you were happy,
b) Remember a time when you were happy,
 ^ Question 15
a) Think about how much you have learned,
b) are you aware of how much you have learned?
See chapter 6.
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Edward: Yes I  am doing. It's very easy with that to find something. 
They aii come rushing to the forefront, mmm. Yeah. It's a very 
reiaxing way to ask it.
J. Yeah.
Edward: It's very comfortabie. The other one is a very sort ofcoid 
and blunt thing to ask, whereas remember is a very reiaxing, very 
warm way of being led into what it is you are asking me to remember.
Here it was as If I had happened upon a group of words that 
influenced the respondents' modes of awareness. These in turn 
affected the internal responses that were evoked and any memories 
that were accessed. It is likely that they acted as categorisers 
influencing how the rest of the information was then attended to. For 
most of my respondents, the word 'remember' produced more 
internal representations and sub-modality distinctions. There was one 
exception, Lucy, for whom the directive 'think' produced a greater 
response than did 'remember'. These extracts also illustrate the role 
of internal dialogue. I have underlined Lucy's words where she reports 
that talking about something alters her internal representation. In this 
case it is not clear whether it is her internal dialogue or external 
speech that is influencing the development of these responses.
j.  [...] So, the first sentence is Think of a time when you were 
happy. '
Lucy: OK. Well obviously I  go inside, and I'm looking at a picture, 
search for a picture, and I  see the picture and then ail the other 
feelings, the kinaesthetic feelings take over, the sounds... Oh it '_s 
gettino bright now as I'm talkino about it now actuaiiy_i, (Here the 
internal dialogue seems to amplify the responses.
J. So you talking about it influences...
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Lucy: It's the picture for me now is getting bigger and I'm hearing, 
feeiing those feelings that I  might feel, yeah, sounds, that sort of 
thing, as they're getting stronger! Whoa!
J. As you're talking about it?
Lucy: As I'm talking about it  it's bringing it back more. Yeah Yeah 
(Author's emphasis).
J. OK. I  wonder how that's different to i f  I  say ’ remember a time 
when you were happy'?
Lucy: Remember a time... it  sounds like the way you maybe said it to 
me, a little sadder. I  don't know. Remember a time... it's like it's more 
in the past... Remember a time... it  seems its more like in the past 
and it's not continuing o n !... that was my initial reaction 'remember 
a time?' ehm.... I f  I  pick the same thing though it's a little harder. 
Remember a time seems very in the past. (Lucy looks to the left.)
J. Mh Mh. because you're looking to the left.
Lucy: Yeah.
J. So has the picture moved?
Lucy: I t  must have!
Later she told me even more about the different effects of her own 
use of'think' and 'remember' in her internal dialogues.
Lucy: We!! as I  was talking to you with the 'think' one I  was becoming 
more associated as I  was talking. The 'remember' one I  stiii haven't 
really thought of something because that good thing I  thought of was 
so big.... I f  I  can jus t think of something... remember something.
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remember ^nmpthing... OK, i f  I  keep talking about it I  would be 
there... (My emphasis).
Steve also reported different responses to the two key words. The 
same kinds of responses were also reported for question 15. Some of 
them were quite startling. Beatrice, for instance, reported a dramatic 
shift in the context of her internal representations. In response to the 
directive to 'think' she immediately accessed memories of the course, 
whereas when asked to be 'aware', there is a conceptual shift from 
certainty about her own learning, to self- doubt.
J. 'Think about how much you've learnt'
Beatrice: It's a moving picture of the last what is it, six or seven 
weeks, us aii together, I  don't know, that's jus t it. The whole crowd of
us.
J. Moving?
Beatrice: Yeah, ail moving, colour, sound, taste, it's got everything in 
it.
J. What's the sound?
Beatrice: Chatter! (laughter)
J. And how is that different to if  I  were to ask you 'are you aware of 
how much you've learnt?'
Beatrice: That's different, that's me on my own, ... it's me on my own, 
still reading still learning, but probably not sure if  I  have really 
learnt...
J. So there's a bit o f doubt in the second one?
Beatrice: Yeah.
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J. OK. Was there any doubt in the first one?
Beatrice: No.
Some of Edward's responses were illuminating. Sometimes it is 
difficult to interpret them from the bare text of the transcripts. 
However, the following extract gives some indication that the word 
'think' elicited responses in the visual domain, whereas 'aware' turned 
his attention to his kinaesthetic sensations. His responses were 
sometimes almost incomprehensible; I suggest that this is because 
we may have been uncovering information for which we do not have 
an adequate terminology. So making sense of this extract may not be 
possible; nevertheless it shows a dramatic difference between his 
responses to 'think' and 'remember'. It would be naive to expect total 
verbal clarity about people's introspections at such depths. At the end 
of his replies to the first question, I asked him:
J. Can I  ask you which came first, the pictures or the K?
Edward: The pictures.
J. And if  I  rephrase that thing slightly and say'are you aware of how 
much you've learnt?'
Edward: Yeah the picture shifts up here, but it  still has... not a but, 
and it stiii has a connection to the original picture. Interestingly what 
it  does is that here are slides that come from this picture, so they're
the slides of the things I'm aware of..em they're bigger, (pause)
They're not... they're just there. They're not actually sitting or 
connected to anything... The connection isn't a physical connection, 
it's an ethereal connection.
At this point, I wanted to know more about what he experienced as 
the sensory specific complex equivalences for the word ethereal.
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J. How do you know it's a connection?
Edward: Because it jus t is.
Still wanting more information, I referred him back to the more 
specific details of his internal representations.
J. What sense wouid that connection be in?
Edward', (long pause) I  guess it's a kinaesthetic, it  has to be because 
it's a feeiing. Yeah, it's a feeiing, definitely.
I had observed him looking to the right when he was describing the 
visual components of his responses to the directive 'think'. One of the 
sub-modality distinctions is the apparent location in space of the 
conceiver's internai representation (Bandler and Macdonald 1988). I 
was intrigued to know more about his original picture .
J. And what's different about the picture over here to your right?
Edward: Oh it's not anchored, whereas these pictures are anchored. 
This actualiy I  can move with me. This one is anchored. Erm, this one 
is em, interestingly as if  it's sort of carved in stone, it has a sort of 
weight to it.
J. That's the left one, yeah?
Edward: Whereas this one doesn't have a weight to it, it's a part of 
me, this is a part of me but waiting for me to... erm... gain what it has 
to offer, and once I  manage to bring that in as being part of me, it 
comes up here... (Indistinct).
J. And this picture is bigger? The one on the right?
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Edward: This one has bands around it, slides. This one doesn't.
J. Is it  a movie?
Edward: No, it's just a.... it's not a movie, it's eh, it's not a movie in 
the sense of the word movie, it's like a nebulous movement.
J. OK.
Edward: Whereas this one is big pictures in front...
J. Are these dear?
Edward: They're actually like words,... words, things sort of waiting 
to... integrate themselves into what I'm learning, whereas these the 
words are no longer here because they are mixing and intermingling 
with what I've already learnt. And growing, it's actually, actually 
growing.
For Ina, this question produced very different, but equally dramatic 
shifts in her internal representations. To the first directive, containing 
the word 'think' she immediately produced a lot of'busy' internal 
representations of activities such as reading and writing, and seeing 
herself writing notes about various topics. This was one of the few 
times that my interlocutors 'lapsed' into content.
Ina: I'm forever making notes, so i f  I  hear something, or I  hear of a 
practice, or a skill, or just things people say, or I  ve attended these 
various symposiums or seminars, I  put it down, 'oh maybe that wiii 
come in handy for the hospital', or 'maybe that will come in handy 
towards so and so'. I 'll look that up. In my job I  can do that, whereas 
the other girls can't.
Her responses to the word 'aware' seemed confused, and the internal 
searches become more apparent.
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J. So what happens if  I  say 'Are you aware of how much you've 
iearnt'?
Ina: ("paused I  know what I  know. ... but I've stiii got to learn more. I  
don't know everything. It's that word 'aware'. I  still have yet to iearm
J. I t  seemed to me that you were searching much more.
Ina: I  can't put down how much I  know, how much I've iearnt, it's 
jus t I  can't... I  can't I've iearnt this, tick. I've iearnt that, tick. I  know 
what I  know. There's stiii other things I  have to learn. So I'm  
probably more aware of what I  might need to know, than to what I  
already know.
Here the word 'aware' appears to have shifted the context of Ina's 
internal representations, and turned her internal focus to what she 
had yet to learn. This appeared to produce more of a trans- 
derivational search. For Lucy on the other hand, the word aware 
produced a stronger kinaesthetic response. Interestingly, she changed 
the position she was sitting in, straightening her back when I asked 
her'are you aware of how much you have learnt'. For her, the main 
difference between the 'think', and the awareness command was it  
ju s t ... feels nicer'.
With Steve, the main difference was also experienced as kinaesthetic. 
In his case, as with Edward, it produced a complex response, which is 
not easy to make sense of. The first part of the question evoked clear 
memories of a classroom situation, with a teacher whose voice he 
could hear, and experienced as unpleasant. I questioned him about
this.
J. What sort of voice is it?
Steve: It's ... a grumpy sort of... staccato voice, with a deep tonality.
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J. Whose voice is it?
Steve: It's the voice of one of my teachers.
J. OK. Right.
Steve: So annoying!
His response to the directive to be 'aware' was dramaticaliy different.
It seemed to move his focus to his kinaesthetic responses, and 
appeared to 'biock out' the visual and auditory components that had 
been there originally.
Steve: Weii, that feeis compieteiy different, I  feei a sense of, it gives 
me a feeiing of... nervousness, but not in ... I  suppose awareness 
wouid be one word, aware o f my nerve endings, nervous sensation 
but not nervousness in the traditional sense of anxiety or anything 
like that. A sense that I'm  more aware of everything actually, I  know 
that's a huge jumping off biock but I  seem .... I  don't have a picture, 
strangely for this, I  jus t have a kinaesthetic, I  don't even have an 
auditory. A kinaesthetic o f sort o f magical feeiing, it's difficult to 
describe but I  sort of feei my nerve endings or something, you know, 
it's very difficult to explain, em, it's mainly a feeling, I  don't see a 
picture.
9.3. Negations
I have already suggested that there are words, such as 'but' that 
appear to weaken or delete the internal responses to the 
representations which emerged in response to the words preceding 
'but'. I have described these in chapter 7. I include a consideration of 
negation in this chapter, because it appears to produce strong internal 
responses, which appear to influence how internal representations 
and sub-modalities are then configured by the conceiver. Some of
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the responses highlight the role of internal dialogue as an aid to 
internal searching.
It is believed that the unconscious cannot compute a negative. 
(Erickson 1980, Bandler and Grinder 1975A). With question 14"^  I 
deliberately set out to explore the effects of asking people not to think 
about something. The first statement Tou must not imagine a biue 
came/'was inciuded to lighten the atmosphere. All the respondents 
immediately reported that they 'saw' a blue camel, before they could 
'delete' it. The second and third statements were somewhat more 
searching, and deliberately used the language that could be 
associated with the context of a classroom, or other learning 
situation. Ina's response to 'don't make that mistake again' was 
typical. It also demonstrates that she uses internal dialogue to 
process my command.
Ina: I t  doesn't feei too good.
J. You maybe think of a mistake?
Ina: Yeah
J. I  said don't...
Ina: ...Just thinks of the things you've done, cringing, good cringe, 
jus t 'don't do it again'.
Question 14.
How do you respond to each of the foiiowing statements?
A) You must not imagine a biue came/.
B) Don't make that mistake again,
c) Don't think about failure.
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In Lucy's case, her response was to change the modal operators of 
her Internal dialogue as she seemed to sort through the internal 
representations that were evoked. First she said:
Lucy: (laughter) Don't make that mistake again? Don't make that 
mistake again. What mistake again... OK, a bit of movement, don't 
make that mistake again. I  suppose I  am a bit nervy about doing it 
again! (Laughter).
Then she elaborated on what she was thinking, and brought herself, 
through her own internal dialogue, to a position of choice, (J wiU if  I  
want to!).
Lucy: Weii I  suppose I  could make that mistake again then. Don't 
make that mistake again. What do you mean, don't make that 
mistake again... I  wiii i f  I  want to!
In Kathleen's case, the mention of the word 'failure' produced a 
strong emotional and kinaesthetic response.
J. What happens i f  I  say 'don't think about failure'?
Kathleen: That's Just shut up... there's a failing in the p it of my 
stomach, the picture zoomed up here, sounds like a swish, 
(indistinct).
Lucy reported that she 'saw' the word failure in response to my 
statement.
J. OK. What happens i f  I  say to you don't think about failure?
Lucy: I  looked to my left. I  suppose failure? Interna! dialogue. I  look 
to my left. I  see the word 'failure'.
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J. And you've jus t been told not to think about it!
Lucy: Yeah I  know, yeah, I  went straight to it, straight to it, and I  see 
the word 'failure'.
Here we may have examples of words that have the power to evoke 
strong emotional responses, even when people were asked not to 
think about them. Not only can the unconscious not compute a 
negative, there appear to be some powerful words that will elicit 
strong responses whatever their context. In this section I have 
considered words that appear to set an internal direction for trans- 
derivational searches, and set the context for how the information is 
to be accessed. Negations, on the other hand, do not necessarily 
block searches. The conceiver seems to first need to produce an 
internal representation in order then to negate it.
9.4. Sameness and difference as two ways of attending to 
information
One of the factors to have emerged from this study is the possibility 
that words can evoke specific epistemological processes. These are 
used in the construction of conceptual maps, and include the re­
casting of information coded at the levels of internal representations. 
Such processes include categorisation, changing perceptual positions, 
generating trans-derivational searches, comparisons, and using 
internal dialogue to generate more information. My interest was 
increasingly becoming focused on the processes that we use to 
construct our maps. For this reason I include some information about 
one of the questions in my interview schedule, where I sought to elicit 
comparison, and wondered about the differences between asking 
someone to focus on similarity, and then on difference. In chapter 3, I 
suggested that there was evidence that comparison may be an 
important conceptual process. The question then arose whether it was 
possible to elicit these processes in people by the words that one 
used.
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This question was designed to elicit people's responses when asked to 
consider the similarities and difference between two events. So I 
included a question^ which asked people to focus on 'sameness' and 
'difference'. I only asked it of four of my interlocutors, as I felt, as the 
interviews were progressing, that this part of the interview may have 
been too reminiscent of an exercise I had set them during their 
course. I nevertheless include some of the information that I gleaned 
from these, though I hesitate to draw too many conclusions from oniy 
three transcripts. (It is one of the aspects of this research that in 
retrospect I would have liked to have explored further, using different 
types of questions.)
The ability to perceive similarities and differences are considered by 
Bateson (1972) to be among our basic epistemological processes. In 
order to categorise events or objects, it is necessary to be able to 
perceive similarities between them; a category is essentially a 
conceptual device to lump similar'things' together. Without this 
ability to perceive similarities, what may be a fundamental 
epistemological activity would be impossible, (Markman and 
Wisniewski 1997).
Conversely, the ability to respond to 'difference' enables us to 
distinguish between categories, and to place our focus on details. For 
Bateson, 'difference' was an essential part of a cybernetic 
epistemology. "A bit of information is definable as a difference which 
makes a difference" (Bateson 1972:315). It belongs to the realm of 
cybernetics because, in Bateson's view, creatures had to be able to 
interact, or exchange information between themselves and the 
environment in order to adapt and survive. Such information was for 
him, news of difference. One of the passages which best explains
 ^Question 2.
A) How are apples and oranges different?
B) How are apples and oranges the same.
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Bateson's thinking about systems, interactions, mind and the 
importance of difference is from his musings on where 'mind' begins 
and ends in systems.
Consider the blind man with a stick. Where does the blind man's 
self begin? At the tip of the stick? At the handle of the stick? Or 
at some point half way up the stick? These questions are 
nonsense because the stick is a pathway along which differences 
are transmitted under transformation. (Bateson 1972:318).
With question 2, I attempted to explore this aspect of people's 
information processing. The questions themselves were very simple. 
The small number of answers were complex and informative, often 
showing that my collaborators oscillated between using the perceptual 
filters of sameness and difference, whatever the wording of the 
question. Two of my interlocutors used their sense of taste when 
asked for the differences between two fruits.
J (...) How are apples and oranges different?
Beatrice: They're fruit. Sorry...
J. What do you do before you say that?
Beatrice: I  recognise one as being an apple and the taste of it, and 
you can use it for baking.
Here she immediately accessed the category 'fruit', so I asked her 
what processes she had used to make that decision, to which she 
replied that she 'tasted' them. Ina gave a similar response, saying she 
could tell the difference because she was experiencing the taste of the 
apple. I continued to question her about how she thought she made 
these distinctions.
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J. When you say you recognise one, is that because you make a 
picture of it out in front? Or how do you know it's an appie you're 
talking about?
Beatrice: You know it's an appie from previous experience of seeing 
an appie. I  suppose you make a picture o f it  as weii. A picture of 
different possibilities and things you know about it. (Here she seems 
to be searching for information she has stored about apples. She may 
be thinking of the object 'apple' as a class rather than an individual 
'thing'.)
Edward's response was to imagine the two fruits together when I 
asked him about their differences. First, he produced one picture.
When I asked him about similarities, he reported conceiving of two 
pictures.
Edward: I  have a picture with apples and oranges in it.
J. Static?
Edward: Yes, ehm...
J. What are you paying attention to?
Edward: I'm actually paying attention to the appie and the orange 
but there's no colour in the picture.
Later, when I continued to ask him about the similarities, he 
volunteered the following information, showing an oscillation between 
the two perceptual processes. One was to focus on difference, then on 
looking for similarities.
Edward: Ah, that makes me search, now I  have two pictures and I  
am comparing one to the other, looking for sameness. Interestingly it 
makes me see the differences.
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In Lucy's case, 'difference' caused her to search for detail.
J. So i f  I  said 'How are appies and oranges different, what do you do 
on the inside?'
Lucy: The first thing I  thought of was visual, it  was the colour, the 
colours, the texture, the skins that I'm seeing obviously, first, and 
then I  suppose that wouid probably bring me down to the more 
specific thing to the seeds, what has seeds, what doesn't, how they 
grew, how they do taste obviously, and the smeii.
In the last paragraph above, she also shows the oscillation between 
thinking in terms of a class, {what has seeds, what doesn't) or of 
specifics, {How do they taste and smeii.)
Ina's responses to the question about differences was to evoke the 
taste of the two fruit, to focus on the sensory specific information 
coded in her internal representation.
J. [...] How do you respond i f  I  Just ask you 'How are appies and 
oranges different?'
Ina: (pause), a sweet appie and a bitter orange.
J. How do you know?
Ina: I  taste them.
J. So the first thing that comes is the taste?
Ina: Yes. (...) And then, colour.
Even this fragment demonstrates that using awareness of different 
logical levels in a text as an analytical tool can yield insights into 
some of the ways in which people process information. People can
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oscillate between using abstractions such as categories, or access the 
sensory specific information coded in terms of the senses internally. 
There seems to be a distinct 'gap', as it were, between the many 
internal processes that I have attempted to explore, and the wording, 
or languaging of people's interior worlds. It thus appears that asking 
people to think about similarities, or differences, may generate two 
different kinds of internal responses. In one, conceivers tends to focus 
more on sensory detail, in the other, the focus moves towards 
abstracting the information to the 'higher' logical level of class or 
category.
9.5. Conclusion
This chapter considered that some words may have the ability to 
evoke different kinds of internal responses. These may shed light on 
the processes that are used in the construction of conceptual 
structures. In this chapter I have looked at how some words seem to 
have the ability to direct people's attention internally in different 
ways, as well as how they may act as categorisers for the subsequent 
information. Often such words come at the beginning of statements. 
Other kinds of syntactical structures, such as negations, appear to 
achieve the opposite of what is intended; asking someone not to think 
of something inevitably brings that 'something' into the conceiver's 
internal focus. Some of the material in this chapter adds to the 
information about internal representations and sub-modality changes.
Lastly, I considered what was essentially a fragment of my interviews, 
where I was attempting to explore what happened when we directed 
people to think of similarities and/or differences. Although the 
information here was sparse, one can hypothesise that there may be 
ways of guiding people towards attending to specific detail, or to the 
higher categories obtained through abstraction.
It could be that approaching textual analysis with an awareness of 
logical levels enables the researcher to track the movement of
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people's thinking between more detailed, specific infornriation which is 
coded by the senses, and the abstractions which appear to be such a 
necessary aspect of people's conceptual models with which they map 
their worlds. These present yet another aspect of connections, which I 
have already suggested are fundamental epistemological processes, 
and are embedded in language structures. Here however, the 
connections are between specifics, and perhaps untold layers of 
abstractions. The ubiquity of trans-derivational searches suggests that 
this may also be a process whose functions deserve further 
investigation. They appear to be dynamically linked to internal 
dialogue. This sheds some light into the roles of inner speech.
The last four chapters were a report on the results of my own 
interviews. My interview schedule was designed to elicit information 
from other people's deep introspections. In an epistemological sense,
I was asking people to direct their attention as much as seemed 
feasible, to some of the finer details of their own internal worlds. As a 
phenomenological inquiry, it demonstrates that we seem to use our 
senses internally to code and re-create experience. I suggest it also 
demonstrates that internal representations are a metaphorical 'layer' 
of consciousness whose exploration yields insights into some of the 
processes that we use to make meaning. I present a fuller list of 
these processes, and a model of their possible interactions, in chapter 
11 .
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Chapter 10. The Master Practitioners' Interviews; Teaching 
and Learning as Transformational Processes.
Choose a friend before you choose a journey, and a neighbour before 
a home. (Oid Arab Proverb).
For the naturalist, ... the term "design" designates nothing more than 
a broad plan relating to certain contingencies that wiii probably arise, 
but the precise nature of those contingencies is unpredictable. I t  is 
anticipated that the design wiii change as those contingencies are 
realised, (that is, made real or constructed by the inquirer interacting 
with circumstances that have evolved). (Lincoln and Cuba 1985:259.)
The map is not the territory. (Alfred Korzybsky, 1958).
10.1. Introduction
In this chapter I introduce and describe the second phase of 
information gathering for this inquiry. It reflects another approach to 
the inquiry. In the last four chapters my gaze was directed mainly on 
the minute specifics of people's internal representations and their 
sub-modality changes, as the result of listening to language 
structures. In this chapter, however, I look at the complex 
abstractions my collaborators had about learning. These can be 
thought of as generalisations that operate at 'higher' logical levels 
than those of internal representations, (Bandler and Grinder 1975).
The material on which I base my analysis and reflections in this 
chapter was obtained from the second phase of information gathering, 
from interviews carried out by two of my assistants. These were 
briefly mentioned in chapter 2. Here I consider some of these 
students' changes about themselves as learners, after participating in 
the NLP course. I also suggest that what is constructed as the result 
of a teacher's approach, has consequences for both people's internal 
representations and future actions. These may all be considered as
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active parts of people's cognitive maps. I then explore the possibility 
that teaching modes can also directly influence the kinaesthetic or 
physiological responses of learners, (as well as influencing the 
construction of their internal models). I also give consideration to 
some of the issues relating to collaborative inquiry. I conclude with 
some reflections on the potentially transformative nature of teaching 
and learning. These findings are entirely from the tapes and 
transcripts of this set of interviews. They were carried out after I had 
left the country. The conclusions I offer below are speculations and 
hypotheses that resulted from my reflections.
10.2. The background to this part of the inquiry
My research had developed into two separate data gathering phases 
during this two-month stay in the Middle East. The first of these was 
my own interviews, whose transcripts form the basis of my analysis, 
which became the main material for chapters 6 - 9 .  This chapter, 
however, is about a second set of interviews, which were carried out 
and tape-recorded by two of my three assistants, Edward and 
'Harry'.^ These interviews were carried out after I had left the 
country. The tapes were sent to me, and I then transcribed them 
when I had returned to the UK. To reflect on this stage of the inquiry I 
use a more generalised approach in the analysis of my own 
transcripts.
Such an approach has been described as phenomenographical 
(Barnard, McCoster and Gerber 1999). It seeks to provide a 
descriptive analysis of collective meaning, and aims for a commonality 
of understanding. "The emphasis is on how things appear to people in 
their world and the way in which people explain to themselves and 
others what goes on around them, and how these explanations 
change." (Barnard et al 1999:214). This part of the inquiry is still 
phenomenological; it seeks to describe some factors that may be
1 The names have been changed to ensure anonymity.
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involved in the construction and re-construction of people's cognitive 
maps, and thus also in the processes involved in learning. Anderberg 
(2000), investigating the experiences of learners, has raised the 
question of how personal understanding is linked to language 
meaning, and states that "little is known about the character of the 
relationship between word meaning and understanding, how it 
develops or what role it plays", (Anderberg 2000:89). This chapter is 
also an attempt to consider some of these issues from another 
vantage point.
The two people carrying out these interviews had assisted me as co- 
trainers on the NLP course, and were themselves experienced in 
teaching and applying NLP. This chapter contains many of my own 
thoughts and analyses of their interview transcripts, and then some 
tentative conclusions about the potentially transforming nature of 
teaching.
Another aim of this chapter was to explore the application of Bandler 
and Grinder's (1975) meta-model of language as an instrument for 
the textual analysis of these transcripts, and to acquire some notion 
of its usefulness as a tool for understanding the subjective 
experience. One of the main foci was on how the participants on my 
course had constructed (and perhaps re-constructed) the notions of 
change and learning. These insights could also shed more light on to 
some of the fundamental epistemological processes that surfaced in 
my own interviews. What emerged was that when people construct 
abstractions about their experiences, they appear to form a complex 
web of links, around such nominalisations as 'learning', and 'failure 
(almost as if the nominalisations acted as the metaphorical nodes of a 
conceptual web). The interviewees' transcripts showed that changes 
had occurred in some of their apparently deeply rooted constructs 
which they had built about themselves as learners. Many aspects of 
these had changed. There had been alterations particularly in the 
connections and generalisations, which formed a part of the'internal' 
architecture of their constructs.
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Sometimes these changes were dramatic, sometimes oniy slight. 
However, all the participants in this part of the data-gathering phase 
showed some changes in their approach to learning. This chapter is 
also about addressing the question 'what changes when people's 
constructs change?' These transcripts hint that what happens when 
conceivers change some of their concepts about learning at higher 
levels of abstraction, then changes in people's internal 
representations about their experience of learning also occur. I 
include a short review of this aspect gleaned from this series of 
transcripts. This leads to the possibility of using this approach for the 
analysis of texts and spoken discourse.
10. 3. Collaborative inquiry.
Both 'Edward' and 'Harry' had been students on previous NLP 
Practitioner courses I had run at the hospital. We had started the 
2000 course with three assistants, but one of them chose to withdraw 
from the venture because she was busy organising her return to the 
UK. The remaining two were aiso keen to increase their skills, so it 
was agreed that their assessment for upgrading from Practitioner to 
Master Practitioner wouid be threefold; to assist me with the 
Practitioner Training, to attend both the Practitioner and a Master 
Practitioner course, and to carry out a modelling project which 
involved them in interviewing the participants on the practitioner s 
course to find out more about learning. (Such modelling projects are 
standard practice for many NLP courses). They gave their permission 
to use their tape recordings for this part of my inquiry.
This part of the research was collaborative. Patton (1990) describes 
this as the professionals and non-professionals becoming co­
researchers. He suggests that it is suitable for a heuristic inquiry, 
where the central question is "what is my experience of this 
phenomenon and the essential experience of others who also
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experience this phenomenon intensely"? (Patton 1990:71). Both the 
interviewers and the interviewees had shared the experience of 
participating in our NLP course. Such collaborative phenomenological 
inquiry can be said to be more heuristic, because, according to 
Moustakas, it "refers to a process of internal search through which 
one discovers the nature and meaning of experience, and develops 
methods and procedures for further investigation and analysis," 
(Moustakas 1994:17).
The topics for their interviews emerged from one of our evening 
workshops; both Edward and Harry reported interesting changes in 
their own thinking as the result of developing more understanding of 
their own conceptual processes through using NLP as an analytical 
tool. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), one of the hallmarks of 
naturalistic inquiry is that the design emerges as the research 
develops. This was certainly true for this phase of the research. This 
chapter emerged from what originated as an assessment exercise for 
the Master Practitioners. I have stated before that, at the time, I 
believed that this phase was only to be a pilot study, so it will be
incomplete.
I was also curious to have some feedback from participants about the 
effectiveness of my own approach as their trainer and facilitator, as 
part of my own professional development. Phelps and Hase (2002) 
point out that reflexivity is integral to the notion of action research 
"which might be defined as a mental process in which one thinks 
about things by going back over them." (Phelps and Hase 2002.516). 
As Reason and Marshall have pointed out, qualitative research is also 
a personal process "for people to make sense of and act effectively in 
their world" (Reason and Marshall 1987:112). The case for reflection 
on practice, according to Burchell and Dyson (2000) has already been 
extensively argued. Leitch and Day (2000) propose that such 
reflection should be a part of teachers' development.
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These transcripts were to illuminate my own practice as a trainer, and 
lead to deeper reflections on the nature of knowledge construction.
10 4. Issues of power and bias
Power is believed to be an ever present factor between different 
groups working within the same organisation. Kincheloe and Maclaren 
(1988) warn that the issues of the potential power of one person over 
others have political repercussions if not recognised and addressed. 
Often, power relations are unrecognised, so that an unspoken status 
quo is maintained between dominant and subordinate groups. At this 
point the question emerges: what were the power relations between 
my collaborators and myself? Mullins (2002) distinguishes between a 
number of different power relations in the context of business, based 
on the means by which members of the organisation comply. These 
include coercive, remunerative and normative power. He links power 
to the types of involvement those members of'subordinate' groups 
experience. He develops this typology further by distinguishing 
between different kinds of involvement, such as alienative 
involvement, (where coercion may feature), calculative involvement, 
(where financial rewards are incurred) and moral involvement, which 
is when everyone shares the goals and aspirations of their group.
Bateson's (1972) anthropological work had led him to propose that 
there were two kinds of relationships between people. These he called 
symmetrical and complementary. In symmetrical relationships power 
and resources are apparently equally shared. In complementary 
relationships, deference is shown by one of the parties to the other. 
One interpretation of this idea of Bateson's is that in complementary 
relationships, one party is the gatekeeper to resources, (actual or 
imagined) which the other may need. Power thus becomes linked to 
the availability of resources. My own position was that of someone 
who had been asked to spend two months in the country to teach 
NLP. In the financial and remunerative sense, the two assistants who 
had organised my trip were also my leaders. Without them I would
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not have been able to give the course. They were responsible for it's 
financing. They also organised visas, recruited students and arranged 
the teaching rooms. They had thus made the whole venture possible, 
and wanted to be involved as assistants so as to learn more. In the 
context of my research inquiry, there was enthusiasm for the idea, 
and a sharing of a common goal. This is close to Mullins' (2002) 
notion of normative power with moral involvement; this approach 
predominated in our work together. Using Bateson's model, our 
relationships were mutually both symmetrical and complementary; we 
seemed to be equals in our enthusiasm for exploring NLP, yet 
mutually complementary when I was the one with the power of 
certification, and they had the power of discontinuing my work in the 
hospital.
Thus power was, from my perspective, something that we shared; I 
was dependent on them for training fees, accommodation, and the 
logistics of obtaining visas etc. They were dependent on me for their 
further learning, certification, and willingly engaged with my work. In 
retrospect, (from my perspective) our relationships were mostly 
reciprocal and balanced; as far as possible we proceeded by 
consensus. The only times I imposed my own views was in the choice 
of what was taught on the course, and the exercises that would be 
used. For me, there was some calculative involvement, as the fees 
were welcome. It was not, however, the overriding factor, which was 
our common commitment.
Naturally the question of bias has also to be addressed in this context. 
Olesen (1998), writing from the perspective of feminist research, has 
pointed out that concern with bias has been "a long standing criticism 
of qualitative research". (Olesen 1998:314). She also maintains that 
the researcher should be reflexive about her views, and be sensitive 
to hidden factors that might be experienced as oppressive to her 
participants. It is certainly true that NLP has a particular culture and 
an approach to its practice, and is in a sense hierarchical, in that 
there are different levels of certification reflecting different levels of
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skill and understanding. The level of certification can influence 
people's earning power, should they wish to use it professionally.
Doubtless both my assistants were keen to acquire more advanced 
certification. I had made a clear distinction between their modelling 
project, which was the 'homework' towards their certification, and my 
research, which was my analysis of the language structures in the 
transcripts of their interviews for their assessment. Bias is always 
present in qualitative research. Both these collaborators told me that 
they were very motivated to learn more about NLP. If there was bias, 
then it manifested itself in the amount of information they 
enthusiastically sought, and the lengths of their own interviews. My 
judgement of these two assistants was that they were the sort of 
people who were genuinely able to say 'no' if they thought a request 
unworthy of their time and expertise.
Addressing the issues of bias, Olesen (1998) also suggests that the 
researcher should view her biases as her resources, provided she is 
sufficiently reflexive about her project. I am aware that my data 
gathering was enormously helped by the enthusiasm of my 
collaborators. I believe, as a practising trainer, that the state that I 
create in my students has a powerful influence on their motivation. 
Some trainers in the NLP world generate a state of great enthusiasm 
in order for their clients to pay for further courses. So there is always, 
when working as a freelance trainer in this field, a tension between 
generating the enthusiasm that, in my experience, motivates people 
to engage in learning, and the need not to close down future 
opportunities for further earnings. "We cannot rid ourselves of the 
cultural self we bring with us into the field", quotes Olesen 
(1998:314). Enthusiasm may be a double edged sword; on the one 
hand it is a strong motivational state, on the other hand it can 
influence the approach of researchers to their task, influencing what is 
and is not attended to. From my perspective, the bias of my 
assistants and fellow interviewees resulted in far more information
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from them about the interviewees' processes than was strictly 
necessary for their assessments.
10. 5. The Master practitioner's modelling project
The assistants and I developed a rather'loose' interview schedule for 
this phase after some discussion. I list the topics that were decided on 
below. Because this was originally thought of as part of a pilot study,
I had not anticipated the wealth of information that was more than 
sufficient for such a phenomenological inquiry. Harry chose to follow 
the schedule quite closely, whereas Edward tended to follow his own 
lines of inquiry. Both people contributed new and different 
perspectives to my own narrower lines of inquiry. Lincoln and Cuba 
(1985) point out the importance of balancing multiple perspectives, 
that in the post modernist world of human research, there is no one 
overarching truth or theoretical viewpoint, but rather an embracing of 
a multiplicity of perspectives. This is also coherent with a systems or 
cybernetic viewpoint; that within a system there must always be 
many different perceptual positions. "In soft systems -  which includes 
most human activity systems considered at a level higher than that of 
physical operations, there will always be many possible versions of 
the system ... and system boundaries and objectives may well be 
impossible to define," (Checkland 1981:165). This was also Bateson's 
viewpoint (Bateson 1972). Reason proposed that the process of 
collaboration roots the individual within a community of peers. He 
urges the development of such communities of co-operative inquirers, 
(Reason 1998). These collaborators' projects provided me with an 
extraordinary wealth of information which I would not have achieved
working on my own.
This raises the question of whose research was this? In a collaborative 
effort, everyone makes a contribution, some more than others. My 
own contribution to this phase was to guide the development of the 
Master Practitioners' skills to an appropriate level of understanding of 
NLP in order for them to carry out their assessments, one of which
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was the interviews. My own work was to transcribe their six 
interviews, each of which was about an hour long. The material was 
contributed by the dedication of my collaborators; the transcriptions, 
reflections, analyses and extrapolations are, however, my own.
It is important to remind oneself sometimes that the research process 
is never tidy. Cook (1998) has written about the importance of'mess 
in action research. Lincoln and Denzin state that "all texts are 
personal statements" (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:413} so in a sense 
what I have written are my insights, sometimes remaining in the 
process of formation, though enriched by the generosity and work of 
the others. "There are no objective observations, only observations". 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:24). In the post-modernist world of 
qualitative research, "no single method can grasp the subtle 
variations in ongoing human experience" (Denzin and Lincoln,
1988:24).
This argues for the validity of using multiple perceptual positions to 
investigate human experience. "The age of value-free Inquiry is over," 
wrote Denzin and Lincoln (1998:24), so it becomes impossibie to 
claim impartiality in an inquiry. The coilaborative phase of this 
research was not originally planned before my visit; it emerged during 
the time I gave the course. Having myself devised an interview 
schedule that inquired into people's Internal representations, it 
seemed a natural progression to explore what was happening at some 
of the 'higher', (or more complex) levels of abstraction in the 
students' cognitive processes. This was an aspect in which I was most 
interested in when studying the Master Practitioner's interview
transcripts.
Lincoln and Cuba stress that In order for researchers to develop their 
inquiries, "there must be frequent, continuing, and meaningful 
interactions between the investigator and the respondents or other 
objects of investigation" (1986:107). They urge that there are 
compelling reasons for conducting inquiry in ways that "maximise
270
rather than minimize the investigator's interactions", (1986:107). This 
was certainly the case during the time of my visit. In a course of 90 
hours, spread over two months, there were many opportunities for 
students, assistants and trainer to interact and develop greater 
insights and understanding. This happened both within the formal 
'classes' and in many informal talks about NLP in general.
I did not really know what was going to emerge from the Master 
Practitioners' interviews until I was back in the UK and had 
transcribed, then read the transcripts several times. Only then did 
patterns of people's thinking emerge, and I began to note aspects I 
thought significant. What the short collaborative phase of this inquiry 
contributed to the work I was doing was a variety of different 
perceptual positions, a feedback mechanism for my own teaching 
practice, and a rich source of information about other aspects of 
people's cognitive maps at levels of abstraction which were different 
to the ones my own interviews had concentrated on.
These are some of the questions that initially emerged when we were 
discussing the Master Practitioners' interviews. They originally formed 
the guidelines for their inquiries.
• Why did the student decide to do the course?
• What did he or she think they wouid achieve?
• What do they think they will achieve now that they had done
the course?
• What did they think was different about the course?
• What did they think was different about the way they learned?
• What has changed about their ideas about learning?
• How do they think they may have changed as individuals?
• What are the sub-modality differences between their memories 
of previous experiences of learning, and that on the NLP 
course?
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It was agreed at the time that the three assistants would interview all 
ten of the participants separateiy. However, because one assistant did 
not carry out these interviews after I had left the country, the two 
remaining ones only carried out six interviews between them. The ex­
patriate community in some Middie Eastern countries is not stable; 
people are always coming and going in a politically uncertain world. 
The sampling for these interviews was therefore somewhat random, 
yet limited to those who had attended the course. It depended on 
who was available within the time frame that we had agreed on.
Whereas my own interview schedule was very tightly designed, so 
that everyone was asked the same questions, I encouraged these two 
collaborators to use the opportunity to engage in their own, rather 
'looser' explorations. They used what we had agreed on as their 
guidelines, to which they mostly kept. Occasionally they would ask a 
more spontaneous question. These interviewers knew their 
interviewees well; most of them were colleagues in the hospital, and 
had also been coached in NLP by them. The ex-patriate community of 
the country also met frequently on social occasions, which had to be 
meticulously planned in order to avoid the religious police, who saw 
any social contacts between men and women as unlawful, and often 
punishable by imprisonment and/or expulsion from the country.
The Master Practitioner's interviews were carried out in the context of 
friends interviewing friends, whereas my own interviews were more 
that of the teacher interviewing her students. Both shared my 
approach to teaching as essentiaily facilitating the emergence of our 
learners' own insights and constructs, and that teaching and learning 
should be interesting and amusing, driven by curiosity and 
exploration. Whether this worked in practice can only be established 
by a post-course evaluation, which was also one of the aims of this 
phase.
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10.6. Reflections on using a phenomenological approach
After transcribing the tapes of these interviews, I read through them, 
and four main themes emerged. In this part of the process, I tried to 
remain true to the phenomenological use of Epoche, where, according 
to Moustakas, "we simply let what is there stand as it appears, from 
many angies, perspectives and signs" (Moustakas 1994:86). He 
further encourages the seeker to use the Epoche in such a way that 
"only what enters freshly into consciousness, only what appears as 
appearance, has any validity at all in contacting truth and reality 
(Moustakas 1994:87). In reality however, I found that my own 
fascination with other people's processes of learning was directing me 
to pay attention to certain contents of the transcripts, and not to 
others. So what I offer is not the result of an idealised process of 
Epoche; rather of what happened to me when "our consciousness is 
directing us meaningfully towards something that continues to remain 
present however much we may turn inward to our internal 
experience" (Moustakas 1994:91). Giorgi proposes that 
phenomenology is "the search for essences"; (Giorgi 1985.43) What 
emerges as the essences of learning from these interview transcripts 
are essences which are very much influenced by my own interests.
This is a stage which has been described by various phenomenologists 
as reduction; Moran (2000) cites Husseri's beiief that "reduction 
provides the only genuine access to the infinite subjective domain of 
inner experience" (Moran 2000:147). He posited that reduction was 
the first acts in laying bare the essences of experience. "Through the 
phenomenoiogicai reduction we strip away the actual character of the 
experience and grasp it as pure phenomenon (Moran 2000:150), thus 
discovering the "correlates of consciousness". Georgiou further 
proposed that it was the phenomenological psychologist's role to 
uncover the invariants of the phenomenon, because "a description of 
the invariants constitutes their essence" (Georgiou 1985:50).
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I have also used a Batesonlan and Korzybskian framework In arriving 
at these reflections; Husserl's 'essences' seem to me to be essentially 
abstractions of a higher logical level than that of description. It 
appeared fitting to use Bandler and Grinder's meta-model, which is 
essentially about the structures and epistemological processes that 
reveal themselves in syntactical structures when information is 
assigned to language. NLP may show itself to be a useful adjunct to 
phenomenological inquiry, because using it has enabled me to 
uncover some information, which is new. I hesitate to claim that I 
used the idealistic stance, which holds that one should suspend one's 
own patterns of thinking. Maykut and Morehouse (1994) state that 
the hallmark pf phenomenological inquiry is the "discovery of 
propositions by observation and the careful inspection of patterns, 
which emerge from the data," (Maykut and Morehouse 1994:13). 
What follows is from my own careful inspection of some patterns that 
emerged from transcribing and listening to the transcripts.
10.7. Some patterns that emerged from the Master 
Practitioners' interviews
My two collaborators' interviews had been thorough. They presented 
me with a wealth of recorded discussions and reflections around the 
themes we had agreed. Several aspects seemed to 'jump out when I 
listened to the tapes, and then read and re-read the transcripts. I 
have chosen to elaborate on five such patterns. They also form some 
of the bases for my model of teaching and learning which I explain in 
the next chapter.
1. The power of the theme of failure.
2. Changes in people's beliefs about learning.
3. Changes in their views of themselves as learners^
4. Changes in their views about their own abilities and future 
activities.
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5. The apparent links between what happens at higher logical 
levels, and to the internal representations and sub-modalities of 
the conceiver.
10.7.1. The demon^ failure; a nominalisation with power
The power of the idea of failure in the context of the individual 
learning something new emerged as a significant aspect in many of 
the transcripts. The participants seemed to have been aware that the 
people teaching the course had avoided mentioning failure when 
teaching the course. Cannon (1999) has observed that people s 
memories of failure are accessible, vivid and painful. "What was found 
to remain well remembered years after a failure experience is the 
anger, the sadness, the surprise, the self-criticism -  processes more 
reactive than thoughtfully reflective," (Cannon 1999:435). Seegers 
and VanPutten (2002) propose that how students access previous 
experiences of a subject is crucial to their current approach to 
learning. Those whose fear of failure had brought about a sense of 
their inadequacy performed less well. The following extract from the 
transcript of Lucy being interviewed by Edward in which she reports 
her own experiences of the course, eloquently illustrates the 
associations that 'being wrong' had once had for her own approach to 
learning. Edward had asked her why she thought learning had been 
easier on the NLP course.
Lucy: Another word, another word... well there's no pressure to learn, 
your mind was open, you weren't right and you weren't wrong. That's 
probably the big thing. You weren't going to fall no matter what. So It 
just was like whatever, we had free range to do something or 
Interpret something that we wanted to, there was no right or wrong 
answer, which takes a lot of pressure off learning.
2 I  use the term 'demon' in the sense that Chambers' (1959) Dictionary gives, as 
something that exerts an influence on people, or possesses them.
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If this extract is examined for the conceivers' complex equivalences, 
then what emerges is a pattern of connections between the ideas of 
'pressure', being 'right' or 'wrong', and 'failure that had been created 
through previous learning experiences. In a cybernetic sense, there is 
no 'right' or 'wrong', there is only feedback about the extent to which 
a system is achieving a goal. What was also noticeable from this set 
of transcripts was that there were changes in people s conception of 
learning when 'failure' was removed from the metaphorical 'road map' 
of their own learning processes. I f  we then look for cause-effect 
patterns in this extract, then what is noticeable is that Lucy implies 
that she experienced herself to be 'at cause', an active agent in 
charge of her own learning processes. Could this have been the result 
of her changing views on the nature of learning, and herself as a 
learner? The experience of being 'at cause' is what Bar-Tal (1984) 
describes as experiencing the locus of control as being within the 
person. In the same interview, when asked for some her beliefs about 
learning, she elaborates:
Lucy: Well the main learning curve for me like I  said was that failure's 
not wrong, you're learning. That was probably the biggest eye opener, 
biggest eye opener, and probably the tenses of words,... belief? 
Belief? Probably the biggest belief for me would be that one. The 
belief...
Then Edward pressed her for more information about her past notions 
of failure.
Edward: What Is It about failure though, that has, or had such a 
strong Impact on you personally?
Lucy: Well I  suppose you'd feel a bit of a loser, wouldn't you. 
Edward: So Is this your Identity?
Lucy: Yeah, It would be.
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Here there appears to have been a 'loosening' (as it were) of the 
connections between the complex equivalences linking four main 
elements of the construct: failure, being wrong, experiencing herself 
as a loser, and learning. These appeared originally as almost'welded' 
together in her original model of learning. It is as if all these entities 
inhabited the same 'mental space', to borrow a term from Fauconnier 
(1994), and were somehow blended together. What I think Lucy 
implies, in this passage is that there has now been a casting out of 
the 'demons' of failure, wrongness and /oser from within the complex 
of abstractions she assigns to her construct of herself as a learner. 
These 'demons' seem also to have been a part of her Identity. In 
Bandler and Grinder's approach, there has been a disconnection of an 
original complex equivalence, and a re-connection to other conceptual 
entities such as movement; possibility, and the emergence of new 
beliefs about herself as a learner. Such connections may have a 
powerful role in the creation and re-creation of meaning.
This is implied in the following extract, where Edward is exploring 
some possible shifts among Lucy's complex equivalences. Edward is 
using a model from Dilts (1998), which separates Identity from 
Beliefs, Values and Capabilities as different logical types. Dilts (1998) 
also proposes that how Identity is constructed is crucial for the 
healthy functioning (or otherwise) of the individual. Dilts^ believes 
that Identity occurs at a higher logical level, though I am uncertain of 
the validity of this claim. It is nevertheless a useful model in the 
purely instrumentalist sense; I had used it on the course as a tool for 
people's self-exploration. In the next extract she appears to have re­
organised the construct to one including moving on and learning.
Edward: Did you still have that feeling that failure was not good?
3 Djits (1998) believes that we operate at 6 different levels, which he lists (going frorn 
the most abstract to the least abstract) as Mission or Spirituality, Identity, Beliefs and 
Values, Capabilities, Behaviour and Environment.
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Lucy: Yeah, yeah.
Edward: And now that's moved?
Lucy: And now that has moved.
Edward: So that's moved from Identity to where?
Lucy: That's moved, beliefs... I've probably just learned,... I  don't 
know. It's a belief about yourself, that It's not falling, you're moving 
on, you're learning.
This extract also shows the lost performative 'not good' linked in to 
the web of connections she had originally built up about failure. So 
within the abstract complex that is the nominalisation failure, there 
are infra-structures, as it were, which, when altered, result in the 
emergence of new meaning, and even new approaches to future 
events, which is also shown in some other extracts below.
In Harry's interview of Kathleen, she reveals an interesting complex 
equivalence about her conceptions about learning on the course. She 
describes it as 'safe', because there was no 'wrong'. The word 'safe' is 
also a lost performative; as with the word 'wrong' it demands that a 
judgement has had to have been made against a scale before its 
utterance was possible. ^It would have been interesting to inquire 
further into the 'safety issues' for this respondent. When asked what 
was different about her experience of learning on the course, she 
replied:
Kathleen: I  suppose th a t... we were allowed to learn and explore, we 
didn't... there was no teacher centred at the top of the class saying... 
with a ruler pointing out, which Is what I  still have In my Image of 
teachers at school, and I  suppose any course I  have done since, like
4 I have written about scalarlty as a possible epistemological device in 
Chapter 4.
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including nursing and management, all these courses, there's your 
lecturer at the top of the class and you sat and you listened and you 
took notes, and this course we were very much encouraged to 
participate and explore, ask questions, and we were always told from 
the beginning that there was no wrong, like there was no wrong_,_ 
once, we were safe, (My emphasis). That we could explore, we had a 
free run, and I  think from day one none o f us were frightened to ask 
questions, we were never like slapped down and told 'no that's wrong, 
you know, that's ridiculous' we might be told that something was 
more correct... It was an exploration. There was a lot of self-directed 
learning In It as well.
It is noticeable that she reported differences between the internal 
representations of two separate experiences she had had of learning.
In this passage there is an implied cause-effect pattern as well. This 
can be summed up as If not wrong, then safe. This text also implies 
that with the type of learning which was associated with exploration, 
and not being either right or wrong, Kathleen also showed a shift to a 
more internal locus of control. It is interesting to note how many of 
these epistemological processes appear to interact with each other; I 
explore this further in the model of learning I suggest in Chapter 11.
Edward's interview of Steve indicates some of the power that the 
nominalisation 'failure' had for him, implying a strong link between 
that and his views of his own abilities, as well as the construct of his 
identity or self. Here there is a complex equivalence between 'I ' and 
'failure'. Dilts suggests that maladaptive constructs about the self can 
be potentially insidious in their effects. These kinds of structures, 
where the concept o f 'I ' is iinked to that of'failure' seem to act in a 
way akin to categories, influencing both their action and perception. (I 
have written about the process of categorisation, and its possible 
effects on thought and perception, in chapter 3). When Edward 
explored some of Steve's views of his past experiences, which were 
originally assigned to the complex nominalisation of failure. Steve's 
answers are interesting because the text demonstrates that there has
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been a re-framing, a re-categorisation of past experience where there 
are no longer the links between the constructs of 'failure' and 'self. I 
have underlined what I believe to be the significant part of the text in 
which this is implied.
Steve: I  have been successful In most endeavours that I  have 
undertaken, I  haven't... I  suppose I  really haven't had a conscious 
strategy for achieving outcomes of different kinds In many areas of 
my //A3 T <^ iippnr:p I  believed that I  was a failure, or that I  had f a l l ^  
certainly, and I  think NLP has given me the ability to see things from 
a different, a different perspective, many different perspectives, 
really, I  suppose.
I suggest that this indicates the strength of the internal architecture 
of the nominalisation 'failure'; these people all reported, in their own 
ways, that they had abstracted from 'being wrong' in a learning 
situation, to the higher levei of identity.^ This seems to be operating 
at a higher logical level, constructing answers to questions such as 
'who am I?' Steve reported how some of his beliefs about himself and 
his abilities had been set through his earlier experiences of learning 
mathematics:
Steve: [...], If a teacher at school told me that I  was doing maths, 
meaning the ordinary level and not honours, I  would consider myself 
not capable of doing.... I  would have considered myself not capable of 
doing honours maths. Now I'm twenty eight I  look back on the 
honours maths course and I  can do It In my head, I  can t believe that 
I... I  jus t can't believe It, you know, because I  had a limiting belief 
that was set by somebody else actually, you know.
If we take the cybernetic view, that systems run on information in the 
forms of calibration and feedback, then the power of believing oneself 
to be a failure, the fear of being 'wrong' must influence how people
 ^Thus I = wrong.
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approach tasks, and also how many of these may be thought to be 
within the conceiver's abilities. Many of the participants reported 
setting new goals for themselves as the result of the course. This 
indicates that their perceptions of their own futures had also altered in 
some ways. I return to this aspect later in this chapter.
10.7.2. Learning about learning
Another set of complex equivalence that emerges from this passage 
were the links between the notions of self directed learning, pro­
activity, choice and exploration. This is a different complex from the 
other kind of learning that Kathleen, for instance, reports on, where 
there are links between passivity {sitting and listening), being reactive 
{taking notes) and essentially having to receive what is given with 
very little choice in the matter. When asked to elaborate on what she 
believed were the key differences, she makes an interesting link 
between being allowed to learn something in her own way, and being 
conscious of an increase in her ability to retain information. Here she 
describes her reflections after the course had finished.
Kathleen: We were all allowed to learn In our own different ways.
We weren't learning In the lecturer's... we weren't... we didn t have to 
learn how the lecturer wanted us to learn something... we were given 
the Information, and what we did with the Information was up to us.
We were allowed to explore with that Information.
Harry: Have any of your beliefs about learning changed?
Kathleen: They have, yeah.
Harry: In what way?
Kathleen: I  suppose I  used to... my method of learning was I  suppose 
to recite things off and off and off, learn It like a pole ("sic/ and I  
suppose a lot of that Information doesn't stay with you long term does
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it, so ... with the NLP, that because I  could explore the Information for 
myself, was encouraged to explore It, that I've retained an awful lot 
more of that Information without actually having to sit down In front 
of the books and rattle It off over and over again, forever and forever. 
So I  suppose, ... that method of learning I  had has gone now. I  don't 
believe that that method of learning was a good one. This 
experiential learning Is definitely...
Ina also discovered that learning could be something that happened 
without her being aware of it. When Harry asked her about what she 
had experienced as different about the course, she replied:
Ina\ (pause) just the general talking, exchange of a lot o f Information, 
and every opinion, everyone's view on something was almost similar 
to yours, or that you already had similar feelings to that person. If you 
know what I  mean. It was like we were connected, we were totally 
connected. It's like you would sort of sit there and go 'oh yeah, I  felt 
that, I  saw that'so It was very comfortable. It was learning when we 
didn't feel that we were learning, (my emphasis) It was more like we 
were sitting In a group discussing things...
The idea that learning may involve unconscious processing also 
emerges from Steve's interview. His responses to Edward's questions 
about what he had experienced as different in the NLP course is 
illuminating, because here again new patterns of complex 
equivalences about learning emerge. Now it seems that learning can 
take place without the learner being aware of it. He describes the 
process as sometimes emotionally draining when asked about his 
reactions to the course.
Steve: I t  was at times very very draining, emotionally and 
psychologically draining because of all the Ericksonian type magic she
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was using^, she was weaving around the place, em, at times I  felt 
that I  wasn't learning anything, but I  was surprised that when I  went 
home, that I'd  look over the book. I'd look over the manual and kind 
of go OOP, there It Is, I  know that I So I  must say that while I  wouldn/t 
have been aware of how much I  was learning, I  learnt a lo t an awful 
lot more than the things I've done In the oast vou know that I  woujd 
have learnt. (My emphasis) And I  mean It seemed effortless, 
effortless. (Laughter)
The complex equivalences (and implied cause effect patterns) here 
form linkages between learning and unconscious processes. He also 
explicitly refers to the influence of the trainer's language structures, 
another cause-effect pattern. Edward then inquires more deeply into 
what may have changed about his ideas of learning.
Edward: Do you think the way In which you can now learn has 
changed?
Steve: Absolutely. Yes. I  believe that now I  don't have... I  suppose 
before I  had a fear of sitting down, studying and stuff like this 
because I  felt that maybe It was a waste of time when I  could have 
used that time to do something practical, and I  would have been 
afraid that the outcome wouldn't have been as desirable as I  want It, 
that fear has gone, and now I  believe that within certain limits that I  
can learn jus t about everything, anything really, well maybe I  couldn't 
learn anything, everything, but I'd be willing to give It a go, and I  
think that I  would use as much of a model of NLP or how J. managed 
to teach us, I  would apply that to any new methods of learning or
® What I believe he Is referring to is the practice in NLP training of what is called 
opening and nesting loops. This is a practice much loved and used by Bandler, who 
developed it from his time modelling Milton Erickson. It  is designed to overcome 
Miller's (Miller et al 1960) belief that the conscious mind can only process 7 + /-2  bits 
of information, whereas the unconscious may be much more receptive to new 
information. By opening and nesting loops, that is, starting a theme or a story, then 
another, then another, then closing the third, then the second, then the first, sets up 
an unconscious mini-Zeigarnik (Mazur 1996) effect which, as it were, makes the mind 
more focused and therefore receptive to the information needed for closure or 
'understanding'. It  is alleged that it is thus better attended to and remembered
283
parts of it. I t  might not all be useful, but certain parts of it I  would 
use.
Steve's complex linkages within his construct of the nominaiisation 
learning indicate that originally he had constructed the nominalisation 
learning as connections between elements such as studying = sitting 
down = learning theoretical material = waste of time. The cause 
effect pattern is shown in his statement that his original mode of 
studying would not lead to success. It is also associated with fear, a 
physiological response. The changes in his beliefs are dramatic; not 
only has the fear gone, but he now believes himself to be capable of 
learning many more things. In terms of causal thinking, the first kind 
of learning produced the feeling of not having any choices of his own. 
The locus of control is experienced as external, and, he uses mind 
reading as a source of his judgements about himself as a learner.
It is as if the kind of learning Steve experienced on the course may 
have created new beliefs about himself as a learner. The locus of 
control has moved to within himself, and his identity as a learner can 
now be summed up as someone who can learn anything he wants to, 
and is seif-directed. He reported that he now perceives more future 
possibilities for himself; in cybernetic terms he has experienced 
having a greater future potential, having generated more outcomes 
for himself to which he can caiibrate. There appears to be a link 
between his changing construct of himself, and his perception of his 
own future. This includes the factor of time as an additional dimension 
in people's constructs.
If we then consider what modai operators are implied within his two 
distinct constructs about learning, then it seems that he has moved 
from a position o f  having to', to one of "wanting to'. There is thus a 
shift in his experience of the locus of causality. For the conceiver, not 
oniy past and present are part of the mental architecture of complex 
abstractions, the dimension of the future has a real and dynamic 
presence.
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In the extract on page 281, Ina also reported that learning had 
occurred without her being aware of it, and that the group had 
influenced this process. This corresponds to Mercer's views, that 
iearning takes place between people through the exchange of ideas 
and experiences, (Mercer 2002).
10.7.3. Changes in people's perceptions of their futures
If the cybernetic view has any validity, then it is to be expected that 
calibration must be an essential aspect of information processing in 
systems. Central to the act of calibration is the notion that in order for 
any behaviour to take place, there has to be, within the system, 
information in the form of a construct about future events. (Wiener 
1965, Bateson 1972). I suggest that my own interviews show that an 
essential aspect of such constructs is people's internal representations 
of future events. They may also act as significant categorisers of 
information.
One of the aspects of the Master Practitioner's interviews were 
changes in people's perceptions of their own abilities, and therefore 
what they now perceived as possible for them to achieve in the 
future. Some of the interviewees reported that they had already 
changed some of their approaches to their professional activities.
These included teaching, and acquiring more professionai 
qualifications. It is perhaps simpiistic to suggest that changing 
people's constructions about themselves as learners alters their 
beliefs in their own abilities, and therefore what they now can 
calibrate to in their own futures. The following extracts bring into 
sharper focus the notion that our information processing may involve 
an internal exchange of information between the different time frames 
pf past, present and future.
Ben had been a participant who had initially seemed reluctant to 
engage in the course. He reported that he had only come on it 
because his friends were doing it. It took a long time for him to settle
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in, and relax with our different approach. In one part of his interview 
he poignantly describes his associations with the process of learning 
at his college of nursing.
Ben: Well sometimes I'd take down notes jus t to ... but I  wouidn t 
iike... it  would be like If your listening to your NLP you're writing, 
you're listening and you're writing it down, whereas if  I  was bored in 
the ciassroom I'd be writing it down but I  wouid n't actually have any 
idea of what I  was writing down. I'd be copying or jus t listening, but 
as soon as you said what was the iast sentence I  wouldn't have any 
idea because it would be... I'd be disinterested, it would be above my 
head maybe, so I'd just be going you know cranial nerves blah blah 
blah, but I  could read It the next day and have no recollection of what 
I  wrote down.
I was interested in Harry's interview of Ben, and in his feedback. Ben 
had made all of us aware of his resistances to the different approach 
we took to teaching and iearning in the first few sessions of the 
course. This extract indicates how his views then changed.
Harry: So we've established that you are learning differentiy, I  think 
that you're learning differently now. Have your outcomes changed? 
Have your expectations of what you are going to learn changed?
Ben: In... have my...?
Harry: In all learning experiences ...?
Ben: I've actuaiiy become a lot more Interested In... there's a few 
courses I  want to do, I  was sort of well yes, maybe. But since I  ve 
done it I'm actuaiiy a iot more interested in making sure I  do these 
courses because I've become a iot more interested in learning,, (My
emphasis).
Harry: Right
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Ben: Because I  am... I've become a lot more Interested In learning, 
because before studying was because you have to do It to get from A 
to B sort of thing. I'm quite interested in iearning more.
Harry's interview with Kathleen produced an example of her growing 
awareness of the power of caiibration in something as simple as 
planning how to talk to a Doctor differently when she was working on 
the wards. It could be said that she was more aware of how she could 
use the TOTE process. Here she indicates that she now rehearses an 
event internally, thus creating an internal representation to calibrate 
to. This appears to enable her to feel more prepared. When Harry 
asked her about the changes she has made, she replied thoughtfully:
Kathleen: (long pause) I  don't know. It's hard to describe, Im  just 
more confident approaching a situation, ... I'm more conscious of the 
language I  use, because I  understand now the effects that your 
language can have on other people, and how like one word can make 
so much difference, so I  probably run a situation through my head 
first before I... run a conversation, how I  would expect a conversation 
to 0 0  throuoh mv head before I  actually encountered the situatiofT-.
(My emphasis).
Harry: Interesting. Are you jus t running the conversation, your
conversation through your head?
Kathleen: No I'm probably guessing their response and have another 
response for them, especiaiiy if  it's a situation where I  m trying to 
convince somebody, iike a Doctor who does not belong to a team and 
I  want him to write up antibiotics or something, I  wili now approach 
the situation (indistinct)... I  know I've done it, run it through my head, 
I  expect them to...
Harry: So you aimost hailucinate what you're actuaiiy going to say...
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Kathleen: Yeah, I  always expect them to turn down my request and I  
always have a gentle and persuasive argument for them to do it, and 
I  always run that through my head now firs t So I  suppose I  do 
actuaiiy listen to both sides of the conversation and then I 'll go Into... 
it  doesn't always come out like I  have previewed, but at least I'm  
prepared for.
The following extract also indicates that she now perceives her own 
future differently, both in the personal and professional domains. (She 
was pregnant at the time of the interview).
Kathleen: I  set a goal for myself during the course, on a goal setting 
exercise, and I  stiii have that goal. It's actually ... a course that I  
intend to do, and that still Is... that hasn't been put aside. That is 
going to be done when I  go home.
Harry: How are you going to do it?
Kathleen: How am I  going to do it? Well it's jus t a course, I  going to 
applying for it, obviously because of the baby I  m not going to do it 
straight away. But I  know that, and I'm  actuaiiy going to apply for the 
course after a period of time that I've set for myself, so that I  m not 
going to be under pressure with a young child in the house, new job. 
I've set a time period in which I'm going to achieve this goal.
Harry: When you've achieved that goal, where do you see yourself 
going from there?
Kathleen: There's an area of work that I  want to go into that this 
course wouid actuaiiy bring me on to this area of work. So I  look to 
the course for achieving that goal.
There were many examples of the students in this sample thinking 
differently about their future as the result of their participation in the 
course. Three of the six people interviewed in this phase of the
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asked ma what was now different about her own approach 
teaching, she replied:
friendly.
Harry: And before?
S S E S Z S :
giving them any leeway.
Harry: Right Is that material still present?
ina: Same material, I'm still using the same material, jus t delivering 
it differentiy.
„  ,S possible M  b ..« 9  w n e o c o d  .  dlfferspl app~bb to
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to teaching is hinted at in the following extract, where she describes 
how what she now attends to is different.
Ina: You see. I'm not concentrating on the way I  teach. I'm  
concentrating on the way I'm  getting feedback, whether I'm making 
sense, whether I'm getting through to them, whether they understood 
me, so I'm more aware of that, whereas in any teaching course you re 
always more aware of your style, your technique, (...)
Perhaps thexhanges that people experienced in their beiiefs about 
themselves as learners may have affected how they subsequently 
acted, especially those who had a teaching role in the hospitai. A 
simple complex equivalence appears to emerge from this, (which can 
also be expressed as a cause effect pattern). Changing peopies 
beiiefs about their own abilities may also change their approach to 
reiated tasks. This, in turn, can affect factors such as their 
performance and results. Another participant, Nigel, also reported 
that he had changed his approach to teaching, by becoming more 
aware of his students' responses. Having been asked, by Edward, 
what had changed about his approach, he repiied:
Nigel'. [...], recognising their physiological responses and ensuring 
you're giving them the correct... well not th a t... by being aware of 
their physiological responses and actuaiiy listening to what they re 
saying and respond appropriately so they feel they have your support 
and don't put them off from new ideas.
It is as if there are a number of inter-related elements (or internal 
dynamics) in peopie's maps which, when one is altered, others are 
also affected. This is only a tentative conclusion; I believe that further 
investigation may be needed for more insights to emerge.
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10.8. Sub-modalities revisited; the physiology of internal 
representations.
In this chapter I considered some of this group of interviewees' 
changes in their ideas of learning, and themselves as learners. I also 
explored how using Bandler and Grinder's (1975) meta-model could 
shed light on some aspects of people's constructs. These interviews 
thus revealed a different order of phenomenon to my own inquiries 
into internal representations and sub-modalities. However, my two 
Master Practitioner coliaborators were as fascinated by people s 
complex inner worlds as I was. It was not surprising then that one of 
them (Harry), rather enthusiastically pursued people's sub-modality 
distinctions in their memories and constructs of learning 'before and 
'after' the course. Edward was not so interested in this aspect, 
nevertheless he too uncovered some distinctions.
What emerges from the text of these transcripts are some aspects of 
the complex inter-connections between people's internal 
representations of the nominalisation 'learning , and the abstractions 
that are linked to it. Although internal representations, and the many 
forms that they take, are of a different logical type to those of 
abstractions and ianguage, they seem linked dynamically to each 
other. Every respondent was asked to compare the internal 
representations that they had of learning something before the 
course, and after it. I have chosen, for the sake of brevity, to focus 
more on what people reported about their kinaesthetically 
experienced sub-modalities, although there were also changes 
reported in the visual and auditory domains.
Just as there were dramatic changes in people's models about 
learning, so there are equaliy dramatic differences in people's internal 
representations. Whereas in my part of this inquiry I concentrated 
almost exclusively on the effects of language and syntax on this level 
of subjective experience, what my two collaborators did was to stride 
out into unknown territory to map some of the correiations between
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people's abstractions and their internal representations. I believe that 
these parts of the transcripts deserve some scrutiny because of the 
novelty of these findings. What was interesting was the idea that 
when people's complex abstractions change, so do their internal 
representations, and therefore their bodily responses, even when 
these were only experienced very subtly. This raises an interesting 
question; does the way that we are taught actually influence our 
physiological responses? Does this happen when we remember a past 
event, or plan the future? One of Lucy's responses indicates a 
difference in her physiological state, (her kinaesthetic response) 
between the two internal representations she has of planning 
teaching. Here Edward is asking her to compare her 'before' and 
'after' representations of planning her teaching sessions.
Edward: Lets go back to when you were preparing for this lecture. OK 
you have a picture. Now what I'd like you to do is to make next to 
that another picture of how you wouid have prepared for this iecture 
before you did the NLP course.
Lucy: Yeah.
Edward: So the two pictures are next to each other.
Lucy: Yeah.
Edward. Now what I'd like to do is to compare the two pictures. Just 
teil me what the differences are.
Lucy: The one before the NLP is just flat, jus t flat at the moment. 
Edward: What do you mean by flat?
Lucy: It's jus t flat, flat.
Edward: Two dimensional?
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Lucy: No it's flat. It's like a mirror.
Edward: OK. Two dimensional?
Lucy: It's flat. No real (Indistinct) on It. While actually the other 
one's all bright colours all happening, ... much bigger, it  jus t seems 
more dearer.
Edward: What are you doing different?
Lucy: I  can see a big smile on my face actually. It's really weird. I t  
just seems happy, I  feel more in control o f the ... of the organisation,_I 
feel more comfortable, it's like I'm  given this... I  don't know... 
something I  can use, like... I'm probably actually excited like I'm  
trying to use it now. I  think it's what this picture's doino. (My 
emphases).
In the last extract, Lucy shows linkages between what she 'sees' 
internally, her sense of control, her state of comfort and what appears 
to be a cause effect connection between her internal pictures, and 
what she experiences kinaesthetically. Lucy's abstract constructs 
about teaching and learning had undergone considerable 
transformations; here they seem to be echoed at the level of internal 
representations.
In the transcript of Ben's interview. Harry interrogates him minutely 
about his internal representations, which are described in some detail. 
I give only the extracts about the reported differences in his 
kinaesthetic modality, although there were also differences in the 
other senses, such as size, intensity of colour and location of the 
picture. The 'picture' of learning before the course was reported as 
flat, dull coloured, and small.
Harry: And is there any feeiings associated with it?
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Ben: Yeah.
Harry: Where are those feelings located?
Ben: Here.
Harry: In the upper abdomen?
Ben: Yeah.
Harry: And do they feel heavy or light?
Ben: They feel like a cloud or something. They ju s t kind of feel like a 
ball or wind or something. They're not kind o f doing anything, they're 
Just there.
Harry: Is It warm or cold?
Ben: Just... I  don't think there's a temperature. Just normal.
The internal picture of the 'after' was larger, with brighter colours and 
much clearer. The feelings it generated were also different; one was 
experienced as kinaesthetically 'warmer' than the other.
Harry: Are there any feelings associated with this?
Ben: Yeah.
Harry: What kind of feelings are they?
Ben: Kind of warm.
Harry: Are they located anywhere?
Ben: Yeah, In me stomach.
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When Harry interviewed Ina about her representations of learning, he 
posed similar questions. Again, I give the extracts that relate to her 
bodily responses, though she had also reported changes in her 
internal visual and auditory domains. This extract, describing her 
construct of learning before the course also shows the interplay 
between internal dialogue and the development of ideas. The feeling 
that seems to predominate is that of frustration,
Harry: And what are your feelings...
Ina: We're jus t sitting there saying, well no. I'm having an Internal 
dialogue actually. I'm  saying Oh God I  have to finish this course, I  
have to finish this course.
Harry: And does that give you a feeling somewhere?
Ina: Yeah, a bit of ...I wanted to do It but It's taking so long. I'm  jus t 
I Ike...'come on, let's go'.
Harry: Is that located anywhere?
Ina: Yeah,
Harry: In the central chest?
Ina: Yeah, my arms and chest, and I  say 'come on let's go!'.
Harry: Your tone Is actually dropped very dramatically as well 
although you're still smiling away, you've dropped your facial tone as 
you were...
Ina: A bit frustrated I  think.
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It is interesting to compare her kinaesthetic responses with those 
evoked by the memory of the learning experience she had classified 
as 'good'.
Harry: I  want to now go back and do what we've got, so lets take you 
to a bit half way through the course, ju s t before the course and all 
that learning, just before you were aw ay/ And jus t remember 
yourself back In the classroom then, and see what you're seeing, hear 
what you're hearing, watch any feelings, tastes, any smells, anything 
that you can actually give a title to, and jus t as you remember that 
can you tell me where that picture Is?
After describing the visual and auditory aspects of her internal 
representations which his words evoked, (which were very different 
from those of the previous experience), she also describes a very 
different kinaesthetic state. Here links began to emerge between how 
something is learned, and the learner's physiological state.
Ina: Yeah, everyone's talking. I  can see people (mentions one of the 
assistants), everyone's talking, we're all talking. We re all listening.
Harry: Any feelings?
Ina: Yeah. Absolutely happy.
Harry: How does happy feel to you?
Ina: How? Great!
Harry: What does happy feel like?
Ina: I t  feels light.
7 There had been a 'half-term' break halfway through the two month course.
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Harry: Light Is that lightness located anywhere?
Ina: Everywhere.
Harry: Everywhere? Good sensation?
Ina: Oh God, yes.
The same pattern is shown in Steve's descriptions of his different 
internal representations about learning before, during and after the 
course. They appear to show dramatic emotional, (and therefore 
physiological) differences. In the first representation he experiences 
himself as anxious, in the second as more content. He also reports 
seeing himself in his internal representations, as if he was taking the 
perceptual position of witness rather than actor.
Steve: Yeah. ... well the first one Is smaller and framed, and the 
second Is bigger and has a fade out frame Just as It goes out of my 
line of vision, actually I  see things clearer with my glasses on, even 
Internally, bizarre, (laughs) oh my God, It's bizarre to discover that 
now, but em .. yeah, the picture of before the course Is framed, 
there's a verv sort of anxious looking me In the picture, whereas In 
the other Its a brighter picture ... more, I  don't know, more content or 
something. Yeah, much... I  suppose In the second picture I  look much 
more content. ... I  don't look any different, maybe a few weeks older, 
that's about It, but I  think the picture after the course Is brighter, and 
It Is a bit more vibrant In colour as well, or Is It? ... (Indistinct.) I  think 
those are the main changes. Both are still pictures. In one I'm  on my 
own and In the other I'm with a bunch of people.
Edward did not always cover the minutiae of his interviewees' sub­
modality distinctions, but he uncovered some interesting aspects 
relating to the changes that interviewees had made in their personal 
views of future tasks. With Lucy, he chose to approach the differences 
in how she now approached teaching, exploring the differences
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between the 'before' and the 'after' of the course. What he was doing, 
essentially, was to explore how she now calibrated differently to a 
future event. This is what she told him; it is noticeable that she 
implies that her kinaesthetic response was linked to her internal 
picture of planning a future event. In this short extract one can also 
get a sense of the interplay between information about the present, 
and about the future.
Lucy: I  can see a big smile on my face actually. It's really weird. I t  
just seems happy, I  feel more in control of the ... of the organisation, I  
feel more comfortable. It's like I'm given this... I  don t know.... 
something I  can use, like... I'm probably actually excited like I  m 
trying to use It now. I  think It's what this picture's doing.
Here I have chosen to focus on people's kinaesthetic responses to 
their constructs of two types of learning they had experienced. The 
differences were noticeable; most people reported that their physical 
responses to their memories of their experiences of the more 
orthodox, information transmitting, approach to teaching resulted in 
bodily sensations that they often reported as unpleasant. When 
thinking about the type of teaching and learning they had been 
exposed to in the NLP course, there had been changes in many 
factors such as their constructs, their beliefs and values, and their 
vision of their own futures.
Their internal representations, which I suggest are an essential part of 
people's information processing, were also different. It is as if they 
were coded differently at the level of the senses, in response to how 
information was structured at the more abstract levels. Our beliefs 
and values seem to produce a kind of'top down' effect, which reaches 
even into the body, possibly through the internal representations they 
generate. Perhaps one of the insights to emerge from these 
interviews is that we teachers have the power to create (and 
transform) learners' constructs at the level that Bateson (1972) 
describes as 'learning about learning'.
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Teaching therefore seems to carry messages about more than one 
level of abstraction. Not only does it involve the transmission of 
information, it may also create beliefs about the nature of the activity 
which people are engaged in. According to Bateson (1972) learning, 
and learning about learning are of two different logical types. I 
suggest that these two processes may be distinguished in some of the 
students' responses. Transformation happens at the higher level of 
learning about learning; it results in more profound changes in 
people's beliefs about learning, and about themselves as learners. 
These are changes in the processes guiding learning, rather than the 
content of the topic. They involve changes in factors such as the 
abstractions that people have built of their beliefs about learning, 
their vision of their own future, their constructions about themselves 
as learners, all linking to the images, sounds, bodily sensations, 
tastes and smells that seem to be such an essential part of human 
information processing.
10.9. Conclusion
In this chapter I reviewed the phase of this inquiry, which was carried 
out by two of my assistants on the NLP course in 2000 after my 
return to the UK. I used the meta-model to analyse the transcripts. I 
focused on the ways in which people had constructed the abstractions 
about teaching and learning from participating in the NLP course. I 
found that there were certain key nominalisations, such as 'failure' 
and 'learning' which were complex structures with far reaching 
implications for the beliefs that people had made about themselves as 
learners. This then influenced how they perceived their own personal 
and professional futures. The apparently all-pervasive concept of 
failure in this group, seemed to act as an inhibitor; a metaphorical 
'virus' preventing the system from fulfilling its potential. I suggest 
that this could be because it acts on the TOTE process (Miller et al 
1960) altering or blocking off the individual's potential to create, then 
calibrate to, future possibilities. It is as if it weakens the power of the 
dimension of time in people's internal worlds.
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I also explored the nominalisation 'learning', which proved to be a 
complex of different deletions, generalisations and connections. I 
believe that what these transcripts show is that when beliefs about 
learning change, other profound transformations also happen. This 
has implications for teaching, because it seems to be an impossibility 
not to communicate about learning at the level of learning about 
learning, with far reaching consequences for how the activity is then 
approached by the learner. Teaching, then, is also about creating and 
transforming beliefs about the individual as a learner, as well as about 
the transmission of'knowledge'. The study of these transcripts 
indicates that such transformations may have far reaching effects on 
the lives of individuals.
The approach to the textual analysis that I used in this chapter was 
based on Bandler and Grinder's (1975) meta-model as an approach.
In a sense, it is also an evaluation of its usefulness as an instrument.
It enabled me to uncover the complexities behind people's 
abstractions coded in the nominalisations 'failure and learning , and 
enabled insights to emerge, both on the nature of people's constructs, 
and the apparent effects they had on their beliefs and actions. These 
included their constructions of themselves as learners. People's 
internal worlds are of an extraordinary complexity and individuality, 
yet there may be universal processes that are essential to how we 
process information. These are at the same time mediated through 
language. This raises the question "Could language and thought be 
two aspects of the same phenomenon?" The analysis of the 
transcripts indicates that their mutual interactions may be subtle, 
intimate and powerful. I extrapolate some possible epistemological 
factors from these analyses of the transcripts in the next chapter.
Last but not least, there are many links between people's abstractions 
and their inner, conceptual worlds of internal representations. These, 
including bodily responses, are also influenced by the many 
abstractions, categories, connections and time frames that seem to 
operate at other levels. When we ask 'what is it that has the power to
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create and re-create such powerful beliefs?' then the answer points to 
language. There is an awesome power to words and syntax, which, in 
this approach, become information that is potentially deeply 
transformative at many levels for individuals. The next chapter is 
about exploring and tentatively describing what I propose are some of 
the fundamental processes that enable us to know, and to know that 
we know. These could be described as our mapping processes.
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Chapter 11. Mapping the Territory; Synthesising the Research 
Findings.
A scientific epistemoiogy, defined as an anaiysis of cognitive 
processes in aii their diversity, would be comparable to a kind of 
comparative anatomy of the structure of knowledge, collating the 
most widely separated Intellectual constructions In different areas of 
science so as to extract the invariants and transformations. (Piaget 
1972:3)
We work hard to make sense, according to our epistemoiogy, o f the 
worid which we think we see. (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:222)
The new geometry mirrors a Universe that is rough, not rounded, 
scabrous, not smooth. I t  is a geometry o f the pitted, pocked, and 
broken up, the twisted, tangied and intertwined.... The pits and 
tangies are more than biemishes distorting the ciassic shapes of 
Euciidean geometry. They are often the keys to the essence of things. 
(Gieick 1998:94.)
11.1. Introduction
In this chapter I explore a hypothetical model of the epistemological 
processes that may be involved in the construction of our cognitive 
maps. This hypothesis emerged as the result of summarising and 
synthesising the findings that emerged from the transcripts of the two 
sets of interviews. I also use some material from a lesson I observed, 
recorded and transcribed in 1999^. Moustakas (1994) urges that the 
phenomenological approach involves a continual reflection of the 
material under scrutiny. "Things become clearer as they are 
considered again and again" (Moustakas 1994:93). He suggests that 
the stream of reflection should continue "to the point of unifying the 
parts into a whole", (Moustakas 1994:93). It is in this spirit that I
 ^This was as part of the first year course work (1999).
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offer this new model of the relationships between language and the 
construction of cognitive maps. Language is considered as more than 
a transmitter of content. I propose that it also plays a significant 
epistemological role. Statements contain instructions for the elicitation 
of certain processes critical to cognitive mapping. We may thus 
separate the effects of language into two dimensions. In the first, 
language is understood as transmitting information about the content 
of a topic. The second dimension is that it also conveys messages 
about how the information is to be configured. This is considered as 
its epistemological aspect.
I suggest that there are a number of basic epistemological functions 
that are used to make meaning out of the chaotic mass of information 
that continuously bombard our senses. I further propose that these 
functions may act in systemic, interdependent ways. In an attempt to 
provide a model, which may explain their actions, I have drawn on 
complexity and chaos theories for some of my explanatory 
metaphors. I further propose that the language used in classrooms 
could be critical to the construction of learners' cognitive maps. My 
philosophical standpoint is that of an instrumentalist, where a model 
is used more as a heuristic device than a description of the laws of the 
'real world'. I review what I believe to be some of the epistemological 
directives embedded in language forms, which emerged from my 
analysis and reflections on the two sets of interview transcripts, and 
suggest these are essential to teaching and learning. I end with a 
model (which I stress has the status of a hypothesis) of the basic 
processes I believe are involved in processing information. I further 
propose that fractal theory may offer useful model to explain some of 
their dynamic interactions.
11.2. Language, teaching and learning
The current predominant approach to education has recently been 
much influenced by constructivism; the learner is now perceived as 
someone who is actively engaging in the creation of their own
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knowledge, as well as that of others, (Mercer 1995, 2000). I have 
reviewed the subject of cognitive maps and constructs in Chapter 3. 
The constructivist approach to teaching is summed up by Wells 
(2002): ""Knowledge cannot be transmitted. I t  has to be constructed 
afresh by each Individual," {WeWs 2002:236). Wells also points out 
that what, in his view, is wrong about the 'transmission model' of 
teaching is that it focuses almost exclusively on the input, rather than 
on the processes that people use to arrive at understanding. 
Rasmussen (2001) suggests that "language should be regarded as a 
medium which the psychic and social processes, respectively, can use 
to structure their own operations". (Rasmussen 2001: 575). Mercer 
(2000) proposes that language enables us to engage actively in the 
mutual construction of knowledge. I also suggest that language and 
teaching style play a fundamental role in how people create their 
internal models, because it could be said that language may catalyse 
or inhibit many of the processes that are vital to learning. For 
instance, Lee and Law (2001) suggest that the language that teachers 
use may reinforce scientifically inappropriate conceptualisations.
The idea that language may shape cognition is not new. Fauconnnier, 
for example, has explored the idea that language has an important 
constructive function. " It is only within a complete discourse and in 
context that meaning will actually be produced. The unfolding of 
discourse brings into play complex cognitive constructions", 
(Fauconnier 1997:37 -  38). However, Fauconnier's work seems to be 
mainly theoretical; there is little evidence of any empirical 
underpinning of his nevertheless generative ideas. These final 
reflections on my inquiry are distinct from Fauconnier's work in that 
they derive from an empirical inquiry. That is, they are as empirical as 
the study of the phenomenology of such evanescent phenomena, 
introspectively arrived a t ,allows. It then outlines a number of 
dynamic constructive processes that may be mediated by language.
I have introduced the distinction between the content of language and 
the processes it generates. Thus any transmission of information that
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is mediated through language, including teaching, transmits 
messages about both the process whereby the model is to be 
constructed, as well as its content or subject matter. This model of 
learning is therefore one in which stresses the importance of language 
in the construction of learners' models. This follows in the Vygotskian 
tradition (Frawley 1997). It places considerable emphasis on the idea 
that teaching becomes as much about activating the processes of 
learning, as about the transmission of content. There have been some 
recent attempts to explore these areas within an educational context. 
Davies (2002) makes the point that one of the central questions that 
should be addressed when planning a topic to teach, is "what 
language will work best to achieve this particular goal?" (Davies 
2002:241). Galton et al (2002) stress the need to impart specific 
cognitive strategies to learners in order to improve learning.
Mercer (2000) proposes that one of the functions of language is "for 
collectively making sense of experience and solving problems".
(Mercer 2000:1). What the model I propose adds to present thinking 
about such issues is that it offers a more detailed description of some 
of the epistemological processes embedded in language structures. I 
suggest that these are fundamental to any sense making. Process and 
content are thus two aspects of communication, and can be studied 
separately. They may need to be perceived as two separate aspects of 
teaching.
This has implications for theories such as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 
and Vygotsky's approach to learning, neither of which make such a 
clear distinction between process and content. In cybernetic terms, 
process and content are not separate entities, but two aspects of the 
same dynamic of sense making. Changing the ways in which 
something is languaged, also changes the ways in which its meaning 
is constructed or sought. This is close to Lakoff and Johnson's views 
that two different sentences can never say the same thing, but will 
often subtly alter meaning, (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
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11. 3. Cybernetics, and other approaches to understanding 
complexity.
The model that is proposed is also cybernetic and systemic, in that it 
suggests that both language and learning communicate (and can 
influence) many different levels of organisation within human 
systems. Kenny and Boxer (1992) proposed that a cybernetic 
approach enables people to make distinctions between what are 
essentially different phenomenological entities. There is a sense in 
which this inquiry is also multi-level in a systemic and cybernetic way. 
This resembles Bateson's (1972) way of teasing out what may be 
happening at different levels of understanding. Phelps and Hase 
(2002) have explained that applying complexity theory also means 
thinking about phenomena in terms of hierarchies of levels of 
complexity. There are, for instance, at least four qualitatively distinct 
levels that can be identified in this inquiry, with a fifth that is 
emergent. On the next page is a way of explaining this model 
diagrammatically.
One of the difficulties that we encounter in an exploration such as this 
is that we lack a terminology for how to describe what happens at the 
different levels. Each involves different ways of thinking about the 
phenomenon. In a sense, the reader of this chapter may be learning 
about learning about learning about learning about learning, so 
generating yet another layer of abstractions. This chapter is an 
attempt to synthesise and map what this inquiry has uncovered about 
the phenomena of language and learning, as the result, as it were, of 
learning about learning about learning about learning!
The other challenge that arises when using a cybernetic approach to 
describe a model is that written descriptions tend to present 
information in a linear way. The model I propose is non-linear and 
systemic. If I were merely to list all the elements of the model, then 
that would not represent my thinking on it; all the processes that I 
describe are a part of all the other processes, so that if, for example, I
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take the concept of causality, then that contains within it many of the 
other dynamics such as abstraction, connections, deletions, goal 
directed thinking, beliefs, and others. If I take the example of 
intentionality, then it will also encompass such processes as cause- 
effect patterning, internal representations, abstractions, induction and 
deduction and the TOTE. There seems to be an almost fractal nature 
to the relationships between these epistemological dynamics that I 
describe.
Diagram 1. Different levels of abstraction involved in this inqui^, using 
Bateson's model of logical levels. Modelling as a multi-level activity.
Learning about learning about learning about learning about learning:
Reading this.
n
Learning about learning about learning about learning:
Synthesising research findings and reflecting on them.
n
Learning about learning about learning:
Analysing the transcripts of learners' interviews.
n
Learning about learning:
Interviewing learners.
n
Learning:
Participating in the NLP course.
Diagram 1. There was learning on the NLP course, and then there was learning 
about learning when the interviews were carried out and reflected upon. Then, 
in writing the anaiysis of the transcripts, I  was learning about learning about 
learning. This chapter could be described as learning about learning about 
learning about learning. Each of these levels, according to Bateson, wiii show 
different emergent qualities.
This hypothesis proposes that the relationships between language and 
thinking are essentially non-linear. It also borrows from chaos and 
complexity theory as explanatory devices, (Gieick 1998). Clegg
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(2000) and Lee and Law (2002) have proposed that the most 
powerful way of altering concepts, and therefore how we understand, 
was through changing their perceived ontological bases. There is a 
sense in which the model that emerges from this inquiry has 
uncovered a different ontological dimension to learning and teaching. 
Both chaos theory and complexity theory suggest that, as well as 
randomness and disorder, there are, within chaotic systems, the 
seeds for an emergent patterning and ordering. This has been used to 
explain the apparent mixture of random and patterned activities in a 
classroom by Doll (1989).
Doolittle (2003, 2003A) urges that the time is ripe for a change in the 
explanatory metaphors used to describe the teaching and learning 
processes. He suggests that complexity theory could yield useful ways 
of thinking about learning. It is coherent with constructivism, "As with 
constructivism, a complexity perspective recognises the difficulty in 
predicting global behaviour from an understanding of its parts. This 
complexity-based alternative perspective understanding the whole, by 
understanding its parts is to understand the whole by understanding 
the interaction of its parts. (Doolittle 2003:2).
Ontologically, chaos theory generates the paradox that systems are 
essentially self-organising; that chaos contains underlying ordering 
principles. Phelps and Hase (2002), in their theoretical paper, urge 
that complexity theory may be relevant to action research, because it 
offers a formal attempt to question how coherent and purposive 
wholes emerge from the interactions of simple and sometimes non- 
purposive components. They also support the exploration of the 
connections between complexity theory and constructivism.
The ontological bedrock of systems theory is information. (Bateson 
1972). This proposed model suggests that the chaotic dance of 
disorganised data is self-organised via some basic epistemological 
processes into more or less ordered conceptual models. These 
processes may be seen as part of the dynamics of self-organisation.
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(Gieick 1998). Phelps and Hase describe the process of emerging 
complexity as producing what they term a bifurcation or phase 
transition, where ""the branching of phenomena seen during chaotic 
episodes [...] bifurcation usually results In new, but more complex, 
stabilities."{Phelps and Hase 2002:516).
Such conceptual processes may also, I suggest, be catalysed by 
certain language structures. Patton (1990) proposed that systems 
theory and chaos theory could offer a new set of metaphors for 
thinking about what we observe. "Chaos theory challenges us to deal 
with unpredictability and indeterminism in human behaviour", (Patton 
1990:84). Within this explanatory framework, the epistemological 
dimensions of language could be seen as one of the ways in which an 
ordering is brought about from the chaos of information overload.
Diagram 2 (page 310) lists some of the basic epistemological 
processes involved in the construction of cognitive maps. Although 
they are presented in linear form, they are all interactive in a 
systemic way. This is summed up in diagram 3 (page 344). Diagram 4 
(page 345) synthesises what I believe are the interactions between 
the senses, our epistemological processes, language, and cognitive 
mapping. Separating out these many factors diagrammatically can 
only hint at their complex interaction.
11.4.1 Induction, deduction, and abduction in particular
Indurkhya (1992), taking a Whorfian perspective, proposed, "our 
perceptual and cognitive apparatus is not a passive receptor of 
sensory stimuii but asserts a formative spirit in shaping the sense 
data through its concepts" (Indurkhya 1991:99-100). There is a sense 
in which the whole of this inquiry has been to track this formative 
spirit, especially the extent to which language is a part of this 
dynamic. Some of the most striking phenomena to emerge from this 
inquiry are the seemingly myriad levels of abstraction that human
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consciousness engages in to create its cognitive models, (Murphy and 
Lassaline 1997).
This idea that we operate at many levels of abstraction is not new; it 
is the central thesis of Korzybski's (1958) seminal work, and the 
conundrums that this idea generated were a life long interest of 
Gregory Bateson's. This approach is drawn from Russell's theory of 
logical types, which posits that there are many levels of abstraction to 
our sense making. Korzybski summed up the resultant 
epistemological challenges for anyone interested in language and 
consciousness with the apothegm 'the map is not the territory'. Many 
others have recognised the multi-levelled nature of our cognitive 
systems. Indurkhya 1992, for instance, stated that "a cognitive 
system might well have several layers with each successive layer 
representing a higher level of abstraction" (Indurkhya 1992:181).
The processes of abstraction raise important issues for our 
understanding of how we think. Language is itself an abstraction, 
furthermore with the ability to abstract. If we think of mental models 
as consisting of various 'layers' of abstractions, then it becomes 
possible to propose that we have the ability to scan levels from higher 
to lower, and lower to higher, and across different domains. If the 
idea that language can guide some of these processes has any 
validity, then moving people from abstract to concrete, or concrete to 
abstract, or across domains, through language, may be possible.
One of these basic processes, induction, involves the generation of 
abstraction of generalisations from prior experience, (Chalmers 
1978). A child investigates how a red-hot stove top feels, and satisfies 
her curiosity by reaching out to touch it. The subsequent burn may 
cause her to generate the abstraction that glowing red things are hot 
and hurt if touched. Thus are generalisations inductively formed.
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Diagram  2- Some basic epistemological processes that can be translated into 
language and used to construct cognitive maps.
Abstraction, categorisation, classification, ordering into logical levels.
Induction 
Deduction 
Abduction 
Deletion
Making Connections
Causality: (Cause-effect).
Complex Equivalence (includes metaphor).
Lost performatives 
Mind reading 
Modal operators
In te rna l representations
Vision
Hearing
Kinaesthetic; bodily sensations
Smelling
Tasting
Movement and balance
Trans-derivationai searches;
Involves internal dialogue
Comparison and judgem ent (scaiarity).
TOTE: calibration and feedback 
Converting inform ation to analogical or digital 
Quantification: ordinal and cardinal;
Changing positions in space and tim e  
Physiological state; emotions and levels of arousal.
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The complementary process to induction is deduction, where the 
abstractions are presented first, and then linked to details, (Chalmers 
1978). The deductive process is one where higher levels of 
abstractions are used as conceptual frameworks to which information 
can be assigned. Categorisation influences what is, and what is not, 
attended to, (Whittlesea 1997). This process is summed up by Thich 
Nhat Hanh (1988) when he wrote "Our mind creates categories ... and 
puts all physical and psychological phenomena into categories ... 
before examining them and trying to find their true nature" (Hanh 
1988:46).
11.4. 2. Abduction.
Induction and deduction are recognised as basic to how learners make 
sense, (Muijis and Reynolds 2002). However, there is a third, equally 
powerful process, which Bateson found of interest, namely the 
process he referred to as abduction, which he believed was as 
epistemologically significant as the other two processes. Abduction 
involves the creation of connections between different conceptual 
entities. Abduction may also be seen as an aspect of the formation of 
connections between conceptual entities. (I have reviewed this aspect 
of language and cognition in chapter 5.)
One of the best examples of abduction is the process of metaphor 
creation. This involves using a familiar construct in order to explain 
one that is unfamiliar. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have described the 
process as one where the structure from one domain is used to 
structure the information from an unfamiliar domain, through the 
super-imposition of perceived structural similarity.^ Gineste and 
Indurkhya (2000) suggest that metaphors not only create new 
associations between concepts, they also generate new 
understandings. Thus the bringing together of two separate entities
2 Whereas induction and deduction can be thought of (metaphorically) as upwards or 
downwards movements, linking different iogical levels, abduction can be thought of 
as a horizontal movement forming links between different logical types.
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causes the emergence of new concepts. Hitherto unconnected entities 
become linked so that radically new insights emerge, such as Winston 
Churchill's linking iron and curtain to create a label and thus a new 
perception of the cold war, (Schon 1967).
This indicates that our ability to code for, and perceive, similarity is a 
basic epistemological process. This idea is gaining support. (Hahn and 
Chater 1997, Goldstone 1998A, Gattis 2001). Its complementary 
opposite is the perception of difference, without which another basic 
process, comparison, would not be possible. The creation of a 
metaphor is therefore only possible if similarity is perceivable between 
the source and target domains. Mercer (2000) proposes that 
metaphors "are categories of likeness which people use to organise 
the data of experience. We say that something 'is' something else, 
and so make the second thing a category which includes the first." 
(Mercer 2000:78). Cameron (2002) urges that a greater 
understanding of the role of metaphor is needed in the creation of 
scientific concepts. Metaphors are also fundamental to language 
production and comprehension.^
Bateson wrote in 1977 "It is abduction which enables me to draw my 
instances of a given regularity from a vast range of different universes 
of experience", (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991:150). All metaphoric and 
analogical thinking originates through connecting conceptual entities 
through abduction. Lakoff and Johnson emphasize the importance of 
connections: "Basic ontological metaphors are grounded by virtue of 
systematic correlates within our experience" (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980:58).
Metaphor and analogy are now thought to be of central importance to 
how we make sense. Clement and Gentner (1991) have explored the 
processes involved in analogical reasoning, suggesting that analogy is
 ^ I have reviewed some of their aspects in Chapter 5.
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a process whereby one matches similarities between unrelated 
domains, thus grouping them and assigning them to 'higher' 
categories. Bateson believed that processes involving abstracting 
were among the most important of ways that we have of making 
sense, describing them as 'tricks', of which the best known were 
"induction, generalisation and abduction" (Bateson and Bateson 
1988:174). By generalisation, I believe he means the process of 
applying information coded at higher levels of abstraction, which 
includes deduction.
Gick and Holyoak (1997) demonstrated the power of abduction as a 
method of facilitating medical students' thinking when asked to solve 
a theoretical clinical problem. When a group of students was told a 
story whose content was nothing to do with a clinical problem they 
were asked to discuss, yet which contained, within its language, both 
the structure of the problem and the processes whereby a solution 
could be arrived at, this group showed more insight into the 
apparently unrelated clinical situation than did the group which was 
not exposed to the story, but simply given the problem to discuss.
Here the structure of a story unconsciously influenced the way in 
which succeeding information emerged, despite the fact that the 
content was different. This may also be an example of processes 
operating unconsciously, and shaping the understanding of content, 
which is then perhaps consciously attended to.
There has been some interest in how students generate explanatory 
analogies for themselves, (Clegg 2000). Burchell and Dyson, (2000) 
explored the use of writing stories as aids to reflective practice, and 
found that they provided insights into the writer's wider situation. This 
is typical of the working of a largely abductive process. Cameron
(2002) suggested that the mediation of metaphor by a skilled teacher 
reveals strategies for avoiding interpretive problems, and maximises 
the impact on the learning of science. It is also suggested that 
abduction may be a largely unconscious process. This could be
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another example of the fundamental epistemological role of 
connecting.
The act of creating metaphor has been extensively explored by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980), whose now classic work has generated a 
different approach to language and thought, often referred to as 
cognitive linguistics. Sandra (1998) suggests that cognitive linguistics 
should be concerned with the mental structures, which make 
language possible. The group of cognitive linguists which focuses on 
the notion of meaning making through what they call conceptual 
blending, such as Fauconnier (1997), Fauconier and Turner (2000) 
are essentially exploring the rich diversity of abductive processes and 
their role in how people make sense. They even extend this to the 
notion of causality, (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, website download).
11.4. 3. Induction, deduction and abduction in the classroom
Deduction, induction and abduction do not necessarily operate 
independently, but perhaps we are always, simultaneously, inducing, 
deducing and abducing whenever we are engaged in thinking. The 
question then arises; how can we guide these processes through how 
we communicate in the classroom? I believe the following extract 
from the maths lesson I observed demonstrates how a teacher uses 
strategies and language to facilitate the processes of induction and 
deduction, thus influencing the processes whereby the children learn 
and make sense.
When I observed Mr Phil teaching a lesson about a Turning Value 
Problem, he seemed to have the ability to move the children's thought 
processes effortlessly between inductive and deductive thinking. He 
did this through how he spoke to them and presented the material.
He asked the children to cut out rectangular pieces of various sizes 
from the corners of sheets of paper so as to make a box. He then 
invited them to explore how changing the size of the indents would 
alter the volume of the resultant box. Many parts of the lesson were
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largely inductive in that he engaged the children in activities enabling 
them to arrive at a general rule about the mathematics of volume for 
themselves. He often used incomplete statements, interspersed with 
directives that set the children's thinking in a particular way. Here is 
an example of his guidance of the children's inductive processes. After 
they had cut out the first box, and worked out the volume, he directs 
them to cut away more of the paper, and then to find that a smaller 
piece of paper, which, when cut in a certain shape, actually produced 
a box with a bigger volume.
Mr Phil: Now Isn't this weird? We've cut out more paper; we've got 
less paper now fhe waves his own demonstration 'box' in front of the 
children) but a bigger box !... So maybe i f  we cut out even more 
paper, we'ii get an even bigger box, (rapidly and enthusiastically) all 
right then, let's try it, another one, aii right, yeah!
The children's recorded responses to this illustrate how they are 
searching to make sense of the puzzle he has set, by looking for the 
abstraction, (or rule) at a higher logical level from which they would 
be able to create meaning, and then apply it further. The mini-disk 
recorder that I was using picked up different children's comments; 
their talk indicated that they were engaged in searching for a 
generalisation or rule, which would 'fit' the raw data.
First child: Sir, its going to keep getting smaller sir.
Second child: no it's going to keep getting bigger...
Third child: no it's going to keep getting smaller.
Mr Phil: Hm, maybe it will, maybe It won't.
By the end of the lesson the children seemed well on the way to 
understanding the theory that there would be a certain limit to the 
growth in volume as the surface area of the box got smaller. The
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homework that he then set them included asking them to see if they 
could work out a general mathematical principle relating changes in 
the surface area of a box to its volume. This is directing a largely 
inductive process. What also interested me at the time were the ways 
in which he gave messages about the nature of learning, which is at a 
higher level of abstraction than working out a formula. He did this 
through his enthusiasm and the ways in which he talked to the pupils. 
He was communicating the complex equivalent learning = discovery. 
Whenever an abstraction is communicated, whether at the level of 
awareness or below, it seems to create a framework for deduction. It 
acts as a category, which then influences how its contents are 
attended to.
We could further hypothesise that if learners are given information 
about the nature of themselves as learners, the beliefs they form may 
be carried over into other situations. This is another example of a 
process of abduction. The language structures, which catalyse the 
processes of induction, abduction and deduction, are different. It is as 
if they create different kinds of movements in the thought processes 
of learners; either from the more specific to the abstract, the abstract 
to the more specific, or creating links between different domains. 
These are different processes embedded (as it were) within the 
nominalisation 'learning'. What Mr Phil did was to facilitate the 
inductive processes in his learners by the ways in which he 
communicated to the class. It would have been very different (and 
using deduction) had he put the relevant formula on the board, then 
given the children exercises teaching them how to apply the given 
theory.
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11.5. The role of the senses in teaching and learning: the 
world of internal representations.
The exploration of the Inner world of Internal representations, and 
their undoubted roles in sense making, has been one of the key 
innovative areas of this inquiry. However, there remain some 
unanswered questions. What are the roles of the internal 
representations in the construction of knowledge? How does language 
influence this aspect of our inner worlds? There has been almost no 
systematic research into this area before my own interviews, so I can 
only reflect on this part of the inquiry, and wonder about the 
implications that this may have for teaching and learning. It may be 
for neuro-biology to offer further insights. There have been attempts 
at this; Hennigen (2000), for instance, has explored ways of linking 
introspectively obtained information with possible neuro-biological 
mechanisms.
One of the aspects which emerged from this inquiry was that there is 
a "layer" to consciousness in which the senses play a vital role in the 
construction of cognitive maps, through the creation of internal 
representations. People seem to be unique in the way in which they 
constellate their individual internal world of the senses. If we use the 
idea that cognitive maps may include a hierarchy of abstractions, then 
internal representations could be seen as belonging to one of the 
'lower' layers, 'above' which words, abstractions, generalisations and 
the other complex building blocks of our conceptual architecture 
operate. Words, and language itself, are of a different logical type 
than internal representations, yet these two phenomena apparently 
interact in a dynamic way.
At this point we could ask: what would happen if we thought of 
teaching as partly the creation of certain kinds of internal 
representations critical to the construction of knowledge? It is as if 
thought, memory, reflection, fantasy and thinking about future 
activities (which are essential to the TOTE process) are dependent on
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internal representations. Thus the internal re-creation of events 
through the use of our senses is vital to our continuous functioning. 
What people learn also appears to be coded internally through the 
senses. So our senses not only receive information from the external 
world, they have a vital role in 're-presenting' information internally.
This aspect of the inquiry is the perhaps the most radical and new. 
There is little in the academic literature that addresses the roles of the 
senses in the construction of knowledge. Schnotz et al (1996) have 
proposed that visualisation is an essential part of the act of 
constructing. However, research into the roles of all the senses in the 
formation of cognitive maps is noticeable by its absence. This aspect 
of thinking, which my coliaborators described so generously, does not 
appear to have been the focus of mainstream cognitive psychology.
Yet it was not unknown in history. Frances Yates (1992), investigating 
the ways in which ancient and mediaeval scholars demonstrated 
apparently extraordinary abilities to memorise, did so by first building 
up complex internal representations. The information to be 
memorised was then assigned to specific loci within these constructs. 
These seem to have been mainly using internal vision. Cicero stated 
that the way to develop the memory was as follows:
"we ought, then, to set up Images of a kind that can adhere longest 
In the memory. And we shall do so If we establish similitudes as 
striking as possible; If we set up Images that are not many or vague, 
but active (imagines agents); If we assign to them exceptional beauty 
or singular ugliness; if  we ornament some of these, as with crowns or 
purple cloaks so that the similitude may be more distinct to us..." 
(Quoted in Yates, 1992:27).
This passage shows the evocation of sub-modalities, such as 
sharpness, movement (which I take from the use of the word active), 
and colour. One of the most important aspects of the hermetic 
tradition of memorising was to build up complex internal 
representations of structures where space and locus were important.
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so there could be 'places' where the contents to be memorised were 
assigned. Yates claimed that the adepts at this art would 'build' 
internal representations of palaces and other structures of 
extraordinary complexity as memory aides.
Yates claims that such complex internal pictures were also spatial and 
three dimensional. Thus some aspects of what I have uncovered were 
not unfamiliar to the hermetic tradition, whose understanding of the 
power of visual imagery was a ciosely guarded secret. There may be 
untapped potential for the modern world in the activation of people's 
internal representations, both for learning and memorising. However, 
this part of our cognitive maps can be created, altered, skewed, 
distorted, inhibited or generated through language, whether this 
comes from an external source, or from people's own internal 
dialogues.
Language seems to have considerable power to influence this level. 
Subtle changes in wording can alter internal representations; it seems 
to be able to change how information is coded at the sub-modality 
level. It can make a person's internal responses to a topic coloured, or 
black and white, large or small, vivid or pale. They can be 
experienced as a film or a series of stills; three dimensional or two 
dimensional, with an apparent location in space. The words that are 
used can evoke more of one sense than another. They can enable 
people to see, hear and feel, as well as taste, smell, balance and 
move, when information is coded by the senses. In my interviews it 
seemed that language structures could apparently even influence the 
location of people's 'pictures' in their conceived space. Not only does 
this happen immediately, as the words are de-coded, it also 
influences how experiences are then re-accessed at a future time.
How teachers use language also seems to create certain kinds of 
memories, partly coded as internal representations, which can stay 
operative in people for many years. They form a part of people's 
beliefs. Such constructs may be insidious in their influence on the 
person, operating below levels of conscious awareness, perhaps for
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good or ill. It seems that not only the words that teachers use, but 
their style and approach, can influence the internal representations 
that remain long after the end of lessons.
Internal representations are by no means unconnected to other 
cognitive processes. How the content of a topic is categorised, 
apparently has a direct influence on the sub-modalities of the internal 
representations that are evoked. This aspect is, I believe, indicated by 
some of the examples of people's experiences of learning from the 
transcripts of the Master Practitioner's interviews. After there had 
been a change in students' beliefs about themselves as learners, (a 
re-categorisation, as it were) there were also changes in how the 
experience of learning was then coded at the level of their internal 
representations. This may have been as the result of a deductive 
process, where changing categories and connections at more abstract 
logical levels had a direct result on how the experience was then 
accessed internally and constellated by the senses.
I have shown that through introspection, people were able to report 
on changes in their subjectively experienced sub-modalities in 
response to changes in the syntactic structure of my statements and 
directives. I believe that much more research needs to be done on 
this; this inquiry is oniy skimming the surface of a phenomenon, 
which needs further exploration. Bandler and Grinder suggest that 
one can evoke rich internal imagery in all the sensory modalities 
through careful use of sensory predicates; that is, words that elicit a 
response from a particular sensory modality, (McWhirter 1992).
This may be too simplistic a view of how we may influence these 
activities in others; yet I have not really been able to answer a 
question such as 'how do we influence internal representations 
through our language?'This inquiry oniy seems to show that it is 
likely that we do. There appears to be a dynamic interaction between 
words and the constructs that are produced at the level of internal 
representations. This might be clarified at the level of neurological
321
studies. I believe that this inquiry has at least demonstrated that 
these evanescent, fragile, constantly changing, yet powerful aspects 
of our internal constructs are indeed vital to creating understanding, 
and therefore of considerable epistemological significance.
11.6. Connections that produce influential beliefs
Making connections between different conceptual entities seems to be 
fundamental to sense making" .^ In the analysis of the Master 
Practitioners' interview transcripts, examples emerged where people 
seem to be disconnecting and then re-connecting conceptual entities, 
especially about their understanding of'failure'. In this section, I want 
to explore the possible roles of connections in the structuring of 
people's beliefs, and how these may be influenced by communication.
I also suggest that when people create beliefs about their own 
learning, and what kind of learner they are, this involves the 
formation of many different kinds of conceptual connections. Such 
frameworks can act as powerful abstractions for the conceiver, which 
then influence the conceiver's approaches to their future actions.
This is echoed in the recent work of Brownlee and her collaborators
(2003) who showed a link between teachers' conceptions of learning, 
and their views of their own outcomes. The authors distinguish 
between 'surface' and 'deep' learning, where 'deep' learning involves 
the active construction of knowledge. Beliefs will also influence the 
generation of goals. Bandura (1997) proposed that when people have 
clear attainable goals, these produced a 'higher' performance level 
than if they only had general intentions to do their best. Illeris (2003) 
showed that adults learn well if they can relate what is taught to their 
immediate goals. Papanastasiou and Zemblyas (2002) have reviewed 
the notion that people's 'self' beliefs play a role in effective learning, 
and that this can be influenced by their own perceptions of their past 
achievements. Vrugt et al (2002) claimed that the theories that
I have reviewed this aspect of epistemology and language in c,hapter 5.
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people harbour about the determinants of their achievements could 
also influence their motivation and the results they obtained. The 
term 'belief has a complex dictionary definition (Tosey and Gregory 
2002)^
I propose to use the idea of beliefs to explore the notion that many of 
the epistemological processes I have described operate 
simultaneously, as if they were different aspects of a whole. When 
using the term 'belief we are essentially using a nominalisation, with 
all its attendant epistemological traps, which I discussed in Chapter 4. 
How beliefs are defined depends on the perceptual stance taken by 
the definer. Chamber's Dictionary, (1959) for instance includes among 
its definitions of beliefs 'to regard as true', 'to judge', 'the opinion or 
doctrine believed', and then includes 'intuition' as part of the meaning 
of the term. Wilson, (1990), on the other hand, prefers a more 
neurological approach, suggesting that beliefs are 'an imprinted 
and/or conditioned, and/or learned network of biochemical reflexes in 
the cortex of the brain', (Wilson 1990). Dilts, an early colleague of 
Bandler's and Grinder's, refers to beliefs as factors which are required 
to accomplish the behavioural goals, that is, why people do things in a 
particular way. "On a macro level, basic beliefs relate to the type of 
meaning, cause-effect relationships and boundaries people place on 
events or perceive in the surrounding world", (Dilts 1998:35).
 ^ Beliefs are very generalised concepts which influence how people think and 
act. Usually people will select information that supports or strengthens their 
beliefs. They are wide ranging explanatory principles which may be held by 
individuals or groups. They act as conceptual filters through which 
individuals'experiences are perceived, coded and made meaningful. Shared 
beliefs produce social cohesion. They cover a variety of experiences, such as 
the meaning of life and death, suffering, right and wrong, the construction of 
an individual's identity, task in life, relationships, roles and other life 
experiences. It  is thought to be impossible to live without beliefs. They often 
create expectations about how things 'should' be. Many beliefs operate 
unconsciously, and are influenced by language. It is now increasingly 
surmised that a person's beliefs can influence such factors as health, 
recovery from illness and the ability to tolerate crises. (Tosey and Gregory 
2002).
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My approach to the notion of beliefs is that they are complex 
constructs that operate at many higher levels of abstraction. They can 
be thought of as a metaphorical framework of interconnecting 
cognitive 'entities'. Beliefs can be thought of as wide ranging 
explanatory principles that may be held by individuals or groups. They 
act as conceptual filters through which individuals' experiences are 
perceived, coded and made meaningful. They are more complex than 
simple nominalisations, yet people may sometimes use a 
nominalisation to describe a belief, such as 'human rights', 'liberty' 
and 'education'. When de-constructed, they can be shown to contain, 
as it were, many of Bandler and Grinder's (1975) meta-model 
patterns, such as the deletions, connections and generalisations that I 
reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. Beliefs act as conceptual frameworks, 
categorising, constructing, connecting and linking to internal 
representations.
These reflections are informed by the shared introspections of my 
collaborators during my time with them. In this sample, some people 
showed significant changes in their belief systems about themselves 
as learners, as the result of experiencing a course where the trainers 
were using a particular approach. ®
I suggest that the changes in people's beliefs about learning that I 
describe are indicative of the complex and multi-level effects of 
communication. This is not, on the other hand, a complete account of 
how teachers can influence the construction of beliefs. I offer the 
suggestion that both the verbal and non-verbal messages that were 
exchanged in the hustle and bustle of the course in Riyadh may have 
played an important constructive role for learners. These may have 
involved the creation of new conceptual connections. The category 
into which a learning activity is placed, explicitly or implicitly, creates
 ^ I  have described some of these belief changes, and their effects, in Chapter 
9.
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a deductive frame, which may then affect learners' perceptions; new 
experiences that they may then have when learning differently might 
catalyse an inductive process, which then creates new generalisations 
through induction.
When observing Mr Phil, I noticed that his verbally (and non-verbally) 
transmitted messages included information that what the children 
were doing was not only engaging in solving an interesting 
conundrum. He was also able to transmit the message that they all 
had the ability to solve the puzzle he was setting and developing. The 
children were often in a state of relaxed awareness, and obviously 
enjoyed his lesson. I wondered what generalisations they would form 
about Maths as a subject, and their own abilities to learn it. If I 
analyse this in terms of the non-verbally expressed modal operators, 
by implication he was informing them that this was something that 
they can do.
What emerged from the Master Practitioner's interviews was that 
when there were significant changes in people's beliefs about 
learning, other changes also occurred. One of these was a change in 
what people then believed was possible for them to attain in the 
future. This may be a consequence of their changed beliefs about 
themselves as learners. The teaching and learning styles that were 
adopted in the NLP course in Riyadh seem to have resulted in people 
altering many of their original abstractions, complex equivalences and 
cause effect patterns. These may have developed as the result of 
previous experiences of schooling. How they then judged themselves 
as learners had also changed by the end of the course. This was 
expressed through the kinds of lost performatives (Bandler and 
Grinder 1975) that were used by the interviewees. These include 
reference to 'good' learning, or'not so good' learning. Thus we can 
begin to dissect the anatomy, as it were, of beliefs; they have 
connections and cause effect patterns within them, as well as criteria 
for making judgements, and internal representations of the mode in 
which future activities might be carried out. For each of these
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processes used in the construction of knowledge, there is a language 
pattern that can either come from the teacher, or from the learner's 
own internal dialogue.
If, when we teach, we facilitate the emergence of constructs in our 
learners, then using language structures based on the meta-model 
could provide us with other means for creating the generalisations, 
nominalisations, and the myriads of linkages through cause-effect and 
complex equivalences that are among the processes that are inherent 
in the construction of knowledge. Learners' beliefs may then affect 
how they generate the internal representations of their own future 
activities that are essential to calibration in the TOTE process.
It seems that the beliefs that are installed through teachers' 
communication patterns may remain operative at unconscious levels 
for decades. Much of the information that we transmit between each 
other appears to be processed unconsciously. Gipps and MacGilchrist
(2002) have reviewed the extent to which learners' achievements are 
influenced by the expectations (that is, the consciously and 
unconsciously transmitted beliefs) of teachers, especially in the range 
of children's success with literacy and numeracy. How is this done if 
not through words, but through the pre-suppositions and implications 
involved in verbal communication. It may also involve the multiplicity 
of non-verbal signals that always accompany human speech.
The implications of this for learning and teaching may be profound, 
especially if educators consider the idea that what and how they 
communicate can influence learners at levels below awareness, and 
even their physiology. Our epistemological processes operate outside 
our immediate consciousness, and yet can be profoundly influenced 
by many different aspects of human language. Erickson summed up 
this approach in the following extract:
In any work you are going to use words to influence the psychological 
life of an Individual today, you are going to use words to Influence his
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organic life today; you are going to also Influence his psychological and 
organic life twenty years from now.
So you had better know what you are saying. You had better be willing 
to reflect upon the words you use, to wonder what their meanings are, 
and to seek out and understand their many associations. (Milton 
Erickson, cited in McWhirter 1992)
11.7, The inner dimension of causality as a factor in learning
Bandura has explored the many ways in which a person's belief in 
their own self-efficacy influences their personal goals and actions. This 
brings in the topic of people's views on causality. Causal thinking has 
been described as an epistemological primitive. (Weick 2001) Within 
the conceptual structures that we call beliefs, there appear to be 
many dynamic processes, which interact. One of these is causality, 
which, although expressed as a nominalisation, represents one of the 
fundamental epistemological processes. It is as if there were specific 
programs that can be activated through language. Causality can be as 
much about what one believes about, say, what happens in the 
external physical world, as about oneself In relation to certain events. 
The transcripts of the Master Practitioner's interviews often indicated 
that people had made a kind of internal movement along the axis of 
causality. Their experiences of being at the receiving end of 
knowledge transmitted deductively had made them feel less in charge 
of their own learning processes, thus placing them, as it were, 'at 
effect'. The kind of learning that they had experienced on the NLP 
course altered the complex set of beliefs that they had about learning, 
and themselves as learners. At the same time, they moved, as it 
were, to experiencing more control over their own learning. It was as 
if, having changed the abstractions that they had created, they 
altered where they placed themselves on the continuum between 
experiencing themselves at cause or at effect. Bandura (1997) has 
pointed out that people's beliefs in their own self-efficacy create
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attentional biases and may then influence what memories are 
retrieved. These can be benign, or emotionally perturbing.
Viewed through the framework of systems theory and cybernetics, 
experiencing oneself as having control or agency in a situation, or not, 
generate two different perceptual positions which, because they act in 
the same way as categories, must then alter the conceivers' 
perception of experience. This will influence how they then react. 
Moyles (2002) summed up this aspect when she wrote " Once 
children see education as something that other people do to them, 
they lose the ability to take any initiative or responsibility for their 
own learning", (Moyles 2002:260).
Wells (2002) has pointed out that the transmission model of teaching 
tends to override learners' attempts to construct their own 
knowledge, forcing them into a more passive role. Carrer and 
Scheider (2002) have reviewed the topic of how people construct their 
sense of autonomy and self-determination. They suggest that there 
may be key needs for people, among which competence, autonomy 
and relatedness may be vital emergent properties of human systems. 
Autonomy could be described as the sense that a person has of being 
at the locus of control, or 'at cause'. Sideridls and Kaissidis-Rodafinos 
(2001) proposed that learners made causal links between goal 
importance, behaviour and beliefs, motivation and perceived locus of 
control, as if these factors were all interactive dynamics of a system.
Causal thinking appears to be a powerful process, because it links 
motivation to the perception of what is possible for the conceiver. 
When I observed Mr Phil's lesson, I was struck by how he was able to 
give the children a sense that they were in charge of their own 
learning. He did this through behaving as if he was uncertain, using 
many questions, and never telling a child that he or she had the 
wrong answer. He appeared to make their learning something that 
they did autonomously. The next extract gives a sense of how he 
achieved this through the strategies he used. He engages the
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children, as if they were really all responsible for solving an intriguing 
problem, and for which he did not have the answer.
Mr Phil: (Conspiratorially) we are trying to get the (emphasis; biggest 
... the maximum, the biggest possible volume we can, out of that 
square that we started off with, that seventeen square. What's been 
the best one so far, giving us the biggest, what's the best cut at It?
Child 1. eleven...
Mr Phil. Yes, how much did we cut out. I'm Interested.
Child 2. three.
Mr Phil: Three, right, three's been the absolute best. Four? /pauses) 
Child 3: Is going down!
Mr Phil: (lowers his voice) Is going down. Somebody said, well, shall 
we do five? What will I  do If I  do five?
Child then heard singing "down down down..."
It was also noticeable that Mr Phil listened to what every child had to 
say to him, as if it was important to the whole of the outcome of the 
lesson. Such active participation by the children, and the way he 
interacted with them, appeared to place them in joint charge of 
solving the problem. Later, when I asked him whether he did this 
deliberately, he told me that he liked to give the children the Illusion 
of being in charge of their own learning. In this way he was guiding 
the processes involved in learning through his communication 
strategies, as well as transmitting the content of the syllabus.
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11.8. Framing and connecting
It is now an accepted view that the process of categorisation plays a 
crucial role in the formation of mental constructs Language can be 
thought of as operating at many conceptual layers, as sentences may 
contain within them information about a number of different levels of 
abstraction. How people perceive events or activities depends on the 
categories to which these are assigned. There are many linguistic and 
non-verbal ways for communicating the overall framework for 
learning.
The words that people use, especially at the beginning of statements, 
seem to influence the subsequent development of their listeners' 
internal representations and abstractions. Is learning classed as 
'exploration' or 'chore'? Are learners 'participants' or 'subjects'? Is the 
task something that is 'possible' or 'impossible'? All these are 
examples of categories which influence both students' and teachers' 
responses. Teachers may communicate categories informing students 
of the nature of learning, or of themselves as learners, verbally, or 
non-verbally. It seems that we cannot, not categorise, whenever we 
communicate.
Bateson (1972) pointed out that such frames are essentially 
messages that organise the perception of the message by the 
recipient. Such frames inform people to "attend to what is within, and 
do not attend to what is without" (Bateson 1972:187). Non-verbal 
communication is especially powerful at transmitting information 
about the category to which the information is to be assigned. 
Watzlawick et al (1967) explored these foundations for the study of 
meta-communication (that is, communication about communication), 
suggesting that the non-verbal, analogue part of a spoken message 
acted at a higher logical level than words. This implies that aspects of 
communication such as body language and voice tonality are powerful
 ^ I have reviewed this further in Chapter 3.
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transmitters of information about categorisation. This influences 
perception as it creates a deductive framework, which affects how the 
information is then processed at different levels of abstraction, as well 
as at the level of internal representations.
Thus both framing and categorising appear to involve the universal 
epistemological process of creating connections between different 
conceptual entities. Such connections can occur between internal 
representations and the abstractions that have been generated from 
them. They are also involved in deductive and abductive processes. 
How learning is categorised, verbally or non-verbally, also affects 
people's perceptions of outcomes, which are connections to future 
events. Here again the almost fractal nature of the model appears, 
because when considering connections, future outcomes are also part 
of the dynamic of processes such as causal thinking and the TOTE 
process.
Beliefs contain a multiplicity of different types of connections. When 
using language, a teacher is continuously creating connections of 
many kinds, including complex equivalences and lost performatives. 
These processes are inevitable, because they are both embedded in 
language, and evoked through the words that we use. They may also 
be fundamental thinking processes. In my own teaching on the Riyadh 
course, I deliberately set out to create complex equivalences between 
learning and discovery, exploration, and the students' own abilities to 
deal successfully with a novel topic. This meant deliberately giving 
them new lost performatives that then acted as new yardsticks for the 
measurement and judgement of their own performances. Moustakas, 
in his descriptions of the phenomenological approach, wrote " when 
one looks with confidence, what one sees will be radically different 
than when one looks with doubt" (Moustakas 1994:71). Such 
different, yet apparently critically important perceptual frameworks 
may be created through verbal or non-verbal means.
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The connections that language can make or break may be as 
numerous as words themselves. It is probably impossible to put a 
number on them. When we teach, we weave a web of abstractions 
and connections that influences how learners process information. 
Connections are perhaps one of the most universal and influential 
strands of the web. The complex equivalences, cause effect patterns, 
lost performatives, categories, and mind reads that are part of the 
architecture of beliefs are communicated through the teacher's words. 
They may also influence how learners then construct their knowledge.
11.9. Language and future outcomes
Nunez and Freeman (1999) urge that the time has come for 
educationalists to return to the idea that intentions and emotions are 
of prime importance to our understanding of cognition. One of the 
most surprising aspects to emerge from this inquiry was the extent to 
which changes in people's belief systems altered their thinking about 
what was possible for them in the their own futures. This suggests 
that the complex conceptual structuring that I have been exploring is 
not time bound; that time itself may be a significant dimension in the 
construction of understanding. By this I don't oniy mean that such 
structures have a temporal duration; rather, that they include 
information about the future. This may set a direction, consciously or 
unconsciously, for future activities. Expectations and intentions may 
thus be considered as a part of such conceptual structures.
It is possible that such changes may directly influence how the TOTE 
process is used. In a cybernetic model, systems cannot function 
without the need to calibrate to an internal representation of future 
events. I have suggested that the phenomena of internal 
representations and their sub-modality variables also play a 
significant role in the construction of knowledge, and may be 
influenced by communication. This may in turn influence action. For 
instance, Bickerstaff (1993) has demonstrated that verbal 
encouragement by Physiotherapists to patients performing physical
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tasks significantly improved their (the patients') performance. She 
also cites work where it was claimed that the louder the 
encouragement from the physiotherapist, the greater were patients' 
responses to strength tasks.
It is no ionger novel to propose that intentionality is an essential part 
of the behaviour of systems. Zelazo and Frye (1997) have suggested 
that cognitive scientists have failed to clarify the functional role of 
consciousness in the production of goal directed activity, and suggest 
a model for the carrying out of intentions that is not dissimilar to the 
TOTE, yet fails to cite Miller's model, (Miller et al 1960). Freeman 
(1999) has suggested that In ten t comprises the endogenous 
Initiation, construction and direction of behaviour Into the world," 
(Freeman 1999:147). He explores the possible neurological bases for 
the existence and fulfilment of a system's goals. Intention and 
causality are interlinked; Freeman further suggests that Hume's belief 
was that causality emerges in the minds of observers. This raises the 
question: what are the links between people's belief systems, and 
how they then generate the information about future events to 
calibrate to? Could there be causal links between the conceptual 
structures that are created, and the conceptual processes that are 
activated for the perception of a task.
People's constructs of their own future outcomes may also act on their 
perception in a way similar to the effects of categories. They may thus 
exert powerful roles in people's perception of their different life 
events. Certainly, in my small sample, people who had changed their 
beliefs about themselves also changed their approach to their own 
future goals. Sideridls and Kaissidis-Rodafinos (2001) propose that a 
learner's goals are the strongest causal agents of success, especially 
for students who can do a lot of studying. Freeman suggests that 
'‘"wholeness Is revealed In the striving for the fulfilment of the potential 
of the self through Its lifetime of change." (Freeman 1999:47).
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It is as if we may be continuously creating and recreating our future. 
These futures will be perceived through the filters of our constructs. 
Their formation of these constructs appears to be affected and altered 
through certain language forms, such as modal operators. I want to 
offer the following generalisation about what has emerged from this 
inquiry; namely that it is an awesome thought that how we 
communicate with our learners not only has a physiological effect on 
them, it also weaves a complex web of beliefs which then influences 
their perception of what is possible for them throughout life.
In this model, intentionality emerges as a vital aspect of people's 
constructs. It follows from this that the factor of time becomes 
another crucial aspect to how we know. In our constructs there are 
connections between numerous pasts, presents and futures. Not only 
is an awareness of time critical to the successful operation of the 
TOTE process, it also acts as a context for changing perceptual 
positions, which I suggest is shown by my findings described in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 9. Both time and intentionality become integral 
processes in cognitive mapping. Some of my collaborators' 
introspections indicated that when there was a re-organisation of their 
own cognitive maps, then some of their perceptions changed. One in 
particuiar was their approaches to their own futures. Teaching and 
learning may therefore be as much about faciiitating the creation of 
people's futures, as about learning content for exams and 
qualifications.
11.10. Searching for, and ordering information through inner 
dialogue
The notion of trans-derivational searching has been a concept long 
used in hypnosis, (Grinder, DeLozier and Bandler 1977). It proposes 
that when people hear words, they are directed into an internal 
search in order to make sense of the information they may contain. In 
my own interviews, I was able to observe how often my interlocutors' 
awareness changed. First they might attend to information from an
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external source, then change to focusing on their own internal 
processes. Often this seemed to involve a search for their responses. 
Grinder, Delozier and Bandler (1977), suggested that people were, in 
this way, connecting surface structure to deep structure. It is as if, in 
searching, a TOTE was set up, where the outcome was to access the 
relevant information. The TOTE process is only exited (or ceased) 
when the conceiver is made aware of the information. In doing so, it 
may well undergo re-organisation. As part of the model that I am 
proposing, I suggest that such searches are another essential process 
in making sense and constructing information. When I was 
interviewing my collaborators, I noticed that they often paused after I 
had spoken, and then repeated my words to themselves. Only then 
did they appear to search internally, and access the internal 
representations that were evoked by my words. Their own inner 
dialogue, whether spoken or not, seemed to play a part in this 
process. Carruthers (1996) has explored the significance of inner 
speech, and concludes that it plays an important role in thinking.
Questions seem to emerge as one of the most powerful language 
structures for generating trans-derivational searches. It was 
noticeable how often Mr Phil used questions in his maths lesson. The 
whole of the lesson could be interpreted (at the process level) as a 
series of guided trans-derivational searches. It would be interesting to 
know what effects such searches have on people's learning. This is 
one of the main differences between the 'transmission of knowledge' 
style of teaching, and one in which iearners are treated as co­
discoverers. Such searches must, I suggest, have the effect of 
ailowing each learner to structure what is to be known in their own 
ways. Again, causality re-appears as part of this dynamic; when 
iearners are actively engaged in their own knowing then it is iikely 
that they also experience themselves as being the agents of their own 
learning.
Another aspect of trans-derivational searches is the Zeigarnik effect. 
(Mazur 1996). Zeigarnik proposed that when human consciousness is
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presented with incomplete, paradoxical or contradictory information, 
then it seems to be pre-programmed to search for order and meaning 
so that the person can achieve closure. Originally this concept was 
used to describe a psychologicai process, which was generated after 
the individual had experienced traumatic events. It is as if there is a 
drive to make sense, to order and categorise, which can also be 
explained as a process aimed at exiting the TOTE. This is thought to 
occur when the afflicted person has reached the outcome of having 
made sense of events by assigning them to a meaningful category.
Lebiere and Lee (2001) believe that intentions are even critical to how 
people retrieve information. They describe what they term the 
'intention superiority effect'. This was that the time that their subjects 
took to retrieve memory items related to uncompleted or partially 
completed intentions, was faster than for those people with no 
intentions associated with the task. We seem to be able to set 
directions for the trans-derivational searches of our learners through 
our questions and how we present topics. As teachers, we also seem 
to be activating the internal dialogues of learners, which, in my small 
sample, appeared to catalyse their trans-derivational searches. We 
can also set goals and outcomes which affect how tasks are 
approached.
Internal dialogue may have many functions. In my interviews, my 
collaborators used it to make sense of my requests. It seemed to aid 
the processes that were used to search for and generate their 
responses. In the Master Practitioners' interviews, there were some 
people who reported on the internal dialogues about themselves that 
they had in the remembered learning situation. Using internal 
dialogue to search for internal representations is different to using it 
as a commentary and judgement about oneself as a learner. Perhaps 
one of the processes that could be an essential part of learning is to 
encourage useful kinds of internal dialogue for the learner.
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Inner speech was a topic which fascinated Vygotsky, who believed 
that it was not simply talking, rather that it had an additional 
function. In Robbins' (2001) account of Vygotsky's theories, she 
quotes Akhutina, who proposed that "For Vygotsky, inner speech is a 
particular independent aspect of verbal thought in which all the 
dynamic relations between thought and word are concentrated." 
(quoted in Robbins 2001:51). However, there is little in Vygotsky's 
writings to suggest that he recognised the role of inner dialogue in 
trans-derivational searches; his views on inner speech were more that 
it represented the internalisation of understanding that had originated 
from an external origin. He did, however, hint at the idea that it had a 
role in sense making (Vygotsky 1939). It was also considered to be a 
'controlling mechanism' (Robbins 2001:53). Robbins (2001) also 
suggests that Vygotsky thought of inner speech as part of the process 
of internalisation, which Robbins describes as a 'system of ontological 
transformations' (Robbins 2000:101). This seems to recognise that 
inner speech has important functions, and may even link to 
motivation, and perhaps a dawning recognition of its apparently 
powerful role in inner searches for meaning, ordering, and arriving at 
conclusions. There is some support for this view; Emerson and Miyake
(2003) suggest that inner speech serves as an internal self-cueing 
device by retrieving and activating a phonological representation of 
the upcoming task.
Bandler and Grinder (1975A) were fascinated by Milton Erickson's 
abilities to enable his clients to change the way they perceived 
themselves and their problems. They identified that he used language 
to generate trans-derivational searches in his patients, suggesting 
that this was one of his most powerful therapeutic techniques. They 
suggested that Erickson deliberately sought to engage the 
unconscious part of clients' minds. This raises questions about what is 
conscious and what is unconscious? ® It does seem that when we use 
language to stimulate the epistemological processes of others, we are
I have addressed this question in Chapter 3.
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aiming to influence a process that may be mainly below conscious 
awareness. One of the aims of modelling with NLP is to discover more 
about these processes. It is coming to be accepted that much of our 
information processing occurs below conscious awareness. (I have 
reviewed this topic briefly In chapter 3). Perrig (1993) believes that 
there is evidence that many such processes operated below conscious 
awareness. These inciuded making distinctions between different 
sense impressions (SInneseindruecke), classification, comparison and 
ordering.
In taking a phenomenological stance, I can only describe the 
phenomena that have emerged, despite the temptations to theorise 
further. The role of internal dialogue in learning and making sense 
becomes an important part of this model of learning. Perhaps it is also 
a way for people to bring unconscious material into awareness.
11.11. The role of the construct of the self as learner; 
judgements and mlnd-reads
One of the most difficult concepts to define Is that of the 'self. From 
an NLP point of view, the word 'se lf is a complex nominalisation, a 
concrétisation of something that may be both abstract and a process. 
Perhaps it is as complex a concept as that of beliefs. The ways in 
which the notion of self has been constructed has been explored 
elsewhere by many, for instance by Vrugt et al (2002), Lacan (1968), 
Bandura (1997), and Harre (1998). I observed that people 
occasionally revealed the complex equivalences that they had made 
between themselves and what sort o f learners they were. For the 
purposes of explaining this model, I borrow from a Batesonian 
definition. Bateson struggled with the concept of self, recognising that 
it was a word that seemed to avoid definition. "Perhaps what each of 
us means by the "self" is in fact an aggregate of habits of perception 
and adaptive action plus from moment to moment, our immanent 
states of action" (Bateson 1972:242). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) 
state that the study of the self, 'concerns the structure of our inner
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lives' (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:267), proposing that this structure is 
based on metaphor. Furthermore, they view causation as being one of 
the fundamental dynamics in people's self constructs. Furthermore, 
Grush (2000), has proposed a neurobiological model which explains 
how people make distinctions between themselves as separate 
objects in the world.
I found that in my sample, people's experiences of schooling had left 
them with interesting complex equivalences between their ideas of 
'self' and what kind of learners they were. This was well illustrated by 
some of the Master Practitioners' interviews, which I explored in the 
previous chapter. Dilts (1998) suggests that identity operates at a 
higher logical level than beliefs and values. He proposes that a key 
element in estabiishing a particuiar role or identity "involves defining 
the sense of mission a person has within the larger system in which 
he or she is operating". (Dilts 1998:35). In this view, self or identity is 
linked to a person's constructs of their own future, and what is 
possible for them. In another sense this transiates into 'what can I 
cause, what can I make happen?' It was noticeable how many of the 
participants actually re-organised their ideas about what they believed 
was now possible for them in the future, after the course. Here again, 
the dimension of time becomes one of the factors in people's 
construction of themselves. Our educational systems continually 
encourage comparison, whether it is the individual marks for a piece 
of homework, or school league tables. This presupposes the existence 
of a scaie, against which one can be measured and perhaps defined. 
Thus lost conceiving of performatives and comparative deletions are 
the inevitable consequences of asking the question 'what sort of a 
learner am I?' The answer to this seems to act as an overall 
framework influencing people's perception of a learning task.
In this model, every dynamic process is also an aspect of all the other 
processes that I have so far outlined. Thus, the idea of'self' can be 
considered as a complex abstraction within which will be found all the 
other epistemological factors that are mediated through language. It
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also operates as a filter through which people perceive what is 
possible (or not) for them. I have found that people's ideas about 
themselves as learners have a remarkable longevity, yet (ieaving 
aside various theories of personality) these ideas are only subjective 
constructs which have arisen through what people have been told, 
perhaps at sensitive stage in their lives, through the verbal or non­
verbal messages from teachers and significant others.
Feedback, and how it is languaged at the levels of words and 
accompanying non-verbal messages, may be another influential way 
of creating or re-enforcing people's beliefs about themselves as 
learners. I suggest this is an important aspect of my findings. This 
was illustrated by many of the extracts from the transcripts of the 
Master Practitioners' interviews, where they reflected on the kinds of 
messages they had assimilated about themselves as learners from 
their past schooling. If communication is multi-level, then perhaps it 
is not irrelevant to ask what kinds of messages, spoken and 
unspoken, do learners receive and construct about themselves? What 
do they project on to others in the form of mind reads? I offer no 
simple solutions; only that this may be an area for further inquiry. I 
can only suggest that my inquiry shows that people construct 
information for themselves in ways that may be far reaching, yet 
below their awareness.
11.12. Comparison
Bateson proposed that another fundamental epistemological 
processes was comparison, (Bateson, in Donaldson 1991). In this he 
echoes Wiener (1948) who had proposed earlier that comparison was 
fundamental to our sense making. He also proposed that the ability to 
distinguish similarities, and differences, were vitally necessary to how 
we knew. Bateson believed that "any ongoing ensemble of events and 
objects which has the appropriate complexity of causal circuits and 
the appropriate energy relations will surely show mental 
characteristics. It will compare, that is, be responsive to difference"
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(Bateson 1972:315). The process of comparison is considered to be a 
fundamental cognitive process by Markman and Centner (2000). 
Associated with the act of comparing is the notion of scalarity, that is, 
that we make use of'internal scales' as part of our sense making 
processes.
Could there be hidden directives in language that evoke the use of a 
scale whereby judgements are to be made? Johnson (1987) suggests 
that scalarity pervades human thought. "Consequently, this ... value 
laden structure of our grasp of both concrete and abstract entities is 
one of the most pervasive image-schematic structures of our 
understanding", (Johnson 1987:123). He proposes that we are able to 
comprehend "virtually every aspect of our existence in terms of 
scalarity" (Johnson 1987:124). Clausner and Croft (1999) perceive 
scaiarity as essential to understanding, and argue that such image 
schemas have a psychological reality. In language, quantifiers, words 
that originate from judgements, vaiues, and even words such as 
sharp, will, they suggest, be located at some point on a conceiver's 
scale. These ideas are similar to Bandler and Grinder s linguistic 
category of lost performatives, which I have described in Chapter 5. 
Clausner and Croft (1999) also suggest that scalarity operates as an 
epistemoiogical device that transforms complex non-linear constructs 
into linear form. Again, one could use the explanatory metaphor from 
chaos theory (Gleick 1998); that there are underlying ordering 
principles which make patterns out of the chaotic and myriad bits of 
information that the nervous system processes every millisecond. 
Among these may be scaiarity and comparison.
The use of a scale, however subjective, is impossible without the 
ability to make comparisons, to evaluate and discriminate between 
the perceptions of sameness and difference. Bateson (1972) 
considered comparison as one of the fundamental epistemological 
processes operating within a successful cybernetic system. It is also 
an essential.part of TOTEing. Cybernetic systems could not use the 
TOTE process, that is, to know when a task has been accomplished
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without the ability to compare the present state of the system with 
the desired outcome to which it is calibrating. It could therefore be 
proposed that the act of comparing could be a universal process in 
human activities and information processing, (Markman and Centner 
2000). Mr Phil's Maths lesson encouraged the learners to keep 
comparing; he was constantly encouraging the children to compare 
the volumes of the different sized boxes they were making in order 
for them to reach the generalisations about the turning value 
problem. He even encouraged them to be 'wrong' with their answers, 
so that the learners kept up the impetus of learning, and finding new 
ways of acquiring their Insights.
Comparison, which is the ability to attend to both similarity and 
difference, may be one of our basic ways of making sense. It may 
also be odious. It may cause students to develop beliefs about 
themselves as learners by comparing themselves unfavourably with 
others. The language of comparison seems ubiquitous; any words that 
evoke the use of an internal scale effectively activate this process. All 
language structures having the qualities of lost performatives and 
comparative deletions as well as many adjectives and adverbs appear 
to elicit these processes. Comparison is also needed in order to 
categorise information; to be able to connect 'similar things' and 
distinguish them from others that are not the same at a higher level 
of abstraction. This seems to be unavoidable to the act of 
classification. This may be another area for further inquiry.
11.13. Factors that appear to generate or inhibit learning
' In both the transcripts of my own interviews, and those of the Master 
Practitioners, there was evidence that people could access learning 
experiences which were associated with a particular (and often 
memorable) kin a esthetic sensation, which were then linked to an 
emotional state. There is currently a growing interest in the 
importance of studying the effects of emotional states on cognition; 
Tart (2000), whose main interest is in altered states of consciousness.
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suggests that emotions such as rage, depression or ecstasy could be 
viewed as altered states. He goes so far as to compare states of 
consciousness to Kuhn's (1970) paradigms, claiming that they act 
"like a set of blinkers" (Tart 2000:217) which produce their own 
complex interlocking sets of procedural rules and theories, which then 
lead to interpretations specific to that emotional state. It may be that 
learning is state dependent; that people learn more easily in some 
emotional states that in others.
One of the first people to note this was Tolman (1948), thought to be 
the originator of the term cognitive maps. He urged that "we must in 
short, subject our children and ourselves ... to the optimal condition of 
moderate motivation and of an absence of necessary frustrations 
whenever we put them before that great God given maze which is our 
human world", (Tolman 1948:208). The links between people's 
physiological and emotional states, and their abilities to process 
information is currently a fertile field for exploration, (Harber and 
Pennebaker 1992, Bower 1992, Tobias, Kihlstrom and Shacter, 1992, 
Yair 2000). More recently, Bibby (2002) has investigated the role that 
"shame" plays in the learning of mathematics. There is also evidence 
to indicate that degrees of physiological arousal, emotion and attitude 
have a part to play in how a learning task is approached. (Revelle and 
Loftus 1992, Teglasi and Rothman 2001, Papanastasiou and Zembiyas 
2002, Hackbath, Grover and Mun 2003).
One of the most interesting aspects of Mr Phil's lessons was how he 
controlled the emotional states of his pupils as part of his classroom 
management. Discipline seemed to come secondary to his control of 
the emotional states in his classroom, so that learning was interesting 
and fun, driven by a relaxed curiosity. He also controlled the levels of 
arousal of the class; just enough to generate enthusiasm, not enough 
to create disorder.
Another aspect that emerged from studying the transcripts of my 
interviews and those of the Master Practitioners, was the many times
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where people reported on sub-modality distinctions in more than one 
of the sensory modalities of their Internal representations; often there 
were apparently distinctly experienced bodily states associated with 
different experiences of learning. It was as if people's construct of 
learning had a physiological correlate; certain kinaesthetic sensations 
being inextricably linked to visual and auditory memories. Such links 
are known as synaesthesias, where two different modalities are 
experienced at the same time. For instance, recalling a pleasant 
holiday experience may evoke both feelings and pictures, which are 
linked as two aspects of the same phenomenon. Damasio (2000) 
believed that even the feelings which "make up the backdrop of each 
mental instant are images, ... somatosensory images, that is, which 
mostly signal aspects of the body state," (Damasio 2000:319). He 
considered that the underlying mechanisms producing these 
phenomena were neural patterning mechanisms. It may thus be 
impossible to separate the construction of knowledge by individuals 
from their physiology, whether it be that of the brain or the rest of the 
body. The two can thus be considered as two aspects of the same 
anatomical and physiological information processing system.
One aspect of teaching and learning that emerges from this is that 
learners' states could be directly affected by the communication of 
others. I suggest that this is where non-verbal messages, transmitted 
through body language and voice tonality, may play a role. Perhaps 
this is an aspect, which is influenced by how something is said. 
Mehrabian (1971) proposed that "we can say that people's implicit 
behaviour has more bearing than their words on communicating 
feelings or attitudes to others", (Mehrabian 1971:77)®. Watzlawick et 
al (1967) explored the notion that meta-communication, that is, the 
non-verbal message about the message, operated at a higher logical 
level than words, and therefore categorised the contents of the verbal 
part. Perhaps the emotional state that is created in a classroom is yet
® Mehrabian (1971) also tried to quantify the amount of information that was 
transmitted through voice and body language. He has been much criticised for this. I 
do not believe that it is possible to reduce such complex interactions to numerical 
ratios.
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another way of categorising the activities of learning. This in turn may 
influence perception, the generation of future outcomes, beliefs about 
learning, self-efficacy, and much else.
11.14. Epistemological processes as part of a systemic 
network; a working hypothesis.
On page 310 I presented a linear listing of the epistemological 
processes that I suggest play a role in the construction of knowledge, 
and which are used by, and activated through language. Such a list 
does not give a sense of the complexity of their interactions. I suggest 
the hypothesis that each of the major categories of epistemological 
processes that I list do not operate singly, but always in conjunction 
with others, either actually or potentially, as a non-linear, systemic 
network. Each process operates as parts of a greater whole, in order 
for us to make sense of the chaos of incoming information, and thus 
form our mental constructs.
Let me explore this suggestion further, using the TOTE as an 
example. I attach a number to each process for clarification in my 
exploration of the possibly systemic structure of epistemology, and 
diagrams on pages 348 and 349 that give an overview of the model.
In diagram 3 (page 348) I give an overview of the hypothetical 
processes used to make sense. In diagram 4, (page 349) I suggest 
that in order to calibrate to a future outcome using the TOTE (1), 
there must be an internal representation (2) of the desired outcome. 
We appear to calibrate (3) to an internal representation (2) of a 
future outcome, continuously comparing (6) the present state with 
the desired outcome. The outcome itself may act as a category, (4) 
which operates at a higher logical level, influencing the configuration 
of the internal representations and their sub-modalities. In order to 
process feedback, (which is information about the extent to which an 
organism has or has not achieved an outcome), the perception of 
sameness and difference (5) play a crucial role.
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Negative feedback is 'news of difference' (Bateson 1972) in order for 
the organism to 'know' that the goal has not yet been achieved. This 
brings in the fundamental role of comparison. This may also involve 
the use of an internal scale by which information is judged, (6). When 
people's achievement and their perceived outcomes are the same, 
then the TOTE can be exited, because then the system 'knows' that 
the task has been completed. The way an outcome is achieved is 
dependent on the organism's neurology and state of physiological 
arousal, (7). We could add that functions such as the trans- 
derivational search (TDS) (8) is run by the TOTE process, (or how 
would we know that we had found the information we were looking 
for?) The TDS is itself often mediated through inner dialogue. This 
uses words, which could be thought of as digitalised information, (9). 
They are of a different logical type than analogue processes. (Bateson 
1972).
How an activity is performed is influenced by past experience and 
beliefs, in the construction of which many kinds of connections and 
abstractions play a role, (10). Time (11) is also an essential 
component of the TOTE, as it involves awareness of both present and
future.
Engaging in a TOTE process may also involve evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the task, which not only involves beliefs (10), but also 
changing perceptual positions in time, (12). Each of these steps may 
also depend on the system's ability to create internal representations. 
Every one of these patterning principles appears to be different 
aspects of the act of knowing.
It is as if these strange aspects of consciousness operate more like a 
complex system. The mind is not a static structure, neither can it be 
understood by superimposing on it a linear reductionist methodology, 
(Gleick 1998). Perhaps these epistemological processes are some of 
the patterning principles, which are proposed as underlying organising
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factors in chaos theory. Gleick describes these as "Patterns born 
among formlessness: that is biology's basic beauty and its basic 
mystery", (Gleick 1998:299).
11.15. Conclusion
This has been a complex terrain to explore and map. The resulting 
map is offered purely as a hypothesis. The map is not the territory.
I have proposed when we know, we may do so at a number of 
different levels, which I have outlined in Diagram 1 (page 306). I 
have also described some of the main epistemological processes, 
which I suggest are active in the construction of knowledge, and are 
communicated through the language and style of a teacher or trainer.
I have listed these in Diagram 2, (page 310). However, these are not 
separable into discrete functions. What has emerged from these 
explorations is the apparent impossibility of separating one 
epistemological function from others in the human act of knowing and 
constructing internal maps. They are all a part of the larger function 
of making meaning. The epistemological processes themselves 
connect with other dynamic aspects of the system such as language, 
sensory input and cognitive mapping, which are summed up in 
diagram 3, page 348.
These processes seem to be inter-dependent and to occur again and 
again at various levels of complexity, whether in the formation of 
simpler constructs such as insights into a mathematics problem, or at 
the more complex level of the build up of a conceivers beliefs and 
identity about themselves as a learner. I propose that these processes 
are mediated through language, through its syntactic and semantic 
structures as well as through non-verbal means. If these views have 
any validity, then good intentions on the part of a teacher are not 
enough. This hypothesis involves a profound ontological shift to 
realise that a teaching method may even influence a learner's 
physiology; that when we communicate we may cause a myriad of
347
conceptual and physiological changes In others. In cybernetic theory, 
whenever there is communication between people, then they become 
a system, where every part can potentially influence other parts. A 
system also has emergent qualities, which are not predictable from a 
study of its parts alone, (Checkland 1981, Gleick 1998). Language 
may be one of the most potent tools for the development of 
knowledge in human systems. Teaching could be said to be about 
'languageing' the thinking of others. This could have implications for 
the training of teachers, which I explore in the next chapter.
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Chapter 12. Some Thoughts on the Implications of this Inquiry 
for Teaching and Learning.
The reality that we Impute to the "worlds' we inhabit is a constructed 
one. ... Reality construction is the product o f meaning making shaped 
by tradition and a culture's toolkit o f ways of thought. In this sense, 
education must be conceived as aiding young humans in learning to 
use the tools of meaning making and reality construction^ better to 
adapt to the world in which they find themselves and to help in the 
process of changing it as required. In this sense it can even be 
conceived as akin to helping people become better architects and 
better builders. (Jerome Bruner 2002:10)
12.1. Introduction.
The model that I have proposed in this thesis arose from my 
reflections on, and analysis of data that suggests that there may be 
close links between the way in which teachers communicate, and the 
epistemological processes that are activated in their learners as they 
construct knowledge. This implies that there may be two distinct but 
related aspects to guiding learning; one is the transmission of the 
content of the subject matter, and the other involves activating the 
processes whereby specific kinds of learning may be engaged, and 
conceptual maps developed. I argue that this is a vital distinction to 
make.
This dichotomy, (of which I am aware in my own practice as a teacher 
and trainer) aroused my curiosity about what teachers are taught 
about language and communication. I also wondered about how 
teachers' communication skills were evaluated in the classroom. I was 
intrigued to know what teachers are currently taught about 
communication. This chapter is the result of this inquisitiveness. It 
aims to indicate, through soundings and informal inquiry, the extent 
to which the issues raised are already reflected in teacher training and 
development. The chapter does not purport to be a systematic study
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of these questions. The intention is to help assess some possible 
implications for practice.
Much of the material in this chapter is drawn from a small number of 
soundings. I spoke to a Headteacher and an Ofsted inspector to find 
out how communication was evaluated in the classroom, and whether 
there was any recognition that language activated epistemological 
processes. I also include the experiences of three newly qualified 
teachers, who had recently undergone PGCE training in three different 
institutions.
I review some of the information that I was able to gather on the 
questions from a variety of official guidelines for the training and 
evaluation of teachers. Finally, I include some of my reflections on the 
literature for the training of teachers at the Open University, drawing 
out some generalisations about their approach to language in 
teaching and learning. I then review the implications of the model 
that emerged from this inquiry for teacher training programmes at all 
levels, advocating more of a focus on the subject of communication 
and its possible roles in the creation of cognitive maps.
12.2. Ofsted sources
The Ofsted Handbook on the Guidance on the Inspection of Secondary 
Schools (HMSG 1995) contains pointers on what inspectors are 
looking for when judging teachers and evaluating classroom practice, 
yet does not address communication as such, except by implication. 
Criteria that it lists include:
• The teachers should show knowledge of the subject area
• Set high expectations, challenge, deepen knowledge and 
understanding,
• Employ methods and organisational strategies which match 
curricular objectives
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• Manage pupils to achieve high standards of discipline. (HMSO, 
1995).
The following description of good teaching is couched in abstract 
generalisations, (let alone the extensive use of nominalisations, which 
I italicise). "Good teaching makes clear the importance of application, 
accuracy and good presentation, and the need to use critical thinking, 
creativity and imagination. It provides the stimulus, the knowledge 
and the methods for pupils to do their best in all these respects. 
Teaching should provide opportunities for students to take increasing 
responsibility for their own work.” (HMSO 1995:72).
These nominalisations are essentially descriptions of processes written 
as abstract nouns. They do not inform the reader about how precisely 
these activities are evaluated. My view is that all of these factors are 
achieved through the way that information is languaged in the 
classroom. They are also influenced through both verbal and non­
verbal means, and may be processed consciously and unconsciously.
The Ofsted Handbook goes on to state what inspectors should 
consider when observing teachers' teaching methods.^ Again, these 
focus on processes, which according to the model I propose, are all 
mediated through language structures and ways of communicating. 
However, this is never explicitly addressed. The closest that these 
guidelines come to evaluating communication is that inspectors 
should consider how well a teacher manages explanation, questioning 
and discussion.
In order to find out more about the Ofsted approach, I approached 
the school where I had originally observed Mr Phil's maths lesson.
 ^ Exposition or explanation by the teacher is informative, lively and well 
structured, the teachers use of questions probes pupils knowledge and 
understanding, and challenges their thinking, practical activity is purposeful 
In that pupils are encouraged to think about what they are doing, what they 
have learned from it and how to improve their work, investigations and 
problem solving activities are efficient in helping pupils to apply and extend 
their learning in new contexts. (HMSO 1995:73).
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which were to have an Ofsted inspection in February 2003. The 
Headteacher invited me to go and see her during the inspection, and 
to talk to one of the inspectors. I talked to both for about 35 minutes 
about the Ofsted guidelines, and the practice of Ofsted inspections in 
schools.
I was also intrigued by what, if any, theoretical bases were used as 
the underpinnings of what teachers are taught about language and 
the effects of wording. Taking soundings from an Ofsted inspector was 
one of my first ports of call.
12.3. The Inspector's views
During my visit to the school, one of the inspectors agreed to talk to 
me during the lunch hour. He appeared very kind, friendly, 
enthusiastic, helpful, and committed to his mission of improving 
teaching, so that children enjoyed school. He wished to remain 
anonymous, refused permission for our conversation to be recorded, 
though gave me his assent to use his views, of which I made 
handwritten notes at the time. This account of our meeting is based 
on these notes. My questions to him were simple; what did he look for 
when evaluating a teacher's communication skills in the classroom? 
What makes good teaching? What should teachers be taught about 
communication skills?
His answers were interesting, because they bore little resemblance to 
the somewhat mechanistic guidelines published by Ofsted. He brought 
a very human dimension to the rather abstract written 
recommendations of the Ofsted handbooks.
He said he looked for how long teachers talked, how they built on 
what was intended for the lesson, how clearly they stated and shared 
the goals of the lesson, how well the lesson was formatted, the extent 
of the teacher's command of the subject, the teacher's use of 
understandable language, the extent to which the teacher's language
354
was geared to the level of understanding of the pupils, and how a 
teacher was able to improve pupils' communication skills and 
knowledge of technical terms.
One of his main aims was to evaluate the response of the pupils 
themselves. How long were they engaged in learning activities? To 
what extent were they 'in charge' of their learning? What state of 
mind, emotional engagement and joy in discovery did they 
demonstrate? In his view, teachers were catalysts, who should not 
only have a good knowledge of their subjects, but also the desire to 
share it with others.
When I asked him what he thought teachers should be taught about 
communication, he replied that he believed that an integral part of 
teacher training should be drama, rhetoric and voice projection. 
Teachers were "thesplans within their little theatre". He then went on 
to offer the view that, in his experience as an Ofsted inspector, the 
quality of the teaching of the expressive arts was better than that of 
any other taught subject. He also added that teachers should be able 
to learn, think, evaluate and reflect on their practice, so as to raise 
the awareness of what they were doing.
He thus recognised the importance of the factors I would describe as 
state, feedback, TOTE, goal setting, inductive and deductive 
processes (though he pleaded ignorance about abduction) for 
learning, though he did not use these terms. He also recognised the 
significance of pupils experiencing themselves as being at cause in 
their learning. These are some of the factors I propose as 
fundamental epistemological variables involved in the construction of 
knowledge. He appeared somewhat baffled yet interested when I 
mentioned that I believed there were links between language and how 
learners constructed knowledge; it was clear that he recognised many 
of the aspects that I believe are involved in 'good' teaching, yet there 
was no stated theoretical framework to his views, nor any knowledge 
of the area of research of this inquiry.
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I mentioned to him that I had found that internal dialogue seemed to 
play a role in learning; he responded that he believed that one of the 
most telling ways of evaluating the success of a lesson was to stand 
outside the classroom door as the pupils came out, and listen to what 
they had to say about the lesson.
This was a useful insight into how teachers' communication skills were 
evaluated by one committed and enthusiastic Ofsted inspector, but 
told me little about what was being taught about communication skills 
to aspiring teachers, and those doing in-service training.
12 4. The Teacher Training Agency (TTA)
One of my next ports of call was the Teacher Training Agency. I 
telephoned their information desk, and asked what guidelines there 
were for the teaching of communication skills to those wishing to 
teach. This question was greeted with a certain amount of bafflement.
I was passed on to several people, none of whom were able to answer 
my question. After several abortive attempts, I reached someone 
who, in answer to my question, told me that their guidelines 
emphasised management, attitude and the abiiity to handie muiti- 
cuiturai situations. I was unable to obtain answers to more specific 
questions about the content of what is taught about communication, 
being told that it was 'up to the training providers to interpret the TTA 
guidelines in their own way'. They kindly forwarded a copy of their 
handbook of guidance, Quaiifying to Teach which the TTA produces for 
initial teacher training providers, (TTA 2002). This outlines the 
'standards' that qualifying teachers are expected to achieve in a 
number of fields.
Little in these standards is immediately identifiable as specifically 
referring to communication skills. Some of them assumed the 
importance of effective communication skills in the context of 
promoting good behaviour. Standard S2.7 declaims that "Those
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awarded Qualified Teacher Status must demonstrate that they know a 
range of strategies to promote good behaviour and establish a 
purposeful learning environment" (TTA 2002:34). Among the 
evidence for the achievement of this standard was "Trainees could 
[...] demonstrate their knowledge of effective behaviour management 
by the approaches they use in the classroom, for example: teaching 
assertively, maintaining a brisk pace to their lessons, setting and 
maintaining high expectations, using their voice effectively, using 
praise and encouragement, asking carefully formulated questions, and 
intervening in a timely way to maintain or re-focus pupils on task"
(TTA 2002:34).
For teaching at the level of Key Stage 3, the TTA manual urges that 
those "awarded Qualified Teacher Status must demonstrate that they 
have high expectations of pupils and build successful relationships 
centred on teaching and learning. They establish a purposeful learning 
environment where diversity is valued and where pupils feel secure 
and confident." (TTA 2002:51). The evidence that assessors are 
required to look for includes: can the trainee encourage pupils to 
expand on topic, express their views on different issues, reflect, 
evaluate and learn from mistakes?" (TTA 2002:51). In the standards 
for delivering effective lessons, (S3,3.3) the TTA urges that those 
judging teachers should consider the extent to which they support 
pupils' understanding of the nature and purpose of the lesson. "Can 
the trainee provide collaborative learning? Can the trainee employ 
interactive teaching methods to promote questioning, reflection, 
observation, critical thinking [...] discussion and dialogue?" (TTA 
2002:58).
From these few extracts, it is apparent that these activities need 
teachers with a sophisticated knowledge and understanding of the art 
of communication, as well as its complexity and theoretical bases.
Yet nowhere is the teaching of communication skills directly 
addressed. The TTA does not directly set standards for communication 
skills perse, yet everything that they urge should happen in a well
357
run teaching situation is implicitly based on a teacher's skill in the 
effective use of language and non-verbal messages. Teachers are 
furthermore expected to have good background knowledge of their 
own subject, including its theoretical basis, yet the means whereby 
these are transmitted to others through language is never directly 
addressed. The implication is that teachers learning to communicate 
within the context of schools and colleges are not offered 
communication as a subject with its own theoretical underpinnings 
and practical experience. Despite the recognition that communication 
is critical to teaching, it is not one of the official Standards for the 
training and evaluation of teachers set out by the TTA.
The TTA publication GTP Needs Assessment and Training Pian, a 
review of good practice (TTA 2002A), makes clear that the courses 
are driven by the need for students to achieve certain stated 
standards. "The Standards are not used as a framework for planning 
but are organised in the training plan as outcomes" (TTA 2002A:4). 
This document urges the use of a wide variety of training activities, 
such as taught courses, workshops and seminars. In the section 
outlining the ways in which tutors should plan their feedback sessions 
with students in teaching practice, there is again no mention of 
language skills per se} Similarly, in the list of examples of training 
activities within and beyond the classroom, there is no mention of 
communication training, public speaking, presentation skills, or 
understanding the possible relationships between language and 
thought, let alone the ways in which language could influence the 
learning process of individuals. It is surprising that these do not 
appear as core subjects.
2 "The focus of the school based tutoring meetings can be planned for each 
term and most frequently may include:
Review and verification of evidence in the trainee's portfolio 
Subject-specific training
Discussions on lesson planning, teaching and assessment 
Discussions and feedback of classroom observations 
Review of the implementation of the training plan; and 
Target setting for the trainee. (TTA 2002A: 5-5).
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In another document published by the TTA (1997) 
Deputy/Headteachers' views on accessing and using research and 
evidence-resuits of a piiot survey, which reports on an inquiry into 
Deputy Heads' and Heads' uses of research, there are some statistics 
indicating the kinds of research papers they had consulted, and what 
types of research they would like to see carried out. The greatest 
number of references that had been used referred to aspects of 
learning. Classroom processes and teaching styles (under which 
communication could be considered to be subsumed) were seventh in 
order of frequency of consultation. The perceived research needs of 
teachers, however, placed comparing the effectiveness of different 
teaching strategies as the highest priority, closely followed by models 
of effective classroom teacher behaviour. These last two could, by 
implication, hint at an interest in, and perceived need for more on 
communication skills.
What of the Further and Higher Education sectors? A similar picture 
emerged. I first approached the Further Educational National Training 
Programme (FENTO) by email, who recommended that I download 
their publication FENTO Standards for Teaching and Learning from 
their website, (FENTO 2002). Again, communication as such is not 
explicitly addressed, but implicit in many of their published standards 
of attainment. In Section D (FENTO 2002), called 'Managing the 
Learning Process' the enthusiastic researcher experiences a sense of 
déjà vu. It urges that teachers should aim to achieve an interactive, 
safe and productive learning environment, maintain learners' 
interests, redress poor motivation, set tasks that foster curiosity and 
creativity, encourage learners to take responsibility for their own 
learning, use group work effectively, set tasks, give constructive and 
relevant feedback, and "use a range of communication skiiis and 
methods appropriate to the subject being studied". Here again, 
communication is implicitly central to effective teaching, yet it is not 
identified as a subject that deserves to stand on its own, as perhaps 
the most important catalyst for achieving the stated good learning 
practices!
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A trawl through the publications on United Kingdom Central Council 
for Nursing (UKCC) Standards for the preparation of teachers and 
lecturers of nursing, midwifery and health visiting proved equally 
revealing about the dearth of information on the specifics of teaching 
communication to people qualifying to be educators. Again, the 
recommendations are couched in the form of Standards, which have 
to be met by the student in order to achieve qualified status. They 
state that they are 'broad statements of principle' which can be 
applied and developed in different ways in order for educational 
institutions to offer meaningful, adaptable and appropriate courses of 
education', (UKCC 2000:5). The first programme outcome is titled 
'Communication and working relationships'. The subheadings, which 
state what this means in practice, do not address communication as 
such, but the word 'relationship' is mentioned several times,^ (UKCC 
200: 6).
There are also recommendations for how to facilitate learning. These 
encourage teachers to attend to the development of an enquiring, 
reflective, critical and innovative approach to education and practice.
It urges the implementation of a wide range of teaching and learning 
strategies, which are effective across a range of education and 
practice settings. For the programme outcomes, which give an 
indication of the content of the courses, communication and learning 
are addressed, but again in very abstract terminology.
Communication is, however, perceived as linked to developing 
working relationships, understanding and support. Another 
programme outcome for the trainee is the facilitation of learning.
Here, trainees are exhorted to demonstrate the facilitation of effective 
learning, as well as strategies for its achievement.
3 1. Communication and working relationships, including
a) the development of effective relationships based on mutual trust and 
respect.
b) The development and maintenance of appropriate supportive 
relationships with students/registered practitioners.
c) The fostering of student inter-relationships
d) an understanding of how students/registered practitioners integrate 
into a new practice setting and assisting with this process.
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The same patterns emerge in the advisory standards for mentors and 
mentorship. Here again the links between communication and 
relationships are stressed, as if they were conceptually linked. A 
criticism of this document could be that it presents communication as 
so closely linked to relationships that the two approaches could be 
considered as synonymous.
There are, however, some common themes that can be plucked out of 
these documents. Among them are the recognition of the importance 
of developing the autonomy of the learner, of providing an 
appropriate learning environment, (which could imply that the 
recognition of the state of the learner is important), the need for 
flexible approaches to teaching, and the importance of goals, and 
relationships. These are all supported by my inquiry, though I 
approach the area in greater detail. The recommendations are, I 
suspect, also more complex than those currently posited by received 
educational wisdom.
12.5. Newly Qualified Teachers (NQTs) report on their 
experiences of learning about communication.
I was curious to know what the experiences of newly qualified 
teachers had been of their training, and whether it had included any 
'input' on the effects of language. These soundings only involved 
three NQTs, so as to obtain a brief glimpse into their experiences of 
their PGCE courses. Because the sample is so small, it is invalid to 
generalise from it. However, it was random sampling, in that each of 
them was teaching at the school where I had interviewed the 
inspectors, but came from different backgrounds. One of them taught 
English, the other Science, and the third Drama. Silverman (2000) 
warns that it may be dangerous to claim representativeness for such 
small samples. He also points out that much qualitative research is 
dependent on access to people. Thus I chose these three people, all of 
whom were women, as much for their accessibility as for the 
'snapshot' that I hoped to obtain about their experiences on their
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PGCE courses. Each one of them had attended a different training 
provider. After obtaining their signed consent/ and my assurance that 
they would remain anonymous, I emailed each of them, asking for 
their responses to the following questions:
• Were you taught communication skills specifically during your 
PGCE course? If so, what sort of things did the course cover, 
and what theory was it based on?
• Now that you have had some teaching experience, what sort of 
things would you like to have been taught about 
communication?
• Were you ever told that there may be a connection between 
language and the development of mental models in learners?
The English teacher replied that she had had one seminar on 
communication, which stressed the importance of recognising the 
main senses that pupils used to learn. This encouraged her to present 
material so that it stimulated pupils visually, auditorily and 
kinaesthetically. She was also encouraged to use body language and 
gesture. The rest of this seminar was on developing multi-cultural 
awareness. It appears that no theory was addressed, neither was 
there any mention of the possible roles of language in the 
construction of mental models.
The Science teacher replied that she had not been taught 
communication formally. "We had a few lectures on class 
management, managing difficult pupils which included a little on how 
to communicate effectively with pupils, but that's about it.” She also 
reported that she had had no specific lectures or programmes on the 
study of language. There was also no apparent theoretical basis to 
what she was taught. My second and third questions elicited the 
following response. "7 was in the Science PGCE course. The answer
 ^The consent forms are included in Appendix 2.
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again wiii have to be no. Not specific programmes or study on 
language".
The third NQT, who taught Drama, responded to the first questions 
with this information. "T was taught about basic language to use in 
the classroom. For example making sure that the language we use 
was only positive that we never used negative phrases towards 
pupils". She also vouchsafed that "there was no theory based on this 
but there might have been/" Amusingly, to the third question she 
replied "J remember a brief and very boring seminar based loosely on 
this subject. But I  don't think anyone paid any attention since the 
lecturer was boring us to sleep!"
Although these are only soundings, it is clear that none of these 
respondents had had any formal input into the critical importance of 
language structures and communication generally in the activating of 
learning processes, let alone what may be emerging about the ways 
in which languaging information could influence how mental models 
are constructed.
12.6. Classroom talk
Despite some reservations about how professional educators 
perceived the importance of understanding communication, classroom 
communication has generated considerable interest. It is increasingly 
coming to be recognised that classroom talk may play a significant 
role for learners. A glimpse at recent publications mentioned below 
shows growing interest in the role of different kinds of classroom talk, 
and there have been several attempts to evaluate its usefulness. The 
emphasis of this approach is to encourage the students themselves to 
learn useful ways of discourse, which facilitates learning.
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Corden (2001, 2001A) investigated teachers who wanted to break out 
of the mode of'traditional' classroom talk,^ and to examine the 
quality of teacher-student discourse during group work, recognising 
that social constructivists emphasise the interrelationship between 
spoken language and learning. He identifies how teachers can 
influence the production of the kinds of talk that facilitate learning, 
among learners. He urges that the oral discourse patterns prevalent in 
many classrooms need modification. He observes that successful peer 
group work depends on students having a shared understanding of 
the purpose of talk, which was not always the case. He distinguishes 
between exploratory language and reasoned evaluation, (which lead 
to successful peer learning) contrasting these with desultory and 
disputationai talk, which seem to inhibit learning. Significantly, he 
also observes that when students perceived teachers in a non­
examiner role, this influenced their approach to learning. He also 
suggested that there were distinct discourse markers® that teachers 
could use to facilitate students to explore and question for 
themselves.
Tao (2003) set about teaching a group of students about the nature 
of science through stories about famous scientists, and peer 
collaboration. This author believes that stories had a considerable 
impact on students' understanding of the nature of science, yet also, 
paradoxically, confirmed the entrenched and inadequate views of 
some. His students apparently even showed selective attention to the 
parts of the story that appeared to confirm their 'inadequate' views. 
This was an attempt to understand different ways of instructing 
through how the teacher communicated, yet when I turned to the
5 This he identifies as the IRE pattern, where the teacher Initiates, the 
student responds, then the teacher evaluates the response.
6 These Discourse Markers included phrases such as 
I was wondering...
I suppose...
It  could be...
What if...?
Don't you think...?
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bibliography, there were no references about the literature on 
communication, metaphor, unconscious learning, let alone linguistics.
The work of Osowski et al (2003) is interesting because they explored 
effective ways of teaching medical students about the immune 
system.^ They found that presenting material with 'gaps' in it, so that 
the students had to fill in the missing information for themselves, 
improved their overall test scores in the subject. This is essentially an 
application of the Zeigarnik effect. There are however no references 
to this, nor is there any attempt to explore any underlying 
explanatory theory, existing or otherwise, (despite the fact that this 
paper had six authors!).
Haggarty and Postlethwaite (2002) make a case for the improvement 
of communication between students and teachers; again they focus 
on the learners' patterns of discourse. However, they also propose 
that there are some useful ways in which teachers can improve their 
classroom skills; these include using checking questions, 'why' 
questions, and giving opportunities for peer-peer self-reflection. Non­
verbal communication is also included as a topic of interest, examples 
include giving students full attention, when talking to pupils altering 
their posture so that teacher and pupil are at the same eye level, 
giving negative feedback non-verbally, and positive feedback verbally, 
and ensuring that the seating arrangements in classrooms produce a 
sense of inclusiveness among learners. Again, there is little reference 
to any theory on which such recommendations are based.
Gray et a! (2000) recognise the importance of teachers learning about 
communication. They observe that "a significant proportion of 
teaching and learning takes place in the classroom, and this cannot 
occur unless communication between teachers and learners
7 I vvas very keen to read this paper, as the title said An Alternative Teaching 
Method for the Regulation of the Immune System. I read this to mean that 
there could be a causal link between the behaviour of the learners immune 
system, and how a subject was taught. Alas, I misread this ambiguously 
phrased title.
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themselves takes place", (Gray et al 2000:111). They recognise that 
language lies at the very heart of the teacher-learner communication 
process. They stress the importance for teachers to keep their talk in 
proportion, to use words that connect to the abilities and ages of their 
learners, and to be aware of the differences between the spoken and 
the written word. Despite the importance given to understanding the 
classroom communication, there is little reference to any theory about 
language and communication.
The Open University® uses an approach to the training of educators 
that stresses the importance of teaching pupils useful ways of talking, 
in order to facilitate each other's learning. The implications here are 
that teachers need to develop an understanding of the usefulness (or 
otherwise) of different patterns of discourse, in order to facilitate their 
emergence among learners. They place considerable emphasis on the 
teaching of oracy and the facilitation of peer group learning. This is 
reflected in the DES Publication Language at work in lessons. Literacy 
across the curriculum at key stage 3. (Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority 2001) The approach that is encouraged in this publication is 
the result of much of the work done by the Department of Education 
in the Open University.® It is addressed to teachers, and contains 
suggestions and examples for the improvement of pupils' abilities to 
engage in useful ways of talking to facilitate learning. Mercer (2002) 
emphasises that teachers need to be able to encourage the 
development of constructive ways of talking among their pupils, even 
in "situations which are not continuously dominated by the presence 
of the teacher", (Mercer 1001:178).
The theoretical framework for this approach comes from the tradition 
of Discourse Analysis. This, as Potter (1991) has pointed out, is a
G This is well represented by their recommended reading, such as Moon, B., 
Mayes, S., Hutchinson, S. eds. (2002) Teaching, Learning and the 
Secondary Curriculum in Schools: A Reader London and New York: The Open 
University, Routledge/Falmer.
9 1 am grateful to Professor Neil Mercer of the Open University for drawing 
my attention to this publication.
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somewhat broad church, comprising more than one approach, whose 
aims were not the investigation of cognitive processes. In another 
Open University Reader^® for their students in Education, Hicks 
(2003), in her reviews of research in this field, and her analysis of 
classroom discourse genres, is clear that she believes that discourse 
could be understood as a mediator of children's learning. Her 
approach is underpinned by the notion that knowledge is socially
constructed.
Neither in how most teachers are trained, nor in the publications that 
are used as recommended reading, are the relationships between 
language and cognition directly addressed. They are however often 
implied. Although constructivism appears to dominate the approaches 
taken by teacher educators (Doolittle 2003), there appears to be no 
formal attempt to link what words are used by teachers, to how these 
may influence the emergence of cognition in their learners with the 
degrees of precision that my inquiry seems to support. The link is 
nevertheless recognised. Anderberg (2000) for instance, argues that 
the intentional-expressive aspects of language and thought have not 
hitherto been taken into close consideration in the investigation of 
learning.
12,7. What would it mean for teachers to know more about 
language and epistemology? A new Trivium?
There is currently some interest in new ways of training teachers in 
communication skills. Burchell and Dyson (2000) have explored the 
use of stories as an aid to reflective learning. Lee and Law (2001) 
urge that the language that teachers use may reinforce scientifically 
inappropriate conceptualisations in their students. Teglasi and 
Rothman (2001) have shown that the use of stories with young 
children showing aggressive behaviours can inform pupils about more
10 Goodman,S., Lillis,T., Maybin,]., Mercer,N., (2003) Language, Literacy and 
Education: A Reader Stoke on Trent UK and Sterling USA: Open University, 
Trentham Books.
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appropriate forms of behaviour. Valenzo et al (2002) describe how 
teachers' gestures enhanced comprehension of instructional 
discourse. Barth et a! (1997) claim that in medical education, where 
surgical residents have had training in communication skills, these 
develop more effective ways of teaching. However the authors do not 
refer to any theoretical basis for the communication skills that were 
taught. In medical education there is an increasing emphasis on the 
importance of acquiring communication skills; Wagner et a! (2002) 
describe the design of structured training activities to emphasis key 
points about patient-physician interactions. Kennedy (2001) has 
written about the importance of teaching veterinary surgeons and 
medical students the art of empathy. Maguire and Pitceathly (2002) 
describe some key communication skills for medics, and how useful 
they were found to be. Vegni, Martinoli and Moja (2002) claim that 
training physicians in patient centred approaches to communication 
increased their perceived competence.
The approaches used by these researchers are not based on any 
clearly identifiable set of theories. There is a noticeable dearth of 
citations from the field of linguistics, let alone the new paradigms of 
cybernetics, systems theory, or other ways of thinking about the 
science of complexity as applied to human consciousness. Our 
understanding of teaching and learning may be enriched by the use of 
such approaches; it could allow for different ways of exploring and 
experimenting. However, the time could now be ripe to introduce 
some new theoretical underpinnings to what teachers study about 
language, and the complexity of human interactions. This could 
provide a focus for further investigations, discussions, and most 
importantly, research. There is a need to test such theories about 
human interactions.
In the mediaeval schools, the curriculum was based on the trivium 
and the quadrivium. The subjects of the trivium were grammar, logic 
and rhetoric, largely informed by the works of classical antiquity. A
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new trivium for the 21 ’^^ Century might be based on what is now 
known about how we construct our cognitive maps.
It would include a grammar that is based on the idea that different 
combinations of words have a distinct effect, and that much of their 
power operates at levels of consciousness that are barely within 
peopie's awareness. It couid be the grammar of moving listeners from 
having a sense of being a passive recipient of knowledge, to being an 
agent of their own learning. Grammatical or syntactical structures can 
set categories to which information is to be assigned, can influence 
the direction of internal searches, can be echoed in people's internal 
dialogue, and can affect a variety of different logical levels of the 
'system'. They can also influence peoples' sense of self, as well as the 
value, or otherwise, of what they are learning. They can generate 
moods, which may or may not be appropriate to learning. There are 
powerful words, which elicit strong physiological responses, such as 
the term 'failure'.
One of the most fundamental linguistic (and conceptual dynamics) in 
teaching is feedback; words can set directions for people's thinking, 
set goals and outcomes, and inform people about the extent to which 
these are being met. Most importantly, linguistic forms can also 
influence what happens to learners' internal representations, sub­
modalities and physiology. They can also connect, or disconnect 
different conceptual entities, thus both creating meaning, and 
changing how it is made. Last but not least, it could include the 
profoundly metaphoric nature of discourse, and the implications of 
this for our knowledge building.
Rhetoric would address how the words are delivered, and would 
include the effects of non-verbal communication, including body 
language and voice tonality. Although this has not been a focus for 
my inquiry, there is nevertheless some literature on how non-verbal 
communication itself acts as a creator of categories, (Watzlawick et al 
1967, Watzlawick 1997). I have said very little about the voice and
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tonality; I noticed when observing Mr Phil's teaching, that he used his 
voice to great effect; creating moods of intrigue and excitement, 
caim, arousal, humour, whilst always retaining control. He told me 
that he had had training in Drama. It was no wonder that his lesson 
was both theatrical and highly informative.
Last but not least, we come to logic, not the dead hand of mediaeval 
syllogisms, but the new logic of cybernetic epistemoiogy. This would 
recognise that we can code information at different levels of 
complexity, and that we can confuse different logical types and create 
double binds (Bateson 1972). It could also be a logic that recognises 
the epistemological necessity of the TOTE, and the power of people's 
goals to their thinking and acting. It would cover some of the main 
epistemological processes that I explored in Chapter 11 as necessary 
to the building of cognitive maps. These may be significant pre­
requisites to learning. It could also include the logic of multiple 
perceptual positions, trans-derivational searches, and the effects of 
sameness -  difference filters. It might aiso describe the ways in which 
human beings make sense of the myriad of bits of incoming 
information through the use of inductive, deductive and abductive 
processes, which always involves the deletion, generalisation or 
distortion of information thus constructed.
Aii epistemoiogies imply a presupposed ontology. In Bateson's 
cybernetics, he proposes that we may not really 'know' what is 'out 
there'; we build a reality through our senses and our physical bodies 
by means of an inescapable epistemoiogy that both enables us to map 
the territory of our experience, yet constrains us by the paradox that 
we may never realiy totally 'know'. We are caught in the most 
fundamental of epistemological paradoxes, which is that the map is 
not (and may never be) the territory.
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12.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to review some of the ways in which 
it seems teachers are currently taught about language and 
communication. I have done this by taking a small number of 
soundings, so as to obtain a somewhat generalised view. I 
demonstrate that there is an increasing interest for some in the 
educational community in the generation of the kind of taik which is 
useful to learners. This however, focuses mainly on learners' rather 
than on teachers' talk.
This chapter has considered how to redress the balance, by sketching 
out some contents for a hypothetical syllabus designed for a course 
for those training to be teachers. It is based on the notion of a new 
trivium, which emerged from my reflections on my findings. This 
encompasses developing an understanding of the different 
grammatical and syntactical forms that influence the creation of 
mental maps, the rhetoric that ensures an effective delivery through 
verbal and non-verbal means, and the logic of the epistemoiogy that 
has emerged from this inquiry. Without these processes, the act of 
knowing as we do would not be possible.
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Chapter 13. Reflections at the End of the Journey.
William James, in his Principles of Psvchoiopy. (1890) wrote : "As we 
take ... a general view of the wonderful stream of our consciousness, 
what strikes us first is the different pace of its parts. Like a bird's life, 
it seems to be made of alternate flights and perchings. In their quest 
to understand consciousness, modern scholars apparently cannot 
agree on which direction the bird is flying, where it might perch, nor 
even what nature of bird it is. A mystery indeed. (Lewin 2001:69)
You see, whenever you think that you understand totally, that is the 
time to go inside and say, ""the joke is on me". Because it is in those 
moments of certainty that you can be sure that the futile learnings 
have set in, and the fertile ground has not been explored. (Sandier 
1985:156).
13.1. Introduction.
In this chapter I review some of my main research findings in a more 
critical light, stress what I believe may be some original contributions 
to our understanding of teaching and learning, and look back at my 
own research process, and at what I have personally learned from 
engaging in it.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) distinguish between theory generation and 
theory testing as different yet valid approaches to qualitative 
research. This inquiry is clearly in the former category. It has 
generated hypotheses and models about language and information 
processing. The main approach was the use of a phenomenological 
approach and some modelling under the umbrella of Action Research. 
According to Maykut and Morehouse (1994), the hallmark of the 
phenomenological approach is the discovery of propositions. Action 
Research (McNiff et ai 1996), is about illuminating practice. "Such 
research aims at helping people make better sense of their lives, no 
mean ambition", (Coulter 2002:203).
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My main focus was to explore the inter-relationships between 
language and people's construction of their cognitive maps. The 
inquiry suggests that the use of our senses internally is an important 
aspect of our cognitive mapping processes.
The generation of the theories that I have written about, particularly 
in chapters 10 and 11, has been the culmination of a complex 
research process, involving an eclectic approach, which has brought 
together ideas and information from a number of different, sometimes 
apparently unrelated, disciplines. This approach belongs within the 
post-modernist tradition. According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998) all 
research is interpretive, guided by a set of beliefs that guides action , 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998:26). One of the threads running through 
the fabric of this work has been both the theory and application of 
NLP, against a background of cybernetic and systems theory.
NLP was used in both stages of the data collection. In the first stage, 
it was applied to interviewing a small sample of students about their 
deepiy subjective experiences of their own internal representations 
and sub-modalities. In the second stage, it was used as a means of 
textual analysis, to elicit a generalised model of some basic 
epistemological processes, which may be mediated by language, and 
vital to learning. There is a sense in which this research project was 
also an evaluation of NLP as a potential adjunct to phenomenology, 
because of what is presupposed about the nature of consciousness, 
cognitive mapping processes and language. It does not seek to raise 
NLP above other approaches to textual analysis; the case is made for 
it to be considered as complementary to approaches such as 
Discourse Analysis.
One of my rationales for using NLP was that it claims to provide a way 
of modelling people's subjective experiences. This was the main thrust 
of my data gathering activities. Chapters 6 - 1 2  are my own 
reflections on the information that I was given by my collaborators.
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My interest focused on modelling people's subjective processes when 
engaging in learning. In order to make sense of much of this 
information, I drew on a number of different approaches, ranging 
across linguistics, cognitive psychology, systems and complexity 
theory, cybernetics, philosophy and research methodology to provide 
the background theoretical matrix to my approach.
McNiff et al point out that "our thinking is already conditioned by what 
we believe in" (McNiff et a! 1996:38), so my choice of literature was 
influenced by the need to explore topics such as cognitive mapping, 
and the wide-ranging topics that have developed from different 
approaches to the study of language. This included information about 
the type and use of mental maps or cognitive models. Here I drew 
largely from the field of cognitive psychology, the 'cybernetic 
epistemoiogy' of Gregory Bateson, and many ideas of the founders of 
NLP, Richard Bandler and John Grinder and some of their 
collaborators.
Another area that I drew from was linguistics; I reviewed some of the 
more recent ideas in this area, and again used Bandler and Grinder's 
distinctive approach to language. Their use of their meta-model, 
which I explored in some detail in chapters 4 and 5, was critical to 
this inquiry. The main reason for this is because it presents a typology 
of language structures, which are thought to relate directly to 
processes that are used in the making of meaning. Thus this has been 
as much an exploration of the epistemoiogy of language, as a 
phenomenological inquiry into the nature of learning and making 
sense.
13.2. On the phenomenology of the relationships between 
internal representations and language
Integral to action research is the notion of refiexivity, which might be 
defined as a mental process in which one thinks about things by going 
back over them. (Phelps and Hase 2002:516).
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My original research questions had been:
• How does language influence the formation of people's 
conceptual structures?
• What perspective does NLP offer on inquiring into the processes 
of teaching and learning?
For the first phase of the data gathering for this inquiry, I sought 
information about an aspect of our cognitive maps, which has been 
largely ignored in the educational and psychological literature, namely 
the phenomenon of internal representations. I suggest that an 
essential part of our cognitive mapping processes are internal 
representations. In using these, we re-create, as it were, on the 
'inside', rich images of information coded through all the senses. 
Among these findings, and the detail in which I have presented them, 
I propose that information may be coded through all the senses. This 
is new to our understanding of the construction of cognitive models. 
Thus we use our senses internally to 'make sense'. This involves not 
only the conceptual abilities of the mind, but also some complex 
bodily and physiological processes. This implies that a more holistic 
view of learning may be useful, one where the whole of the person is 
perceived as involved, rather than learning being considered as only 
involving 'mind' or 'reason'. The paradigms that give the best 'fit ' to 
this emerging model are those of cybernetics and systems theory.
In these approaches, phenomena are not reduced to their component 
parts, or distorted by false dichotomies such as the mind/body divide. 
Various different variables within a system are considered as 
operating interactively. They cannot be 'reduced' to one factor driving 
all the others. The science of complexity proposes that more complex 
systems give rise to emergent properties, which are not predictable 
through the mere study of their component parts. Maturana and 
Varela (1987) echo this; ''we hold that the biological roots of knowing 
cannot be understood only through examining the nervous system;
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we believe it is necessary to understand how these processes are 
rooted in the being as a whole", (Maturana and Varela 1987:34).
Wiener (1948) proposed that the stored information of the mind lay 
on many levels of accessibility, that it was rich and varied, and always 
influenced by an individual's affective and hormonal conditions.
Bateson (Donaldson 1991) believed that the separation of what we 
experience into apparently clear categories was a creation of our mind 
and our own psychology. I discovered that the conceiver's fleeting 
appearances of internal representations, and their changes, could be 
influenced by words and syntax. These could either come from 
another person, or through the individual's own internal dialogue. I 
believe this to be a new contribution to our understanding of cognitive 
mapping, and making sense of experience. It may also be of interest 
to educators who take a constructivist approach to learning.
Throughout this research I was attempting to develop a model of our 
learning processes, which was intrinsically holistic, and not reducible 
to parts, or presented as a list implying any order of importance. 
Having teased out what I believe to be some of the vital 
epistemological processes without which learning cannot take place, 
and which are mirrored in syntactical structures, I drew on complexity 
and chaos theory to suggest that these processes operated holisticaliy 
and interactively. Phelps and Hase (2002) have stated that in their 
view, complexity theory can be treated as a formal attempt to 
question how a coherent and purposive whole emerges from the 
interaction of simple and sometimes non-purposive components. I 
am not aware of any work that has attempted to show such 
interrelationships between language and thinking in such detail, and 
uncovered not just more about our'mental maps', but also the means 
whereby such maps are created from the chaotic dance of information 
that assaults our senses. As Silverman pointed out, ''human subjects 
actively participate in the construction of social and psychological 
realities." (Silverman 1993:110). I hope that this study has addressed
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some of the ways in which this happens, particularly through the 
model of the interactive nature of some of our basic epistemological 
processes.
I have presented a new model of learning, which can be viewed as 
belonging within a constructivist approach. This was the culmination 
of a long and complex modelling process, whose beginnings I 
described in Chapters 1 and 2. It is now coming to be recognised that 
chaos theory, and the science of complex systems, may have a role to 
play in educational research. Doolittle (2003A) suggests that the time 
is ripe for the introduction of a new metaphor system to our theories 
about teaching and learning, urging that chaos theory may be a way 
of gaining new insights. Phelps and Hase (2002) have furthermore 
made the point that few authors have drawn an explicit connection 
between action research and complexity; an approach which is still in 
its infancy. My whole inquiry was illumined, from the start, by 
cybernetic theory, which belongs, as it were, to the same family of 
models as systems theory, the science of complexity, and chaos 
theory. I thus offer both a new model of learning, and a different 
metaphor system whereby we may gain insights into the complex 
ways of how we make meaning.
In chapter 1 ,1 suggested that the approach that I took was largely 
constructivist, and influenced by the ideas of Vygotsky. I then used 
NLP to investigate the phenomenon of learning in more depth.
Frawley (1997) cites Vygotsky's comment that "thought is not 
expressed in the word, but is completed by the word. One might 
therefore speak of the becoming (the unity of being and non-being) of 
the thought in the word" (Frawley 1997:97). He further proposed that 
the Vygotskian, interactive approach to language and thought 
presupposes that every piece of information can potentially impinge 
on every other. For Vygotsky, knowledge was mediated through 
language, first from an external 'other', then internalised to become 
part of the developing individual's thinking. Thus this inquiry may also 
add to the Vygotskian approach.
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13,3. Reflections on questions of validity and reliability
This brings us to the question of the status of the models I have put 
forward. Because the means of obtaining them was essentially 
phenomenological, this meant that the models that emerged were 
largely inductive in origin. They have not been tested or replicated, 
and thus, strictly speaking, only have the status of a hypothesis or 
sketch map waiting to be refined by further exploration. This would 
involve testing them, and even submitting them to faisification in the 
Popperian sense, (Popper 1969). This is what hypotheses are for! 
There is a sense in which this inquiry has been an adventure in 
mapping a little known terrain, and has relied on the use of a limited 
number of instruments. The material was obtained through a small 
number of collaborators, who shared their deep and personal 
responses with my two assistants and myself. James (1999), 
exploring the influence of a researcher's autobiography on her 
research, has pointed out that the development of insight into 
situations was a "somewhat haphazard process" (James 1999:85). 
This was certainly the case with this inquiry. The apparent significance 
of people's inner dialogues, for instance, only emerged during the 
course of the interviews, and was confirmed by the reading and re­
reading of the transcripts.
There are of course limitations to both the data and my 
extrapolations. This is because I used a very small sample from a 
target population of people who had trained in NLP. Anderson urges 
that a target population should be clearly defined and its boundaries 
understood. (Anderson 1990). Thus one can only legitimately 
generalize about this particular target population. "One cannot 
generalise from a sample to anything other than the population from 
which the sample was drawn," (Anderson 1990:197). However, my 
sample could also be included in the category of learners, so my 
extrapolations may be relevant to other learners. Nevertheless they 
remain as hypotheses, awaiting further testing.
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The reasons for restricting myseif to a handful of collaborators were 
twofold. Firstly, my small groups yielded a vast amount of 
information,^ which provided me with much analysis and reflection. 
Secondly, I knew that the people involved could safely explore and 
share their inner worlds. As a practitioner of NLP I am cognisant of 
the possibility, however remote, that drawing people's attention to 
deeply subjective experiences may evoke repressed traumatic 
memories, which can cause them great distress. I have witnessed this 
in other trainings. Safety was thus an issue.
I was confident that each individual in my small sample could safely 
navigate through these inner worlds, and share their introspections 
with me. For this reason it may have been ethically questionable to 
use a larger and randomised sample of people that I did not know. I 
remain aware that the extrapolations from the transcripts must 
remain hypothetical, and material for further exploration. The 
generation of hypotheses is after all the main aim of the 
phenomenological approach, (Giorgi 1985). Giorgi also urges 
"psychological explorations must discover their own methods, 
procedures, rules of interpretation and so on ..." (Giorgi 1985:45).
A reasonable challenge to this work is the possibility that in training 
my collaborators to be aware of their internal processes, (which is one 
of the main approaches used in all NLP training); I could be accused 
of installing their internal representations rather than eliciting them. 
The NLP approach in training is to make people more aware of how 
they construct their own internal realities. It is difficult to know how 
many people have undergone NLP training; a conservative estimate 
would put it at many thousands. The only occasions where I have 
failed to enable people to elicit their internal representations were 
with severely traumatised individuals. Working with people's internal 
representations has a formed the basis of many therapeutic 
interventions in NLP, (Bandler and Grinder 1979). There are claims
 ^The transcripts of my interviews amounted to over 35000 words. Those of 
the Master Practitioners came to over 27000 words.
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that they have been used successfully for the treatment of phobias, 
anxiety and trauma, (Koziey and McLeod 1987, Einspruch et al 1988, 
Konefai and Duncan 1992).
There is also the question of the power and influence of the teacher 
turned researcher. I have explored some of these issues in chapter 
10. An ever-present danger to validity could be that a student turned 
into a research subject may be too inclined to 'please the teacher'. In 
this case I was careful to separate out the two activities of assessing 
and interviewing. All the practitioners had been told that they had 
passed the course nearly two weeks before my interviews. There was 
a lapse of time between their assessment and the formai presentation 
of their certificates, and my interviews. The course itself had thus 
achieved some closure. This does not mean that my influence had 
ceased; if anything I believe it manifested itseif in the amount of 
detail that my collaborators presented me with. Everyone who 
participated in my interviews was given to understand that these had 
nothing to do with their assessment. Punch (1998) has described the 
politics and ethics of qualitative research as 'a swamp' (Punch 
1998:179). I was as honest as possible with my coliaborators. 
However, in quaiitative research, it is recognised that the researcher 
is never without influence, (McNiff et al 1996).
McNiff et al (1996) have also suggested some criteria for establishing 
the validity of a piece of research, though they warn that the 
discussions about validity in the literature are ''littered with 
controversy" (McNiff et al 1996:67). They suggest that when a study 
has been carried out where the researcher has developed her own 
measuring instrument, the situation becomes more complex. (The 
patterns of language, which NLP describes, can be used as 
instruments for information gathering and textual analysis). For 
McNiff et al (1996) an important criterion is reiiability. For them, 
measuring human characteristics with an instrument that is valid but 
not reliable will produce potentially different results on different
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occasions. Furthermore, an instrument that is not valid can never be 
reliable.
Seale (1999) has suggested that it is useful to distinguish between 
internai and external reliability. Internal reliability is evaluated by the 
degree to which the models that are presented are coherent, and the 
extent to which the work is replicable. It also depends on the 
evidence procedures; the extent to which filed notes, transcripts and 
recordings are made available. The transcripts, which came to over 
62,000 words, are indications of internai reliability. I doubt that this 
work is entirely replicable, though I believe that others, working in 
simiiar contexts, may happen upon the same processes that I have 
described.
External reliability, on the other hand, is more compiex. It invoives 
the researcher in being clear and transparent about her own 
theoretical perspective. She should also provide as much as possible 
of the original data to the reader to ensure reliability, (Seale 1999). I 
have attempted to do this; two complete transcripts are included as 
examples in the Appendices.
The iliustrative texts are highly selective, having been chosen because 
they show aspects that I thought important. Seale (1999) points out 
that the interpretations of texts may produce ideological distortions. 
Thus interpretations can never be 'neutral' (whatever the word 
means) but will always be informed by the perceiver's own bias. The 
research questions themselves continually influenced how I looked at 
the transcripts; the notion of a separate, 'neutral' observer having the 
ability to make 'objective'judgements and reach 'true' conclusions is 
no longer viewed as valid in the post-positivistic tradition.
This approach is echoed by Gleick (1998), who explored the notion 
that it was never possible to obtain totally accurate measurements. 
Measurement is influenced by how something is measured. My texts
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were used as a source of Information, which allowed me to pursue my 
own curiosity about people's internal conceptual processes.
Another significant aspect of the inquiry was the order in which the 
questions were asked. I do not have any basis for believing that 
altering the order of questions would significantly and materially have 
altered the data. My concern in designing the interview schedule was 
to vary the questions as much as possible, so that similar language 
patterns were repeated in the next question. It is possible that during 
the interviews, which demanded deep introspection from participants, 
they may have become more practised in reporting on their 
introspections as the interviews progressed. In one case, ('Ina', in 
chapter 7) the sequencing of modal operators seemed to amplify her 
motivation. Perhaps this is also an area for further investigation.
So how valid is such an inquiry? Gummesson (2000) proposes that 
validity means that a theory, model or concept describes reality with a 
good 'fit', ''just as a good map properly describes Earth or an 
architect's blueprint is useful for erecting a functional building", 
(Gummesson 2000:93). He suggests that validity is ''seen as a 
continuous process that is integrated with theory and that requires 
the researcher to continuously assess his {sic) assumptions, revise his 
results, re-test his theories and models and reappraise the given 
limitations that have been set for the study," (Gummesson 2000:91). 
Seale (1999), points out that all interpretations may ultimately 
involve a modified form of realism; this "involves opposition to the 
pure constructivist view that states that there is no possibility of 
knowing a real world which exists separately from language," (Seale 
1999:27). Bateson (1972) would add to this that the territory of 
'reality' exists, that our maps are our ways of knowing it, and that we 
may be continuously updating our maps through feedback from 
interacting with the 'real' world. The hypotheses that I offer may in 
this sense be understood as initial attempts at mapping a terrain of 
experience, which is experienced by the conceiver as real.
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Even with something as novel as the relationships between language, 
epistemoiogy and the construction of knowledge, I have referred to a 
wealth of disparate literature to back up my views. I do, however, 
take full responsibility for the models that I propose, however fragile 
they may seem as initial hypotheses.
This fragility is in part due to the small sample that I used. Silverman 
(1993) suggests that one way of validating the generalisations that 
have been derived from data is by respondent validation. That means 
asking the respondents for feedback on one's theorising, to establish 
some validity. This was not possible; some of my sample had moved 
to new jobs in other countries, and others who stayed in the Middle 
East were difficult to access electronically; emails to certain countries 
in the Middle East have a habit of not arriving at their destination.
Silverman (2000) also warns that there can be problems with 
representativeness when a small sample has been used. The solution 
he offers, is to validate the theories generated from a small number of 
cases through further inquiries using a larger population. He also 
suggests that in such cases, the theoretical nature of any propositions 
generated from small samples should be emphasised. Without further 
testing, my theories risk being accused of'anecdotalism'. Silverman 
describes this as a situation where researchers have used a few well- 
chosen examples, rather than basing their findings on critical 
investigation. To counter this, I referred to as much of the related 
literature as was feasible.
The wealth of data that I obtained, even from my limited sample, was 
almost overwhelming; a larger sample would perhaps have generated 
too much information. Silverman (2000) also suggests that one of the 
ways of overcoming the problem of representativeness and validity is 
triangulation. This was not part of the formal research protocol, as the 
design 'emerged'. I had not, whilst carrying out the fieldwork in 2000, 
expected my initial inquiries to form the main body of the data on 
which to base this work. However, the Master Practitioners' interviews
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could be seen as a kind of triangulation. Certainly, they too were able 
to interrogate people's subjective experience, and to evoke responses 
in their interviewees about internal representations and sub- 
modaiities, as well as other aspects. They also showed that the 
conceiver's internal representation changed according to the context 
of the memory of the experience they were being asked to access 
introspectively.
The second phase of information gathering could be criticised because 
some of the people my coliaborators interviewed were the same as I 
had used. I had no control over this stage. I had already left the 
country when these interviews were carried out. I had initially asked 
all three assistants to interview every participant on the course, 
assigning them to specific students before I left. One of the assistants 
was unabie to carry out the agreed interviews, leaving the other two 
to do the best they could in my absence. Truly, research is never a 
tidy, or predictable process.
Silverman (2000) also suggests that "in qualitative research, working 
with smaller datasets open to repeated inspection, one should not be 
satisfied until your generalization is able to apply to every single 
gobbet of relevant data" (Silverman 2000:180). Repeated inspection 
through interviewing was not possible with the small transient 
population I had at my disposal during my two month stay in the 
Middle East in 2000. However, the transcripts were repeatedly 
inspected and searched for meaningful patterns, and I believe that 
they were there in all of them. This was one of the reasons for going 
into such detail about my findings. I could have presented even more 
examples.
Whatever the problems of validity and reiiability, I believe that as an 
exercise in theory generation, this inquiry has shed new light on a 
number of issues. Not least of these are the possible relationships 
between language and epistemoiogy, which raises questions about 
the training of teachers about the influence of language forms on their
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learners' subjective processes. I explored some aspects of this in 
Chapter 12. It also adds to our understanding of cognitive processes, 
by drawing attention to the phenomena of Internal representations 
and sub-modalities. There are also the roles of internal dialogue and 
trans-derivational searches, which again appear to be catalysed in 
some way by speech. Although the most hypothetical part of this 
work Is explained In Chapter 1 1 ,1 do not claim that what I have 
written is 'the truth'. In Frawley's view, "Higher thought is 
instrumental and involves the deferral and recasting of the external 
world, never Its direct apprehension in its own terms" (Frawley 
1997:96).
The model I have presented of the possible basic epistemological 
processes which are linked to language are a working hypothesis, 
rather than 'true'. Silverman (2000) has pointed out that hypotheses 
have their uses in the generation of knowledge; they are essential to 
further research in order that better theories may emerge. This is the 
spirit in which I offer my findings. As hypotheses however, they are 
still novel and original. The main issue is whether they are testable.
Reliability can also be provided by the researcher exposing her 
emergent ideas to the scrutiny of others, (Seale 1999). Although 
research often feels very isolating, I engaged in many discussions 
with others who also used NLP as an approach to their teaching.
These gave me encouraging feedback. I also gave a brief presentation 
of my findings to a group of professionals working as coaches and 
mentors, and found a receptive audience. Perhaps the acid test was in 
submitting chapters 11 and 12 to the scrutiny of the Headteacher who 
had let me observe teaching in her school. She has no knowledge of 
NLP or related fields. She considered that my ideas were novel, valid, 
and could stimulate new insights into our understanding of teaching.
This also raises the issue of the possible use of my hypothetical model 
to teachers. I have explored some of the existing approaches to the 
training of teachers in communication skills in Chapter 12. The
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question of how this could translate Into directions for teaching 
practice is a relevant one. I am aware that more research needs to be 
done. How do I know that my findings are of any use to teachers? I 
have been surprised to find that carrying out this research has 
changed my own teaching; I am much more conscious that I am 
intervening in some complex, multi-level personal processes that are 
influenced and directed by how I teach and the language I use. Such 
reflection on practice, and the consequent development of new 
insights, is claimed to be one of the aims of Action Research, (Gill and 
Johnson 1997, McNiff ef a /1996).
It is difficult, without more research, to say more precisely how some 
of these ideas could influence the training of teachers. All I would 
suggest is that a few weekend workshops are not enough; that to 
understand the power of language in the classroom, teachers would 
need a grounding in many aspects of linguistics, some of which are 
yet still to be fully discovered.
13.4. Using NLP
One of the aims of this inquiry was to test the use of NLP in three 
main ways; first as a way of structuring interview schedules, using 
questions directly derived from Bandler and Grinder's meta-model, 
secondly as a distinct method of approaching textual analysis, and 
thirdly as another tool to use in phenomenological inquiries.
The first approach was used in my own data collection through 
interviews. One of Bandler and Grinder's assumptions is that 
information is always deleted when it is languaged. This is coupled 
with their view that we use internal representations as part of our 
cognitive mapping processes. My approach was based on these 
notions. I was interested In people's subjectively experienced aspects 
of consciousness, so my approach was to uncover as much detail of 
people's internal representations as was possible within the time
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that it yields, then I suggest that this approach has yielded some new 
understandings of the processes of cognition, and therefore to 
learning. Exploring the roles of internal representations and the role 
of affective body states to learning are, I propose, some new 
directions for future educational research. Furthermore, little is known 
about the nature of internal dialogue, and its effects on learning.
The second aspect was the use of NLP as a tool for textual analysis. 
This was one of my main aims with my approach to the Master 
Practitioner's transcribed interviews. This forms the main body of 
chapter 10. I demonstrated that there were a number of different 
thought patterns, which could be revealed by such an analysis of the 
text. These included the ubiquity of connections, of cause effect 
thinking, of nominalisations with powerful influence, and not least, of 
the effects of learners' beliefs about themselves as learners. It also 
included the question of whether these collaborators experienced 
themselves as active agents or as passive recipients of their own 
experience of education. The factor of time emerged as a possibly 
significant factor In people's conceptual maps.
The Master Practitioners' interviews were also an evaluation of my 
course. Here I began to concentrate on bringing what I believed to be 
some basic epistemological processes to light. I began to perceive 
these processes as factors, which could be thought of as bringing 
order to chaos. They informed my subsequent approach to teaching 
and training. These processes could not be reduced to discrete 
functions, but were essentially interactive in their nature in an almost 
fractal way. (My explorations of these aspects formed the main body 
of chapter 11). This is yet another metaphor for our metaphorical 
toolbox. However, again I stress that my findings are in essence the 
results of hypothesising, and not of establishing facts.
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13 5. Bias and verisimilitude; the spectres of qualitative 
inquiry
Many of my theoretical speculations have been directed through the 
'lenses' of the paradigm of cybernetics, especially as developed by 
Gregory Bateson. As Kuhn pointed out in his seminal work (Kuhn 
1970) a paradigm is never neutral, but tends to 'skew' perception so 
that one attends to what 'fits', which means, to what is explicable 
through the perceptual filters of the paradigm. Anomalies that are not 
explicable tend to be ignored, or dismissed through ad hoc 
hypotheses. Sometimes the seductiveness of a paradigm may blind 
one to the appearance of anomalies, which may not even be attended 
to. However, it may be impossible for us to 'know' anything that is 
not, in some way, theory bound. I believe that using cybernetics 
sheds a different light on our understanding of our cognitive 
functions. Lincoln and Denzin (1998) warn that ''there are as many 
verisimilitudes as there are genres (comedy, detective fiction, tragedy 
and so on), (and that this) is a reminder to the too enthusiastic 
researcher claiming verisimilitude", (Lincoln and Denzin 1998:416).
Although Lincoln and Denzin warn that "verisimilitude can be 
described as the mask a text assumes as it convinces the reader it 
has conformed to the laws of its genre; in doing so it has reproduced 
reality in accordance with those rules," (Lincoln and Denzin 
1998:416). The Master Practitioners' transcripts revealed that 
people's ideas about their own futures were not only influenced by the 
language in which a proposition was couched, but also affected by the 
personal generalisations they had derived from their own past 
histories. Thus, when using NLP as a method for approaching an 
analysis of texts, many dimensions are brought to into view, not least 
among them being the power of people's perceptions of their own 
futures.
NLP also offers the researcher a way of identifying the many ways in 
which people use the factor of time in their constructs. This was
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explored In chapter 10. Again, here I only scratched the surface of a 
complex issue. If there is substance to the idea that language 
structures reveal not only the content of people's experiences, but 
also the means whereby these were constructed, then this way of 
analysing language may potentially also enable researchers to identify 
what epistemological processes lie buried below the surface of a text 
or speech. This notion is presented as another aspect of the 
hypothesis, which needs to be tested by further inquiry. Paradoxically, 
Lincoln and Denzin's caveat is not inconsistent with some of Bateson's 
deepest held beliefs; that we can only map the territory of 
experience, and were thus forever caught in the ontological double 
bind of knowing that we know that we cannot know.
13.6. Using NLP to investigate the phenomenology of learners' 
experiences
The complexity of the NLP model could make the investigation into 
the phenomenology of subjective experience more complex. It could 
also offer a more detailed map for exploring this terrain. I started by 
inquiring into the possible interactions between language, and the 
cognitive maps which were important to teaching and learning. What 
emerged was a model, not of maps, but of the processes we use to 
construct our maps. I believe an understanding of these to be basic to 
gaining new insights into the complex processes which are mediated 
through language, and which drive teaching and learning. On the way 
I became aware of both internal dialogue and the ubiquity of the 
directives in language about how the building blocks of knowledge 
were to be put together.
Seale (1999) warns that the issue of causal analysis in qualitative 
research should not be ignored, as, in his view, it so often is. My 
hypothesis relies on the notion that the epistemological processes that 
I have described in Chapter 11 have a causal function, in that they 
are agentive in the creation of cognitive maps. "Writers generally 
depend on carrying readers along with their sense of having been
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close to the field, so that causal asides ... are accepted as the 
successful application of verstehen", (Seale 1999:40). He urges that a 
useful corrective to this tendency would be the application of 
Popperian falsificationism to one's favourite theories. If on the other 
hand the model that is proposed is clearly defined as having the 
status of a hypothesis, then faisification seems to be appropriate to 
another type or phase of research in this area. Popperians would of 
course approach the model with falsification in view. Mapping our 
mapping processes is inevitably complex and fraught with the dangers 
of over-simplification.
At heart this was a phenomenological inquiry, which approached the 
experience of subjective, sense-making processes using the tools of 
NLP. Within this framework, however, I can claim some validity to my 
constructs, as they have been carefully obtained from interviews 
designed to uncover phenomena rather than to measure or test them. 
My aim was to obtain what Wertz (1985) describes as data that is "as 
faithful and complete a description of what was lived through by the 
interviewee as possible". (Wertz 1985:167).
Wertz also stresses that it is necessary to identify what he calls the 
'meaning units'. These are the result of the researcher's organisation 
of the parts they can work with. It is then up to the researchers to 
judge which constituents are relevant to the research. "In the case of 
every meaning unit, the researcher's comprehension is challenged to 
find relevance any way it can, and his (sic) choices are based on his 
specific ability to do so. The burden of proof rests on him." (Wertz 
1985:167). This, in Wertz's view, is where the limits of a researcher 
may be revealed. However, for him, a valid way of approaching 
phenomenological research is to reflect on the descriptive data, puli 
her reflections together, and "concisely express the psychological 
structure of the individual case", (Wertz 1985:178).
Giorgi (1985) makes the point that both phenomenology and 
psychology are not mature sciences, but are still in the process of
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coming into being. This reflects my own approach to my reflections on 
my collaborators' introspections. Giorgi (1985), further stresses that 
to be phenomenological means to return to the phenomena, and to 
obtain an eidetic intuition of their structures. He also urges that the 
investigator should be rigorous and systematic, "each defined 
according to how the very appearance of the phenomenon invites the 
researcher to be methodical, systematic and rigorous." (Giorgi 
1986:26). The method, rigour and system need to be defined 
according to the "very appearance of the phenomenon" (Giorgi 
1986:26). The extent and depth of the small number of interviews, 
and the use of the system of language structures proposed by Bandler 
and Grinder requires both rigour and a systematic approach.
Thus, this inquiry may have a phenomenological validity, yet be 
unacceptable to those of a posltivistic inclination. Denzin and Lincoln 
(1998) stress that what we take to be objective knowledge and truth 
is the result of perspective, holding that there is no 'real' world 
independent of human mental activity and human language. When 
considering the notion of truth as applied to research findings, they 
state that they prefer the notion of 'rightness' to truth, dismissing the 
idea of certainty as "a pretentious muddle of the psychological and 
the pseudological", (Denzin and Lincoln 1998:238). In their view, the 
idea of'rightness', that is, the ability of new constructs to fit into 
context, is a more appropriate one. Drawing on different methods 
can be like using a street map of London to inquire Into its geological 
structure. Both maps are equally valid, but are produced for radically 
different purposes. It is as if the range of qualitative methodologies 
that are available to the putative researcher can be metaphorically 
thought of as different protocols for the mapping of the same terrain.
Another of the aims of this research was to evaluate the use of the 
theoretical approach of NLP as an adjunct to phenomenological 
inquiry. Here I will allow the collection of my data to speak for itself. 
Not only has it uncovered an aspect to language, which has hitherto 
not received much attention, it has also indicated the existence of
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internal representations and sub-modalities, and given us glimpses 
into their complex dynamics. This is an addition to our understanding 
of cognitive processes. NLP has also been useful in textual analysis. I 
believe that it revealed more about people's cognitive processes that 
lay, as it were behind the language structures of the transcripts, than 
had I relied on Discourse Analysis as my main methodological 'lens'. 
Nevertheless, NLP itself is still in its Infancy, and needs the further 
refinements that constructive criticism can produce.
13.7, Action research, and reflections on Lincoln and Denzin's 
'Fifth Movement'.
Researchers that have reached this juncture are urged to be self- 
critical and to reflect on their research process. "Action researchers 
have the social intent of improving the quality of life for themselves 
and others, and this is deeply value laden", (McNiff et ai 1996.38). I 
am not sure whether the results of my Inquiry would improve the 
quality of life of an already overworked teaching profession; however 
I believe that if it generates energetic discussion and even heated 
disagreement, then it will have fulfilled some of its purpose, even If 
only to make people aware that there may be a vast field of research 
that has been opened up for further investigation and verification.
This marries well with the psychological-phenomenological approach, 
which McCall (1983) urges should "stand for a program to be 
developed, a set of recommendations to be followed", (McCall 
1983:97). He goes on to suggest that these can provide a preiude to 
what could assume the rationale for a new and improved psychology. 
That Is my perhaps over-ambitious hope for this work.
Lincoln and Denzin (1998) go on to challenge us with the implications 
of post-structuralism. Texts, in their view, have a political dimension; 
an author who claims some authority in the field writes them. This 
they refute: "The desire to produce an authoritative (valid) text is 
renounced, for any text can be undone in terms of its internal 
structural logic", (Lincoln and Denzin 1998:415). They stress that
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such research should not neglect issues of power, proposing that truth 
is political whereas verisimilitude is textual. There were certainly 
power issues in the carrying out of this research, which I reviewed in 
chapter 10, and re-visited in section 13.3 above. There are also the 
further issues of the penetration of texts by power and ideological 
standpoints, which Lincoln and Denzin stress that the fifth movement 
in qualitative research must take into active consideration.
Paradoxically, I believe that what I have uncovered about language, 
thought and epistemoiogy, may provide a set of more refined tools for 
uncovering such threads running through texts. Thus, a model of 
language, which assumes that there are identifiable embedded 
epistemological directives in texts, is surely one which could be used 
to reveal such facets to scrutiny? Can having a grasp of epistemoiogy 
mean. In some way, that we can be more aware of how information 
Influences people, even, perhaps unconsciously, the politically 
dispossessed? It could be that this research project is in some ways 
coherent with Lincoln and Denzin's fifth movement as part of the 
development of other approaches to qualitative research. It could 
possibly even provide it with new tools to use for textual analysis and 
interview design.
13.8. What has been learnt on the way.
This has been a journey, an obsession, and an exploration. It has 
been full of surprises, especially when information suddenly seemed 
to constellate Itself into new patterns of insights. My unconscious was 
as much a part of this process as were my conscious rational 
reflections. Perhaps one of the biggest surprises was the discovery 
that the 'pilot' studies yielded so much information, and that using 
NLP, there was almost no end to the many levels of analysis that I 
could have carried out. This meant leaving out some important 
aspects, such as the whole field of non-verbal communication and its 
many influences. I have also largely ignored the NLP model of meta­
programs (McWhirter 1992), which is almost a theory of personality.
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and describes some overall patterns that people use when responding 
to Information. I have perhaps been somewhat selective In the 
examples from the transcripts that I have used. McNIff et al (1996) 
stress the need to Identify collaborators who are representative of 
what one Is trying to show. The dividing line between seeking 
representativeness, and being biased seems to be a very fine one.
Were I to repeat this project, I would think about gathering less data 
on Internal representations and sub-modalltles, and more about the 
'higher' logical levels of people's changing beliefs and values. At the 
time I was unaware of the wealth of information that I would also 
glean from the analysis of the Master Practitioners'texts. I only 
became conscious of this on my return to the UK, when my 
collaborators were no longer available for further face-to-face 
Inquiries and follow-ups.
I have been committed to using NLP as my main approach. I 
recognise however that It Is not necessarily a perfect tool. The model 
that I used is based on work done In the early 1970s. Neither Bandler 
nor Grinder, who were the main originators, have developed their 
model of language further, or deliberately Invited scrutiny from the 
academic community. The meta-model also has its critics. Robbie 
(2000), who was one of Bandler's students and co-workers, has 
suggested that Bandler and Grinder have not kept up to date with 
other developments In linguistics, and that their model is therefore 
Incomplete. McWhlrter (2002, 2003), who runs his own training 
company specialising In NLP, has posted an extensive critique of NLP 
on the internet. He accuses Bandler and Grinder of neglecting other 
Important aspects of language such as metaphor. In his view, their 
models of language and personal change are not precise enough. He 
proposes that the meta-model should only be treated as an 
Incomplete Introduction to the complexities of language. He even 
suggests that language has a fractal aspect. He believes that unless 
people are trained to a higher level of precision In NLP, practitioners
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may use it without a full enough understanding of the underlying 
dynamics at work within language and thought.
NLP also has a culture of competitiveness and Is often explicitly anti- 
academic. It can be too slick, used too easily to Identify and exploit 
people's patterns of thinking, and may In some training schools 
encourage trainers to become manipulative In order to keep 
generating a cash flow. It can be used unethically, as In many 
trainings on selling. Claldlnl (2000) has described many techniques 
that can be used to Influence people's actions unconsciously. Despite 
these reservations, NLP Is used extensively In training sales people, as 
well as in general management training, (Bandler 1996). NLP has, 
however, never been applied and tested In the way that I have in this 
study within an academic context.
I could be accused of having ignored the spiritual dimension, which is 
considered Important by NLP trainers such as Robert Dilts (1976, 
1994, 1998). There are researchers who believe that qualitative 
research should engage more with this aspect of being human, 
(Lincoln and Denzin 1998, Heron 1998). Lincoln and Denzin (1998) 
have suggested that the time Is right for the emergence of what they 
term a 'fifth ' movement In qualitative research. They propose that 
the centre of the fifth movement lies "In the humanistic commitment 
of the qualitative researcher to study the world always from the 
perspective of the Interacting individual" (Lincoln and Denzin 
1998:407). This Is perhaps an Idealistic view; is It ever possible to 
study something purely from another perspective, without 'polluting' 
such Information through one's own beliefs and approaches? Perhaps 
NLP could be a useful adjunct to such explorations, particularly for 
tracking changes In how people make sense of life-changing events.
I believe the limitations of NLP are at the moment more In how It Is 
used, rather than about Its theoretical assumptions. Both have yet to 
be developed and tested more extensively. For me It was as If I had a 
different and more powerful high-resolutlon lens through which I
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caught fleeting glimpses of some mysterious creatures, which had not 
yet been described.
Throughout this Inquiry, I may have given the impression that I was 
inquiring into what I believed were the only ways of knowing. It was 
never my Intention to provide a complete description of 
consciousness, only to explore the interface between language and 
thought. This was as the result of my personal interest rather than my 
metaphysics. The topic of my Inquiry Is distinct from the Insights of 
the dreamer, or the ecstasy of the mystic where there has been a 
letting go of the ties of consciousness that bind (Epstein 1996). I 
have simply explored language, which is one of the most Important 
ways we have of being human, from a phenomenological perspective 
within the context of teaching and learning. Let Wittgenstein have the 
last word! "Philosophy may In no way Interfere with the actual use of 
language; it can only in the end describe it." (Wittgenstein, in Kenny 
1994:269).
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A Bedouin Story
There was once upon a time an old Bedouin who had three sons. He was 
ambitious for them to become leaders of the tribe. In the village lived a wise 
old man, many people went to him for advice with problems such as whether 
they should mate their camels, plant more date palms or take another wife.
One day he sent his firstborn son to the old man, to ask him how he could 
become a wise leader of men. The old man received him graciously /n n/s 
dusty old tent After they had exchanged the age old Arab greetings, the old 
man asked:
"What brings you here to me my son?"
"Ya Mahmoud, I  wish to become wise and be a leader of men.
The old man looked at him, running his hands through his grey beard. There 
was a silence, then he said:
"My son, you must go into the desert for thirty days, and report back to the 
tribe what you found."
The young man was a little surprised, but he did as the old man suggested. 
Early one morning he took his favourite camel, laden with food and goat 
skins full of water, and walked away from his father's tent into the wide, and 
hot desert, not knowing v/hat he would find.
They travelled a long time, through rough country and bright red sand 
dunes. The camel's plodding hoof beats were about the only sounds that the 
young man heard in the throat parching heat of the evenings, when they did 
most of their travelling (because it was cooler than during the day). When 
they stopped for the night, it was pleasant for the young man to drink the 
water the camel had carried for him, even though it tasted of goatskins. They 
slept under the stars, so close to each other that the young man could reach 
out and stroke the sleeping camel's rough fur, whereon she would grunt with 
pleasure.
One day they arrived at a beautiful wadi, a dried riverbed, just as the sun 
was setting, making the sky blaze with golden light.
"Oh" said the young man, "this is beautiful. I  could stay here and enjoy these 
feelings for ever." Then he remembered his task. "I'm sure my fellow 
tribesmen would love to hear about the wonderful feelings that the desert 
produces. That would surely be very wise".
So he spent many days writing about all the feelings that the desert 
produced in him, of joy, terror, interest, pleasure, excitement, and fear of
the unknown.
One day he arrived back at his village, and everyone came to greet him. 
"What have you discovered?" they asked him, with great anticipation.
"Oh my friends, I  want to share with you all the feelings I  had in the desert 
replied the young man. And he told them. He listed every feeling, and then 
far into the night noticed that the tribesmen had crept back into their tents, 
as they weren't very interested. And the young man went back to his father, 
and tended camels for the rest of his life.
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One day, many months afterwards, the second son went to the wise man's 
dusty old tent, exchanged the age old Arab greetings, and when the old man 
asked him what he wanted, this young man told him that he wanted to learn 
to be wise enough to be a leader of his tribe.
"In that case" said the old man, pulling at his grey beard, you must go out 
into the desert for thirty days, and come back and tell the tribesmen what 
you found." So this young man set off with his favourite camel, carrying a 
supply of food and water on its back. They wandered for some days, until 
they came to a sandy plain. As he looked at it, the young man suddenly had 
an idea. "What if  I  counted the grains of sand on this plain, and told my 
fellow tribesmen? Surely that would make me wise?"
So he set about counting the grains of sand. In the evenings, oniy the sound 
of his counting, and the snorting of his camel could be heard on the desert 
air. Before they slept, he would talk to his camel, drink her sweet milk, and 
tell her how many millions or trillions he had counted that day.
One day he arrived back at his village, and everyone came to greet him. 
"What have you discovered?" they asked him, with great anticipation.
"Oh my brothers and friends" he replied. "I have counted the grains of sand 
on the great red plain, and found ten thousand trillion million, one hundred 
and forty two thousand, six hundred and eighty three grains of sand. Is that 
not truly wonderful?"
But his fellow tribesmen did not share his enthusiasm. They looked 
disappointed, muttered amongst themselves, and then went off to one of the 
tents to smoke a hookah. The young man was disappointed, went home, and 
grew date palms for the rest of his life.
Some time later, the father of the three young men told his youngest born to 
go to the wise old man, and ask him how he could become a leader of the 
tribe. This young man would rather have stayed at home drawing pictures in 
the sand outside his tent, but he went, because it is written that one must 
obey one's father. They exchanged the age old melodious Arabic greetings, 
and then the old man asked him what he wanted. The young man told him 
that he wanted to learn to be wise enough to be a leader of his tribe.
"In that case" said the wise old man, pulling at his grey beard, "you must go 
out into the desert for thirty days, and come back and tell the tribesmen 
what you found. "
So this young man took his favourite camel, laden with food and drink, and 
one evening their footsteps could be heard getting fainter as they went off 
into the vast unknown desert. They wandered about for some time, exploring 
wadis, and visiting the red plain, and the young man wandered and 
wondered at how he could learn to be wise in this unknown and hostiie place. 
One evening he came to the crest of a hili, and saw many mountains and 
valieys in the distance.
"I wonder if  anyone has ever seen these before?" said the young man to 
himself, as he looked at the landscape. But then he realised that perhaps no 
one could ever find their way through these strange mountains, so might 
never be able to describe them to his feliow tribesmen.
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The distant hiiis iooked tempting, so he decided to go there. He said to his 
faithful camel "my friend, we are going to strange new places" and the camel 
grunted. Then the young man had an idea. "I wonder if  I  can cnakea sort of 
image of how to get into and out of the mountains as I  go along? he asked 
himself, and no sooner had he thought this, that a picture came to his mind 
of representing the compiex mountains, dried river beds and oases by 
scratching iines on a goatskin, which had been used to carry the precious 
water, and was by now very smelly.
So he wandered up and down strange wadis, over rocky hiiis and sometimes 
rested in smaii oases where there were sweet dates on the trees. And 
aiways he scratched the outlines of the mountains, and many other features 
he discovered on the goatskin, so that he could at least tell his fellow 
tribesmen where he had been, and how to get there again.
When the end of the thirty days came, he looked at the goatskin, and it was 
frankly rather a mess. "Oh dear" he said to himself. "They will think me a 
fool for wasting my time, bringing back such an inelegant thing as the 
outlines of mountains, paths, rivers and oases scratched on to this old snielly 
goatskin. " So it was with fear and disappointment that he returned to the 
village on the appointed day. Everyone came to greet him. "What have you 
discovered?" they asked him, with great anticipation.
"Alas" he replied. "I have not brought you any great wisdom. All I  have is 
this old goatskin with scratches on it, to teii you where I've been and what 
I've discovered. I t  is incomplete, my brothers, but hear my tale".
So they sat around the fire, which was filling the desert air with the scent of 
special woods burning,, and he told them of his journeys, showing them 
where he had been by pointing at certain iines on the skin. The fellow 
tribesmen were fascinated, and therefore did not mind the smeii of oid 
goatskin. Soon they were all crowding round, asking "what is there? What is 
here?" as they pointed at the various signs he had scratched. Soon it was 
night, and the sky was full of stars as bright as only they can get in the 
desert sky. Stiii they asked questions, and then, when it was nearly the hour 
of the dawn prayer, the wise old man, who had crept into the throng without 
being noticed said:
"My son, you are truly wise, for you have brought back a map, so that 
everyone can now find their way around the desert."And they all cheered, 
and embraced him, before facing Mecca and praising Allah.
The young man became the leader of the tribe, and spent many more hours 
in the desert, making more maps, content that although they were 
incomplete, his peopie could now find their way to places of which they had 
never even dreamed of before.
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Transcript of the Interview with 'Ina'. April 2000.
Interviewer: Jane Mathison.
1  OK Ina, so what Tm going to do is just read some sentences to you, and 
you respond in whatever way, and if you can respond with what do you do 
internally ... as the result of my words, that would be lovely. OK. So if I 
were to say to you think of a time when you were happy? what happens? 
Ina: I immediately start smiling, {iaughs gentiy)
T Smiling, yeah. What happens before the smile?
Ina: I picture a picture of when I was happy, I picture a story in my life 
which brings joy and which I think of fondly comes straight into my head 
and I'm there.
T You're associated. Yeah yeah.
Ina: Yeah. Associated. Warm feelings 
1  ...and you're pointing to the left. Is the picture to the left?
Ina: Yeah, It's actually right in front of me there. {Points in front of her)
1  About two feet in front of you. Yes?
Ina: Yeah.
T 3D? Colour?
Ina: 3D. Colour. Movement, I  can even hear what I'm saying and what 
people are saying to me, I can even remember a touch. I've got, you know 
I've got the whole thing.
L Lovely. Well you were really there, so I'm wondering what happens if I 
change the sentence slightly. To remember a time when you were happy?
Ina: (pause) I have many pictures now, in slides, it's silent, ... and I'm
actually looking at the slides, so I'm dissociated, putting the slides down, of 
happy moments, but I'm outside, they're in my hand, and I'm putting them 
down like cards.
T Any sounds?
Ina: No, silence.
T Feelings? Kinaesthetic?
Ina: Warm.
L Any difference between the kinaesthetics between those two experiences? 
Ina: Yeah, this one was joy and ... I'm up, but ready to go back into that 
picture, this one {point to the others) is yeah, I remember that, I  remember 
that...
L Great. So that's question one. So now we go on to question two. How do 
you respond if I just ask you How are appies and oranges different?
Ina: (pause) ... a sweet apple and a bitter orange.
L How do you know?
Ina: I taste them.
J. So the first thing that comes is the taste?
Ina: Yes.
J. eh he
Ina: And then, colour.
L  Yeah. So when you see colour, what are you doing. Are you making a 
picture?
Ina: Yeah, apples, oranges.
L Two pictures?
Ina: I've got two pictures, two scenes.
L Where's the apple as a matter of interest?
Ina: Here.
T To the left?
Ina: One is sweet, bitter orange.
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L OK. nice. So what happens if I  now say to you how are apples and 
oranges the same.
Ina: The shape. They're both round, (laughter)
T Yes! What's happened to the picture?
Ina: I've actually put the apple on top of the orange, (laughter)
T Yes I  can see. You were gesticulating with your hands. Yeah.
Ina: They're the same shape.
T  Are the apple and orange superimposed over one another?
Ina: Yeah.
T  OK. Wow. All right. SO question three Is a bit different. Can you be 
aware of how you relate to someone you value?
In a : (pause) yeah,
T  Yes.
Ina: Yeah.
T  What happened before you said the yes?
Ina: I actually thought of the person that I  value. I had to picture it, and 
then I (laughter) I  was like... if she was sitting there I would, you know... 
how do I ... how do I  respect and value her.
T  So you actually see her?
Ina: Yeah.
T  Sitting over there in that chair?
Ina: Yeah.
T Fine. How is that different to can you think of a relationship with a person 
you value?
Ina: (pause) yeah, (laughter) he's floating! Yeah.
T  Who? Someone's floating?
Ina: Yeah. I visualise there, that space, looking down at me.
T That person's looking down at you. Life size?
Ina: Life size.
T OK. Movement?
Ina: Yeah. The mannerisms of that person I  value, I  know what he does 
when he greets...
T  Yeah
Ina: ...or when I was nervous ... you know, times when I've needed his 
friendship and he's trying to make me relax, he does things ...
3. So just to compare the two, when you were looking at the person you 
value over there, the first one, was there the same amount of movements, 
less movement, more movement in one or the other.
Ina: Em, she was still. I had movement in him.
J. You had movement in the second one?
Ina: Yeah.
J. So the person there was kind of moving, interacting with you?
Ina: Yeah.
T All right. Here comes some biology. So just let me know your responses 
to this. In the heart the ventricles contract to pump blood around the body. 
The atria receive blood from the body. Closure of the valves at the bases of 
the main arteries prevent the back flow of blood on ventricular relaxation. 
Ina: (pauses) ... I  have blue and red, I have the heart actually pumping, I 
can see the actual movement in and the movement out, but that's probably 
due to my education.
T  Yes, because you're a nurse, but you're kind of pointing to your own 
heart.
Ina: Yes, and here's it's coming in, and going out. (points to places on her 
chest).
J. OK. And blue and red?
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Ina: Yeah, and the heart moving. Pumping.
J. So, what happens if I were to say your heart is a pump and receives 
blood from your body and pumps blood around your body. Imagine your 
ventricies contracting and squeezing blood into the main arteries so they 
need valves at their bases that close, so that blood isn't sucked back when 
the ventricle relaxes. (My voice was slow and a bit monotonous).
Ina: Picture of a diagram.
L You get a picture of a diagram? (laughter)
Ina: Yeah, (laughs) I  get the picture of a diagram like from when we were 
studying with actual ...
L  It's on the table is it?
Ina: Yeah, it's on the table with actual arrows pointing in and pointing out, 
the valves ... yeah. I've got a diagram.
L  Mh mh
Ina: I  can't see the heart pumping, it's just a diagram, a still, and the 
arrows are actually pointing in, pointing out, and the valves, like that, you 
know, this is open, this is closed.
L  Yeah.
Ina: Actually I  couldn't think of it pumping!
L  The second one there's no pumping, the first one you were pumping.
Ina: The first one was pumping, I immediately saw it.
T  It  seemed to me you also felt it in your chest.
Ina: Yeah, but this one was just a diagram.
L  Outside? dissociated?
Ina: Yeah, when you were giving me the Instructions I  actually had the 
diagram, yeah.
T OK.
Ina: Whoo, sorry. What did you think of that?
T  I think what is so fascinating is that you just get a response, and there's 
no right or wrong responses, it's just a response. OK. You obviously know 
your heart.
Ina: (laughter) I think to make sense I  had... first instructions you had 
were nice, the second instructions you gave me were more textbook. i he 
language was unfamiliar yet it needed textbook picture, whereas the first 
language was un textbook like, it was understandable to a nurse or a 
layman, it was easy, the second one I needed a diagram for myself. It 
reminded me of school.
T  Oops! OK. So we're on to number five, and this is essentially running 
something through a series of different modal operators, it's something 
we've already done. So can you think of something quite ordinary, you 
know, like cleaning your teeth, something that you're going to do in the 
near future, sort of something fairly pedestrian. Now, what happens if I say 
you will do it.
Ina: I  agree. Can do, will do.
T  Is that an internal dialogue?
Ina: Yeah.
T  And do you have a picture of what you're going to do?
Ina: I'm actually doing it.
T  You're actually doing it. OK. Yeah. So you're doing it, and you're saying to
yourself...
Ina: You can do it.
T  So back to the picture of what it is you're going to do, or the internal
representation of it. What happens if I say you might do it.
Ina: You've frozen my picture, (her bleep goes off) I'm still....
L  Do you want to answer your bleep?
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Ina: Yes please, (pauses, microphone accidentaiiy disconnected .for a short 
time). It stopped the movement, whereas when I said 'I  will' I was actually 
performing, 'might do' has actually frozen me.
1  So what happens if I say you can't do it?
Ina: Exit picture.
L You mean the picture's gone?
Ina: No, just me, out. I was there, and now I'm looking at what I'm  
supposed to have done.
L  OK. And what happens if I say you should do it?
Ina: I've stepped back in the picture. I'm aware of my surroundings.
J. Is the picture all round you?
Ina: yeah. I've stepped back into the picture and I'm looking around, and 
I'm basically saying to myself well have ago, see what happens, have a go, 
see what happens.
1  Oh! You can do it?
Ina: I'm there. I'm actually. I'm  swinging. I'm doing it. I'm looking around, 
looking at what I'm supposed to be doing, and I'm ready. Yeah.
J. Has the picture changed in any ways?
Ina: Yeah, there's movement, there's sound. I'm looking at everything 
around me, and I'm saying to myself'some on then girl, keep going'.
L And is it more so than in you should do it?
Ina: Yeah, in should, it was silent, in 'I  can' there's sound I can hear what's 
going on around me. I  think I  should is more private. I'm like 'I'm  going to 
give it a go!'.
L  Yeah. So with the 'should' you've got an internal dialogue, and the 
outside Is silent?
Ina: Is silent.
L And what happens if I  say you  could do itT
Ina: Yeah, it re-enforces my 'I  can'. It's just given m e ,... go ahead... more.
I have support by somebody saying I  could. 'Go on, you could do it, you 
could do it'. I'm actually, yeah, my coaches ...
J. So you're touching your left shoulder. Is that as if somebody's kind of 
encouraging you?
Ina: Yeah yeah.
L So, picture?
Ina: Yeah. Yeah, ' I  could' is me actually going out to the dug out 
(indistinct), and I'm getting a 'could' and 'I  can' I'm actually at the batting, 
right there, on my own, but still aware, but 'I could' is like I  have somebody 
on my back.
J. Encouraging you! OK. this is content free but I'm quite interested to know 
what it was. Is it a sport or something?
Ina: Yes it was, it was my, ... soft ball 
L Oh, OK.
Ina: You sort of like freeze when you get to the batting mount, so it 
depends who sends you out. If  they say 'you will do it, you could do it or 
you can do i t ...'. Brings back memories.
L So modal operators might actually be quite...
Ina: Helps me play better...
1, ... powerful in terms of your performance.
Ina: That's what I say when I'm  getting ready to hit. 'I  will, I will I will'. 
With the 'I  could' is just an extra support for me. Somebody actually has 
faith in me to say, go on, you can do it!
T Just as a matter of interest, as I went through these modal operators, 
was there anything like stacking an anchor going on?
Ina: yeah, I can, and I will, and you could ... it's just that I'm out here ...
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L Did they all sort of influence each other?
Ina: With the 'I  will' then you've told me, and I will do it, so I've already 
future done It, I will do It, and I can has put me there, 'I  can do it'. I'm  
there. And 'could' somebody's just reinforcing me, bringing me forward.
L So with the ... It seems to me, and again I'm  not sure. I'm really just 
suggesting something, trying not to mind read ,... it seems to me that 
you've developed like an ... attraction?
Ina: ... yeah, a pull, the further down we've gone the more the pull has 
developed. I feel safe, I feel great, I  fell like somebody actually believes 
that I can do it.
J. OK
Ina: Somebody values me as a player!!!
L  Yes, that's always important.
Ina: Oh God here she comes, it's like, 'oh great, we've got a chance there 
to get some home runs.'
L Yeah. OK. Well we could talk about that for a long time but we're on to 
question six. Think about something you have to do but you're not sure 
you particularly want to do?
Ina: Yeah. I  have to {indistinct^) ... what a repulsion! I  have to .... Bound 
by duty.
L  So what was the first response? Was it a K?
In a : Yeah.
J. Because it seemed to me, and again I might be mind reading, so just let 
me check this out with you. It  seemed to me that you were running 
something through... saying something to yourself. Maybe you were just 
running my words through again.
Ina: No, I actually visualised it, what I'm  supposed to be doing, and what I 
have to do.
L  OK OK.
Ina: It's like. I had it back there, it's like Oh God, I've still got to do that!
L  Picture in front?
Ina: Picture in front, yeah. You've just made me bring it forward. I did have 
it back there. {Points to where she 'sees' the image).
T  You had It behind you first?
Ina: I had it behind, and I was, you know, repeating the question, I had to 
bring it forward, yeah, I have to do it.
1  So novv imagine that you were in the future having done it?
Ina: Well I would hope that I've done it would be a good outcome. I won't 
know until I did it because I  can get two reactions to it, I  do it, depending 
on the outcome it might be a good one or a bad one, depending on the 
person involved.
L  OK
Ina : My intentions would have been ABC... somebody else's may have been 
CDE.
L So what's happened now that I've asked you to step into the future and 
imagine you've done it, what are you doing on the inside in response to that 
question?
Ina: Well if I do It this way, will she be pleased, but if I do it that was... to 
please me, will she be pleased. I  know what I  have to do but what I want to 
do. I'm going to get two different...
L  Do you have two pictures?
Ina: Yeah 
L Where are they?
Ina: Out in front.
J. Which one's on the left?
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Ina: The one I  have to do. The one I want to do is.... {points in another 
direction).
T Let's assume that It's successful and you're in the future looking back on 
it...
Ina: Yeah,
T Where's the picture now?
Ina: In front of me. I  know I  could lead to this way but I  just don't want to 
think about that though...
T  So there's another one down by the left that you're not looking at?
Ina: 'Cos I haven't done It but I would like the one...
T  I'm sure you'll find the necessary resources to have a good outcome. OK. 
So, on with the interrogation...
Ina: ...just down on the floor.
T  Can you remember a mildly unpleasant experience, ... mildly ....
Ina: OK.
T Response? You're looking down.
Ina: Disappointment really.
T Right, so it's a strong K?
Ina: Yeah, I've seen it.
T  You've seen it, but is it down on your... It's down on the floor? OK. What 
happens if I  say how do you feel about it?
Ina: I got angry.
J. So...
Ina: Disappointed the way it turned out, but I'm also angry because it went 
the way it did. I t  shouldn't have done that.
J. OK. So has... and again don't let me put words into your mouth, ... asking 
how you feel about it (bleep goes off) Has the asking 'how you feel about' it 
in any way amplified your kinaesthetic response?
In a: Yeah,
1  'Cos you didn't mention anger the first time
Ina: I  was just seeing the picture and I'm  listening to what was going on 
and I'm seeing both person's involved, and I knew those persons, that's 
why disappointment came first, then the anger.
T Was there anger after I said 'how do you feel about it?'
Ina: yeah.
T OK. Do you want to answer your bleep?
Ina: Yes please, {pause)
T On to question number eight. What if I were to say to you: you are 
good at NLP but you need to work on your rapport skills.
Ina: I'm thinking, ooh, what have I demonstrated... you've given me ... I'm  
questioning your ability...
T You're questioning your abilities. OK.
Ina: The next question would be 'how can I improve it'?
X So it's like you're paying more attention to the second part of the 
sentence than the first.
Ina: Yeah. I like the first bit. The second bit I need to work on.
X OK, so if I were to say you need to work on your rapport skills but you 
are good at NLP?
In a : OK.
X Does that change anything?
Ina: Actually, I don't have the (indistinct) that I had with the first one.
X OK. So the first one was more powerful?
Ina: Yeah. You made it sound like my rapport skills were acceptable, but I 
could get better, but you d idn't... there was like no force or anything, there 
was no focus on it,
J. OK
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Ina: ...because you but the 'but' in, and you said I was good at NLP, OK,
I'm going to take the second value.
J. You ended it good? OK. So ending it good has a different effect on you 
than ending it bad?
Ina: With 'bad' I automatically start thinking 'how can I make it better'.
X OK so if I were to say to you think about your rapport skiiis so that you 
can be even better at NLP?
Ina: That's great. I'm happy, you're not questioning my ability. I'll just take 
it into account.
X So is it an internal dialogue, or are you seeing pictures, or is it just a 
kinaesthetic response or any one or all three?
Ina: Pictures and kinaesthetic. Pictures of what I was like in class, and the 
feeling I was getting from the group. Yeah. Nice.
X Yeah. OK. the next one, we're on number nine now, is think of something 
you might have done better. Again, pick something that isn't a biggie.
Ina: OK.
X And just see what happens if I give you feedback in two different ways. If  
I say you did that wrong or you did that wrongly, is there a difference?
Ina: You did that wrongly makes me ... fiddle about?... (indistinct) you did 
it wrongly gives me room to make it better. Wrongly notices some things 
that I've done wrongly so I can make that better, but with wrong I'm going 
to have to start all over again, I must have done a big boo boo.
X So with the 'wrong' is there a picture? I  mean, you're going like this with 
your hands.
Ina: Yeah
X Yeah, and wrongly?
Ina: Wrongly, I have a picture, and I have ... I'm actually ... I'm aware of 
what I'm doing and I'm just thinking, everyone's looking and I'm actually 
going to think about this. So I'm actually having an Internal dialogue, and 
it's like they're frozen, but I'm actually having a dialogue saying to myself 
'OK, Ina, how are you going to do this? remember your points, look at your 
lesson plan', so they're frozen, yeah, and I'm .... I'm making improvement 
and I'm actually checking ....
X It  wouldn't be a series of slides ... ?
Ina: No no, my lesson plan...
X OK. You've got your lesson plan actually in front of you. Like a stack?
Ina: Sort of at waist level.
X Yeah. OK. Thank you! (laughter) OK we're on to question ten so we're 
half way through. What happens if I say remember your chiidhood?
Ina: {Long pause). I t  was hard.
X It  was hard. Picture?
Ina: Just the word childhood, and I'm getting flash backs of things I had to 
do and things I had to put up with.
J. Right, flashbacks in terms of....
Ina: Way back there!
X Way back there, but they seemed to be in front of you at one point.
Ina: Oh yeah yeah. Oh no I can handle it.
X Sure sure sure.
Ina: Questions come up, why this, why that? What if? {she shows signs of 
distress).
X OK. Internal dialogue. So let's go through the next one very quickly. Just 
give me a... just dip in and out, remember being a chiid? {pause) Just dip in 
and out.
Ina: Yeah. No, I remember, I can see me as a child, but I'm remembering 
with this head.
J. Yeah
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Ina: If  you know what I mean...
X I know what you mean.
Ina: I can see myself as a child, with a child's body. I can see ... the girl, as 
the girl, who was nine and had the head of a seventeen or eighteen year 
old, kind of...
X OK, so you're looking at her at nine, there in front of you?
Ina: She wasn't thinking as nine, she was thinking of ... you know, ten 
years her agJ. OK. so let's move quickly on to the next one. this is just 
exploration. Is it any different if I say remember your self as a child?
Ina: (pause) I was lonely.
X So is that a K?
it, I had brothers and sisters and stuff but I  felt lonely.
X OK. That's fine. And pictures, sounds...?
Ina: Oh yeah, I can hear the family going on...
X Can't we all. Yeah!
Ina: They never seem to .go silent.
X Oh dear!
Iona: But yeah, they're going on having {indistinct) but being a child, I was 
carrying I was ten years, and I was .... {indistinct)....
X OK, so it's obviously a biggie, and you know, it takes a lot of shit to 
produce the best roses, (laughter from both people.)
Ina: But when you think your parents are there to develop the roses and it 
turns out that you have to do the developing of the roses, that's when it's 
hard. It's like, hold on a minute. I'm still nine, still ten.
X OK. Those questions evoked quite a lot of stuff. I mean, I appreciate you 
sharing that, and you can zoom it out, so question eleven, think of 
something you do really well. And there's lots of things you do really well. 
Ina: Yeah.
X OK? What's your response?
Ina: {laughs) it's like I'm having an internal dialogue saying yeah, you 
really do that really well, and you know you do it well so go forth, so it's like 
I'm giving myself the old pat on the shoulder, and going you know...
X Picture?
Ina: Yeah.
X Picture before internal dialogue or after?
Ina: No, I've actually said it to myself, as I'm saying it as well, the picture's 
coming up. It's everywhere
X Sort of all round? What happens if I say to you now as you're looking at it 
how could you make it even better?
Ina: {iong pause) this is going to sound really weird, but it's like I need to 
have my mum in the picture and say 'look what I  can do!'
X OK.
Ina: Look look look look, take it in. That sound weird, doesn't it.
X No!
Ina: Anything I do, anything good. I'm proud of this, it's like you said look 
what I can do!
X ... and you're pointing to a series of pictures in front of you from left to 
right?
Ina: yeah, look.
X And again, if I said to you what are you not paying attention to, what 
happens?
Ina: In my picture?
X Wherever.
Ina: I can still see the good stuff, looking at it, enjoying it.
X Yeah. Could you be looking at it differently at all?
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Ina: Oh no.
X Great. The next one is a fairly simple one. So, imagine something you 
might do.
Ina: OK.
X And what happens, what's the difference between me saying you can't do 
that and you can't do that yet?
Ina: What do you mean you can't? I put up my defences. I can do it.
X Internal dialogue? OK. And 'you can't do that yet?' What sort of 
response? Do you just go 'OK'?
Ina: OK for now, but why? {Laughter) OK, I'll take that in but why? Just 
explain. The 'I  can't' is ... I get defensive. And 'I can't yet', OK I'll accept it 
for now, but I'm going to do It, for now, unless you tell me otherwise.
X OK. Next one's a little bit longer. Think of a goai you have in your iife.
Ina: OK.
J. And you've got the VAK\ the lot? OK. What happens if I ask you what do 
you need to achieve it?
Ina: What do I  need? I'm making a list. I've made a list of all the things I 
need.
X And what happens if I ask you how wiii you achieve it?
Ina: I don't know until I start activating my list (laughter) I need a trip to 
go home to England first, the process starts then.
X And if I ask you why wiii you achieve it? What happens to your internal 
response?
Ina: Because I  want to achieve it. There's a need. I  have to.
X You touched your chest right then. Is that like a K?
Ina: I have to.
X So it's something important to you. And if I now say what will it be like to 
have achieved that now?
Ina: It  would be excellent. I would be working on my degree.
X I don't think you'll have any problems there.
Ina: Thank you. I'll be very proud. I'll be happy.
X So now if I ask you to think of the goal again, has anything changed from 
the first representation, between the first representation and the last one?
Ina: You know the question of how will you do it? I've actually visualised 
how I'm going to do it before activating my list.
X OK.
Ina: I've actually ... doing my degree, and ... I've done something because 
I'm doing it, because I know the 'how' so I'm actually seeing myself doing 
it.
X OK.
Ina: I've done it!
J. So when you think of the goal again, has that changed?
Ina: Yeah, it's like I'm on my way to achieve it.
X Movement? Attraction?
Ina: Yeah, whereas the 'how' stopped me, because I was like.... I've got 
this list, how am I going to do it, That's what I said, I hadn't activated my 
list yet. But saying that I've achieved it, and how do I feel, it feels the how 
has already been done, because I've done it, and I've succeeded, very 
happy.
X Congratulations. OK. Next question. What happens if I say you must not 
imagine a biue camel?
Ina: {long pause) I'm sitting here thinking of a blue camel.
X And if I say don't make that mistake again!
Ina: The blue camel? Or just the words?
 ^This is an abbreviation for visual, auditory, kinaesthetic.
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X Anything.
Ina: It  doesn't feel too good.
X You maybe think of a mistake?
Ina: Yeah.
X I said don't...
Ina: ...just thinks of the things you've done, cringing, good cringe, just 
'don't do it again'.
J. Picture, sounds?
Ina: Internal dialogue again. 'Oh Ina, I don't believe you did that'!
X So if I said Enjoy your holiday and your time off?
Ina: That's good, that's cool.
X A good K?
Ina: A good K, yes 
X Pictures?
Ina: Airport? Family, holiday.
X So you see...?
Ina: The rain, the wind, looking forward to it.
X Yes. Slides or film, movie, colour, black and white?
Ina: I'd say slides, it has to be still, because the family will be there. We'll 
do this, we'll do that, so I'm probably thinking of our last holiday, we'll be 
doing this, going to Grand Ma's, going to in laws.
X It  looks to me as if they're all on the table as you're pointing.
Ina: Yeah.
X The next one might sound a bit silly, just interested to know if there's any 
different kind of response if I were to say to you Enjoy your trip and have a 
good break?
Ina: You've shortened my holiday!
X Oh, sorry!
Ina: It's not a trip, it's a holiday. I  like the word holiday.
X You don't like the word trip?
Ina: Trip I consider is a weekend away which I do to Jeddah.
X Yeah.
Ina: But a holiday ... you don't get a trip to England, you get a holiday to 
England.
X OK. It's a nice complex equivalence, {laughter)
Ina: Yeah, trip equals Jeddah.
X Right. We're on to number sixteen. Think about how much you've learnt? 
Ina: What, everything?
X Anything you want.
Ina: Wow.
X What produced the wow?
Ina: The 'God you really did that, well done.'
(interruption)
X OK. so 'think about how much you've learnt'?
Ina: I've learnt a lot. I've still got a lot to learn. You've got this, this, this, 
and you've still got this ... still haven't learnt this, so I've learnt this, but I 
still have...
X So, you seem to have an internal representation of something you've 
learnt, and that's close to your chest, and you seem to have a circle beyond 
that of things you're still...
Ina: ...which I have to learn.
X You have to learn. Right.
Ina: I can see myself up there.
X Are you paying more attention to what you haven't yet learnt by any 
chance?
437
Appendix 3. Interviewee: 'Ina'. Interviewer: Jane Mathison. 438
Ina: I'm forever making notes, so if I hear something, or I hear of a 
practice, or a skill, or just things people say, or I've attended these various 
symposiums or seminars, I put it down, 'oh may be that will come in handy 
for the hospital, or maybe that will come in handy towards so and so. I'll 
look that up. In my job I can do that, whereas the other girls can't.
X OK. So internal representation of what you've learnt close to your chest, 
the rest out there, and then you go in to seeing yourself writing things 
down.
Ina: Yes.
X So what happens if I say Are you aware of how much you've learnt?
Ina: (pause) I know what I know. ... but I've still got to learn more. I don't 
know everything. It's that word 'aware'. I still have yet to learn.
X It seemed to me that you were searching much more.
Ina: I can't put down how much I know, how much I've learnt, it's just I 
can't... I can't I've learnt this, tick. I've learnt that, tick. I know what I 
know. There's still other things I have to learn. So I'm probably more 
aware of what I might need to know, than to what I already know.
J. You see the interesting thing is your gestures are completely different, 
because what you know is now further in front of you, and then what you 
don't know is up, up there.
{end of first side of tape. Turn over.)
J. Lovely. OK. SO, if I say it's a nice day, the sun is shining, we couid all go 
to the desert?
{Laughter)
Ina: I don't think we'should be going to the desert in this heat. It's all 
sweaty. It's not a good idea.
X Did you make pictures?
Ina: I made a picture, yeah 
X And then you ... what happened 
Ina: I associated.
X Yes. And you felt the heat?
Ina: I felt the heat, and the uncomfortable sweat and the...
X OK. And is that any different to, it's a nice day and the sun is shining so 
we couid all go to the desert?
Ina: We could all go? ... Still nothing, no change. Not even a picture. Just 
don't go to the desert in May!
X It's only April!
Ina: April, beg your pardon, {laughter)
X_Change of subject a little bit. It's important to understand 
communication.
Ina: (pause) I'm agreeing with you.
X How are you representing it though?
Ina: I'm seeing things at work.
X In front of you?
Ina: Yes. {pause) I  am listening to what everyone is saying, and I'm saying 
to myself that it's important, that's why we have to be aware of it.
X OK. And is that in any way different to it's important to understand 
communicating?
Ina: (Pause) understand communicating. I'm communicating. I'm  
visualising... I'm doing the communicating.
X So in the other one, there was general communication going on?
Ina: Communication. And I'm going 'that's why it's important' and to 
understand communicating, what I'm actually doing the communicating, 
and I  see the responses of the people.
X Is there more movement?
Ina: Yeah, more movement.
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X More sounds?
Ina: Only for me though. Only for me, yeah, just me, doing the. 
X Brilliant. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you so much.
439
Appendix 4. Master Practitioner Transcript of interview between ‘Edward’ and ‘Steve’. 440
Transcript of 'Edward' interviewing 'Steve', 8^ *' May 2000
Edward: Is there anything you wanted from the NLP course before you
actually started it?  ^ .
Steve: Just information really about accelerated learning techniques and
how NLP was different or similar to hypnosis.
Edward: Right. You looked into NLP before?
Steve: Yea yeah.
Edward: And so did you have any expectations of the NLP course ...
Steve: Emm, the course itself, really, no.
Edward: What were the goals you had coming to the NLP course.
Steve: O h ,... main goal was to satisfy my curiosity, and anything after that 
was a plus really to be honest.
Edward: How did you think you could use these goals if you achieve them. 
Steve: ... interesting question. I suppose... I suppose I didn t have any 
preconceptions about using them after, I  hadn't, I didn t perceive myse 
using the skills after the course, it was mainly out of curiosity that I 
undertook the course , but the reality was different.
Edward: OK. With the skills that you now learned, and the different things 
you've become aware of, do you think there's anything that you can now 
achieve that you didn't think you could achieve before?
Steve: Thousands of things!
Edward: Really.
Steve: Yeah, thousands of things, from very very small things to
considerably bigger things. '
Edward: How is it that you think the NLP will help you achieve all these
different things? . .   ,
Steve" I have been successful in most endeavours that I have undertaken, i 
haven't... I suppose I  really haven't had a conscious strategy for achieving 
outcomes of different kinds in many areas of my life, I suppose I  believed 
that I was a failure, or that I  had failed, certainly, and I  think NLP has given 
me the ability to see things from a different, a different perspective, many
different perspectives, really. I suppose.  ^  ^ . .
Edward: OK Saying that you perceived in the past that you failed to achieve 
the things you wanted to do, using the NLP you've learnt, do you think the
things you tried to do were failures? .
Steve: No, no, I look at them a lot differently now, and I  see them in a lot... 
in a lot better light, if you like, it's hard to describe them, but better 
actually, sub-modality wise you could say in a much brighter light. And I 
think th a t ... yeah well I  suppose that's it really., they're., they definitely 
don't seem to have the same impact in my present life as they did have 
before the course.
Edward: OK. Are you able to look back at these events and break them 
down into the useful part, the part that really have no value, and the part 
that may have some value but you're not aware of yet.
Steve: I think mainly the parts that were not of any use to me, and in those 
situations I wouldn't use those again, really. You know, I wouldn't go so far 
as to make the same mistake twice if you like.
Edward: OK So maybe NLP helped you to learn from what you thought was 
a failure, and actually wasn't necessarily a failure, was just a way of doing 
something?
Steve: Yeah, absolutely. That's a fair analysis.
Edward: I guess leading on from that, is there anything you would now do 
differently as the result of having learnt NLP.
Steve: Yeah. There are a few things. One that comes to mind I  suppose. 
I've changed my outlook on what I'm able to do and what I m not able to 
do. I'm far more confident in my abilities in the future, I suppose if I were
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to say th a t ... I'm not using NLP on other people if you like, or at least not 
consciously. Mainly I'm using it on my own processes.
Edward: OK. DO you not think that may be this affects the way you are with
other people then? ^
Steve: With some people, yeah, with some people. In certain situations,
Edward: OK, so maybe what you're telling me is that at certain times you re 
aware of using the processes of NLP in order to sort through the things
you're doing and thinking about? . ». ■
Steve: Mainly what I'm thinking about, mainly what I m thinking about, in 
other words I suppose I've used, or I use NLP all the time at work, but 
mainly internally, and I suppose I do believe that externally I  have changed 
a little bit anyway, you know, for the better.
Edward: How is it that you're using NLP internally?
Steve: I suppose by using the different techniques to ... there again, view 
situations from different perspectives and trying to find out how somebody 
else would do the same thing, so sort of modelling really, on a smaller 
scale. ... I suppose I've become more aware of other people's anchors as 
well, for triggering off responses to me, and I've learnt either to avoid the 
anchors or to use them for my own benefit really.
Edward: OK. You mentioned modelling. Do you find that you are breaking 
down processes?
Steve: Yeah yeah. Yeah yeah ... . . . .
Edward: So you're becoming more aware maybe of the individual bits that
lead to an outcome? _ . .
Steve: Absolutely, absolutely, and not only in my own in my own, m what 
I'm doing myself, but in what I see other people doing as well. ... I would 
be more conscious of my ability to solve problems now as well, whereas that 
was taken for granted in the past, in so far as I  never thought about solving 
problems, it just..., the problem had a solution, but now I  think problems 
have many solutions you know, and I don't see them as problems as such. 
Edward: OK, well that's good. What I would have to say then here is, 
because we're all very happy to say NLP is very good, it's very helpful for 
people, do you actually find that It is helpful?
Steve: Absolutely, absolutely.
Edward: In what way? .
Steve: It's helped me to become more consciously aware of my thoughts, or 
what I think, even though generally I'm quite an internal person anyway, in 
so far as I tend to have a lot of internal dialogue, and I think that from the 
NLP point of view it's helped me to place thoughts and ideas in different.... I 
suppose to sequence them, to put them in the best order I  find possible, to 
help me to achieve just from small things to, from small things in the 
present like work, like everything really, doing much bigger things in the
future, that I'm planning on doing. _
Edward: OK. Do you do this by running and re-running the internal 
dialogue, or do you just do it once and say 'that's how it's going to be ? 
Steve: Running and rerunning but not too often, you know, I  wouldn t run 
the loop over and over again, just a few times, and each time I would try to 
see or hear... I would try to become aware of what might be different each 
time that I do run the internal dialogue.
Edward: So in rerunning the dialogue a few times, do you have pictures 
with it?
Steve: Yeah, yeah ...
Edward: And are they clear pictures or do they change?
Steve: They change, they change as the dialogue changes. They change, or 
they might change... they would have the same theme but in detail it would
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be different, maybe each time or every so often when I'm ... thinking or 
?dward?°A'nd do you find yourself looking In on these pictures or being part 
Steve " in ^ ^ t u r e  I  tend to be looking in at the picture, something thats
Fdward:']u % T little  extra, do you ever step into your future pictures? 
motivator, it's a motivator.
iliifllSII#
# # # # # &
W iS m m
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my s^tes really,' ^ r  l d c e Z l o n A  o l^ p h y s W a l 'J  r% % s M W In g  It
E d l% r s o % % ' m % Z d % t % P  joins together with all these other 
things that you've done in the past, you meditate ... ?
Steve: I  think so yes.
Edward: Rather than it standing on its own. in
K C i ': , %  : a s : s : : : e : h : : " . ;  ::u :iV s % :::% < m g
a s
the NLP because I  found that so useful and good for easy accessmg ... and I
Edward: That's a nice metaphor, yes. It's amazing how many we use.
Let's just move back to the course itself. You've obviously done n^ny 
different types of courses to get where you are today. Did you find this 
course in any way different to courses you've done before?
iSPlliti
. . . .
found was more useful compared with ways you've learned in the past.
iSlslll#
t l ] ^ e s % y ^ ! V m 1 n m g '% t i ln I l ly  and psychologically draining because 
of all the Ericksonian type magic she was using, she was weaving around
while I wouldn't have been aware of how much I  was learning, I learnt a lot, 
an awful lot more than the things I've done in the past you know t ^  I 
would have learnt. And I  mean It seemed effortless, effortless. ('^ugWer) 
Edward; That's one of those phonological ambiguities. So if you look at the 
way you learnt from before the kind of way you used to learning, we all 
remember sitting in the classrooms studying, you've got to pass exams, and
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taking that and how you applied yourself in order to learn in that situation.
Do you think the way in which you can now learn has changed?
Steve: Absolutely. Yes. I believe that now I don't have... I suppose before 
had a fear of sitting down, studying and stuff like this because I felt that 
maybe it was a waste of time when I  could have used that time to do 
something practical, and I  would have been afraid that the outcome 
wouldn't have been as desirable as I  want it, that fear has gone, and now I 
believe that within certain limits that I can learn just about ^erythm g _  
anything really, well maybe I couldn't learn anything, everything, but Id  be 
willing to give it a go, and I  think that I would use as much of a model of 
NLP or how Jane managed to teach us, I  would apply that to any new 
methods of learning or parts of it. I t  might not all be useful, but certain
parts of it I  would use. ,
Edward: OK. And do you see a use for these new skills when you are
teaching people?
Steve: Yes I  do.
Edward: in what way? . , , ___
Steve: Well I  must, I  agree with the statement that not eveiybody learns on 
one representational system, and that's a thing I  would not have been 
aware of before. So now I  would integrate that if I was teaching people 
something, as well as using things like metaphors and past experience of 
my own and of other peoples, I  think they are very very beneficial for 
different people. If  I  was confident enough to assess how best another 
person might learn.
Edward: You said earlier that you would have limits to perhaps either ho 
you learn or what you would be able to learn. What do you mean by 
Steve: I  think {laughs) may be I don't! I  suppose, I ^^Gaii I  
there are certain things that I  will not be able to learn, I  don t believe I I I  b 
able to learn, emm how to build a nuclear reactor. Nuclear physics was 
never my thing. I  mean I'm  aware of nuclear physics but I  don t believe 1 11 
ever become competent in learning them, I  don't know why that is, I  ve 
never tried to learn nuclear physics but I  mean it's just a belief that I have, 
you know (laughs) a belief that I  need to address! Sorry Jane!
Edward: Well that's an interesting thing, because nuclear physics is an  ^  ^
interesting point to bring up as something that you perceive as being out of 
your reach anyway, or for where you see yourself going.
Steve: As well as that I  suppose it's not just out of my reach, it s something 
I don't really desire to do, or desire to learn. .
Edward: So what I  would say here Is It that you're putting a belief on to 
something because its not within your environment as something that you 
desire, or is it really setting to you that you believe 'well I couldn t do that
so I wouldn't do that'. .  . ,
Steve: No I  suppose it's about the environment, it really is... I  suppose it 
put my mind to it I could, I could, yeah I could ... I hope there are jobs in 
Thorpe when I  go back, I hope Thorpe's still there. Yeah, there are limits 
when I  haven't discovered, when I haven't discovered .... No, what I m 
trying to say is I believe I've got limits until I've tried something I  don t 
know if I've got limits, if I'm limited or not.
Edward: OK , _ _ ?
Steve: It's something that I'm future pacing or, but on beliefs I suppose.
I'm not a strong believer in the fact that I have limits like, but it is a 
limiting belief.
Edward: how do you set those limits?
Steve: Lack of knowledge I  think is one thing, lack of practice ... I  suppose^ 
other people's beliefs about my capabilities would have been an influencing 
factor, like if a teacher at school ... a very common example, if a teacher at 
school told me that I was doing ' maths, meaning the ordinary level and not
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honours, I  would consider myself not capable of doing ... I  would have 
considered myself not capable of doing honours maths. I  m twenty 
eight I look back on the honours maths course and I  can do it m my head, 
can't believe that I ... I just can't believe it, you know, because I had a 
limiting belief that was set by somebody else actually, yoiJ know.
Edward: OK so you're able now with your NLP to see that it s not your 
limiting belief, it was somebody else's imposed on you.
Steve: Very much so yea, in many, in many many areas.SSSES
any of your beliefs changed. t
Steve; Yes, some have, some have. We've discussed one t,.ere.^. suppose... 
i ï i i i^ m a n y  have ... what am I  trying to say here... yeah many ha\^ but
s x s . ' r i œ s r r s
been too many changes but there have been some. .
Edward: I  mean you're aware that the course was not designed to cha g
C e : : : J d %  you
are aware of, how have they changed? j  t
Steve: I  suppose ... it's in sub-modalities that they ve changed. I  see
honest I'm  not a hundred percent sure which way it is. Excuse me ... the ... 
I think that's the main one that's change. I  think it's the main one.
Edward: So what kind of directions it's moved you in?
Steve: Its sort of ... sort of fanned me out in a forward ^
it's more a sixty degree angle in a forward way, and I  m tending to bounce 
back and forth, sort of aiong path, if you like, path, picking up something
new from each path as I go along. _
Edward: So how does this compare to before you did the course.
Steve: I  think before I  was sort of slowly sauntering along one path. 
Edward: Really!
I^ ^ Is ^ o ^ p e rh a p s  this made you more aware of the different choices you
Steve: Yes, absolutely but I think before when I was sauntering along the 
path the things I  could have done were like Billboards along the side o/ the 
road that I  looked at as I  passed them and they fade away for some of the 
would have been filed away for later, but now I  have an array of pictures in
time, some of them are unachievable, I  know that, b u t ... you re going to 
ask me how I know this now, I  just know, {laughs) .
Edward: No, I  was going to say, OK at the moment you might say that 
some of them are unachievable. But perhaps it's not that they re 
unachievable, perhaps it that at the moment you don t see that as being
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■
been aware of, but I'll probably be aware of it in my own way but not
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S ifw "  i f  « C  S
S S  S o T h te  f t h e  S o s s lS y  that you can sort things or deal with 
things much easier than ...
It*»
before and you're taking all those learning e/\He,ie,,ce.., m -.. yo- 
Steve: Mh mh ... . . .  -,
own and in the other I'm with a bunch of people.
j i f f t n '^ t h e  nrst thTpre cotime one. Obviously I  know all the people 
EdwardToKJf^vou c L  just look at yourself in the two pictures, are youillH iïS irœ iœ
Edward: And this is in which picture?
Steve: In the second picture.
sive-^They' look brighter but they look wider in the first picture. Yeah. ...
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because I  know what it means.
^ ^ r i t h i n k T . ' . . % t a i , T S e f .  i f  probabîî"go home and now
::fC :;h a n g ^ ^
*
Edward: Is there anything you think we could change on the course to
the course quite professional, quite good.
Edward: Any last comments?
glad you enjoyed it. Switch this off.
449
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Appendix 5.  ^ Bandler and Grinder’s Metamodel of Language.
involve making connections between different levels of abstractions.
• Deletions, or statements where detail is missing 
Simple Deletion (Information about Detail)
A deletion is a statement with insufficient detail, or missing information.
Example "lam uncomfortable" or "Idon't understand".
Recovering the missing information is by questions such as 
"About what? About whom? Uncomfortable about what?
deletions.
Comparative deletion
A comparative deletion is where the standard of comparison is missing. The key words to 
such statements are better, worse, more/less, greater, lesser, happier, sadder.
Examp/e. "S/ve'sabeKerpefson^He'saworsep/ayerTheresponseswhichwouldrecover
the missing standard of comparison are questions such as:
"Better than whom? Who says? Worse than what? How do you know?
judgement has been made.
Lack of referential index.
This is typified by the presence of an unidentified pronoun.
Example: They don't listen to me, or that doesn't matter
The response to identify the non-specific pronoun could be 
Who, specifically, doesn't listen? What, specifically, doesn't matter?
1 This is an extract from one of my training manuals. The information was derived from 
Bandler and Grinder (1975).
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Unspecified verbs
These are verbs in sentences that delete the specifics of how something happened, 
where It happened, and when it happened.
Example. She rejected me, or he left me.
The response to this pattern is to recover the specific information about the 
experience, for instance:
How did she reject you? Where did he leave you? How do you know? What do you 
mean by leave?
Nominalisations
nominalisations. They are words that are abstract, yet we talk about them as 
they were 'real', almost as if they were three-dimensional.
analogue process.
Examples.
My relationship is going well 
I  want recognition.
We must improve our communication.
Here the words relationship, recognition, communication are "ouns which
presuppose that they have an independent existence external to the subject. T y 
also imply that they can be possessed, rather as one does a house or a car.
The questioning here needs to re-establish the noun as a verb, that is, to rediscover 
the process or the activity that the nominalisation disguises, thus:
W/?atwou/dpeop/ebereco9n/5/ng? Howwou/dyoubecommWcat/ng? /Yowwou/d
you be relating?
• Generalisations
said is universally applicable. Quantifiers are a group of words that indicate the 
turn also influence the beliefs of others.
For instance, the remark women are always like that presupposes that what the 
speaker believes women to be is universally true, and that there can "^^ver^a Y 
exceptions. Similar messages are pre-supposed by words such as 
words indicate that the belief is universally applicable. Such universality is also
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Universal Quantifiers
These are words that imply that the scope of the information is universai, that is, 
perceived as always valid.
Examples. She never listens to me!
No one tells me the truth.
Teenagers are alwavs like that.
Has there ever been a time when she has listened to you?
Are you saying that all your life every single person has lied to you.
Have you ever known a teenager not behave like that.
Limiting Quantifiers
I  never get my sums right.
I  sometimes don't get my sums right.
You are always bad tempered.
You are sometimes bad tempered.
Modal Operators. These are important words that inform you about the mode or
approach someone is taking towards an activity.
Hali  ^ (1989) distinguishes six categories of modai operators.
Impossibility: impossibie, unable to, can't, couldn't, incapable 
Possibility: possible, able to, can, could, might, may 
Capability: can, could, able to, capable of 
Desire: want, Vvish, hope, would like, choose 
Necessity: necessary, need to, have to, must, should, ought to 
Certainty: am going to, will, am, is, won't.
W M W M M m w
possibilities.
2 Hall, Christina. (1989) The Language of Change London UK: ITS, 7 Rudall 
Crescent, London NVV3 1RS. UK.
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Will happen i f  you don't? 
such as:
What would happen If  you didn't? Who says you should? What stops you? What 
will happen if you do/don't?
• Distortions, the connections in people's maps.
Cause-effect
This Is where a sentence indicates that the speaker believes that a specific stimulus 
causes or caused a specific response.
Examples
I  am depressed because I  had an unhappy childhood.
Teenagers are lacking in concentration because of too much television.
His voice irritates me
You're saying that to make me angry.
is there?
be in control or not.
Mind reading
Such patterns imply that the speaker somehow 'knows' what a person thinks, feels 
and so on.
Examples. You don't like me or He should know that I  love him. or I  know you are 
feeling uncomfortable or She looks very anxious.
your evidence? are useful in this context.
Lost Performatives
s f i i i f i i f l ï
experience.
Example: It's bad to be inconsistent or Voivo's are best.
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The response is to recover the source of the opinion or the belief strategy operated 
by the speaker, by using questions such as:
How do you know it's bad?
According to whom?
Who says?
Complex Equivalence patterns
m m m m M W M -
experience, and generalise them to apply to more and more examples, 
is related to 'aiways doing the washing up .
